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The thesis is organised around an empirical investigation of 
the relationship between residents of a Hertfordshire village 
and people who are, or who have been, patients at a nearby 
psychiatric hospital, some of whom regularly venture into the 
village to use local facilities. 
The research employs the method of participant observation and 
draws upon the discourse analytic approach of Potter and 
Wetherell, together with the rhetorical perspective of Michael 
Billig. In particular, the research focuses upon the discursive 
practices of local people, practices which function to sustain, 
amplify or minimise difference between themselves and others 
who are patients. The critical theory of Jürgen Habermas is 
drawn upon to complement and extend the discourse analysis 
approach, which receives critical evaluation. 
In addition, the time-geography of Alan Pred is employed as an 
heuristic for the representation of journeys of patients in the 
village. The historical dimension of the relationship between 
village and hospital is addressed by drawing upon Parish 
Council minutes and local newspaper reports. 
The thesis contains a conceptual investigation of public 
anxieties concerning mental disorder, an overview and 
discussion of the contemporary relevance of the labelling 
perspective, and a review of relevant literature. In addition 
it provides an exploration of methodological and textual issues 
involved in social research. 
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Chapt ar 1 
The Career o. E a Research . Project 
Alice Schroeder, going out of her kitchen door to hang 
some laundry on the line, was surprised to see two strange 
men standing in her garden, apparently absorbed in looking 
at the roses. Having set her basket down, she was 
approaching them to ask what they wanted, when they turned towards her, and she screamed. 'Eddie! - Eddie, come down! ' And she ran toward the house. Alice Schroeder knew 
mental cases when she saw them. (Patricia Highsmith, 1987 
p68; Tales of Natural and Unnatural catastrophes) 
Background and Rationale 
This study sets out to examine the nature of public reactions 
to people who are, or who have been, patients in a psychiatric 
hospital'. It concerns a particular place, Shenley village, and 
its mental hospital. 
The general rationale for this project has derived from a 
number of related paths of interest and concern which have come 
A note concerning categories: The terms 'patient', 'village' and 
'villager' which are used in this thesis are terms which are used 
by residents of Shenley village themselves independently of 
discussions with me, although their meanings vary according to 
the argumentative context of their use. This can be clearly seen 
in Part Two below in my analysis of public debates, and in 
Appendices B and C. However my concern about the possibility of 
reinforcing stereotypical reactions has also led me to speak here 
of 'people who are patients', as well as 'patients'. 
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to intersect, as it were, at a particular place. They have been 
both theoretical and practical. Employed for some fifteen years 
as a social worker in a North-London Department of Psychiatry 
which has operated a community and crisis intervention service, 
I have spent many hours attempting to divert people away from 
psychiatric hospital admission in the belief that such 
admissions are not always in the best interest of the 
prospective patient. This service grew largely out of the work 
and energy of the psychiatrist R. D. Scott (see e. g. Scott 1973a, 
1973b, 1974,1975,1979,1980,19902. See also Baruch and 
Treacher 1978, Cohen 1988 and Johnstone 1989 for references to 
Scott's work) but also drew momentum from the 'anti-psychiatry' 
movement as a whole. 
One of Scott's fundamental premises was that psychiatric 
hospitalization could result in what he called the 'closure' 
of highly charged emotional issues for the patient and his or 
her family. The conflicts which gave rise or contributed to the 
emotional distress would become buried on admission to hospital 
under the symbolic baggage of 'mental illness'. Such an 
approach has hinged upon a particular view of public knowledge 
and ideas about mental disorder, and public responses to 
psychiatric hospitalisation, while Scott's notion of the 
discourse of 'psychiatric- space' might be said to have 
coincided, albeit unsystematically and perhaps unconsciously, 
with some of the 'post-modern' considerations of space and 
place (see Scott 1979, Foucault 1977,1980, Soja 1989, and ch 
8 of this thesis). From Scott's perspective the implication for 
practice entails challenging wherever possible the 
instantiation of stereotypical ideas by reframing the problem 
in non-illness terms. This practice has kept alive to some 
2 For details of some of Scott's collaborative works see the 
bibliography. 
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extent the memory of an early provocative labelling perspective 
(e. g. Scheff 1966, Rosenhan 1973). 
The second impetus has come more directly from sociology via 
the work of Thomas Scheff, David Rosenhan and Erving Goffman. 
In particular the audacity of Rosenhan's (1973) celebrated 
research stimulated the methodological imagination, although 
he was not the first to utilize the 'pseudo-patient' method 
(see e. g. Caudill et al 1952, Deane 1961, Goldman et al 1970, 
Lofland and Lejeune 1960), while Scheff provided clear 
proposals for further studies. To some extent this project can 
be seen as being concerned with a critical examination of 
Scheff's seventh proposition, that 'Labeled deviants are 
punished when they attempt the return to conventional roles' 
(1966, p87), although it draws upon a very different 
philosophical and social-theoretical background3. Goffman of 
course was the author of seminal works on stigma and the mental 
hospital and has written widely on the 'situational 
improprieties' of mental disorder. 
The study of public reactions to people who are or who have 
been patients in a psychiatric hospital appears to be 
particularly relevant in an historical climate in which far 
reaching decisions are being made about where many such people 
should be living. In spite of opposition (Bartlett 1989, Dobson 
1990,, MIND 1989, Morris 1988, The Times 1987), the closure of 
the old Victorian mental hospitals continues, with consequences 
which- may be- no less significant than the iconographic and 
emblematic event of Pinel's striking of the chains from the 
prisoner-patients of Bicetre, or the redesignation of the 
leprosaria, in Foucault's scheme of things. The 'public', it 
I do not view this research as a 'test' of Scheff's proposition, as 
in more positivistic social science. That the issues here are 
complex will be shown below. 
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seems, is destined to have more contact with people who are, 
or who have been, designated as mentally disordered, and this 
study sets out to contribute to an understanding of the 
reception faced by people who are former patients in the 
community. At the same time it may be seen as akin to an 
anthropological study of an imminently extinct culture, 
focusing as it does on a village where the nearby psychiatric 
hospital is on the verge of being dismantled and its land sold 
off for redevelopment. 
Fourthly my concern rests with an interest in the philosophical 
discourses of modernity, to use Habermas' phrase, as they 
pertain in particular to the methods of the social sciences, 
and how these discourses articulate in certain respects with 
madness. I have drawn throughout the thesis upon the work of 
Habermas in an effort to examine how his theory of 
communicative action and rationality may relate to madness, 
empirical research and social scientific methodology'. 
Finally, I must admit to an interest in the socio-psychiatric 
reality of a particular place established over many years of 
commuting through it and by the occasional use of its public 
houses. One day when seated quietly in a pub I was asked 
jokingly by men at a nearby table whether I was one of them' 
from the hospital. I subsequently came to think of the 
hospital-village as constituting an interface between madness 
and sanity and became interested to know how villagers and 
patients inter-related; how villagers told the difference 
between patients and others, and whether this was an important 
issue for them. At the same time I have seen this research 
* This is difficult not least because as Habermas makes clear (e. g. 
1982 pxiv preface to On the Logic of the Social Sciences, 
1970/1988, and cf. 1986b p152), he does not view his theory of 
communicative action as a continuation of methodology. 
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project as an opportunity to pursue a number of theoretical 
issues and challenge my own professional prejudice, language 
and practices. The more specific aims of the project are set 
out below. 
Early Days, Different Designs 
The Heisenberg principle applied to research activities.. 
states that money, time and suitable themes for research 
can never be present at the same time... (Sartorius 1977 
p179. ) 
The current project began its life in a different form, with 
a different design. The first protocol had the objective of 
focusing solely upon audience responses to former psychiatric 
patients who displayed no behavioural or other signs which 
could be construed as indicative of mental disorder. Initially 
it was intended to recruit a research assistant to play the 
part of a pseudo-patient. The plan was that the researcher and 
assistant would independently join a local social club and that 
after a three month-"period a disclosure would be made to 
members of the club to the effect that the research assistant 
had been a patient in a psychiatric hospital. The role of. the 
researcher was to monitor preceding and subsequent events and 
later to carry out in-depth interviews with club members, with 
the aim of investigating responses and the reasons for such 
responses towards a person who carried a psychiatric label. To 
this end the researcher conducted a limited pilot study by 
disclosing himself as a 'former psychiatric patient' to the 
secretary of a political party of which he was a member and for 
which he was due to stand as a prospective candidate at a 
forthcoming local election. 
See Edelman's (1974) astute article concerning the political nature 
---of psychiatric professional discourse. 
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This initial research design was finally abandoned following 
the failure to procure sufficient funding to pay for a suitable 
research assistant, coupled with increasing misgivings about 
the ethics of a program of deception (for discussion concerning 
such issues see e. g. Bulmer 1982, Duster et al 1979, Homan 
1980,1991). It was subsequently decided to pursue a broadly 
similar idea but by employing someone who had actually been a 
patient in a psychiatric hospital, rather than a pseudo- 
patient, and by offering expenses rather than a salary; 
deception would thereby be reduced substantially. The position 
was advertised in the local press, Time Out and City Limits, 
and a number of responses were obtained mainly from local 
people. The researcher then met the selected candidate 
regularly over a period of several months when the anticipated 
stressful nature6 of the task was discussed and plans were 
finally drawn up to begin the fieldwork. The prospective 
research assistant was interviewed by a psychiatrist to gain 
a further opinion as to the extent of her vulnerability and it 
was decided that it might also be helpful to introduce her to 
the researcher's principal supervisor. This design then 
proceeded more or less according to plan until the point of 
engaging in fieldwork when the research assistant unexpectedly 
dropped out of the project. As a result the design was then 
abandoned. After almost a year of preparation and hard work 
6 The literature warns that fieldwork is a stressful endeavour (see 
e. g. Clarke 1975, Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, Johnson 1975, 
Lofland and Lofland 1971/1984, Shaffir et al 1980). Indeed 
sociological fieldwork and mental disorder have been directly 
linked in a causal sense by virtue of the inherent ambiguity of 
the role of participant-observer. Clarke (1975) provides an 
account of how sociologist J. R. Seeley underwent psychoanalysis 
as a result of a research project and quotes anecdotal evidence 
of the psychiatric hospitalisation of an anthropologist during 
fieldwork. As Clarke points out, Lurie's (1967/1987) fictional 
account of sociological fieldwork, in which the researcher goes 
mad, may indeed be not always so far from fact. 
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this was inevitably dispiriting for the researcher who was 
faced with the task of reformulating the entire project. 
The third and final design is different in many respects to the 
first two and to some extent addresses different questions. 
Fundamentally there has been a shift in focus away from an 
analysis of responses to a 'former psychiatric patient', who 
displayed no symptomatology, to a study of a particular social 
and geographical location in which people who are both former 
and extant psychiatric patients come into regular contact with 
members of the public?. However, in lieu of previous obstacles, 
new hurdles appeared to take their place, including an 
exceptionally slow and cautious Health Authority Ethics 
Committee8. Some of these difficulties will be discussed below. 
Before moving on to consider the precise design and its 
problems in more detail, the sociological 'problem' which this 
project sets out to address and the context of the problem are 
set out briefly here. 
Aims and Present Design 
In its broadest sense the present study was initially organised 
around a critical examination of the proposition that people 
who are or who have been patients in a psychiatric hospital are 
T In addition, the present project did not depend upon procuring 
the services of a research assistant nor upon obtaining funding 
for such a post, although I have gratefully received some 
financial and material support from the Social Workers' 
Educational Trust, Hatfield Polytechnic, and Napsbury Hospital. 
Such assistance has been welcome not least because of my change 
to the status of part-time employee in order to pursue the 
research. 
It took me approximately one year to gain Parkside Health 
Authority Ethics Committee approval to interview people who were 
patients at Shenley hospital. I also had to gain the consent of the 
Polytechnic Ethics Committee for the project as a whole. 
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discriminated against and stigmatised by others; that they are 
excluded', devalued, and discredited. 
Organised in part around a participant-observation study of the 
relationships in a local community between people who have 
been, or still are, patients in a nearby psychiatric hospital 
who regularly go into the local village for various reasons, 
and other local people, it has some loose similarities to the 
programmes carried out by Roosens (1979) and colleagues in 
Geel, Belgium, and especially Jodelet (19919, and cf. Cumming 
and Cumming 1957, Estroff 1981a, Kielhofner 1981, Scheper- 
Hughes 1987, Stoneall and Schmitt 1984). 
The principal aim of the project has therefore been to provide 
a critical descriptionl° of the local practices of villagers in 
relation to people who were patients at the nearby hospital. 
To what extent, I wished to know, were patients discriminated 
against by the local population? What were the discursive and 
9I only came across Jodelet's work recently (late 1991). Some of its 
content and description bear quite a remarkable resemblance to 
my own although her analytic methods are not the same and her 
theoretical base is essentially Durkhelmian. The focus in social 
psychology upon 'social representations' (see e. g. Farr and 
Moscovici 1984, Herzlich 1973) has received critique from Potter 
and Wetherell (1987) and Billig (1991) amongst others. 
10 The research is primarily descriptive, although not in a simple 
sense. I do not directly provide a causal analysis of those factors 
which predispose villagers to respond in one way rather than 
another, although causal links may be implicit in Part Two. A 
substantial part of the project however concerns those often 
delicate and dilemmatic themes which run through villagers' talk, 
and which I suggest illuminate areas where villagers' practices 
in relation to patients may be highlighted and opened out in 
further debate. In this sense the research is a critical project. 
At the same time I also subscribe to the notion that all description 
has a critical moment and all interpretation is an intervention of 
sorts (cf. Giddens 1984 p338, Habermas 1984, Thompson 1984 p141). 
However my use of the term 'critical' will be further elaborated 
below. 
" The Career of a Research Project 9 
extra-discursive practices used by local people to either 
sustain, amplify or minimise difference between themselves and 
those others who were psychiatric patients? 
At the same time however I set out to find out how people who 
were patients went about describing and accounting for the 
responses of the village residents. To this end I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with a number of patients who were 
identified by staff and villagers as frequenting the village, 
although I also met with many of these patients on numerous 
other occasions. 
My aim has therefore been to thematise stigma and 
discrimination; to look at what it might mean to try to 
identify it in this place, to look at what might possibly count 
as discrimination; and to open up and extend the discourse and 
debate about mental disorder, psychiatry and stigma. In 
addition the research project has documented the impact upon 
the local community of the closure of its hospital. The land 
is in the process of being sold. Buildings have already been 
demolished, road layouts altered, and new pavements laid. 
To achieve these aims I set out over an eighteen month period 
to take part (on a part-time basis) in local activities. 
Attending jumble sales, bazaars, school and village fetes, 
shopping at the local store, drinking in the pubs, attending 
Parish Council and village society meetings etc; these 
activities were supplemented with more formal semi-structured 
interviews with villagers which were tape-recorded, drawing 
upon my experiences within the village to stimulate discussion 
and debate". In addition I collected a large amount of 
documentary material from local newspapers and village 
11 Details of the number of villagers interviewed are provided in 
chapter 13. 
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magazines, ' Parish Council minutes, hospital Management 
Committee minutes, and other information contained in the 
hospital archives (and see chapter 6 below). 
Partly to assist me in an initial assumption deriving from 
studies of racial prejudice (e. g. Billig, Condor, Edwards, 
Gane, Middleton and Radley 1988, Gumperz (ed) 1982, van Dijk 
1984) that discrimination may be a largely 'hidden process' 
(Jupp et al 1982) and have an often subtle linguistic dimension 
which may reinforce or alleviate social difference and 
distance, I have drawn upon a particular form of discourse 
analysis advocated by, inter alios, Potter and Wetherell 
(1987), and Gilbert and Mulkay (1982,1983,1984) (and see also 
Billig 1987,1989, Billig et al 1988, Mulkay and Gilbert 1982, 
Potter and Reicher 1987, Wetherell and Potter 1988,1989). In 
the following pages I shall outline this particular approach 
and demonstrate how it might be drawn upon productively as a 
complement to ethnographic work. I shall also consider briefly 
some of the theoretical and methodological problems of 
combining this form of discourse analysis with ethnography. 
It may be prudent at this point to be explicit about what the 
research is not about. The focus is upon the village and 
villagers' reactions, both discursive and extra-discursive, to 
patients. It is not primarily about the quality of life of 
patients, their hopes and fears, the appropriateness or 
otherwise of community care, patients needs and health and so 
on, although it touches upon all of these12. As part of the 
12 The literature on these issues is extensive. For overviews and 
discussions see e. g. Brown (1985), Busfield (1986), Estroff (1981a, 
1981b), Test and Stein (1978,1980), Tomlinson (1991), Tudor 
(1990/1). For research of the views, experiences, quality of life 
and health of former patients in Britain see e. g. Abrahamson and 
Brenner (1982), Barham and Hayward (1991), Goldie (1988), Leff 
(1990), Petch (1990), Prior (1991). For an account of the Maudsley 
study of a community based approach to 'serious mental illness' 
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research method I have asked people who are patients for their 
experiences of, and views about, the village. But the focus 
nevertheless remains upon the responses of villagers, although 
Appendix D provides some space for the presentation of 
patients' views13. 
e 
see Marks and Connolly (1988). Knapp et al (1990) discuss the 
financial costs of community care. 
13 For a description of the structure of Parts Two and Three of the 
thesis, and Appendix D, see chapter 6 below, especially pages 130- 
133. 
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Chapter 2 
Changing Times . Re-es tab1 fishing a 
Dialogue i ri th 17adness 
Explorations 
I set out in this chapter to provide a short introduction to 
ways of thinking about madness'. In the process I attempt to 
set the scene for an exploration of what it might be in 
practice about madness and the idea of madness in our society 
which is both unsettling and intriguing. 
Madness and its synonyms is of perennial and enduring interest 
to mankind. Its themes, specifications and particulars are to 
be found not only in comparatively recent form in the annals 
of psychiatry but in the popular and local press, cinema, 
television, literature and drama (see e. g. Adlam 1990, Doherty 
and Young 1978, Domino 1983, Feder 1980, Felman 1985, Gardner 
1982, Gerbner 1980, Janik and Kubickova 1975,1976, Schneider 
1977, "Stumme 1973, Wahl and Roth 1982, Welsford 1935, Winick 
1978,1982, as well as Nunnally 1961 and Scheff 1966). Its 
figures have recurred in historical debate and philosophical 
argument, in intellectual and practical life from antiquity to 
the present (see especially Rosen 1968, also Bynum et al (eds) 
1985, Clarke 1975, Doerner 1981, MacDonald 1981, Scull 1979, 
In other words I do not attempt to offer here a comprehensive 
overview of models of madness. I am concerned here less with 
psychiatric-scientific models than with philosophical, sociological 
and historical approaches. 
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Skultans 1979). The histories of madness are not smooth however 
but often replete with competing images which are bound to 
competing philosophies, models of human nature and theories of 
history itself. The iconoclasm of Foucault (1961/1971) and 
later the work of Scull (1977,1979) dealt a blow to 
uncritical, 'triumphalist' histories (Ingleby 1985 p81, Pilgrim 
1990). Foucault's ideas concerning the relationship between a 
nascent Reason and its 'other' have had wide currency. For 
Foucault it was as if Newtonian physics and Cartesian 
rationalism required the sole sovereignty of reason and the 
'consequent expulsion of anything that constituted a threat to 
its rule as a necessary condition of their birth' (Sheridan 
1980 p13)2. The themes here are of subjugation and the end of 
a dialectical conception of madness (Cohen 1978). For Foucault 
(1961/1971 p68), 'Classicism felt a shame in the presence of 
the inhuman that the Renaissance had never experienced. ' The 
Age of Reason in this version ushered in the end of men's 
communication and dialogue with madness as ddraison, unreason 
Madden 1985 p53). Where the madman in the 'preclassical' 
period once reminded each man of his truth (Foucault 1961/1971 
p14), the language of psychiatry, a monologue of reason about 
madness, has become established on the basis of a broken 
dialogue, upon silence (ibid pxi, p262). 
In recent years Foucault's version of events has been 
challenged3. Sedgwick (1982a) has pointed not just to the myth 
of the 'Narrenschiffen' but to a large variety of medieval 
2 Compare Peter Ackroyd's (1986) brooding novel about Nicholas 
Hawksmoor, buried incidentally at Shenley, in which he portrays 
the sense of disjunction between the incipient rationalism of 
experiment, demonstration and calculus, and the mysteries and 
madness. 
3 Although as Boyne (1990 p5) points out, the force of Foucault's 
demonstration that our understanding of madness is shaped by 
a variety of social, political, economic and epistemological factors 
cannot be disputed. 
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sources which suggest that the mentally afflicted were regarded 
as 'ill' within a medical framework and had been confined in 
custody or therapy in pre-rationalist Europe for centuries 
before the 'Great Confinement' (Sedgwick 1982a p134. See also 
Jones and Fowles 1984, Merquior 1985, Midelfort 1980, Porter 
1987/1990 ch 1). From Sedgwick's perspective the notion of a 
dialogue with madness may be a useful counterpart to our modern 
ways of dismissing mad people, but is unlikely to encounter 
much historical evidence other than that of 'an intelligentsia 
which has always preferred to toy with 'madness' as a literary 
or artistic spectacle rather than to re-arrange society's 
dealings with the common insane who live outside the safe 
distance of a poem, a tract, or a painting' (1982a p136). 
That the issues here can be complex is shown by Skultans (1979) 
who has argued that beliefs about madness in any historical 
period may be contradictory and often conflict with practice. 
She traces the dual structure or 'double aspect' of madness in 
Elizabethan England, the contradictory opposition of 
bestiality, a fearful and incomprehensible force to be kept in 
subjection by physical brutality, with reconstituted 
Aristotelian notions of ' melancholic madness as poetic 
inspiration and wit (ibid ch 2). MacDonald (1981) has argued 
that early seventeenth century explanations and treatments were 
marked by a 'traditional mingling of magical, religious and 
scientific concepts' (p7). And if Horwitz (1982 p19) is 
correct, most societies distinguish two major categories of 
mental disorder: nonviolent eccentricities and violent forms 
of madness, although the precise form which these categories 
take varies culturally and historically (and cf. Marsella and 
White (eds) 1982/1989, Rosen 1968, Scull 1979 p64 ff, Platt and 
Diamond 1965). 
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Returning to the present day, the somewhat disembodied and 
abstract characterisation of madness which Foucault offers has 
been explicitly countered by Giddens who opposes the notion of 
a 'living, voluble and anxious madnessi4 with a model based on 
the chronicity and predictability of everyday routines. These 
maintain the essential ontological security of actors and at 
the same time underlie the constitution of structure and 
institution. It is therefore in the disruption of routine (cf. 
Bury 1980) that an indication and potential understanding of 
madness lies; in the disruption of the socialised responses 
associated with the security of the management of the body and 
a predictable framework of life. The mad person is portrayed 
as either lacking the social skills needed to manage everyday 
unmotivated life, or as challenging everyday routines5. In 
contradistinction to Foucault, and drawing upon the work of 
Goffman, Giddens identifies an understanding of madness not in 
terms of the 'other face of reason', not in the extravagance 
of delusion or visions of other worlds, but in '... much more 
mundane features of bodily and gestural impropriety.. Social 
disability, not a , mysterious access to ä lost continent of 
unreason may express its real nature' (1984 p158). On this 
reading mental disorder can be seen as a kind of social grit 
in the wheels of chronic and routine interaction. 
4 'Although Foucault is intent upon detailing the way in which 
madness is a social 'construction' there is a arguably a residue 
in Madness and Civilization in which he attempts to evoke some 
sense of the 'ultimate truth' or the 'underlying reality' of 
madness (Bernauer 1987, Gutting 1989 p265, Boyne 1990 and 
Appendix D). In the following pages it becomes clear that what is 
often at issue is the 'universal' 'nature' of madness. In this thesis 
I attempt to locate a 'grounding' for critique in formal pragmatics. 
s Compare Garfinkel's (1967) students, who disturbed the sense of 
ontological security of their subjects by undermining the 
intelligibility of discourse, intelligibility anchored in the 
routinisation of practices. 
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Madness, then, is as much at home in the front room as it is 
in the formalised schema and battles for reason (cf. Ford 1975 
ch8). In a mundane sense madness returns in the routines of 
everyday life. This impression of the undistinguished and 
commonplace is portrayed in the work of a number of other 
authors who share a common concern with the intelligibility of 
action, such as Maclntyre (1981), Horwitz (1982), Coulter 
(1973,1979), Ingleby (1982,1985) and Morgan (1975). I have 
said more about this debate elsewhere (Southgate 1992c), but 
for now will briefly track the arguments of Horwitz (1982) for 
the light they may later shed upon empirical research. 
For Horwitz (1982 p19) there is an inevitable association 
between incomprehensibility and unpredictability, and between 
the latter and dangerousness. If we cannot understand another, 
the argument goes, then we cannot predict the other's behaviour 
and this poses a fundamental threat to our security. There 
exists a link here with the notion of routinisation as 
grounding the ontological security of actors which I have 
identified in the "work of Giddens. - From this overall 
perspective we can see that the idea of mad people as 
dangerous, although often reinforced by media accounts, may not 
achieve its credibility from such accounts alone, but from the 
disruption of the very structures of language and social action 
which madness may entail. 
This argument initially appears to have merit. But on closer 
inspection the sequence 'incomprehensibility, unpredictability, 
dangerousness' turns out to be too simple. It is for example 
quite possible to imagine someone who appears on the surface 
to be unintelligible in terms of their behaviour or language 
but whom we may nevertheless come to see as quite predictable; 
someone for example who refuses to leave their bed or venture 
outdoors. Similarly unpredictability may be of such a minor 
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nature that it poses no threat at all. At the same time 
Alisdair Maclntyre (1981 ch8) has argued that both 
predictability and unpredictability are necessary if life is 
to have meaning (and compare Shotter 1989). Whereas 
predictability is associated with the coordination of social 
action, the construction of plans and projects, 
unpredictability is related to our desire to be in possession 
of ourselves, to preserve our independence, freedom and 
creativity, to be not merely the creations of the projects or 
intentions of others. We are, he argues, therefore involved in 
a world in which we are simultaneously trying to render the 
rest of society predictable and ourselves unpredictable (ibid 
p104)6. Unpredictability then can be seen as generative of 
power in relationships and an ordinary and acknowledged feature 
of human life. Mental disorder it seems cannot therefore be 
readily reduced to unpredictability, although the latter may 
be rendered as one aspect of its.. 
Throughout the preceding admittedly bald outline of interests 
in madness a particular theme continually resurfaces. This is 
the sense in which madness is portrayed as partaking of 
something which is less (or more, e. g. Connor 1982/89, Screech 
6 The use of unpredictability can be explicitly found in the realm 
of psychiatric therapy. By rendering one's actions systematically 
unpredictable it is arguably possible for the therapist to gain 
power in an ostensibly therapeutic situation in which the impetus 
has been lost to the patient (see e. g. Birch 1985). 
7 Alternatively we may say that although unpredictability is a 
necessary and ubiquitous feature of everyday life, with positive 
and creative features, that of the mentally disordered is of a 
particular type which is generally unacceptable to others. In 
other words issues of normative rightness surround 
'(un)predictability' as an identifying concept for mental disorder. 
As an empirical issue the alleged dangerousness of people who are 
considered to be mentally disordered has received attention both 
in terms of the amount of reported violent activity and in terms 
of people's opinions and attitudes towards present and former 
patients. This research is discussed below. 
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1985) than human, as sinking below the human horizon. The 
fashions of viewing the insane, we might say, are linked to the 
moral temper of the particular age, so that the description of 
an illness often incorporates characteristics opposed to those 
of the contemporary human ideal (Jahoda 1958, Porter 1987, 
Sedgwick 1982a, Skultans 1979 p140). The view of the insane as 
less than human can be traced as I have shown in the accounts 
of antiquity but also in more recent writings. The 
identification of madness with unintelligibility for example 
may tend to reduce and push mad people to an uncomfortable 
position on the edge of a common humanity (cf. Barham 1984 
p199, Barham and Hayward 1991 ch3). And there is a link here 
perhaps between the criterion of unintelligibility and the 
cessation of dialogue with madness of which Foucault writes, 
for dialogue depends it seems upon a comprehensibility, lying 
somewhere between speaker and listener. 
In a recent book Roy Porter (1987) addresses the issue of a 
colloquy with madness. Although he is intent here upon 
encouraging dialogue by providing accounts of what mad people 
have had to say, rather than 'explaining away' what they said, 
Porter appears uninterested in looking at the implications for 
any future discourse of contemporary policies of 
de institutionalisation. For Cohen (1978) on the other hand, the 
latter provides an important opportunity to reconsider the 
dialectic between madness and sanity, to explore the potential 
benefits of a communication with madness and to begin to 
recognise once more that people whom we consider to be mentally 
disordered have social value (and see Barham and Hayward 1991, 
Doyle 1989, Lewis et al 1989, Tudor 1990/91). Peter Barham 
(1984) has pointed to the way that 'chronic' psychiatric 
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patients may focus the question of the 'bounds of community" P 
but as much as-the patient it is arguably the whole complex 
process of deinstitutionalisation which is of vital importance. 
The Bounds of Community 
A certain nostalgia for 'community', an iconography of 
Gemeinschaft, has been a recurring theme in human history 
(Cohen 1985/1987 p118, Ignatieff 1984). This picture of the 
'genuine' community contains images of sharing, commitment, 
intimacy, stability, mutual aid and a sense of belonging. One 
irony here as Gordon (1987, and see also Rosenblatt and Mayer 
1974) has pointed out is that for many psychiatric patients and 
also staff this is just what the old asylum has been providing. 
The process of decarceration may for many mean the loss of a 
sense of 'community'. Whatever the reasons for this process of 
closure, whether it is best analysable in terms of political- 
economy and its critique, humanitarian reform, or medico- 
scientific progress or hegemony, it seems unlikely that it is 
the result of greater acceptance or toleration by the public 
(cf. Scull 1977 and Unsworth 1987 for an account of the 
involvement of MIND in mental health reform). 
8 Barham (1984 p199) cleverly describes the place of the 'chronic 
schizophrenic patient' by drawing out the multi-faceted nature 
of the phrase, 'the edge of the common': 'The schizophrenic, it 
may be said, resides at the edge of the common. Common refers 
in one form of usage to the life that we may think of ourselves 
as holding in common, to (as is sometimes said) the common 
conditions of our lives; yet also in an opposing sense the common' 
is the effect of a history of division and enclosure, the residue 
of a common estate over which we all of us have rights but that 
is at the same time 'wasteland'; and common finally is seen as the 
low and the vulgar, as the converse of the civilised. The edge of 
the common is stipulated not only because, in the various senses 
of common, that is where the schizophrenic has so often been put, 
but also because he focuses sharply the whole question of the 
bounds of community. ' 
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In Museums of Madness, Scull makes the point that from the 
moment of their existence asylums reduced people's tolerance 
for deviance, that people became less willing to put up with 
inconvenience and troublesome relatives (p240). As a corollary 
we might ask whether, with the demise of the asylum, people 
will consequently become more tolerant of mentally disordered 
people. Clearly however 'toleration' cannot simply be measured 
from hospital in-patient statistics. We are just as likely to 
see rejection, exclusion and exploitation, the latter being 
linked in the present economic and political conditions to the 
increasing privatisation and commodification of problems and 
people (Brindle 1990, Cohen 1985/1987 p63, Kovel 1981, Scull 
1981, Spitzer 1980, Shadish 1989)9. 
But in addition to the process of decarceration, the historical 
canvas may be filled out by the much broader strokes of 
political economy. One argument which makes a certain amount 
of intuitive sense is that public tolerance of marginal groups 
is likely to increase during periods of economic expansion (cf. 
Scott 1969,1984 p101). The suggestion is that due to the 
overall decrease in the surplus labour force, employers are 
more willing to accept the labour of erstwhile castouts and 
that as a direct consequence their social value increases along 
with public acceptance and toleration. Although hedged with 
conditions; Brenner's (1973) work implicates community 
intolerance as a° factor in the high correlation between the 
state of the (U. S. ) economy as measured by employment levels 
and rates of psychiatric hospitalisation. However, Brenner's 
ideas have been overtaken by reality in that Britain has 
witnessed massive increases in unemployment coupled with 
9 Whorley (1978) discusses pathways to community acceptance of 
psychiatric patients but in the process utilises a framework of 
'social profitableness' which is consistent we might say with the formal rationality of a 'disenchanted world', although perhaps 
fitting for Britain at the end of the millennium. 
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dramatic decreases in psychiatric hospital populations 
including decreases in psychiatric first admission rates 
(Central Statistics Office 1987, DHSS 1985). 
Community tolerance cannot therefore be read off in any 
deterministic sense from either in-patient statistics or 
economic indicators. Similarly with changing policies 
concerning hospital admission, decreased in-patient admission 
rates lose any claim to represent overall rates of emotional 
or psychiatric distress in society. 
In the following portrayal of a Hertfordshire village 
community, I attempt wherever possible to depict the 
interrelation between action and structure, lifeworld and 
system. I show that the relationship between village and 
hospital has changed over time especially in the recent context 
of the hospital's planned demise. Many villagers have opposed 
the closure of the hospital and yet at the same time retain an 
ambivalence towards people who are patients. For these 
villagers the bounds of community are indeed being tested, not 
now by an influx of patients but by their loss, or perhaps more 
precisely the loss of the hospital, and a proposed massive 
influx of housing estate residents. The presence of both 
hospital and patients has arguably contributed to a sense of 
local identity, to that which has made Shenley a 'special 
place' for its residents, in addition to its rural nature and 
proximity to the capital. I will show how this is reflected in 
the way that some villager talk displays a corporate identity 
in which hospital and village become merged. And in Part Three 
I also track the parameters of the dilemmatic nature of 
villagers' responses in relation to the interpretative 
repertoires and discursive methods which they use to talk about 
people who are patients. Several themes of the above debates 
concerning the nature of mental disorder re-emerge here. In 
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Appendix D the issues raised above concerning a dialogue with 
madness meet head on with a dialogic orientation to social 
research. 
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Chapter 3 
The . Place c, ± Stl gm& &xid Labe111nq 
Whither Labelling? 
As I have suggested above, the labelling perspective in 
psychiatry depends upon an assumption of negative public 
responses to patients, responses which provide the basis for 
a symbolic reorganisation of self and a stabilised patient 
career (e. g. Lemert 1951, Goffman 1961/68, Scheff 19661). As 
I will go on to show in a review of the literature (chapter 4), 
the available empirical evidence is equivocal with regard to 
public reactions to people who are, or who have been, 
psychiatric patients and that evidence which does exist is 
predominantly American and based upon sometimes questionable 
methods. 
The clear, systematic and propositional work of Scheff (1966,1975) 
achieved respect (Matza 1968, Pearson 1975) and also notoriety. 
Allegations of a host of '-Isms' have now all but buried Scheff's 
prototypical version; from decontextualism (Coulter 1973, Warren 
and Johnson 1972) and abstractionism (Taylor et al 1973,1974), 
to reductionism (Matza 1968), positivism and determinism (Plummer 
1974,1979) not to mention immanent logical inconsistency (Mankoff 
1971) and a disregard for self-labelling and 'emotional deviance' 
(Mankoff 1971, Pugliesi 1987, Tholts 1985 and cf. Rotenberg 1974). 
In the early form presented by Scheff (1966) the labelling 
perspective appears largely untenable (see Southgate 1982b for 
further discussion of Scheff's work). However this does not mean 
that labelling is irrelevant. I suggest following Plummer (1974, 
1979) that the labelling position is most usefully conceived of as 
a perspective rather than a theory, the core problems of which 
concern the nature, emergence, application and consequences of 
labels. The work of Emerson and Messinger (1977) has been drawn 
upon in chapter 9 below. 
. The Place of Labelling and Stigma 24 
However, this project is not directly concerned with the whole 
labelling process, nor with the initial construction of patient 
identities, although it has implications for both. The patients 
in this study are already in-patients, already abstracted from 
home or family, or else they have been discharged into a mental 
health community care resource close to the village. 
On the other hand it is a tenet of this project that public 
responses to patients and former patients are likely to be an 
important factor in the successful 'rehabilitation' of such 
people. From my position, people who are long-stay patients 
(and others) may in the right circumstances be able, to a 
significant degree, to throw off their symptomatology and their 
patient identities. Cross-cultural studies focusing on 
psychotic conditions, in particular schizophrenia2, have shown 
that the presence or absence of stigmatising responses and 
imagery may be significant factors here (Ciompi 1980, Horwitz 
1982, Kirmayer 1989, Lefley 1985, Murphy and Raman 1971, Warner 
1985 ch 7, Waxier 1974,19793 and cf. Prudo and Blum 1987, 
Sartorius et al 1986, W. H. O. 1979), while many psychiatrists 
acknowledge the importance of 'environmental' and social 
factors in the alleviation of positive and negative symptoms 
of schizophrenia (see e. g. Kendell and Zealley 1973/83, Strauss 
et al 1989, Wing 1989)4. 
2I continue to be unhappy about the use of the concept 
'schizophrenia'. For some of the debates see Bannister (1968), 
Clomps (1984), Coulter (1973), Harvey (1987), Hill (1983), and more 
recently Bentall et al (1988), and Bentall (ed) 1990. 
3 For a contrasting view see Murphy (1976), and for criticisms of 
her work see White (1982 p72). 
* See also Southgate (1982a) for an account of the rather 
positivistic work on 'expressed emotion' and relapse in 
schizophrenia, and Falloon (1988) for an overview of the 
literature. Greenley (1986) has theorised 'expressed emotion' In 
terms of familial social control. 
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In the more local terms of this project, the possibility cannot 
be ruled out that some patient behaviours may arise as a 
response to audience reactions, so that exclusion by villagers 
might for example contribute to social withdrawal or a show of 
disdain or anger by the patient, which might then serve to 
confirm to the audience that their original grounds for 
exclusion were legitimate. 
Nevertheless the refined labelling perspective does not purport 
to provide the complete explanation for stabilised mental 
disorder (Plummer 1974,1979, West 1985)5. My own position is 
that although madness may be conceptualised at different times 
by different people in different cultures, for various purposes 
and in a variety of ways, that it may be in this sense 
discursively 'constructedi6, it is nevertheless arguably the 
In 1982, Sedgwick (1982a) proposed that labelling 'theory' was 
defunct and morally bankrupt. Nevertheless it continues to be 
given sympathetic if not unambiguously enthusiastic book-space 
(cf. Busfield 1986, Cochrane 1983, Gerhardt and Wadsworth 1985, 
Miles 1981/1987,1988, Ussher 1991). It has since received 
theoretical consideration within anthropology (Raybeck 1988), 
'courted' by attribution theory (Howard and Levinson 1985) and 
'modified' by Bruce Link and collaborators (e. g. 1989,1990). 
Moreover, some recent and interesting work by Scheff (1987,1988, 
1989), Retzinger (1989), Scheff and Retzinger (1991) and Lewis 
(ed) (1987), has once more implicated labelling in the causal 
process of mental disorder, via the extension and magnification 
of intrapsychic shame. In this way, perhaps, the transition from 
primary to secondary deviance becomes more credible. At any rate 
Sedgwick's pronouncement of the death of labelling 'theory' (and 
see also Gove 1982 p295) has proven to be premature. 
6 Although the social-constructionist view might be seen to draw 
upon 'interpretative' models such as symbolic interactionism or 
ethnomethodology, this perspective does not exclude 'structurally' 
oriented sociologies. Marxian critiques for example provide explicit 
accounts (e. g. Leonard 1984, Phillipson 1982) while of course 'man' 
for Marx did construct 'his' own history. In fact it can be argued 
that most sociology is about 'social construction' in one way or 
other. The Issue, I suggest, is not whether reality is socially 
constructed but rather how this is achieved historically and 
geographically. For recent accounts of the return to Mead of the 
constructionist view in social-psychology see e. g. Gergen (1985), 
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case that the validity claims which may be raised or appealed 
to in any debate concerning the rationality or otherwise of a 
practice, behaviour or argument may be specifiable universally 
at a formal level. That it may be possible; in other words, to 
theoretically 'ground' the relativist conception which societal 
reaction theory introduced into the theory of deviance. How far 
theý'something' of 'madness' or 'mental disorder' may be 
usefully understood in terms of a model of formal pragmatics 
which may in certain respects subsume or complement the 
analyses of previous sociological observers such as Goffman, 
Scheff, Horwitz and Coulter, and in a manner which is directly 
concerned with systematically asymmetrical relations of power 
in the ascription process, is a question I have addressed 
elsewhere (Southgate 1992c). This in turn does not imply that 
everyday lay and professional ascriptions are or may be 
unproblematic or straightforward, only that formal procedures 
are discernable through which such decisions come to be made. 
In addition, it is my view that people play a part in what 
happens to them, that madness may have meaning and method and 
be perceived as having short or, long term consequences of a 
positive kind (see for example Braginsky et al 1969,1976), 
that the '... actor is always endowed with some degree of 
consciousness about the likelihood and consequences of reaction 
against him... ' (Taylor et al 1973 p276). To the extent that 
lifeworld understandings are shared, then contra Becker (1963 
p9), most deviance is a quality of the act (ibid p147)7. 
Gergen and Davis (1985), Shotter and Gergen (1989). Kitzinger 
(1987) provides a good example of how social constructionism is 
becoming increasingly linked to rhetoric. Compare also Parker 
(1989) and Parker and Shotter (1990). 
7 Several- authors have accused labelling 'theorists' of confusing 
sociologists' with members' versions (West 1985) and of not doing 
justice to ordinary members' distinctions. See also Coulter (1973 
. The Place of Labelling and Stigma 27 
But it is also clear that the ascription of madness, mental 
disorder or mental illness is often the outcome of identity 
struggles, in which are implicated various and historically 
changing forms of domination within society8. A full theory of 
madness therefore requires an analysis of how the choices and 
resources available to people may become so limited that it can 
appear as if people are 'determined'. People indeed make their 
own history, '... but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves.. ' 
(Marx 1852/1958 p247). An understanding of madness demands a 
consideration of the dialectical relationship between lifeworld 
p62), Pollner (1974a), Rains (1975). Thus, '... deviance is not 
construed by members as something conferred upon an act (or a 
person) - it is construed as a property of that act or person... ' 
(Coulter ibid. As I show below, in this research I orient to 
accounts as both resource and topic. And for a discussion about 
whether mental disorder should be called 'deviance' at all, see 
Ingleby (1982,1985) and cf. Busfield (1986 p104). 
8 The relationship between race, gender and psychiatry has, over 
the past ten years or so, been increasingly subjected to 
examination (e. g. Allen 1986, Fernando 1989, Francis 1989a, Francis 
et al 1989, Holland 1990, Johnstone 1989, Littlewood and Lipsedge 
1982, Loring and Powell 1988, Mercer 1986, Miles 1988, MIND 1992, 
Rosenfield 1982,1984, Sashidharan 1989, Selig 1988/1991, Sheppard 
1991, Showalter 1987 and Ussher 1991). Black clients for example 
are considered by staff to need more medication, seclusion or 
coercion than their white counterparts, are more often 
misdiagnosed (e. g. Littlewood and Lipsedge 1982, Francis et al 
1989, Sashidharan 1989), and compulsorily detained with police 
assistance (e. g. Francis et al 1989, Rosenfield 1984). But although 
authors are concerned with stigma and discrimination, the 
labelling perspective as such often recedes into the background, 
the problem being located directly in the marginal status of black 
people in Britain and the ethnocentricism of psychiatry. At times, 
it seems, psychiatry and its categories would be fine if it (they) 
were not racist (or sexist) and did not incorrectly diagnose. In 
a critique of the normalizing impetus of transcultural psychiatry, 
Mercer (1986) argues 'The liberal and humane themes of the 
project [of transcultural psychiatry] do not reach as far as 
seeking a fundamental change in the nature and functions of 
psychiatric provision. Rather, they propose an adjustment, a 
modification and a reform of the ethnocentric dimensions of the 
clinical encounter' (p139). 
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and system (Habermas 1984,1987a, Southgate 1992b). In other 
words I believe that people may be driven into madness (cf. 
Searles 1959/1965), may choose and use madness, and may also 
at times have the designation 'mad' unhappily, unwillingly and 
illegitimately thrust upon them9. 
Although the radical labelling perspective, exemplified in 
Scheff's early (1966) work, has become largely unacceptable as 
a-causal theory, nevertheless the study of psychiatric stigma 
has maintained momentum (e. g. Jones et al 1984, Link and Cullen 
1990, Miles 1984,1981/1987,1988, and see note 5, p25 above 
and ch 4 below) and the convergence of geography with sociology 
and anthropology has resulted in several recent studies 
concerning societal reaction (e. g. Dear and Taylor 1982, Dear 
and Wolch 1987, Smith and Giggs (eds) 1988). 
However there is often a sense here in which stigma theory, 
presented as an ostensibly separate and circumscribed area of 
study at the end of the labelling process, achieves 
respectability by avoiding some of the problems which have 
beset the labelling perspective. While the latter for example 
failed to grapple adequately with the issue of the transition 
from primary to secondary deviance (Mankoff 1971), and appears 
to indicate in its crude form that there is no such thing as 
mental disorder without a label (cf. Akers 1967), the study of 
9 Whether mental disorder is regarded as 'caused' by external, 
interpersonal, or internal forces beyond the control of the 
individual, or is alleged by others of, that individual, or whether 
the person believes him or herself to be mad, the 'reality' of such 
disorder must still refer to the discourses which 'sustain' or at 
least 'mediate' it. See the realism-relativism debate in ch 5 below. 
The competition between madness as a 'thing in itself', and as in 
some way socially constructed, certainly has rhetorical and 
political consequences (cf. Habermas 1971) and is a theme of this 
thesis. 
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stigma can sidestep these difficulties10. In place of the 
intensely acrimonious relationship between psychiatry and 
'anti-psychiatry' there is arguably an atmosphere of co- 
operation between psychiatry and social science. The result at 
any rate is that the study of stigma and discrimination remains 
today an often legitimate and respectable pursuit". In his 
recent address to the Royal College of Psychiatrists, HRH The 
Prince of Wales, the patron of SANE, raised it as a theme'2 
(1991 and see the criticisms of SANE by MIND 1989), and its 
consideration also informs the recent Law Commission report on 
mental illness and decision-making (HMSO 1991, and see also 
Campbell and Hegginbotham 1991). But there is a danger here, 
we might say, of a kind of 'social amnesia' (Jacoby 1975) in 
which 'mental illness' and 'stigma' become once more 
conceptually separated out13 and in which labelling, as stigma, 
becomes a sanitised 'output-end' and psychiatry-friendly 
category. From this view one may happily argue that the use of 
10 Sedgwick (1982b p213-218) has implied that the restructuring of 
the welfare state and de-institutionalisation, as well as theoretical 
problems, have rendered the radical labelling perspective 
redundant. But this is too simple. An more adequate soclo- 
historical analysis would need to consider the complex inter- 
relations between the state and political-economy, the power of 
psychiatric institutions to defend and define themselves and their 
users/patients (Castel et al 1982, Miller and Rose 1986), together 
with the reciprocal development of 'user groups', advocacy and 
patients' rights (Pilgrim 1990, Ramon and Giannichedda 1988/1991, 
Rogers and Pilgrim 1991, Romme and Escher 1991), as well as 
critiques oriented to race and gender. In turn, the discourse 
upon 'rights' may itself be located via an analysis of the tensions 
and contradictions of advanced capitalism (e. g. Gough 1979, 
Habermas 1976, Offe 1972,1974,1984,1987). 
11 Although, as I shall go on to show, there are those who deny its 
importance. 
12 HRH even provides an etymology: stizein (Gk), to tattoo. 'SANE' 
is an acronym for 'Schizophrenia, a National Emergency'. 
13 That is, concern about stigma itself has a long history as I shall 
show later. 
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a biologically-based disease model and psychiatric 
hospitalisation are both fine, and that the real problem lies 
with the public's attitudes toward mental illness, without 
seeing that the two are intertwined14. 
That the issue of intentionality is important in understanding 
public (and professional) responses to people who have become 
psychiatric patients will be demonstrated in later chapters. 
And in chapter 9 below I provide an account of the historical 
development of the relationship between village and hospital 
in which questions of identity come to the fore. 
Finally, I have attempted, more directly perhaps than some 
'labelling theorists', to incorporate an analysis of 'place' 
into the proceedings, as an essential aspect of the ongoing 
dialectic between social structure and agency. This is 
organised by way of the concepts of Pred's time-geography which 
is outlined in chapter 8. The concept of place is then used to 
provide a bridge between a participant-observation analysis 
and discourse analysis. 
14 For example there are grounds for believing that the disease 
model might actually amplify fear and stigma. See Farina (1982), 
Farina, Fisher, Getter and Fischer (1978), Farina and Fischer 
(1982), Fischer and Farina (1979), Langer and Abelson (1974), 
Ommundsen and Ekeland (1978), Rothaus et al (1963), Sarbin and 
Mancuso (1970), Townsend (1978) and see ch 4 below especially 
p58. From, their vignette-based study, Norman and Malla (1983) 
report findings which '... imply that the more a person's behaviour 
is perceived as "mental illness", the less likely he/she will be 
socially acceptable and that such behaviour is likely to be 
ascribed a physical etiology. Furthermore, belief in medical 
/physical etiology of mental illness is not positively related either 
to perceived prognosis for or increased social acceptability of the 
mentally ill. ' (p48). A full analysis of stigma must therefore 
examine the social power relations implicated in definitions of 
madness and the practices of professionals and others. This 
involves a sociological analysis in which society (as a complex 
power-laden field) is given full measure rather than being 
'epistemologically eliminated', to use Renaud's (1978) phrase, by 
scientistic psychiatry. And at the very least, one can argue, the 
anticipation of stigma may deter some people at the input-end of 
the psychiatric process from seeking or effectively accepting 
psychiatric help (cf. Morrison 1987, Oliver, Huxley and Butler 1989 
p91-96). 
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The Dimensions of Stigma 
Before moving on to an examination of the research literature 
it will be useful to consider further the concept of stigma. 
One of the difficulties with such research is that stigma, like 
labelling in general, is susceptible to a wide variety of 
definitions and is approached from a variety of theoretical and 
philosophical positions15. 
The term stigma may be used in relation to disvalued aspects, 
attributes, characteristics or defining features of people. 
Page (1984 p4), for instance, associates stigma with 'inferior 
attributes which are commonly regarded as major norm 
infractions'. 
Stafford and Scott (1986) similarly see stigma as essentially 
normative. Devalued aspects may range from small skin blemishes 
to membership of particular religious, ethnic, gender or other 
social groups or divisions. Goffman (1963/1968 p14) identified 
three 'grossly different' types of stigma: a) physical 
deformities b) blemishes of individual character and c) 
'tribal' stigmas of race, religion etc. 
At the same time, stigma is used descriptively and 
methodologically both to refer to people's experiences and 
feelings about themselves and their condition, what Robert Page 
(1984 p13) and Graham Scambler (1983,1989 p55 ff, and Scambler 
is Collins English Dictionary _, (1986 -edition) contains the peculiar definition of stigma as inter alia: '(d) any sign of mental 
deficiency or emotional upset'. -- One may wonder whether the 
inclusion of 'emotional upset' In an expression of the British 'stiff 
upper lip'! Also it is important to see that to study 'stigma' is to 
study part of the labelling process, so that stigma is labelling. 
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and Hopkins 1986,1988) have called 'felt' stigma16 (see also 
Page 1974 and West 1985), and also to the behavioural and 
ascription practices of others, so that we may talk of 
stigmatising responses or 'enacted' stigma (Scambler 1989 p56 
and op cit). This raises issues about whose definition of 
stigma is to count. For example it may be that people are 
excluded from certain social interactions, and yet do not feel 
'stigmatised', and visa versa. At what point then do we say 
with confidence 'there is stigma here' (cf. Stafford and Scott 
1986 p79)? 
The opposition between 'felt' and 'enacted' stigma is 
particularly important and appears in various guises throughout 
the literature. In relation to mental disorder it often finds 
expression in a dichotomy between the symbolic and the real. 
Whereas 'felt' stigma appears to tap into an autonomous 
symbolic realm unrelated to others' 'real' reactions, 'enacted' 
stigma refers to what other people 'really' do. The implication 
here is that some stigma might only exist, as it were, at the 
symbolic or abstract level and that in 'reality' other people 
might actually be tolerant, accepting and so forth, and not in 
practice bothered by the label '(former) psychiatric patient' 
at all. 
Stewart Page (1974), for example, has argued that the public 
are generally accommodating in practice to people who have 
received psychiatric treatment, but. that stigma 'attaches to 
the concept of mental illness' (ibid p16, and see the 
literature review in ch 4). Scambler's (1983,1989) interesting 
16 Page's definition is wider than that of Scambler. Page includes all 
feelings about stigma, whether warranted by 'actual' responses 
of others or not. For Graham Scambler on the other hand, 'felt' 
stigma refers to feelings of shame founded upon a sense of 
'ontological inferiority', and the anxious anticipation of 'enacted' 
stigma (1983 p201). 
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explanation for felt stigma in relation to epilepsy rests 
partly upon the notion of 'stigma coaching' by parents which 
induces a sense of shame or fear of enacted stigma in their 
children (e. g. 1983,1989 p56-7)17. The centrality of shame in 
the whole process of labelling and mental disorder is one which 
has been pursued in the later work of Scheff (1987,1988,1989 
and see Lewis (ed) 1987, Retzinger 1989 and Scheff and 
Retzinger 1991). Similarly the empirical work of Bruce Link and 
colleagues, discussed in the next chapter, implicitly links 
shame with stigma. 
To some extent, however, the attempt to frame the issue in 
terms which attempt to definitively pin down 'stigma', to grasp 
and define it, may be both reifying and misplaced because it 
becomes clear that what we take to be stigma and stigmatising, 
and who we take to be stigmatised, as well as what we take to 
be 'real' or 'symbolic', is an outcome of our debates and 
discourses, which are finally discourses of powerte. Stigma, in 
other words, does not exist outside of these discourses". The 
17 Nevertheless one may still ask why parents themselves feel and 
transmit shame if, as Scambler seems to suggest, there is little 
'enacted' stigma in relation to epilepsy. 
18 This dichotomy between the real and the symbolic is unstable in 
so far as any 'real thing' or material structure may be symbolic, 
while symbols we may say are real in terms of our shared 
understandings of them and their consequences, as well as in 
terms of the real material circumstances of their production. 
Compare Frow (1989 p204). Thus we can say that 'symbolic' stigma 
is intimately related to those material practices in our society 
upon which the hierarchy of importance of particular attributes, 
personal qualities and so forth is predicated. Compare ch. 2 
above. The relationship between the symbolic and the real is of 
course a central feature of Marxian debates concerning ideology. 
19 Discussing Goffman's (1963/68) identification of the central feature 
of the stigmatised individual's situation in life, a search for 
'acceptance' (1963/68 p19), Finkelstein (1980) argues that it is 
nonsense 'to conceive of disabled people as dependent upon 
bigots and prejudiced people for "acceptance", just as it would 
not make sense to consider freed slaves... as dependent on their 
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expectations and differences which define stigma (and shame) 
are arguably not irremediably fixed but like illness itself, 
historically, culturally and contextually variable. And 
although there may be some attributes which appear to be 
universally discrediting, this makes them no less socially 
defined albeit in terms of norms which are widely shared (cf. 
Sedgwick 1982a p33). If we follow Sedgwick's lead then illness, 
disease, stigma and shame may all be seen to relate to norm 
infraction. 
Nevertheless I have suggested above (p29-30) that stigma can 
be rendered compatible with biological positivism, so that the 
illness-object to which society responds is regarded as 
independent and autonomous and is confronted by a separate 
subject which attempts to apprehend it. It becomes clear then 
that the study of both stigma and-the whole labelling process 
may partake of differing social-scientific and philosophical 
positions; different epistemological relationships between 
subject and object and different ontologies. Some of the wider 
philosophical issues involved here are discussed in chapter 5 
below. From the perspective of Marx to that of Garfinkel, 
stigma is not immune from examination and scrutiny. 
In its heavy form, stigma may then be said to incorporate a 
number of features. The full weight of stigma bears down upon 
the person whose membership of a particular category or group 
pervades most of his or her social interactions and assumes the 
proportions of a 'master status'- (Becker 1963, Hughes 1945) 
with the result that the person's identity becomes, in 
Goffman's (1963/68) terms, spoiled. The person so stigmatised 
is defined in terms of that one attribute, and is devalued, 
discredited and/or rejected or segregated. This identity 
former oppressors for "acceptance"' (p31). For Finkelstein, 
Goffman is an apologist for the maintenance of relations of 
domination (and see Oliver 1990 p66). 
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exhibits a degree of permanency and becomes difficult for the 
person to shake off. The conceptual organisation of the stigma 
of mental disorder may be further illuminated by its comparison 
to other illnesses, and leprosy provides an interesting 
starting point. 
The connection between madness and leprosy is a curious one. 
If we follow Foucault (1961/1971) it appears that their fates 
have been crucially linked in at least an historical and 
European sense. In their study of leprosy, Gussow and Tracey 
(1968) argued that the two are unambiguously related so that 
in fantasy 'the two darkest fates are to "lose one's mind" as 
in lunacy or to "lose -one's body"--gas -in leprosy' (p319), Both, 
they maintain, involve a threatened loss of self or identity. 
Drawing upon the -work of pathologist Olaf Skinsnes who 
constructed a hypothetical ideal-typical worst-possible 
disease, the authors detail the dimensions of such a disease 
and compare it to leprosy20. The dimensions of this hypothetical 
disease are as follows: It would be externally manifest; be 
progressively crippling and deforming; be non-fatal and 
chronic, running an unusually long course; have an insidious 
onset; have a fairly high endemicity but not be epidemic; be 
associated with 'low' standards of 'living; appear to be 
incurable and have a long incubation period. Gussow and Tracey 
argue then that leprosy comes very close to this ideal-type of 
stigmatising disease21. In their chapter 'The Dimensions of 
20 Ideal types are problematic in so far as they are by definition 
ahistorical, formal and unempirical. As a result one may readily 
ask whom they are 'ideal' for, and what purposes their use 
serves. At the same time it can be easily seen that this worst- 
possible scenario is value-laden. 
21 Of course Skinsnes may well have derived his worst-possible 
scenario from his or others' ideas about leprosy, in which case 
the 'dimensions of stigma' become vacuous and principally 
rhetorical (in its negative sense) devices, which serve in the 
misguided pursuit of an ahistorical content. 
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Stigma' Jones et al (1984) provide a further typology of six 
dimensions which they argue is consistent with previous 
empirical work: concealability, course, disruptiveness, 
aesthetic qualities, origin and peril22. Taken with a pinch of 
salt, such broad typologies may provide useful pointers to the 
kinds of things which others may find threatening about mental 
disorder. On the other hand the precise responses of any 
audience are not 'determined' by such considerations in any 
simple sense, as the authors acknowledge. 
One methodological objection which may be raised to the present 
project is that it takes mental disorder in one sense as given; 
that is, it focuses on the discursive and non-discursive 
practices of local people towards extant 'patients', some of 
whom may be said to display unusual or disconcerting behaviour, 
and it may well be objected that the negative responses of 
others come about as a direct result of patients' behaviours. 
Of course people reject patients, it may be argued, because 
patients behave so abominably. 
The previous discussions of labelling and stigma have I hope 
served to rebut this objection. It is clear that a wide range 
of responses may be compatible with any particular behaviour23 
so that it would be naive to think that any one response is 
22 But immediately we are faced with further definitional problems. 
For example although an externally manifest disease may elicit 
negative reactions from others and invoke negative feelings for 
the sufferer, the ability to hide an illness may itself render that 
illness more of a threat to others and potentially and actually 
stigmatising for the sufferer who may live in fear of disclosure 
(cf. Miles 1988 p83). 
23 Although the behaviour of others is often directly and 
unreflectively mediated by our categories, concepts and 
assumptions, and is normally seen immediately as behaviour of a 
particular type, there are occasions when we are unsure how to 
categorise particular behaviours. But even if immediately and 
unproblematically categorised, our responses may still vary 
widely. 
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determined directly by that behaviour. To suggest as much would 
be to assume a deterministic behaviourism and to ignore at the 
very least the place of repertoires of audience beliefs, 
knowledge and imagery concerning patients as well as local 
rules, values, norms; the existence or otherwise of local 
support structures; other neighbourhood characteristics and 
wider structural factors which have direct local effects. These 
all impinge to varying degrees upon the actor's choices and 
opportunities for action. The issue of audience responses 
therefore, together with audience images, representations and 
knowledge, even towards patients who are effectively well 
advanced in the psychiatric system, must remain a question to 
be investigated empirically and is not to be assumed a priori. 
In addition it would be to predetermine the case to suggest 
that people who are patients are all alike in behaviour, 
demeanour, presentation, disability, etc. Indeed to pre-empt 
my later analysis it is plain that although villagers in this 
study felt able generally to identify a patient as a patient, 
there were many occasions when they could not say whether or 
not a person was a hospital patient, a discharged patient, 
someone recently moved to the village, or an 'innocent' passer- 
by. This project sets out in part to examine the methods local 
people use to identify patients qua patients, together with the 
strategies used to maintain 'difference' between themselves and 
putative patients and to define themselves as 'sane' in the 
process. 
'Difference' may therefore be-read at one level in terms of 
category selection and imposition so that what is to count as 
'different' depends upon what is culturally important in one 
sense or another. In other words, in terms of the 'differences' 
between people, the universal aspects or specifications of 
'difference' may be regarded as formal: the formal procedures 
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and requirements of communicative action, the interpretative 
openness of language, or the formal conditions of cognitive and 
practical development, both human and non-human (e. g. the need 
to be able to both differentiate and integrate, perceptually 
and cognitively). Viewed substantively on the other hand, 
'difference' must be seen in terms of the real historical 
exclusionary practices of real people, groups and classes in 
the maintenance of power. 
There is nothing here, I would argue, to suggest that we should 
not acknowledge many patients and especially people who are 
designated as 'chronic' patients, to be handicapped in many 
ways. The argument here is rather that such handicaps which may 
be interpersonal, linguistic, financial, cognitive etc are 
often ameliorable in appropriate settings and that what we make 
of them, how we define and respond to them and attempt to 
affect them or redefine them, need not be taken as given. 
Recognition of difference needs to go hand in hand, in other 
words, with acknowledgement of similarity. 
A Brief Excursus on Mental Illness 
In his critique of Foucault and elsewhere in his book, Sedgwick 
(1982a, and see also 1982b) pursues his agenda of challenging 
earlier sociological and 'anti-psychiatry' critiques of the 
'mental illness' concept24. Because of the influence of his 
24 There are two opposed arguments in this respect which revolve 
around the issue of responsibility. The first sequence links 
'illness' to lack of responsibility, to lack of personal control, to 
perceived unpredictability, to perceived dangerousness and hence 
avoidance by others. 'Mental illness' is, thus, stigmatising. The 
second suggests that 'illness' protects patients and others from 
attributions of, in this case, a damaging responsibility. The 
mentally ill person may therefore be treated with compassion, and 
the concept of 'mental illness' is liberating. Both arguments are 
simplistic as I shall later show. 
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work upon critical thought it deserves further attention. I 
will consider here the central components of his argument. The 
first is his well-known aphorism 'there are no illnesses or 
diseases in nature' (ibid p30). All 'illness' he argues is 
socially constructed, including both physical and mental 
illness (see also e. g. Conrad 1981, Kennedy 1981/1983, White 
1980, Wright and Treacher 1982). Once we recognise that all 
illness expresses 'both a social value judgement (contrasting 
a person's condition with certain understood and accepted 
norms) and an attempt at explanation (with a view to 
controlling the disvalued condition)' then the way becomes open 
for an acceptance by critics of madness as illness. Mental 
illness in this view can be made into a critical concept (ibid 
p41), 'provided those who use it are prepared to place demands 
and pressures on the existing organisation of society' (ibid). 
Sedgwick's fear is that a denial of 'mental illness' simply 
plays into the hands of those who solicit policies of neglect. 
I have some sympathy with this argument. Clearly 'illness' can 
be reconceptualised in the right circumstances as a critical 
concept (cf. Renaud 1978). 
Secondly Sedgwick argues that '... the specialised medical model 
of illness is not the only possible one... ' (ibid p39). He does 
not want to 'technologise' illness beyond the point it is 
helpful to do so (ibid p40). At the same time he wants to 
retain the gains of scientific 'experimental reasoning' (ibid 
p139) while politicizing medical goals (ibid p40). Because the 
current theory of the person upon which our concepts of illness 
are based is positivistic and physicalist, then illness and its 
causes become located within the body of the individual (Ibid 
p35). For Sedgwick this constitutes only one possible 
manifestation of the illness concept. 
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Sedgwick's arguments are persuasive, yet there is often a sense 
in which he overstretches his case. In his critique of Foucault 
he argues that madness as 'illness' has an extremely long 
history. But when he speaks of the 'mental patient' of the 
sixteenth and previous centuries (ibid p136) he sounds quite 
anachronistic, and presents no evidence to support his view 
that such people were regarded as either 'mental' or as 
'patients'; or better, he does not properly consider what 
'mental patient' could possibly have meant in the sixteenth 
century (cf. Herzlich and Pierret 1985). The use of physical 
methods in attempts to render someone sane do not necessarily 
imply an illness or disease model of madness, nor 'patient' 
status. They may just as easily be seen as punishment or 
exorcism. The semantic issues here are formidable and Sedgwick 
tends, I believe, to gloss them. 
Similarly when he suggests that each culturally specific 
account of illness must involve a theory of the person, and 
then goes on to say that in cultures with an animistic 
tradition the invasion of the person will be one of the spirit 
or the soul (1982a p35), he begs the question of whether this 
manifestation is always seen as one of illness. What then of 
ancient Christian or contemporary Balinese 'blessed madness' 
(Screech 1985, Connor 1982)? 
Sedgwick wants to oppose the technologising of illness and the 
medicalisation of moral values (1982 p40), while spurning the 
'relativist trap' of science as ideology which he asserts 
denies all the conquests of experimental reasoning' (ibid 
p139). But the fact is that in our culture the concept of 
mental illness is strongly tied to the alliance between 
psychiatry and a positivist science (Isbister 1983, and cf. 
Kolakowski 1972, Bryant 1985). From the perspective of the 
critique of positivist science and technology as domination 
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(e. g. Habermas 1971, Horkheimer and Adorno 1944/1979, Leiss 
1972, Marcuse 1964) we do therefore still require an 
examination of the illness concept which takes into account its 
putative ideological effects (cf., e. g. Figlio 1980, Renaud 
1978, Szasz 1987), its role in sustaining precisely those 
relations of power which Sedgwick appears to want to challenge. 
That this does not necessarily entail denying the 'conquests 
of experimental reason' has been shown for example in Habermas' 
(1971) engagement with Marcuse. 
Finally, and connected to the last point, there is also a sense 
in which Sedgwick does not go far enough. His maxim 'there are 
no illnesses or diseases in nature' is itself problematic in 
at least two respects. First (and to risk being facile) we can 
inquire of Sedgwick where exactly the constructs of 'illness' 
and 'disease' are to be located. If they are separated from the 
realm of nature, then Sedgwick appears to imply a radical 
dichotomy between man and nature about which we may have cause 
to feel concerned. But if man is part of nature then presumably 
so are his constructs. Secondly, if illnesses and diseases are 
social constructs (or part of our particular language game, or 
form of life) might not 'nature' itself, and notions of our 
separation from nature, also be considered part of our 
constructed world? In other words Sedgwick-wants to stop at 
diseases and illnesses when his logic could perhaps carry him 
on further. He wants to retain a materialist orientation in 
which 'nature' exists independently of 'man'. To be sure, the 
philosophical issues here are complex and I shall attempt to 
explore them further in a later chapter. However, although the 
question of the independence or otherwise of objects may be 
finally metaphysical, particular philosophical beliefs may have 
political implications. The question we should address is 
therefore 'What are the practical and rhetorical consequences 
for our practices of advancing particular theoretical and 
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philosophical positions concerning the 'nature' of man, nature 
and life? '. 
There is another related argument which I wish to explore 
briefly here, which takes its cue from the location or 'place' 
of disorder. Within our culture there exists the possibility 
in many physical illnesses of distancing one's self from one's 
illness. We can say for instance, 'It's my heart' or 'I've got 
a problem with my leg', or even 'I've got cancer' (Billig et 
al 1988 ch6, and cf. Herzlich 1973 p135). However this cannot 
be so readily done within the parameters of our current 
conceptions of mental illness. It appears to be unacceptable 
to say 'I've just got a problem with my brain', or 'It's OK, 
it's only my self/mindi25. This is no doubt because of our 
society's dualistic tendencies which privilege mind over body 
(Kirmayer 1988). If the self is what society holds accountable 
for the body (ibid p80), if the brain is in charge, as it were, 
and the seat of the mind-self is located somewhere in the 
brain, then the possibility of discursive dissociation from 
mental illness becomes blocked. 
But this argument is actually a little more complex, for it is 
not the location in the brain on its own which is the problem, 
but the fact that use of the term mental illness both promises 
spatial specificity but is locationally (and causally, cf. 
Ablon 1981) not specifiable enough within the brain, unlike for 
instance a tumour or perhaps epilepsy26. It- may for example be 
25 And in addition, apart from ironic comments from psychiatric in- 
patients, we never hear someone say 'I'm feeling a bit mentally 
ill today', whereas we do hear 'I'm feeling physically ill'. When 
the lexical unit 'physically' is used in this way it may on 
occasions be in order_toýdistance the speaker from the possible 
assumption by a listener that the illness in question may in fact 
otherwise be mental. 
26 Although the site of discharge is often locatable, epilepsy is 
usually regarded as idiopathic. 
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possible in talk to allude to a brain tumour and thereby 
separate off the self from the illness. Although people do 
sometimes say 'I've got schizophrenia' the latter has not (yet) 
been sufficiently localised or causally understood by medical 
science to render it a concept with discursive distancing 
potential27. It is not yet, we might say, sufficiently 'ill'. 
From this perspective, the use of the term 'mental illness' 
does not allow its sufferers to adopt the same face/self-saving 
strategies as other illnesses might allow. In this sense then 
it becomes handicapping. The 'self', seen as the seat of reason 
and control, is inevitably implicated so that people who have 
'mental illnesses' suffer illnesses of the 'self' (Bott 1976, 
Scott 1974). As Bott (1976 p118) put it: 'One has a physical 
illness; one is a mental illness. '28 
However this argument moves on a little. For in terms of 
chronic physical complaints it appears to be the case that when 
opportunities for action are regularly denied through various 
discriminatory practices and related fears such as 
contamination, dependency and so on, then the ill person is 
more likely to identify him or her self (and have her self 
27 It is of course true that some physical diseases have a 
stigmatising potential even when localisable, such as cancer, 
leprosy, AIDS and so on. We may be more likely to say 'I've got 
cancer' than 'It's my lungs'. And in this case the degree to which 
the self becomes identified with the disease may depend upon a 
variety of other factors. In this sense 'schizophrenia' may never 
have much discursive distancing power. However this does not 
necessarily negate the argument presented here that differential 
possibilities exist for discursive mitigation and manoeuvre. See 
the following discussion and 'The Dimensions of Stigma' above for 
a worst-possible disease scenario. 
28 Compare Estroff (1981a, 1981b p244) who makes a similar point but 
equates the identification of illness and self with the chronicity 
of the illness, a theme which I also discuss here. 
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identified) with the illness (Billig et al 1988). In other 
words we could say that 'mentally ill' people may be doubly 
excluded in terms of place effects. As well as everyday 
discrimination (see chapter 4 below), they suffer the 
consequence of a conceptual system which places constraints 
upon the possibility of discursive distantiation of self from 
illness in ways which are open to sufferers of many physical 
complaints. 
If we are to speak of 'mental' conditions at all, I prefer to 
use the term 'mental disorder' for the following reasons. First 
it contains the idea of (dis)order as a behavioural or action 
phenomenon, located within an interpersonal setting, as in 
"Your behaviour is out of order", or "Disorder broke out in the 
ranks". There is a moral, normative and hierarchical aspect 
involved here. Disorder expresses normative transgression which 
may be conscious or unmotivated. It contains the notion of 
challenge to order and 'breakdown' of order. It clearly invokes 
'society'. 
At the same time disorder connotes disorganisation, perhaps 
chaos, a lack of integration, a lack of purposiveness or 
organising agency. It even alludes to the idea that something 
is mechanically malfunctioning, as in 'The lift is out of 
order. ' 
'Mental disorder' therefore has the benefit of imputing both 
agency and non-agency. Whilst allowing for 'breakdown' and even 
illness, which the person could not control, it also allows 
for the possibility of conscious manipulation of the 
interpersonal scene by the 'patient'. The use of the term 
'mental disorder' does not solve all the problems posed by the 
concept 'mental illness', but does, I suggest, capture and 
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allow wider meanings and possibilities29. It is the term I use 
throughout the thesis alongside 'madness' and occasionally 
'insanity'. 
29 For an alternative view which suggests that the concept 'mental 
disorder' is much too woolly and 'catch-all' and is therefore in 
fact counterproductive in so far as it dilutes issues and diverts 
attention from particular needs of particular groups of mentally 
ill people, see Campbell and Heginbotham 1991 chs 1& 2). For 
references to empirical work which addresses the social impact of 
the 'mental illness' label see p30 below, note 14, and chapter 4. 
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Chap t d--r 4 
A . Review o. 
f the Lit era t ure 
Once you've seen a psychiatrist then other people often 
start behaving very strangely'. 
Introduction 
The task of the reviewer of research investigating public 
reactions to extant or former psychiatric patients is 
formidable for a variety of reasons. As Rabkin (1974) and Link 
et al (1989) have pointed out, there is often a lack of clarity 
in the terms used by many researchers who regularly and 
uncritically interchange categories 'mental patient' and 'ex- 
mental patient'. In addition, researchers often employ 
different methodologies, using different sample sizes and 
population types, focusing upon different kinds of theoretical 
problem and using different instruments. This means that it is 
often difficult to make direct comparisons between survey 
results or to categorise material. Furthermore the presentation 
of empirical work itself raises issues concerning the validity 
of particular methods, and although I tackle some of the issues 
as I go along, I have reserved a more thorough theoretical 
critique for the next chapter. Finally, a vast amount of 
empirical work exists on labelling and stigma in relation to 
psychiatry, and it is not possible to review all of it here. 
I have therefore selected those studies which appear to me to 
1 Remark overheard at a 'users' conference. 
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provide a representative overview, concentrating in particular 
upon those themes which importantly inform this study2. 
I have chosen to structure the material in the following 
manner. A large number of attitude studies can be categorised 
according to the conclusions they reach, which in a general 
sense are either 'positive' or 'negative', so that a number 
find audiences accepting of extant or former patients, while 
others see rejection. Another body of papers deals with the 
characteristics of 'markables' (Jones, E. E. et al 1984) and 
significant others which are most often associated with 
stigmatization. Yet other research is concerned with the 
question of whether and to what extent societal responses are 
a function primarily of the label carried or the behaviour 
exhibited. This group begins to provide an explanation for 
stigmatization in terms of unpredictability and dangerousness. 
I shall address each of., these areas, which indeed often 
overlap, in turn, but begin however with research which has 
explored the experiences of people who have been in receipt of 
psychiatric help. 
Experiences of Stigma 
It is fitting to begin with the work of Agnes Miles (1981/1987, 
1984,1988), a sociologist and author concerned with mental 
disorder in Britain today. Miles' view of the consequences of 
carrying the label 'ex-psychiatric patient' follows quite 
closely that of Scheff, so that for her: 
2 The reader may wish to compare the following additional reviews: 
Farina (1982), Johannsen (1969), Link et al (1987), Link and Cullen 
(1990), Rabkin (1974,1975,1984), Segal (1978), Weinstein (1983). 
I have not included in this chapter a review of that research 
which bears some similarity to my own i. e. Roosens (1979) and 
Jodelet (1991). In addition space limitations have also precluded 
a discussion of other geographically oriented research (e. g. Dear 
and Taylor 1982, Moon 1988, Smith and Hanham 1981). 
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Mental illness is a field in which labelling can have 
quite devastating consequences. It carries a peculiarly 
powerful and lasting cultural stereotype, resistant to 
change and extremely negatively evaluated. (1988 p18) 
In her most recent research project Miles (1984,1988) 
investigated the experiences of men and women, referred for the 
first time to see a psychiatrist, who had been diagnosed as 
'neurotic' and attended for psychiatric out-patient treatment. 
There are in her work some quite compelling and dramatic images 
that are difficult to dismiss as 'simply' subjective. Rejection 
which was not anticipated became as a result more profoundly 
felt, thus: 
She was my friend since school, we were very close, and 
saw each other all the time. Since I started with the 
psychiatrist, she has been here only once and even then 
treated me strangely, she wasn't herself at all. (1988 
p73) 
And 
My sister-in-law doesn't want me near her children in case 
I hurt them or go funny, so I don't go there any more. 
(ibid p73) 
The following respondent expected her friend who was a nurse 
to be understanding and helpful: 
Kitty was worse than anyone: when I told her that the 
psychiatrist recommended group therapy and I started to 
attend, she completely abandoned the friendship. She has 
no time to meet me, never rings, and told me that she had 
made new plans for her holiday. (ibid p74) 
Miles' text provides ample evidence that these respondents 
experienced negative evaluations, rejection and ridicule from 
their social groups including friends, neighbours and family. 
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While we may be left wondering whether the subjects' behaviour 
at the time led to the disruption of relationships, Miles makes 
it clear that the portrayed responses of others were often out 
of proportion to the mental disorder itself. The question of 
whether to conceal or disclose their psychiatric referral was 
seldom clear-cut for Miles' subjects. People made decisions 
according to the particular circumstances in which they found 
themselves. In this respect the nature of the problem of stigma 
was therefore fluid, shifting and context bound3. 
In (West) Germany, work by Angermeyer et al (1987) confirmed 
patients' experiences of stigmatization. Using a Likert-like 
questionnaire method the researchers found to their surprise 
that patients admitted to a psychiatric ward in a modern, 
integrated, university hospital felt more devalued and 
stigmatised than those who spent time in an old, large, 
isolated state hospital. This appears to relate to the fact 
that patients in the local hospital were more likely to meet 
people they knew, and to be identified more readily as 
psychiatric patients. 
In another study Teasdale (1987) analysed the views of clients 
in a psychiatric day unit. He conjectures that the transfer to 
locally based services has made stigma management more of an 
issue for clients by reducing the possible options available. 
Thus it becomes more difficult for such clients to conceal 
their attendance from people in the locality in which they are 
3 Miles also shows how her respondents used negatively evaluated 
terms when referring to psychiatric disorder, such as 'loony', 
'mental' etc. As she points out, one might have expected her 
respondents to eschew such terms. But it may be the case that, 
as Scheff (1966) argues, there are no colloquial terms which 
present madness in other than a negative light (cf. Brandon 1987, 
Nunnally 1961). Perhaps madness has after all lost something of 
itself in its battle with reason. 
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living. Clients reported overhearing remarks such as "Why 
should they come here, they're mental, we don't want them 
around here. " The irony, as Teasdale notes, is that the day 
unit clients were already living in the town unnoticed until 
the day unit was proposed. 
An earlier project by Neuhring (1979) set out to measure, using 
a Likert-like interview schedule, the degree of social stigma 
experienced by discharged psychiatric patients and the extent 
to which these people were viewed as a burden by family and 
friends. Neuhring's results were somewhat equivocal but she 
concluded that the more depressed the ex-patients were, the 
more stigma they felt and the more they were perceived as a 
burden. The identified relevant intervening variable here is 
the search by the ex-patient, as a result of depression, for 
high degrees of social interaction. The quality of this 
interaction is not discussed. 
Two early papers which are still often referred to in the 
literature are of interest. As part of a wider study Cumming 
and Cumming (1965) interviewed 22 patients consecutively 
discharged from a state mental hospital. Although no direct 
questions about stigma were asked, 9 out of the 22 were 
adjudged to have 'felt' stigma, which was inferred from the 
interview materials. The authors found 'two basic evidences of 
stigmatization' (p138): the first an expression of shame or 
inferiority because of the hospitalisation, and the second an 
expectation of negative responses from others (and cf. Scambler 
1989). 
The retrospective study of Yarrow, Clausen and Robbins (1955a 
and cf. Yarrow et al 1955b, and see Scheff 1975 p24 for a 
critique), examining the experiences of patients' wives, 
indicated that in the post-hospital phase it was the 
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unpredictability of other people's reactions which best 
summarised the wives' experiences. The families in this study 
were then followed up over the next 15 to 20 years and the 
results published by Clausen (1981). 
From this important study based upon a series of interviews 
with several different cohorts of spouses and former-patients 
hospitalised in the 1950's and 1970's, Clausen (1981) concluded 
that stigma does not play an important part in the lives of 
former patients, thus: 'Most former patients do not feel 
isolated and punished once they have been back in the community 
for a few weeks or months' (p288), and in the twenty years up 
to 1981 there had been a 'decrease in the expectations of 
negative reactions from others--whom one knows' (p290). When 
they did inform friends and neighbours about their spouses 
hospitalisation, Clausen's husbands and wives (the exact 
percentages are not specified) reported overwhelmingly that the 
response had been sympathetic and understanding (p290) (cf. 
Schwartz 1957 paper on the first part of the same study). This 
conclusion clearly clashes directly with the results of Miles 
(1988) above. 
On their return to employment, Clausen's former patients 
reported that colleagues had been supportive and sympathetic 
and that subjects' initial apprehensions related to doubts 
about their ability to perform the job (and see Huffine and 
Clausen 1979). 
In the longer-term follow up study of people hospitalized in 
the 1950's, more than half of the husbands and wives 
acknowledged some degree of feelings of stigmatization as a 
consequence of the patient's hospitalisation(s), 'but only' one 
fifth of the wives and two-fifths of the husbands expressed 
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'anyi4 strong sense of stigmatization (p292). Some children 
who were infants or who had not been born at the time of the 
hospitalisation in the first study had not been informed about 
it 15-20 years later. 
Clausen's answer to the question he poses about 'where' 
feelings of stigmatisation come from, if not from 'actual' 
responses of others, will be considered later. 
In their analysis of feelings of stigma among relatives of 
former psychiatric patients, Freeman and Simmons (1961) 
reported that very few of their sample (24.2%) reported 
feelings of stigma, and that stigma appears to be associated 
with the degree of bizarre behaviour on the part of the 
patient, the social class of family members and their 
personality characteristics, so that '... family members who 
feel stigma may be characterised as socially incompetent and 
isolated. ' (p319). 
Gove and Fain (1973) investigated the experiences of 429 people 
who had been treated in a state mental hospital and concluded 
that only a small minority appeared to see the stigma of 
hospitalisation as having posed a serious problem. The authors 
argued that in real-life situations, audiences respond in a 
fairly reasonable and human fashion to people who are former 
patients. Townsend (1978) however has disputed these findings, 
pointing to possible sources of bias in the authors' research 
design but also making the point that Gove and Fain recount 
virtually nothing about the actual social and economic 
situations of their patients. Townsend is not quite correct 
4 Clausen's rhetorical argument is evident here in his attempt to 
minimise the import of his statistics. Two-fifths we might feel is 
not an unimportant fraction. 
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here for Gove and Fain do consider the relationships and 
activities of former patients but primarily in terms of 
quantitative reports5. 
In one of a large series of intriguing studies concerning 
stigma and mental disorder, Amerigo Farina6, together with 
Allen and Saul (1968) conducted a laboratory experiment 
involving 90 male psychology students. Through the judicious 
juggling of fabricated statements about themselves which one 
member of a pair falsely believed had been given to his 
partner, Farina et al showed that 'merely believing they were 
viewed as stigmatised influenced the behavior of the believer'. 
At the same time however, subjects in the stigma groups 
(history of psychiatric hospitalisation or homosexuality) were 
spoken to less than control group subjects: a form of 
rejection. The authors speculate that the discomfort of 
subjects in believing that the other had been given certain 
information about them, led them to act in an anxious and 
aloof way' towards the other person. 
In a further study by Farina, Gliha, Boudreau, Allen and 
Sherman (1971) the authors deployed genuine former patients. 
One half were led to believe that a prospective employer had 
been informed of their psychiatric history, while the other 
half were told that the employer believed them to be ex-medical 
patients. The prospective employer was actually a researcher, 
unaware of the subjects group membership, who asked each 
s And see Townsend's more recent comments on Gove and Fain in 
Townsend and Rakfeldt (1985). In their interesting study of 25 
'first-contact' ý pre-patients, 13 of whom were diverted from 
psychiatric hospital and 12 admitted, Townsend and Rakfeldt 
reported that the large majority of subjects saw hospitalization 
as more stigmatising than diversion. 
6I have included references to a large number of Farina's projects 
in the bibliography. 
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subject to perform a task and complete a questionnaire. The 
authors report that subjects who believed that the interviewer 
knew about their psychiatric history, felt less appreciated, 
found the task more difficult and performed the task more 
poorly than those in the control group. Furthermore the 
interviewer, although unaware of the experimental conditions, 
rated subjects in the psychiatric patient group as more tense, 
anxious and poorly adjusted than those in the control group. 
Assuming that the two groups were well matched, the implication 
here is that believing that others know about the label may be 
quite disruptive for the person carrying it and also lead to 
greater social rejection. 
The above studies of people's experiences are by no means 
conclusive and the results often appear to be in conflict, 
especially in terms of the occurrence of 'real' stigmatising 
responses (compare e. g. Miles with Clausen), yet most report 
some evidence that people who are former patients do experience 
'feelings of stigma'. The work of Farina et al suggests that 
feelings of stigmatisation may be a consequence of believing 
that others know about the mark. But for Clausen (1981) the 
real issues are different. Clausen plausibly concludes that 
while negative attitudes about mental illness do exist, there 
is no inevitable and automatic stigmatising response from 
others. However, negative attitudes cannot be 'banned' because: 
'there is a realistic basis for negative responses when one 
must deal with unreasonable behaviour, whether it is called 
sick, bad, or simply irritating' (Clausen 1981 p294). For 
Clausen the occasional 'stigma' of mental illness is to be 
located in the fear of 'law-abiding' residents of local 
neighbourhoods who are apprehensive about local levels of 
informal social control and social integration and who are now 
more likely to encounter 'chronically symptomatic patients' in 
the streets. Thus: 'If mental illness does sometimes carry a 
stigma, it is to be seen in the behaviours of such patients 
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and in the responses evoked by them' (ibid p295). From 
Clausen's perspective therefore, it is not the segregation of 
such people in psychiatric institutions that contributes to 
stigma but ironically the opposite, the more frequent 
appearance of 'chronically' mentally ill and behaviourally 
disordered people in the community. 
But in addition Clausen suggests that the anticipation of 
stigmatising responses by formerly 'psychotic' (non-chronic) 
patients relates to their own shame and self-doubt about past 
behaviours, just as anyone may feel ashamed at having lost 
self-control (ibid p295), together with their anxiety about 
whether they will be once again able to function adequately in 
particular roles (ibid p294). The fear is that people may find 
out what one has actually done, or that one may once again 
'lose control'. His explanations therefore focus upon the 
behaviour involved, rather than the label, and it appears that 
for Clausen stigma does not exist, in spite of negative public 
'attitudes'7. We might nevertheless feel that there may be many 
different ways of 'losing control' and that not all are equally 
shameful, so that shame or fear of 'loss of control' becomes 
a rather woolly notion. And Clausen fails to distinguish 
different kinds of putative problematic public behaviour, so 
that we are left being unable to distinguish mental disorder 
from vandalism. What is it, we might ask, about someone in 
public which makes them candidates 
7 Or, perhaps better, that for Clausen any residual stigma has a 
reasonable or rational base. However, by splitting behaviour and 
label in this way there is almost a sense that behaviours are 
themselves unmediated objects, whereas I have argued that this 
is not the case. Clausen could reply that it is the symbolism in 
relation to the infraction of behavioural norms which is 
significant, not the symbolic weight of the label 'mental illness'; 
indeed that the latter is derivative of the former. Nonetheless 
there is the implication, lent support by his empirical work, that 
as a former patient one will generally not be stigmatised by 
others as long as one behaves appropriately. Other empirical work 
bearing upon this argument is discussed below. 
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for the predicates mentally ill, mentally disordered, mad, and 
so forth? In Part Three of this project I set out to consider 
the methods which local village people use to 'tell the 
difference' between 'patients' and 'non-patients'. 
A parallel argument can be made that ex-patients may be over- 
sensitive as a result of continuing psychiatric problems and 
simply imagine the reactions of friends, family and 
neighbours8. However, in some of the above studies respondents 
have not been ex-patients themselves but rather pseudo-patients 
or relatives who presumably cannot as easily be said to 
directly share in any hypothesised pathological 
hypersensitivity, but who can experience courtesy stigma 
(Goffman 1963/68, Posner 1976). More profoundly we can still 
ask why, even if they are being hypersensitive, should people 
who have been psychiatric patients be hypersensitive about 
their status as 'ex-patient' as opposed to their status as 
'father', 'social worker' or 'Jehovah's Witness'? Why should 
anxiety attach to the public acknowledgement of this role as 
opposed to another? Clausen (1981)- has emphasized the 
significance of behaviour, yet it is implicit for example in 
Miles' (1988) study (and cf. Yarrow et al 1955a p44), that 
others' responses were reported to have been rejecting 
following the psychiatric hospital contact, rather than before. 
In other words the situation became most problematic after it 
had been officially ratified as to do with mental disorder in 
some way (cf. Horwitz 1982 p41). 
e Compare the study by Hamill et al (1989) which suggests that 
patients' accounts of seclusion experiences while in hospital are 
generally factually accurate although subjects tended to play 
down the part of their own aggressive behaviour. Dunn et al 
(1990), who performed a participant-observation study of a long- 
stay patients' club, and conducted interviews with patients, 
suggested that 'A close correspondence emerged between the 
observations of patients' social behaviour and material reported 
by patients when interviewed... ' (p842). 
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Nevertheless the issue of responses to disturbed behaviour is 
important and will receive further attention below. For the 
moment it is important to note that people do use information 
about themselves in different ways and with different effects 
as I shall demonstrate in Part Three. Accounts of feelings of 
stigmatisation may be no exception. In the following section 
I shall review some of the attitude studies and experimental 
work which considers how people respond to those identified as 
mentally disordered or behaviourally disturbed, and those 
central features of mental disorder which are most threatening. 
Audience Responses: Attitude Studies 
Of the large number of attitude studies conducted in this area, 
a proportion have unambiguously reported positive audience 
responses to mentally disordered people. Thus Ring and Schein 
(1970) saw the general trend in attitudinal responses to be in 
the direction of acceptance and understanding. Respondents in 
a black, middle class community expressed a pronounced degree 
of willingness to associate with people who had been 
psychiatric patients, as fellow workers, club members and 
neighbours, and if faced with a mental or emotional problem 
themselves favoured consultation with a medical 'caretaker' 
(i. e. source of help). In their questionnaire survey of 1076 
(937) General Motors workers in Baltimore, Crocetti et al 
(1971) concluded that respondents were almost unanimous in 
considering mental disorder as an illness requiring a 
physician's care and that they were optimistic about treatment 
outcomes. They found no evidence of extreme rejection by blue- 
collar workers of formerly mentally disordered people. The 
strong message from these studies is that enlightened climates 
of public opinion are related to the increased adoption of the 
medical model by the public. In a later paper, Bowen and his 
colleagues (1978) obtained similar positive responses from 
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mail questionnaires, although less than 25% were returned 
completed. In the words of Gove (1982 p290), such studies 
suggest that 'Most mental patients experience some stigma; 
however, in the vast majority of cases stigma appears to be 
transitory and does not appear to pose a severe problem... '. 
In contrast to these results, a large body of survey research 
indicates a more or less sustained negative response from the 
public. Thus Star (1955/62), Nunnally (1961), Phillips (1966), 
Maclean (1969), Tringo (1970), Sarbin and Mancuso (1970), 
Rabkin's (1974) review, Solomon and Davis (1984) have all 
indicated that people respond with dislike, fear and aversion 
to the idea of mental illness and mentally ill people. 
It is possible to locate two camps here which differ primarily 
on theoretical and ideological grounds as Rabkin (1974) has 
pointed out. While Lemkau, Crocetti and others (e. g. Crocetti 
et al 1972, Lemkau and Crocetti 1962) find positive public 
attitudes which they argue arise out of the medical model and 
illness metaphor, 'Sarbin and Mancuso (1970, Mancuso 1980) see 
negative public attitudes arising out of the same source9. 
Methodological doubts about this kind of research have led two 
critics (Rootman and Lafave 1969 p264) to ask 'So what? '. But 
some survey research is interesting not least for the 
inconsistencies it throws up. Rahav et al (1984) for example 
found that although respondents in Israel supported a modern 
medical approach and demonstrated a good deal of tolerance on 
issues of -treatment, civil rights and acceptance of mentally 
disordered people into the mainstream of society, they also 
displayed fear, mistrust and rejection at the level of close, 
personal and intimate involvement. Rahav et al have shown then 
9 For further references on this issue see p30 above, note 14. 
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how tolerance and intolerance may co-exist in a complex 
manner1°. 
In a more recent series of studies Bruce Link and colleagues 
have devised and tested a modified labelling approach which 
focuses upon the consequences of labels and raise several 
objections to critics of the labelling perspective. A central 
point is that those researchers who obtained 'positive' (i. e. 
no stigma) outcomes were measuring the wrong attitudes: 'the 
attitudes measured often were not the key theoretical concepts 
required to form an adequate test. ' (Link, Cullen, Struening, 
Shrout and Dohrenwend 1989 p420). For Link the important 
question is whether people believe 'that "most people" (the 
community at large) will devalue and discriminate against a 
mental patient. ' (ibid p403). For Link and colleagues it is the 
anticipation of such discrimination and devaluation, whether 
or not it 'really' happens, which leads to negative labelling 
effects in terms of the responses of the patient or former 
patient (and compare the studies by Farina and colleagues). 
Their sophisticated 1989 research which explored the 
relationship between beliefs that 'most people' will disvalue 
a former patient, former patients' defensive manoeuvres, and 
former patients' social support networks, supported their 
hypothesis that stigma constitutes a major variable in the 
construction of support systems. 
And - in their 1983 postal research using vignettes, Link and 
Cullen concluded that although respondents expressed an 'ideal' 
positive view of former psychiatric patients, their notions of 
how 'most people' respond were much less positive (cf. Rahav 
et al, above). 
10 Their results therefore conform more closely to what I otherwise take to be an often complex and contradictory social reality. 
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These authors therefore tend to endorse Scheff's (1966) view 
that the negative consequences of psychiatric labelling derive 
from a socialisation process reinforced by media 
representations, from which we all come to know that former and 
present psychiatric patients are devalued and discriminated 
against (in North American society). This tacit knowledge leads 
to patients adopting a variety of defensive manoeuvres (cf. 
E. E. Jones et al 1984 ch 6, Jones and Pittman 1982, Rogers and 
Buffalo 1974, Link et al 1989, Trice and Roman 1970), and often 
suffering the negative effects of the labelling process: 
'... labeling may cause demoralization (which contains 
components of anxiety and depressive symptomatology) and thus 
produce the very behavior for which a person is then rejected. ' 
(Link 1987 p110 and see also Link 1982, Link and Cullen 1990). 
Personal Characteristics 
A number of research papers have addressed the issue of those 
characteristics of both 'markables' and audience-others which 
are most likely to correlate with stigmatisation and rejection. 
Following the earlier discussion about dimensions of stigma 
(and cf. Rabkin 1980) it is possible to construct from these 
studies a 'worst-possible' scenario. Respondents least likely 
to tolerate indications of mental disorder seem likely to be 
male (Farina, Feiner and Boudreau 1973, Farina and Hagelauer 
1975, Farina, Murray and Groh 1978, Norman and Malla 1983); 
older, poorer, poorly educated, of lower socio-economic status 
(Bord 1971, Clark and Binks 1966, Dohrenwend and Chin-Shong 
1967, Nudelman 1965, Nunnally 1961, Whatley 1959); to have had 
little or no prior experience of mentally disordered people 
(Trute and Loewen 1978); to exhibit ethnocentricism (Mulford 
1968), authoritarianism and conservatism (Nudelman 1965); and 
to be unlikely to perceive any similarity between themselves 
and the former patient (Ring and Farina 1969, and cf. Doob and 
Ecker 1970). 
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Those former patients least tolerated appear likely to be male 
(Phillips 1964, Linsky 1970); from a lower socio-economic group 
and low status racial-ethnic groups (Bord 1971, Linsky 1970); 
to lack close social ties in the community (Linsky 1970); and 
to exhibit dangerous and unpredictable behaviour (Bord 1971, 
Fracchia et al 1976a, 1976b, Kirk 1974, Nunnally 1961). In 
addition, research by Farina et al (1977,1986) and Napoleon 
et al (1980) has suggested that hospitalised patients are 
considered to be less physically attractive than 'normal' 
controls. 
However this scenario is not consistently supported. Blizard 
(1970) for example concluded that age and educational status 
of his New Zealand respondents were unrelated to respondents' 
attitudes, and that 'previous contact' and 'authoritarianism' 
were of only marginal significance. Trute and Loewen (1978) 
modify their conclusion that 'the higher the level of direct 
exposure to the mentally ill, the less rejecting the attitude' 
(p83). They suggest that previous 'direct experience' was less 
significant in situations involving 'personal activities' or 
'social relations' with others identified as mentally ill. And 
a more recent vignette-based study by Malla and Shaw (1987) of 
female nursing students concluded that direct experience with 
psychiatric patients had no influence upon social distance 
scores. 
Label or Behaviour? 
A certain proportion of attitude studies have focused on the 
issue of the effects of the label in contrast to the behaviour 
of the labelled person (Bord 1971, Fracchia 1975,1976b, Husek 
and Bobren 1964, Kirk 1974, Phillips 1964, Schwartz et al 
1974). 
In his study of 350 college students, Bord (1971) concluded 
that the 'behavioural variable' exerted the strongest and most 
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systematic influence on rejection. His proposal here is that 
rejection will increase as behaviours violate 'highly valued 
norms', the most salient being that people should not engage 
in threatening behaviour and that people should behave in a 
reasonably predictable fashion (see the discussion of 
predictability in chapter 2 above). However he also concludes 
that the 'threat factor' implied by any given behaviour is 
contingent upon the actor's socio-economic status and other 
social characteristics together with situational factors and 
the social characteristics of members of the audience. 
The focus shifts a little in Kirk's (1974) study in which he 
concludes that it is only behaviour which influences rejection 
and that the effect of the label is negligible in comparison. 
Lent support by other studies, some of which rated subjects' 
responses to videotape sequences (Lehmann et al 1976, Loman and 
Larkin 1976, Lindsay 1982, Pollack et al 1976), the implication 
here is that in the absence of problematic behaviour in 
interaction, labels do not in themselves evoke negative 
responses. 
In their research of public perceptions of former psychiatric 
patients, Fracchia and colleagues (1975,1976b) reported that 
'More positive perceptions of mildly ill ex-mental patients 
were obtained when subjects were given short paragraphs 
describing typical behaviors and symptoms. ' (1976b p76). The 
implication here is that although the public respond negatively 
to the label 'ex-mental patient', when provided with 
information about behaviour they may alter their evaluation. 
Such research arguably supports the notion that both behaviour 
and label are important. This issue has been further tackled 
in a number of interesting papers by Farina and colleagues. 
In an early study Farina and Ring (1965) involved pairs of male 
psychology students in a laboratory experiment. One member of 
each pair was led to believe that his partner had been twice 
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hospitalised for a mental disorder. The pseudo ex-patients were 
then consistently perceived as less likeable and competent by 
their partners. Furthermore when the pairs were asked to co- 
operate on a particular task, the pseudo ex-patients were 
reported by their partners as having hindered the joint 
performance even though this performance had been quite 
adequate or better in comparison to that of the control pairs. 
The authors conclude that believing an individual to be 
mentally ill strongly influences the perception of that 
individual in spite of the fact that his behaviour fails to 
justify these perceptions. 
In a series of later studies (Farina, Feiner and Boudreau 
1973b, Farina and Hagelauer 1975, Farina, Murray and Groh 
1978), five experiments were conducted using subjects who were 
workers at three different places of employment: department 
store, hospital and university. Workers were asked to meet a 
job applicant, a confederate of the researchers, who had been 
instructed to act 'normally' with half of the subjects and to 
behave in a nervous and tense manner with the rest, a different 
confederate being used for each of the five studies. In each 
study half of the workers were told that the applicant was a 
former psychiatric patient while the other half was not. While 
the female subjects tended to discriminate against the 
'nervous' applicant and welcome the pseudo ex-patient, the male 
subjects unequivocally rejected the pseudo ex-patient as well 
as the 'nervous' applicant. The authors concluded that women 
tend to treat former-patients more favourably than do men (cf. 
Farina 1981) and that 'Not all ex-mental patients are treated 
badly by everyone' (1973b p371). Clearly the authors were 
surprised at the results which appeared to challenge some of 
their previous assumptions concerning the importance of the 
label 'former patient' in comparison to behaviour (ibid). 
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In addition to Farina and his colleagues, Page has also 
attempted some relatively unusual approaches to the subject 
including the 'lost-letter' method developed by Milgram (Page 
1980). His 1977 study of 180 landlords/ladies, investigating 
the responses to enquiries for accommodation, found that the 
female researcher was considerably less likely to be offered 
accommodation if she revealed by telephone that she was about 
to leave a psychiatric hospital, than if she made a 'simple 
enquiry' with no such reference. 
In a further project, Farina, Hagelauer and Holzberg (1976) 
investigated the responses of private medical practitioners 
towards people presenting with physical symptoms but thought 
to be former psychiatric patients. A pseudo former psychiatric 
patient presented to half of the 32 practitioners complaining 
of stomach pains suggestive of ulcers. The authors concluded 
that 
... a former mental patient seems to receive the same 
medical treatment as anyone else' (p499). 
Research by MIND (1986) investigated responses of prospective 
employers using 179 matched pairs of job applications which 
differed substantively only by reference to a 'nervous 
breakdown' and psychiatric hospital admission one to two years 
previously. Although discrimination was said to have applied 
to one quarter of such applications, in a pilot study of 80 
matched pairs there appeared to be no discrimination of those 
applications which included the diagnosis 'depression' together 
with psychiatric hospitalisation (compare a similar method by 
Fry 1986 for the Spastics Society). 
Finally, in their postal questionnaire research using vignettes 
Link, Cullen, Frank and Wozniak (1987) concluded that the label 
'former-patient' led to high social distance scores from those 
members of the public who linked mental disorder with danger. 
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For people who did not see former patients as dangerous however 
the same label fostered low social distance scores. In other 
words for these authors the label 'former patient' is important 
and its significance depends upon the kinds of beliefs held by 
the audience. This leads to a further consideration of the 
relationship between danger and mental disorder. 
Danger and Mental Disorder 
From many of the above studies, perceived dangerousness and 
unpredictability often recur as twin themes which underlie 
explanations for rejection of people who have been psychiatric 
patients. There are two main arguments here. The first is that 
ex-patients are unlikely to be rejected by others unless they 
display such behaviour (e. g. Bord 1971, Kirk 1974). Some of the 
studies outlined above (e. g by Farina et al and Link et al) 
challenge this assumption. The second related proposition 
connected to debates about madness is that rejection may occur 
because people who have been in a psychiatric hospital are 
believed to be generally dangerous and unpredictable (e. g. 
Fracchia et al 1976a, 1976b, Link et al 1987). 
The topic of the 'actual' dangerousness of people who have or 
have had psychiatric problems has received considerable 
research time but such efforts are again bedevilled by 
methodological and definitional problems which make 
generalisations themselves difficult and dangerous (C. I. Cohen 
1980, Monahan 1988). The results depend upon whether certain 
patient categories are included as mentally disordered, e. g. 
people with diagnoses of substance abuse, 'personality 
disorder' and so on, and whether people with arrest histories 
prior to hospitalisation are included. Rabkin (1980), Treffert 
(1981) and others have also argued that those former patients 
admitted to inadequate community facilities are more likely to 
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be arrested for minor offences such as vagrancy, shoplifting 
or disorderly conduct. This represents for Treffert (1981) a 
criminalisation of mentally disordered people. 
To simplify somewhat, Steadman and*Cocozza (1977-78,1978), 
Cocozza (1980) and Rabkin (1980) appear to consider that 
mentally-disordered people are no more dangerous than others 
(and cf. Steadman 1984). Teplin (1985) presented data of 1072 
police-citizen encounters in an urban area (USA) and concluded 
that the patterns of crime for mentally-disordered and non- 
mentally-disordered people were substantially similar, the 
former group not being suspected of crimes at a rate 
disproportionate to their numbers in the population. As early 
as 1938, in research commissioned by the State Department of 
Mental Hygiene, Pollock reported a comparatively low rate of 
criminal offences committed by patients 'paroled' from State 
hospitals over a one year period. 
The 'natural experiment' created by the discharge directed by 
the Supreme Court of 967 patients from a hospital for the 
'criminally insane' (the 'Baxtrom case') produced fascinating 
results in which only 3% of such people were eventually 
returned to a high security hospital (Gunn 1990, Steadman and 
Keveles 1972). It suggests that many people whom we (or the 
USA) keep locked up in secure institutions really do not need 
to be there. 
In their survey of the records of men remanded to Brixton 
prison over four months, Taylor and Gunn (1984) suggest that 
'... although most offending by schizophrenic men was trivial' 
(p1948), the link between schizophrenia and homicide was 
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strong". Five out of 61 men charged with murder were said to 
have been schizophrenic, and all five were convicted. This link 
between schizophrenia and violence is endorsed elsewhere 
(Krakowski et al 1986, Mullen 1988), although an earlier study 
by Evenson et al (1974) of 'incident reports' from a large 
state psychiatric hospital, concluded that people with 
schizophrenic disorders had low risk-rates for disturbing 
incidents across all factors (including e. g. 'assault', 
'elopement', 'self-injury', 'antisocial behaviour'), compared 
with patients of other diagnostic categories. A more recent 
longitudinal study by Lindqvist and Allebeck (1990) of 790 
(644) schizophrenic patients discharged from hospitals in 
Stockholm in 1971 and followed up until 1986, reported that 
although the rate of violent offences committed by this group 
was four times higher than that of 'normals', the violence 
recorded was 'almost exclusively of minor severity' (p345). 
In an earlier and commonly cited study of the hospital records 
of 400 hospitalised mentally ill patients, excluding patients 
diagnosed as having a personality disorder and as drug or 
alcohol dependent, Lagos et al (1977) concluded that 36% of 361 
admissions 'were preceded by some form of violent, fear- 
inspiring behaviour. ' (p1134). We are not told whether the 
patients were admitted 'formally' or 'informally'. 
A problem with studies which utilise the retrospective review 
of records (see Krakowski 1986 for references) is that they 
play down the way records are rhetorically constructed in a 
manner which builds the kind of case which then becomes 
eligible to be read as a case of that particular kind 
11 Earlier, Taylor (1982 p269) had stated 'There is no doubt that 
schizophrenics are capable of violent behaviour and, there, any 
certainty about the relationship between schizophrenia and 
violence ends. ' 
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(Garfinkel 1967). When professionals write up case notes they 
have a regard for the way such notes may be used, and the same 
may be said of the accounts offered by relatives who are intent 
upon the patient being admitted to hospital. Explanations for 
example for compulsory detention may have to be reported to a 
tribunal, or a Court if the patient sues for wrongful 
detention. Once a decision for compulsory detention has been 
made, then the professional (psychiatrist or social worker) and 
relative will tend to have regard for justifying their actions 
as rational for all practical purposes and we may say that such 
accounts indeed constitute the reality of previous dangerous 
behaviour. But what Lagos et al miss is the often equivocal 
dialogic process by which such a definition is reached and in 
which power is implicated. From their viewpoint both mental 
illness and dangerousness become reified and cases become 
hardened. 'Dangerousness' may then be a convenient resource 
which professionals and relatives may (unconsciously) use in 
constructing their accounts, thereby reconstituting 
stereotypical notions12. 
To conclude with a more recent controversy, Dr Donald Dick's 
(1990) well-intentioned suggestion of the creation of a 
register of 'designated patients' in order to keep track upon 
vulnerable and potentially violent discharged patients has been 
met with angry rebuke. In a published reply to Dr Dick from the 
Director of International Self-Advocacy Alliance, Mike Lawson 
(1990) states 'We are as unanimous in not choosing his dubious 
12 From the perspective of the approved social worker the 
assessment of dangerousness in various guises is arguably a core 
part of the whole assessment. The 1983 Mental Health Act refers 
to the criteria for compulsory admission for treatment: 'necessary 
for the health or safety of the patient or for the protection of 
other persons' (sec 3(2)(c)). In this way dangerousness (and 
risk) is a central parameter around which decisions for 
compulsory admission are made and justified (cf. Mills 1988), and 
thereby becomes 'built into' assessments. 
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register as were Jews not wanting to wear the yellow star. The 
effect would be the same. ' And in their discussion of the 
increasing use of the predicate 'dangerous', Forbes and Thomas 
(1990) ask 'If we are going to use the label "dangerous" why 
stop at clients and professionals? What about dangerous living 
conditions? What about the dangerous councillors and 
politicians...? ' From the perspective of the present research 
programme it will be observed that while patients sometimes 
signify danger to villagers, a number of patients have 
themselves been killed crossing the road which separates 
village from hospital. 
Attitudes and Arguments 
The above review of the literature confirms at the very least 
that the anticipation of negative audience responses may be of 
crucial importance to people who are present or former 
psychiatric patients, and indeed to the rest of us in our 
future encounters with psychiatry and in our efforts to re- 
establish a dialogue with madness. That the public may indeed 
entertain competing opinions or views about such people is a 
theme which recurs within certain empirical studies of public 
reactions, although it may be only implicitly expressed. At the 
same time it will have been seen that 'danger' often appears 
as a central theme around which empirical projects are 
organised. 
But before moving on to consider methodological issues in more 
detail, I wish to conclude with some reservations about the 
task of identifying public views as if there were immutable 
structures of belief which exist, as it were, over and above 
actors' experiences, lives and practices, structures immune 
from feedback and influence. 
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This position is implicit in the work of several of the above 
authors. Although I have sympathy with many of their arguments, 
the focus for example of Bruce Link and colleagues upon the 
central role of the common understanding that 'most people' 
will devalue and discriminate against people who are former 
patients, an understanding derived from socialisation and the 
representations of the mass media, is suggestive both of an 
relatively autonomous realm of ideas, as well as a conception 
of actors as oversocialised and uncritical 'judgmental dopes' 
(Garfinkel 1967 p66 ff). 
But this fails to adequately explain how such negative ideas 
originate or how they may change. If we are all inevitably 
socialised into this seamless view, which then at some 
mysterious point becomes immune to feedback from further 'real' 
experiences and responses, then it seems that the prospects for 
change are limited indeed. How, and from where, does the 
impetus for further debate arise which will enable the mutation 
of such ideas? 
By way of contrast, as I have already indicated, I am 
interested in the way that reality is skilfully reconstructed 
in practice but in relation to structures which both inform 
such practices while being sustained, challenged or changed by 
them. In Parts Two and Three of the thesis I consider the 
dialectic between interaction and structure from different 
perspectives. In particular I focus in Part Three on the 
reconstruction of reality in dialogue, in which villagers draw 
differentially upon sometimes competing interpretative 
repertoires and with a variety of effects. Knowledge of what 
'most people' will do can then be seen as a flexible structure 
or resource rather than something by which our actions and 
feelings are inevitably and unthinkingly conditioned. We all 
necessarily possess shared and common knowledge in various 
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forms, but may at times choose to challenge common sense 
understandings and knowledge claims (and see the discussion of 
the work of Habermas in chapter 5 below). Thus while we may 
understand discrimination against people with psychiatric 
histories to be 'what everybody knows', the contradictions, 
ambiguities and argumentative complexities of 'common 
knowledge' may not have been fully grasped by attitude and 
opinion studies13. When the argumentative and rhetorical 
contexts of thought are taken into account, then public 
responses may appear in a different light. 
The neglect by attitude studies of this argumentative context 
is arguably the neglect of a central component of human life. 
Whereas the study of stereotypes is often the study of the 
apparently immutable and autonomous, to study the structures 
of argument is to show how ideas about mental disorder and 
patients (and, potentially, ideas generally14) are discursively 
and complexly reproduced. 
And from the perspective of the patient, shame may be of 
central importance in understanding 'felt' stigma as well as 
the production of psychiatric symptoms. It is tied to socially 
constructed notions of the subject, of self-worth, of value and 
substance. Yet shame, when shared, discussed and debated may 
also be ameliorable'5. 
13 Although to be fair to Link and his colleagues, they have 
emphasised the often subtle and dilemmatic or contradictory 
aspects of attitudes towards people who are former psychiatric 
patients (e. g. Link and Cullen 1983) albeit expressed in terms of 
different 'attitude levels'. 
14 Compare e. g. Thompson's (1990 p8) view that to study ideology is 
to study how symbolic forms or systems 'are used and understood 
in specific social contexts. ' 
is That it is possible for people to change their ideas and feelings 
about themselves and their behaviour is of course a fundamental tenet of psychotherapy. 
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Chapter 5 
Phi .Z osophi c&1 and . Plethodol ogri cal 
Issues of Researching. Pzzbl 3c Reac ti ons 
In this chapter I shall briefly explore the theory and logic 
of competing methods as they relate to this project. My 
underlying premise is that methods are tied to theories 
concerning the nature of social reality and the conditions, 
scope and possibility of our knowledge concerning such reality. 
Attitudes and Experiments 
My approach to attitude studies owes something to Habermas' 
characterisation of positivism as a 'disavowal of reflection' 
(1968/1987 pvii, p67-69)1. My position is that while it is 
possible to reconcile an orientation to truth with a social 
constructionist view, we should be suspicious of research which 
represents itself as unproblematically objective and unbiased, 
research which displays no acknowledgement of conceptual, 
methodological and philosophical problems, and which attempts 
This is probably insulting to those who admit to being positivists, 
for 'reflection' we may say is a necessary part of any thoughtful 
research. Habermas is complaining about the way positivism has 
'repressed older philosophical traditions and... monopolized the 
self-understanding of the sciences... ' (ibid p69). See, on 
positivism, Adorno (1976), Bryant (1985), Cohen (1980), Glddens 
(1974/75), Halfpenny (1982), Kolakowski (1972). Cohen (1980) seems 
to want to argue that whether we acknowledge it or not, most 
sociologists are probably positivists at heart, and anyway 
unknowledgeable of some of its distinguishing characteristics. If the latter point is correct then perhaps this supports Habermas' 
view. 
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to discard in the name of disinterested science its inherently 
social nature. All research is creative, and that research 
which denies its creative moment is in danger of becoming 
ideological2. 
Sociological critiques which show how influence, persuasion, 
unwarranted interpretation and dubious coding practices are an 
inherent part of survey research, and lead to bias and error, 
now have a substantial history (e. g. Cicourel 1964, Bruyn 1966, 
Phillips 1971,1973, Sjoberg and Nett 1968, and Webb et al 
1971). 
But underlying the concept of attitude, as well as the 
positions of some of its critics, is the notion that there is 
some concealed, underlying and fixed structure of beliefs to 
which access can be gained by asking enough of the right kinds 
of questions (Finch 1987a p110). Attitudes are often viewed as 
internal mental states which partake of an enduring and 
homogenous nature and as Sayer (1984 p230) has argued, 
descriptions of attitudes often appear to be treated as 
'preliminary versions of law-like statements about eternal 
regularities. ' 
In contrast to this idea it is possible to argue that people 
construct and express 'attitudes' for particular purposes, in 
different contexts (especially the context of survey research), 
and with differing effects. While from one viewpoint many of 
the factors arising in the collection of sociological data can 
be read as 'biases' to be eradicated by the use of increasingly 
2 Nevertheless in spite of his critique of positivism, Habermas' own 
version of natural science is ambiguous at least in its early form, 
as Vogel (1988) has recently argued. See also Parsons, who finds 
a tension in Habermas: '... in the end, Habermas appeals to that 
constituted (nature) to justify the act of constitution itself. ' (1992 
p224). 
A 
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precise means, so that the object becomes, as it were, 
approached and scrutinised more closely by an independent 
subject, an alternative view sees bias itself as expressing 
something fundamental about human interaction and 
communication. Here, we might say, the relation between subject 
and object becomes much more complex. For Billig (1987) for 
example the world of everyday experience is full of shifting 
opinions and impressions, a rhetorical world filled with the 
'spirit of contradiction' and argument, and in which logoi are 
perpetually challenged by anti-logoi. In Billig's (ibid p225) 
terms our attitudes represent 'unfinished business in the 
continual controversies of social life'. Thus for Billig, as 
for Protagoras, there are two opposing sides to every question 
(Billig 1987 p41)3. As Shotter (1989 p154-5) has put it: 
'... practical-moral knowledge is not a unified system, but 
constituted in large part argumentatively (Billig 1987), i. e., 
in terms of common-places (or topoi) whose discursive 
formulations are "essentially contested" (Gallie, 1955-6). ' 
Furthermore it is by no means clear that people even have 
opinions or attitudes towards objects until their attention is 
drawn to them by the researcher with the clipboard and 
questionnaire. Friedrich Pollock nicely caught the implications 
in the following manner: 
That lack of interest in public affairs on the part of the 
individual who enjoys democratic rights, which is the 
subject of so much lamentation, may in part result from 
the fact that when confronted with these matters he feels 
helpless, having neither the time, the energy, nor the 
education to put together the data necessary to form a 
personal opinion. By proceeding on the assumption that it 
is necessary to have an opinion about everything, opinion 
research runs the risk of seducing people in the 
interviews it conducts to express opinions they do not 
3 The notion of the two-sided or two-handed nature of common- 
sense is pursued in Billig et al (1988). 
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instinctively hold, opinions which are not theirs at all. 
Precisely the contradiction between the compulsion to have 
an opinion and the incapacity to form an opinion leads 
many people to accept stereotypes which relieve them of 
the thankless task of forming their own opinions and yet 
enable them to enjoy the prestige of being in touch with 
things. (Pollock 1955/1978 p229) 
In other words although it is arguably the case that all 
research, and indeed all social action, reconstructs social 
reality in some manner, the danger of survey research is that 
it may be said to consolidate and recreate a stereotypical 
reality4, or in Barthes words, to awaken the monster of signs5. 
The 'problem' of the disjunction between expressed attitudes 
and subsequent behaviour, and the predictive power of 
attitudes, also has a long and controversial history (LaPierre 
1934, Ajzen and Fishbein 1980, Deutscher 1973, Wicker 1969)6. 
LaPierre's old study continues to receive reference space 
(Ajzen and Fishbein 1980, Billig 1987), and in relation to 
mental disorder (Miles 1981,1987, Rabkin 1974), while his 
results have been subject to alternative interpretations. 
Billig (1987 p188-9) shows that while for Campbell there was 
'consistency' between attitudes and behaviour in LaPierre's 
4 At the same time, the form of large public opinion polls effectively 
reinforces the democratic ideal that each individual opinion counts 
equally, whereas we may have cause to doubt this in 'real' life. 
And following the lines of Pollock's argument, attitude studies and 
public opinion polls may be considered to represent a vestigial, 
depoliticised and privatised aspect of a more open debate which 
arguably once occurred in the bourgeois 'public sphere' (cf. 
Habermas 1974, McCarthy 1978, Eagleton 1984 and Rodger 1985). 
5 Barthes (1983 p461) suggested that within each sign 'sleeps that 
monster: a stereotype. ' 
6I have not attempted a rigorous review of the literature nor of the precise arguments concerning the predictive significance and 
sequence of attitudes, beliefs and behaviour. See O'Keefe (1990) 
for a recent overview. 
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study, for Deutscher there was 'inconsistency'. As Billig 
points out, what is pseudo-inconsistency for one is genuine 
inconsistency for another. Again this points to the social, 
rhetorical and dialogic nature of our adjudicative criteria by 
which reality becomes defined. 
One particular tool which has been used in many of the above 
studies is the 'vignette method' (e. g. Bord 1971, Kirk 1974, 
Link and Cullen 1983, Link et al 1987, Phillips 1964,1966, 
Star 1955/62). Those vignettes used in the above studies tend 
to constitute essentially static representations. In her 1987a 
paper Janet Finch advocated the use of longer and more complex 
vignettes which can be built into a narrative structure, 
incorporating changes which occur as if over time. This 
vignette method has the merit of increasing the concreteness 
and contextuality of material and is congruent with the notion 
of dramatic narrative as the crucial form for the understanding 
of human action, a view with which I have some sympathy (see 
also Barham 1984, Gergen 1988, Maclntyre 1977,1981). 
Nevertheless although this method has distinct advantages over 
that of the fixed vignette, it shares some of its problems. In 
particular Finch has used these vignettes to 'tap the general 
imagery' (ibid p112-3) of the public morality of family 
relationships, but the suspicion still remains that she is 
attempting to test for the existence of an hypostatised and 
independent structure of beliefs. And as with more standard 
attitude studies, this approach is open to the criticism that 
reactions to contextualised vignettes are unreflectively 
constitutive of this reality as an outcome of the research 
process itself. 
However, that her position is in fact more complex than this 
can be seen from a later paper where Finch hypothesises a 
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flexible and socially constructed normative structure which is 
drawn upon in negotiations between people (Finch 1987b), 
although she still seems to assume that such a structure is 
readily susceptible to investigation by survey research. And 
it is precisely the rhetorical and argumentative context which 
structures, and is structured by, ongoing 'negotiations' and 
definitions of the situation, which survey research, including 
Finch's sophisticated vignette method, arguably misses. 
It may be that some of these problems of research can be 
resolved once we regard all research as contributing in 
different ways to what is essentially a public debate in which 
claims to normative rightness and truth become thematised. 
Nevertheless I also want to support and reserve for the moment 
the argument that different objects are best researched by 
different methods but in a manner whereby the competing 
conventions of research together with the nature of the objects 
themselves are socially elaborated. 
If attitude and vignette-based surveys raise questions about 
the nature of the object under investigation, the kind of 
laboratory-based experiments conducted by, for example, Farina 
and colleagues are also beset with difficulties. A primary 
objection is that such experiments often amount to a form of 
behaviourism so that participants' responses become abstracted 
from their meanings (e. g. Harre and Secord 1972). In the 
'artificial' setting of the laboratory we may also reasonably 
expect to encounter=-all those sorts of 'bias' which beset 
survey research, from modelling/ expectancy effects and 
acquiescence responses derived from an hypothesised desire to 
please the researcher, to deliberate or unconscious attempts 
to distort and deceive, based upon a diametrically opposed 
hypothesised desire to subvert the research programme. 
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These difficulties are, however, endemic in most forms of 
"social research and Billig's (1987 p72) argument that the 
social psychology experiment does not solve problems in any 
straightforward manner but actually creates more uncertainty, 
can also be applied elsewhere. No 'vacuum cleaner', the 
psychology experiment does not suck up the confusing layer of 
dirt to reveal an underlying shiny reality? (ibid p206), but 
tends to create more dirt. In the terms of Bhaskar's 
(1979/1989) realism, social psychology experiments rather 
naively assume the possibility of system closure. 
The Prejudice of Stereotypes 
The reader will recall that negative stereotypes of mental 
disorder feature prominently in the work of Scheff, Link and 
others. According to Scheff these stereotypes are learned in 
early childhood and continually reaffirmed in everyday life and 
discourse. For Scheff they acquire a certain impermeability and 
are highly resistant to change. The concept of stereotypes was 
first advanced by Lippmann in 1930, and Townsend (1978) has 
provided an account of his position which I follow here. 
Lippmann viewed stereotypes as emerging remorselessly out of 
the necessarily selective process of perception and 
categorisation; largely automatic, culturally determined, 
associated with a particular affect and subject to unconscious 
7 We may compare Popper here, for whom the elusive nature of firm 
and clear ground, or shiny floor, applies equally to the natural 
sciences. Although approaching nearer to the truth, defined in 
Tarskian correspondence terms, natural science rests on the 
swamp of falsification rather than hard rock. However, getting 
nearer to the truth in Popper's terms still appears to be 
problematic on at least two counts. First because Popper himself 
expresses doubts about our ability to know when we have found the truth, and secondly because of the status of his falsificationism as a method aimed at telling us when we have failed to find the truth (Popper 1959,1963). 
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distortion. He argued that stereotypes are constantly used by 
us to justify our actions and position in society but that 
although inevitable, they need not necessarily remain negative 
and should be 'recognised', 'held lightly', and 'modified 
gladly' (Townsend 19788 p39, and see also Miller 1982). 
The issue of necessary pre-judgement has been developed within 
the different tradition of philosophical hermeneutics by Hans- 
Georg Gadamer (1975/79, and see Warnke 1987 for a good 
account). For Gadamer, prejudices constitute our very being and 
may be blind or enabling, thus: 'What is necessary is a 
fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a 
recognition that there are legitimate prejudices... ' (Gadamer 
1975/79 p246). These may be distinguished, explicated or 
challenged not monologically but only through dialogical 
encounter, and indeed constitute the very possibility of such 
encounter. When Gadamer argues that to understand is always to 
understand anew or differently, he means that such 
understanding is only possible because of the prejudices and 
prejudgments that are constitutive of what we are (Bernstein 
1986 p98). It is in this sense that Gadamer speaks Of the 
hermeneutic endeavour as an ontological condition of our being 
in the world. From this perspective hermeneutic understanding 
is achieved in practice via a If usion of horizons' in dialogue 
rather than an empathetic identification of subjective meanings 
or a process of socialisation9. Gadamer's position may be 
contrasted, for example, with that of Winch (e. g. 1964) for 
8 In his empirical cross-cultural study Townsend (1978) found no 
evidence of the extreme negative stereotyping discussed by 
Scheff, but did find contrasting cultural conceptions of mental 
disorder. 
According to Gadamer, the best definition of hermeneutics is: '... to 
let what is alienated by the character of the written word or by 
the character of being distantiated by cultural or historical 
distances speak again' (quoted in Bernstein 1986 p63). 
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whom forms of life appear hermetic and monadic (cf. Bernstein 
1976/1979,1983, Outhwaite 1975/85 p98, Habermas 1970/1988 
p136, Welimer 1971, p29). 
From the direction of social psychology, Billig (1987) has 
recently argued against the idea that prejudice and 
stereotyping are merely inevitable instances of the normal 
cognitive processes of categorisation: 
If prejudice, or stereotyping, is the outgrowth of normal 
thought processes, then one can ask how, on this logic, 
it is possible to have tolerant thoughts, especially since 
we have a "propensity" for prejudice? (p126) 
For Billig, cognitive theories often develop a one-sided image 
of the person which excludes particularisation, and in the 
process they fail to grasp the essence of thinking itself: 
The automatic application of categories is the negative 
of thinking, in that it is essentially a thoughtless 
process. thinking starts when we argue or deliberate about 
which categorisation to particularise or how to categorise 
a particularisation. (p140) 
Categorisation does not then exist on its own but is 
accompanied by particularisation. People are depicted as able 
to choose between different argumentative strategies, drawing 
upon those categories suitable for the occasion. Billig is 
therefore arguing for the mutable nature of prejudices and 
stereotypes which may be challenged and used imaginatively in 
the rhetorical contexts of justification and criticism10. It is 
10 Billig's (1987) work occasionally generates, peritropically, a hint 
of paradox. For if, as he argues, no argument ever has the last 
word, then from where does Billig's argument about arguments 
speak? This is another version of the relativist paradox. His 
efforts to avoid this appear to take him towards Habermas (Billig 
1991). See my discussions below. 
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this process, I argue, which survey research misses. 
But what may appear to be a disjunction between the views of 
Billig and Gadamer turns out not to be the case. Gadamer does 
not see prejudice as static, ahistorical or necessarily 
restricted to categorisation per se, and Billig does not 
advocate a tabula rasa of cognitive processes nor the 
possibility of a value-neutral language. Both would agree on 
the primacy and 'inner infinity' of dialogue, debate and 
argument and both would be likely to concur that on the 
cognitive level, prejudices involve a dialectical relationship 
between the general (categorisation) and the particular". 
This brief consideration of stereotypes and prejudice has 
served two purposes. The first has been to reinforce the idea 
that stereotypes and attitudes may be used differentially in 
debate and argument (cf. Potter and Wetherell 1987, Quastoff 
1978), -in other words that while stereotypical images may well 
'exist', they may or may not be drawn upon or reinforced in 
I have 
-attempted 
to pull Billig and Gadamer together here. 
However the Issues are at least as complex, we might say, as those 
which separate Protagoras from Socrates. There Is certainly a 
notion in Gadamer of dialogue towards truth which appears to 
parallel Socrates' notion of a 'common search' for truth (Plato 
1956, Billig 1987 p24), although for Gadamer there can be no 
'closure', no end to understanding, and dialogue cannot be 
transcended by the attainment of an Ideal world of eternal truth 
as Plato might have wished. on the other hand Billig does recently 
seem to be moving towards the position of Habermas In his 
suggestion that some reasons are better than others, and his 
celebration of argumentation which 'would express the wish for 
conditions of undistorted communication. ' (Billig 1991 p26). Or 
again, Billig suggests that Socratic dialogue Is not a good example 
of 'true conversation' as Gadamer (1975/85 p326-347) Implies, but 
actually Protagorean In form and In Its regular lack of agreement 
(Billig 1987 p24-48). Elsewhere Gadamer (1976 p24) has emphasised 
the Interlocking ubiquity of rhetoric and hermeneutical 
understanding, derived from their joint rootedness in 'everyday 
discourse and common-sense experience' (Dallmayr 1991 p20). See 
also Stone (1988). 
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practice. The second has been to introduce the important idea 
of the universality of hermeneutics as dialogue, that the 
quintessence of our being is to be dialogical' (Bernstein 1986 
p65). It is in this sense that I understand not only 
participant-observation and the interpretation of historical 
documents drawn upon in this study but also the analysis of 
discourse presented in Part Three. 
Natural and Social Science 
In contrast to a positivist view of natural science in which 
the observer allows him or herself to be impressed by objective 
reality, having removed bias, prejudice and emotional 
involvement, 'Observation is shot through with interpretation, 
expectation and wish' (Scheffler, quoted in Mulkay 1979 p47). 
From developments within many branches of the human sciences 
(e. g. philosophy of science, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, the psychology of perception, critical anthropology 
and critical theory), the observer must now be seen as actively 
ordering reality, so that observation consists in the active 
interpretation of sense-impressions in terms of a linguistic, 
theoretical, and practical framework. Some concepts and 
theories are always present in the very act of scientific 
observation. Following the debates involving Kuhn, Popper, 
Lakatos and Musgrave, Feyerabend and others, such arguments are 
now no longer neW12. The relativist-constructivist perspective 
has caught up with natural science (e. g. Woolgar 1988a, 1989, 
Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (eds) 1983), and to paraphrase Habermas 
(1986a p204), a fallibilist conception of truth and knowledge 
has become trivial and commonplace13. Hermeneutic endeavour is 
12 The arguments here probably do not require further rehearsal. 
13 Within the philosophy of science the view of the theory-ladenness 
of observation in fact has a long history. See Kolakowski (1972) 
for an account of Duhem and conventionalism. Popper produced 
his Logic der Forschung in 1934. 
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not confined to the social sciences but is central to the 
natural sciences. At the same time we may agree with Giddens 
(1976 p79,1977) that since the objects of natural science do 
not, as far as we are willing to concede, themselves interpret 
the world'4, then we may still distinguish between a single and 
a double hermeneutic'5. 
From the perspective of the 'post-empiricist' philosophy of 
science, natural science has become a complex affair in which 
there appears to be nothing in the physical world which 
uniquely determines the conclusions of the scientific 
community. In the words of Derek Phillips (1979 P84) 
1 ... nature" has something to say although it does not determine 
what we can say. I In contrast to the standard view, therefore, 
natural scientific knowledge has come to be seen (by some) as 
not stable in meaning, not independent of social context and 
practices or the communication structures of investigators, and 
not certified by the application of universally agreed 
scientific procedures (Knorr-Cetina 1981, Knorr-Cetina and 
Mulkay 1983, but cf. Lynch and Fuhrman 1991, Radder 1992, for 
criticisms of this position). 
14 But see Law (ed) (1991) and my computer's independent 
communication in Woolgar (1991 p92). 
15 Although from Woolgar's (e. g. 1983,1988a) relativist and 
'constitutive, position, (and compare also Gadamer 1975/1979 and 
Wittgenstein 1953/1958), what we take to be precise differences 
between the respective natures of subject and object are 
themselves the agonistic (and textual) outcome of social practices 
(cf. Law (ed) 1991, Latour and Woolgar 1979). Or, further, In the 
terms of Law (1991 Introduction), what appears to be 'social' is 
In fact 'soclotechnicall. Compare also Bhaskar's (1979/1989) 
realism, and Knorr-Cetina (1981). 
16 Although I think we must be continually aware of the danger of 
perpetuating the opposition between (wo)mankind and nature. 
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Rationality and Relativism: The Relevance of Habermas 
The extension of the notion of the theory-ladenness of 
observation to the natural sciences, together with the 
associated idea of the underdetermination of theory by 
evidence, has led inevitably to the 'problem' of relativism". 
If all observations are necessarily impregnated with theory, 
then it appears as if scientific knowledge is determined by its 
theoretical presuppositions rather than the world itself. 
Instead of theory-neutral observation we end up with 
observation-neutral theory (Sayer 1984 p7o). Instead of the 
positivist exclusion of the reflecting subject, there is an 
exclusion of the object, but at the same time the subject 
becomes unable to account for its own objectivity as part of 
the natural world. Linked to such terms as 'incommensurability' 
and 'subjectivism', the nature of rationality itself apparently 
becomes problematic. Without a grounding in an objective and 
independent world how can we defend science as a 'rational' 
enterprise? This opposition of objectivism and relativism 
(Bernstein 1983,1991) can be seen as the modern moment of an 
ancient debate about man's place in the universe. It may be 
reconfigured for example as a dichotomy between realism18 and 
relativism (e. g. Woolgar 1988a, Potter and Wetherell 1987), 
17 The interesting conjunction of the 'return' of madness to the 
community and the rise of the spectre of relativism, itself 
sometimes seen as a kind of madness (e. g. Lawson 1985), in 
philosophy and science, cannot be pursued here. 
18 In its simple form 'realism', which is often referred to here, refers 
to the notion that things (objects, meanings, motives) pre-exist 
their surface signs. In Woolgar's view this belief is part of an 
'ideology of representation' (1988a ch 7,1989). My own position 
tends towards ontological realism and epistemological relativism 
(see Outhwaite 1987). On the other hand I believe it is important 
to continually monitor the social consequences of holding these 
respective views. 
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scepticism and foundationalism (Hamlyn 1970), or scepticism 
-and universalism (Ferrara 1987). 
There are many ways of approaching this debate. I have chosen 
here to provide a very brief19 comparison of the work of 
Habermas with that of Garfinkel and Gadamer. 
To attempt to capture Habermas' position in a nutshell might 
be to say that for Habermas emancipation and critique are 
located in a certain kind of social action, which he calls 
communicative action. To some extent the ef fort in Part One of 
his Theory of Communicative Action might be characterized as 
the provision of a 'quasi-anthropology, in Habermas' words 
(1986a p213), that is, a view of what it is to be human20 (Brand 
1990 p122), and in the process Habermas takes as central not 
the philosophy of consciousness, not the subject-object 
relation, but the subject-subject relationship. This paradigm 
shift is central and vital. The epistemology of the philosophy 
of the subject promotes an isolated subject encountering, 
representing and acting upon, a separate object (Brandt 1990 
p16, Habermas 1984 p391-2), while its ontology is much too 
narrow (i. e. it contains impoverished versions of world- 
relationships and world concepts). It is this move which allows 
19 It Is difficult If not Impossible to produce a comprehensive 
overview of Habermas, work In only a few pages because of Its 
wide ranging and at times extremely complex nature. As a result 
the following account Is at best severely partial and I present a 
largely sympathetic reading. However, Habermas has drawn 
substantial criticism. See, e. g., Bernstein (1985), Held (1982), 
Honneth and Joas (1991). Rasmussen (1990) provides an extensive 
bibliography of secondary literature. Elsewhere, (Southgate 1992c) 
I have provided an analysis of Insanity ascriptions from the 
perspective of Habermas' formal pragmatics. 
20 But note that for Habermas communicative competences oriented 
to validity claims vary historically according to the degree of 
rationalization of the life-world (Habermas 1976 p14-15,1979 p98, 
1987a p77 ft). 
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Habermas to distinguish between different types of action and 
rationality concepts, and to extend the action and rationality 
framework beyond that of the purposive-rational. As Brandt 
(1990 p10) puts it in relation to post-empiricist philosophy 
of science, 'Rather than accepting that the arbitrariness 
allegedly found in the realm of norms and values has now also 
penetrated the realm of science, he has emphasised that 
potentially, norms too can be a subject of rational discourse, 
as can be inner states and feelings'. 
This allows Habermas not only to reconstruct for example Marx, 
Durkheim, Weber, and Horkheimer and Adorno, and the theory of 
reification in terms of the rationalization processes of life- 
world and system, but also to locate and ground his own 
reconstructive science as an immanent critique; that is, in 
contrast for example to the Dialectic of Enli_qhtez2ment, 
Habermas, critical theory shares a common normative ground with 
its object of analysis (Wellmer 1985 p52, and cf. Habermas 1982 
p252, Bernstein 1985 p17, Fay 1987, Roderick 1986 passim). 
In The Theory of Communicative Action the concepts of 
communicative rationality and action are developed via an 
analysis of other rationality and action- concepts. To 
summarise, Habermas' argument here is- that only an 
understanding of communication in which the subject can be seen 
to relate to three worlds; the objective, the social, and the 
internal, with the corresponding validity claims of truth, 
normative rightness and sincerity, is sufficiently 
comprehensive to distinguish the basic modes of language use 
or functions (1984 p278). 
Because of their central importance it is necessary here to 
clarify more precisely the meanings of communicative action, 
validity claims, and communicative rationality: 
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a) Communicative action refers to action which is oriented 
to agreement, coordination and cooperation. It designates 
a type of interaction that is coordinated through speech 
acts but which does not coincide with them. The 
communicative model of action does not therefore equate 
action with communication, and the teleological structure 
is fundamental to all concepts of action (1984 p101,1986a 
p213). 
b) The concept of communicative action contains the notion 
of the rational redemption of validity claims2l which are 
raised in all such action: 'Thus a speaker owes the 
binding (or bonding: bindende) force of his illocutionary 
act not to the validity of what is said, but to the 
coordinating effect of the warranty that he offers: namely 
to redeem, if necessary, the validity claim raised with 
his speech act, (1984 p302). A validity claim therefore 
is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the 
validity of an utterance are fulfilled (1984 p38). In this 
way the discursive redemption of validity claims, good 
reasons, and the power of the better argument can be seen 
as central aspects of Habermas-theory, and act here as a 
'security reserve', contra sanctions, gratifications, 
force or money (1982 p269). In, contrast to restricted 
notions of social action, in communicative action validity 
claims are raised in relation to three worlds: the 
objective world (truth claims), the social world (claims 
to normative rightness) and the internal 
21 Although Habermas appears to see these claims as inherent In the 
structure of speech (e. g. 1979 P54,66-7, and McCarthy's 
Introduction pxIx, also 1982 p235,271-2, Giddens 1985a p128), his 
analysis proceeds via an examination of the general 
presuppositions of communfcaUve action, an orientation to 
cooperation, agreement and understanding (Verstandfgun_q) (1979 
pi). His justification Is that other forms of social action such as 
'conflict, competition and strategic action In general', are 
derivatives of, and parasitic upon, communicative action (Ibld, and 
see the discussion below). 
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world (sincerity claims)22. Only the first two are capable 
of redemption in discourse (Habermas 1979 p64, Giddens 
1985 p129) 23. 
c) Habermas argues that different models of social action 
entail different relations of actor to the world (1984 
p102) and that these differing 'world-relations' involve 
differing notions of rationality. For example, taken in 
isolation, the relation between an actor and the external, 
object, world, may implicate a cognitivist-instrumental 
rationality and action. But from the perspective of 
communicative action this becomes simply one part of a 
wider view of rationality and action (1984 plo). From the 
latter position, 'This concept of communicative 
. rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately 
on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, 
consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which 
different participants overcome their merely subjective 
views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated 
conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the 
objective world and the intersubjectivity of their 
11 f eworl d. I (ibid) . For Habermas, theref ore, communi cative 
rationality involves an orientation to reaching 
understanding; a willingness to pursue issues 
discursively, based on the inter-subjective recognition 
of criticizable validity claims. 
22 Habermas also refers to a validity claim of comprehensibility, that 
Is, a claim that speech or language use Itself Is coherent and 
Intelligible. As Holub (1991 p13) notes, the claim to 
comprehensibility Is fulfilled within language Itself and thus does 
not belong to pragmatics. ' Formal pragmatics Is therefore oriented 
to the other three claims (cf. McCarthy's Introduction In Habermas 
1979 pxix and p28). 
23 Habermas argues that the truthfulness of utterances (sincerity 
claim) can only be checked against the consistency of subsequent 
behaviour (1979 p64). Presumably this Includes verbal behaviour. 
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For the social researcher one important implication of applying 
this extended framework of action and rationality to both 
researcher and subjects is that the methodological gap between 
the two thereby disappears: 'As soon ... as we describe behavior 
in terms of communicative action, our own ontological 
presuppositions are no longer more complex than those we 
ascribe to the actors themselves' (Habermas 1984 p118)24. 
Habermas' scheme has something in common with the kind of 
critique offered by Garfinkel, and so Habermas is not 
unsympathetic for example to the notions of the documentary 
method, and the projection and cooperative production of an 
occasional commonality, or the 'occasioned corpus' (1984 plOO, 
125). But this sympathy has a limit, to the extent that 
ethnomethodology presents itself as more than a critique of 
method and as a theory in its own right. And this brings us to 
the crux of Habermas' argument in relation to Garfinkel 
(Habermas 1984 p128). 
For Garfinkel, standards of rationality are to be treated, 
along-with facticity, objectivity, etc, as phenomena; that Is, 
as contingent accomplishments of socially organised practices. 
For Garfinkel's actors, what is universal is merely taken to 
be so by actors and is in fact merely locally occasioned 
(Garfinkel 1967 p33). As a result rational properties of 
practical activities should not be assessed, recognised, 
described, outside of the action settings within which such 
properties are produced, recognised, used etc (ibid). But 
Habermas argues that this raises problems for the status of 
Garfinkel's own theory and standards of validity which appear 
24 This also means that the same kinds of validity claims are raised 
both within and outside the interview world, although the precise 
form such claims take will vary. 
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to lie outside the domain of those applied by the participants 
themselves (1984 p129). Elsewhere, Habermas (e. g. 1982,1987b 
p119,1990 p89) has termed this a 'performative 
contradiction i25. For Habermas the dilemma here is one of 
'either a Husserlian absolutism or a confessed relativism' 
(1984 p130). This dilemma, he argues, can be escaped only if 
Garfinkel would 
... take seriously the claim to universality implicitly built into the ideas of truth and rightness as pointing 
to the validity basis of speech. The social scientific 
interpreter, in the role of an at-least virtual 
participant, must in principle orient himself to the same 
validity claims to which those immediately involved also 
orient themselves; for this reason, and to this extent, 
he can start from the always implicitly shared, immanent 
rationality of speech, take seriously the rationality 
claimed by the participants for their utterances, and at 
the same time critically examine it. In thematising what 
the participants merely presuppose and assuming a 
reflective attitude to the interpretandum, one does not 
place oneself outside the communication context under 
investigation; one deepens and radicalises it in a way 
that is in principal open to all participants. In natural 
contexts this path is often blocked; but is always 
ingrained in the very structure of action oriented to 
reaching understanding (1984 p130). 
For Habermas, therefore, the given context can be transcended, 
and everyday interpretations can be reflectively penetrated 
(1984 p128). The potential for critique is built into 
communicative action itself (1984 p121) so that the lack of the 
methodological gap between researcher and researched becomes 
not a hindrance but the means by which critique can be 
sustained. The general structures of communication which 
25 Similar criticisms may be levelled at the discourse analysis of 
Potter and Wetherell, and Gilbert and Mulkay, and the rhetorical 
approach of Michael Billig. The latter for example argues 
singlemindedly that every argument has two sides. The former 
offer definitive versions (accounts) of the problem of identifying 
members' definitive versions (accounts). 
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competent subjects have learned to master, and which Habermas 
had identified in his theory of formal pragmatics, not only 
open up access to specific contexts, but also simultaneously 
provide the critical means to penetrate a given context, 'to 
burst it open from within and transcend it; the means, if need 
be, to push beyond a de facto established consensus, to revise 
errors, correct misunderstandings... ' (1984 p120). This 
potential for critique can be exploited by the social 
scientist26. 
This brings us to what has been called one of Habermas' 'most 
basic and challenging theses' (Bernstein 1985 Introduction 
plo): that to understand involves understanding reasons, and 
that understanding reasons involves (at least implicitly) 
evaluating them, that is, taking a 'yes' or 'no' position on 
them (1984 p132 ff, p192)27. This I very strong thesis' (McCarthy 
1985 p184) which has drawn substantial criticism (ibid, and 
Sch&delbach 1991), appears to lend theoretical and practical 
weight to the aspect of critique which Habermas wants to find 
26 Of course it may be objected that we do not need this kind of 
theory in order to engage In argument over fact, norm or value. 
That we do this all the time cannot be denied but then the 
question becomes 'What Is the philosophical and sociological 
significance of such debate or argument or disagreement? ' From 
the perspective of Habermas what Is at Issue here Is rationality 
Itself. The very criticizability which, so to speak, Is built into 
formally pragmatic validity claims, links them up directly to the 
anticipation of an Ideal speech situation, and to a critique of 
structures of systematically distorted communication. The attempt 
to thematise validity claims and the success or failure of our 
endeavours may determine whether we come to suspect that some 
communication is systematically distorted. At the same time as 
rationality Inheres In the promise Of discursive redemption of 
such claims, so we can say that the (moving) ground of critique 
also lies here. As well as 'grounding, critique, Habermas provides I suggest a practical model for thinking about what may be going 
on within discourse, as I, shall later show. 
27 So for the researcher too, questions of meaning cannot be strictly 
separated from questions of validity in contexts of communicative 
action (Habermas 1984 p106, p115-6). 
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in language itself. This position suggests that in the process 
of attempting to make sense of a situation, to reconstruct a 
common definition in the face of a breakdown in communication, 
the participant (including the social scientist) must judge and 
evaluate. Habermas has himself provided some examples of how 
this may apply. one example, the least plausible', concerns 
'explanations for what appears from the perspective of the 
speaker to be unmotivated laughter in the audience' (Habermas 
19ýlrp230)28. 
Another way in which the above arguments can be displayed 
concerns Habermas, critique of philosophical hermeneutics. 
There has been a substantial debate between Habermas and 
Gadamer (see Habermas 1970/88 edition, Warnke 1987, McCarthy 
1978/1984, Holub 1991). And Habermas (1970/88) has also engaged 
with Wittgenstein and Winch. What is common to these debates 
is Habermas' critique of what he views as the authors' 
subjectivism or relativism. His own critical moment has to be 
found, as above, in action oriented to communication; to the 
rationality inherent in the power of the better argument, 
rather than the argument of power. 
Against Gadamer and Winch, Habermas pitches a quasi-universal 
formal-pragmatic framework in the discursive redemption of 
28 It Is possible to extrapolate further here. If, when asked, the 
audience provides the reason for laughter as 'You told a joke', 
I may reply 'No, I didn't', thus disagreeing with the audience, but 
still understanding why they laughed; a successful evaluation. In 
this sense, understanding, as Habermas stresses, does not 
necessarily Involve agreement. On the other hand the audience 
may say 'The scenery's collapsed behind you. ' I evaluate their 
reason by looking behind me and, If they are correct, agreeing 
with them, thereby understanding their laughter. However if they 
reply 'Because of your blue tie' I may feel I cannot say 'yes' or 
'no' to this reply, and finally admit that I don't understand their 
laughter. Of course I may decide not to bother Inquiring, In which 
case I again have not yet understood their laughter. 
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validity claims. Rationality constitutes a willingness to press 
on discursively. The ideal speech situation which allows 
consensus only through generalizable interests (Habermas 1976 
p 110) can be seen to be anticipated in all communicative 
action and any attempt to challenge this argumentatively only 
presupposes what it tries to dispute, depending as it does upon 
the power of the better argument. The centrality of 
argumentation is of course a difficult one to dislodge in 
argument without raising the protest of Itu quoquel that is, 
it constitutes a performative contradiction (cf. Habermas 1990 
p89, McCarthy 1978/1984 p321, T. Smith 1981, White 1988 p50-65). 
As McCarthy puts it: 
The arguments that relativists put forward on behalf of 
"primitive" cultures not only appeal to standards of 
argumentation absent from the cultures they defend but 
make use of modes of reflective reasoning 
(metatheoretical, metaethical, epistemological, historical 
and anthropological) that are largely unavailable in those 
cultures. (1978/84 p321) 
Nevertheless, as Habermas acknowledges (1976 p109-10, P158-9), 
there is a decisionistic residue in his position (cf. McCarthy 
ibid,, Smith ibid, White ibid) which concerns the non-rational 
decision to enter into argument, which it appears cannot itself 
be argumentatively justified, without entering a vicious 
circle. In other words argumentation is not the only language 
game (Smith 1981 p76). In terms of practical discourse we might 
say that the establishment of the principle of 
universal izabi 1 ity of interests itself rests on a mere decision 
(Smith 1981 p75). 
Habermas attempts (successfully Smith 1981 says, unsuccessfully 
according to McCarthy 1978 p321) to defend his position in the 
following way. Criticising the notions of monological thought 
and action, he argues: 
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Anyone who does not participate, or is not ready to 
participate in argumentation stands nevertheless "already" 
in contexts of communicative action. In doing so, he has 
already naively recognised the validity claims - however 
counterf actually raised - that are contained in speech 
acts and that can be redeemed only discursively. Otherwise 
he would have had to detach himself from the 
communicatively established language game of everyday 
practice. (1976 p159) 
In terms of this discussion it should be noted that in his more 
recent work Habermas has played down the notion of the 'ideal 
speech situation' which is largely absent (in explicit form) 
from his (1984,1987a) magnum opus (cf. Brand 1990 p125, Dews 
1986 Introduction p18). He acknowledges that the details of 
this proposal may be unsatisfactory but still regards his 
original intention as correct (see Habermas 1984 p25,1990 
p88). He has suggested for example that if the distinction 
between what is held to be true here and now, and what would 
be taken as true under ideal conditions made no sense, then we 
could not explain how we could learn reflexively, that is, 
improve our own standards of rationality (from Brand 1990 
p125). 
But Habermas also stresses that practical discourse cannot 
generate the content of norms, and cannot decide issues of the 
'good life' (1990 p103,1986 p2lo, 1984 p17)29. In addition 
Habermas has no substantive conception of human needs, but 
rather argues that the definition of human needs is culturally 
variable (e. g. Habermas 1986 ch 7, Dews 1986 Introduction p1g, 
White 1988 p70, cf. Doyal and Gough 1991). In relation to the 
principle of generalizable interests, Habermas is clear that 
this is only a model for criticizing interests which unjustly 
29 Thus: 'Practical discourse is not a procedure for generating 
justified norms but... for testing the validity of norms that are 
being proposed and hypothetically considered for adoption. ' (1990 
p103). 
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pass themselves off as universal (1986b p175). In modern 
societies there is often no general interest at stake but 
usually only particular interests. In this sense then practical 
discourse cannot somehow generate a generalizable interest, but 
must be content with the withdrawal of legitimacy from the 
privileging of one side which falsely claims to represent a 
general interest. Where particular interests are at stake then 
'even in ideal cases, conflicts of action can only be settled 
by bargaining and compromise (Habermas 1986b p176,1976 P112). 
It is important therefore to realize that for Habermas the 
ideal speech situation is just that: an ideal, which can never 
be attained in reality, but may yet prove a useful idea. 
I believe that the above points go some way to correcting 
misunderstandings which are sometimes evident in commentaries 
upon Habermas I work. Thus Hammers ley, s (1992) recent and acute 
critique of ethnography nevertheless only partially grasps the 
thrust of Habermas, position. For example, in his discussion 
of validity claims, Hammersley (1992) suggests: 
... (Habermas) argues that only if these claims are 
accepted by other participants as what would be recognised 
as true in the ideal speech situation can understanding 
take place (p114). 
As far as I can see Habermas nowhere says this, and indeed from 
his major work he is at pains to point out that the evaluation 
of validity claims need not require agreement for understanding 
to take place (see examples above). In other words disagreement 
may equally lead to understanding which is by no means 
restricted to reference to an ideal speech situation3o. 
30 Similarly, Fay (1987 p188) rejects Habermas because of the latter's 
'... unstated assumption that to understand a speech act is to 
agree with it. ' Although this position may have been implicitly 
present in Habermas' earlier (e. g. 1979) work, Fay largely ignores 
his more recent arguments. 
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Habermas attempts to add a further dimension to this issue by 
linking his theory of argumentation, the objectivity of 
discursive standards of rationality, to a developmental logic 
underlying the acquisition of communicative competence 
(Habermas 1970a, McCarthy 1978/1984 p321) via an analysis of 
Piaget and Kohlberg. I am unable to consider this here. 
Finally, and in a manner which is of vital theoretical and 
methodological importance for sociology (Brandt 1990 Pxiv), 
Habermas connects communicative rationality up with the 
developmental logics of life-world and system (Habermas 1976, 
1979,1984,1987a). I have provided an outline of his arguments 
in another paper (Southgate 1992b). 
Habermas and Rhetoric 
Before moving on to provide an indication of the relevance of 
Habermas for this project, and to discuss the methods adopted, 
I need to consider briefly the relationship between Habermas 
and the tradition of rhetoric; both are drawn upon in this 
thesis. To what extent, I wish to ask, is an acknowledgement 
of the centrality of rhetoric for an understanding of social 
life and social science compatible with Habermas' project? Can 
Habermas I scheme accommodate rhetoric, or does rhetoric subvert 
it? 
I have shown above that Habermas is intent upon providing a 
kind of formal grounding for a critical theory, located in 
communicative action itself, which for Habermas is the original 
mode of language use (Habermas 1984 p288). We might say that 
in order to fulfil his project he must persuasively argue that 
the orientation of language use to co-operation and agreement 
has a conceptual and practical priority over the strategic use 
of language (cf. Culler 1985). The critical moment must be 
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located in truth and agreement rather than dissimulation and 
domination, otherwise it would not function as a grounding for 
a critical theory, and indeed Habermas argues that the 
instrumental use of language is parasitic upon communicative 
action (Habermas 1984 p288). 
His method is to turn to speech act theory for a model for 
action oriented to reaching understanding (ibid). Habermas 
defends his use of this model by distinguishing perlocutionary 
from illocutionary acts such that perlocutionary acts inter 
alia can serve the nonil locutionary aim of influencing hearers, 
only if they are suited to achieve illocutionary aims (1984 
p293)31. Thus the use of language with an orientation to 
consequences 'is not an original use of language but the 
subsumption of speech acts that serve illocutionary aims under 
conditions of action oriented to success I (ibid) . Perlocutions 
are defined here in terms of the employment of illocutions as 
means in teleological contexts of action and thereby conceived 
as a special class of strategic interactions (ibid)32. Habermas' 
effort is to ground his distinction between communicative and 
31 In other words, In order to covertly Influence another, we must 
still perform Illocutionary acts. These arguments become a little 
more accessible once one understands the lexicon. Habermas 
Icatchphrasel for grasping locutions, Illocutions and perlocutions 
Is as follows: to say something, to act in saying something, to 
bring about something through acting In saying something (1984 
p289). However I find more helpful the following distinction: In 
illocutions, 'the communicative Intent of the speaker and the 
Illocutionary aim he Is pursuing follow from the manifest meaning 
of what Is said. ' (IbId). In other words Illocutionary alms and 
meanings can be read off I the surface structure of the sentence. 
With perlocutions however there Is a further meaning which 
cannot be directly read off the sentence. It Is In this distinction 
that Habermas finds his de-centred model of language-in-use. 
32 Habermas distinguishes two types of strategic action: a) concealed 
(i. e. perlocutions) and b) open (1984 p333). Concealed strategic 
action Is again subdivided Into conscious and unconscious. Open 
strategic action refers for example to commands and requests, 
action oriented to success. In the strategic attitude only Indirect 
understanding via determinate Indicators Is possible (1979 p209). 
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strategic action, not in intentions, but in the structure of 
language use itself, and it is this originary structure which, 
he argues, the analysis of illocutionary acts yields. 
The privileging of communicative over strategic action has been 
challenged by a number of critics (e. g. Culler 1985, Farrell 
1981, Rasmussen 1990, Roderick 1986 p159, Wood 1985). Drawing 
upon Culler, Rasmussen for example argues that Habermas is not 
sufficiently able to unambiguously distinguish perlocutionary 
from illocutionary, acts (ibid p39). Rasmussen suggests that 
this can only be done by anchoring this distinction in an 
intentionalist semantics or a phenomenological notion of 
intentionality, paths that have been ruled out by Habermas as 
a return to the epistemological framework conceived within the 
paradigm of the 'philosophy of consciousness' (cf. Habermas 
1984 p274 ff). 
However, by suggesting that we must be able to clearly 
distinguish illocutionary from perlocutionary acts Rasmussen 
may be missing the point. That we cannot tell whether someone 
is acting perlocutionarily might arguably be seen to be 
irrelevant. We do not need to distinguish the two clearly in 
practice, for us to reject one as a potential model that is 
supposed to explain the linguistic mechanism of coordinating 
action by way of the illocutionary binding effect of speech 
acts (Habermas 1984 p294). While in theory of course, it is 
possible to distinguish illocutionary from perlocutionary acts 
as Rasmussen notes, but it is in part precisely because of the 
intentionality linked to perlocutions (as well as other 
difficulties) that Habermas rejects perlocutionary acts as the 
basis for his model, leaving the illocutionary act to bear the 
burden. 
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And similarly Culler's (1985) argument that the distinction 
between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts is not actually 
a distinction between communicative and strategic action may 
also be misplaced. Culler (ibid p136) argues that many 
illocutionary acts seem designed to produce certain effects 
rather than to bring about understanding. But in fact Habermas 
spends considerable time in acknowledging that not all 
illocutionary acts are constitutive for communicative action, 
but only those with which speakers connect criticizable 
validity claims (Habermas 1984 p305). He states: 
... when a speaker is pursuing undeclared ends with 
perlocutionary acts ends on which the hearer can take 
no position at all or when a speaker is pursuing 
11 locutionary aims on which hearers cannot take a grounded 
position - as in relation to imperatives - the potential 
of the binding (or bonding) force of good reasons -a 
potential which is always contained in linguistic 
communication - remains unexploited. (ibid) 
Thus, simple commands or requests, expressions of will which 
lack normative authorization, may take the form of 
illocutionary acts which are nonetheless strategic or 
instrumental, oriented to success rather than understanding or 
agreement. However the objections of Culler and others may 
still promote a sense of unease which may also be derived from 
Habermas' minimal analysis of the relationship between rhetoric 
and communicative action. To a large extent rhetoric is 
consigned by Habermas to the bin of concealed strategic action 
(perlocutions) and hence cannot play a part in the grounding 
of a critical theory. It is percei 
' 
vqd--. as identical to 
dissimulation and deceit, to the attempted achievement of a 
forced consensus (Habermas 1984 p129,288). And yet the 
rhetorical use of language may arguably be oriented towards 
truth rather than deception, for example in the use of irony, 
as Farrell (1981 p916) notes. 
Habermas does of course acknowledge that rhetoric plays an 
unmistakable and 'ineradicable' (Habermas 1987b p209) part in 
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everyday life33 but he wants to maintain a distinction between 
those contexts in which the rhetorical (poetic) function 
assumes centrality, as in literary theory, and those of 
everyday life in which it plays a subordinate role (McCarthy 
pxiii, introduction to Habermas 1987b). In the former, 
rhetorical elements take on a life of their own and language 
is disengaged from everyday practices and routines. Habermas 
argues that in the work of Derrida and others, language's 
capacity to solve problems disappears behind its world-creating 
capacity (ibid pxiii, p201). And while rhetoric may be present 
in scientific and other discourses he suggests that it is 
subordinated or 'tamed' (ibid p209) to problem solving and 
distinct forms of argumentation34. The rhetorical elements in 
language therefore assume 'entirely different roles' (ibid). 
on the surface Habermas appears to be pursuing an old dichotomy 
between rhetoric and truth (Mason 1989). He wants to retain 
specialised discourse, such as that of science, as a realm in 
which rhetoric plays second fiddle to the power of the better 
argument. To the extent that this division appears essential 
for his notion of the ideal speech situation35 (Habermas 1970a), 
as well as the distinction between the blocking of, and the 
33 A related objection may be made that Habermas underplays the 
central role of disagreement and partial understanding In life (cf. 
Shotter 1989 p164). However Habermas does acknowledge that this 
may be the case: 'Stability and absence of ambiguity are ... the 
exception In the communicative practice of everyday life., (1984 
plOO, and see 1982 p235-6). 
34 See Gaonkar (1990) for a recent endorsement of the old argument 
that rhetoric cannot escape Its marginal status and Is 'parasitic' 
upon other discourses (e. g. of science, ethics, politics) rather 
than productive of them, and cannot turn Itself Into its traditional 
counterpart 'dialectic'. 
35 However there seems no logical reason why the Ideality of the 
Ideal speech situation cannot encompass rhetoric as an aspect of 
Itself oriented to truth (cf. Farrell 1976 on rhetoric and 
consensus). 
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thematisation of, validity claims, -then 
there may be a problem 
here in so far as the rhetoric of, for example, scientific 
inquiry, may at times play-a major rather than a minor role36. 
However, while it is not difficult to locate science as a 
highly rhetorical activity, Habermas, point may still apply; 
that rhetoric may be used in the service of theoretical and 
practical problem solving, for instance in terms of the 
rhetorical standardisations of objectiVity37 or the novel and 
illuminating use of rhetorical tropes. The latter, although 
perhaps 'world-disclosing' (i. e. imaginative, creative), are 
still harnessed here in the pursuit of, for example, truth or 
the solution of technical problems. The contrast is with 
literature in which the rhetorical means of representation 
'depart from communicative routines and take on a life of their 
own' (1987b p203), the 'poetic' function, in Jacobson's terms. 
The use of rhetoric may therefore, from Habermas' perspective, 
be consistent with an orientation to truth38. At the same time 
36 For this position In relation to the human sciences see e. g. Nelson 
et al (1987), Simons (ed)(1989), Shapiro (1985-6). For analyses of 
the relation between rhetoric and natural science see also e. g. 
Campbell (1975), Gusfield (1976), Harr6 (1990), Overington (1977), 
Simons (1980), Simons (ed)(1990), Woolgar (1988a) and cf. also 
Gilbert and Mulkay (1984), Yearley (1981) and Kuhn (1962/1970). 
For sociology and rhetoric add e. g. Brown (1977/1989), Davis 
(1986), Edmondson (1984), van Maanen (1988). Davis and Hersh 
(1986/88 p57-73) and Shotter (1989) comment upon rhetoric and 
mathematics, while anthropology and rhetoric has been tackled by 
e. g. Clifford (1983), Clifford and Marcus (1986), Marcus (1980), 
Marcus and Cushman (1982). For a critique of the 'anti-epistemic' 
elements of the 'rhetoric of Inquiry' perspective see Keith and 
Cherwitz (1989). 
37 Compare the discussion of methods 'triangulation' in Woolgar 
(1988a). 
38 My argument Is that this recognition does not entail the collapse 
of Habermas' central theoretical distinction between Illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts. But leaving this complex argument to one 
side It Is clear that, Importantly, rhetoric In a broad sense Is in 
any case neither Identical to perlocutionary acts nor to strategic 
action. 
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although rhetoric is an 'ineradicable' part of our everyday 
lives, this does not mean that we cannot and do not distinguish 
truth from untruth. Rhetoric and truth, we may say, are in fact 
intertwined, both pointing to and relying upon the other and 
Habermas is quite aware of thiS39. As Mason (1989 p93) puts it: 
'It is clear that if any truth can be expressed in words, its 
expression will have a rhetorical shape. ' 
Another way of addressing the difference between everyday, 
practical problem solving, and the play of literary texts, is 
to examine the distinction between fact and fiction (cf. drif 
1991 quoted in Appendix D p481). Clearly the two are intimately 
and complexly related but arguably one major difference from 
the perspective of Habermas is the blocking or partial blocking 
of the redemption of validity claims which fiction involves 
(cf. Lamarque 1990, Pratt 1977, Searle 1975). 
The above discussions suggest that although an acknowledgement 
of the place of 'rhetoric' in all discourse somewhat muddies 
Habermas' arguments, it still seems possible that from 
Habermas' position a rhetorical view of the world and a 
rhetorical analysis of the kind provided later in this research 
project can be consistent with- the pursuit' of truth; or 
perhaps better, with the raising of truth claims, and thus with 
his theoretical framework of formal pragmatics. Indeed, as 
Simons (1980 p127) points out, the classical conception of 
rhetoric encourages the 'eulogistic sense, of rhetoric as the 
39 Compare Culler (1981 p4l) who argues that rhetoric logically relies 
upon a distinction between literal and rhetorical meaning; rhetoric 
cannot do without the literal, the unambiguous, the fixed. And at 
the same time the literal, In order to be literal, demands Its other, 
the figurative. Aristotle (1991 edition) probably prefigured this 
argument contra the Platonic Socrates for whom persuasion is 
contrasted negatively to virtue, wisdom and the search for truth. 
See also Leff (1978) for an overview of comparably recent work 
on rhetoric as epistemic. 
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offer of good reasons in matters of judgment, while Haarscher 
(1986) has noted an inner connection between the work of 
Perelman and Habermas. And in his more recent work, Michael 
Billig (1991) draws upon the work of Habermas in his 
elaboration of the moral vision at the heart of rhetoric as a 
critical approach. Further, Nelson and Megill (1986 p27) 
consider- that Habermas, in his later work, is attempting to 
I ... harmonise many projects in social theory with communication 
and rhetoric' and to I ... rejoin philosophy and rhetoric ... I. 
But should this argument still lack persuasion I think it is 
possible to find further signs in Habermas, work which provide 
for the analysis of rhetoric in sociological research. Habermas 
wants to argue that his delineation of formal pragmatic 
validity claims, central to communicative action, may be 
empirically useful. But how can this be when they appear to be 
so idealised? He suggests that what is necessary is a step by 
step reversal of the 'strong idealizations by which we have 
built up the concept of communicative action' (Habermas 1984 
p330). Such a reversal involves admitting into the arena for 
analysis: implicit utterances, ambiguous expressions, texts and 
conversations, and background knowledge, and provides for the 
increased possibility for the analyst to better distinguish 
strategic from communicative action (ibid p330-1). 
Elsewhere Habermas responds to an objection that no relation 
to normative contexts can be inferred from the meaning of 
nonregulative speech acts (ibid p311). Simple constatives for 
example do not always immediately or intuitively appear to have 
a normative correlate, whereas for example 'I order you to get 
off the train' does. Habermas replies that nonregulative speech 
acts can 'go wrong', that is, may be inappropriate, out of 
place, awkward or offensive, thereby indicating that they too 
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belong to the social world (ibid p311-2). In other words it is 
possible to see that how people talk, including our blunders 
and rhetorical manoeuvres, may be highly significant for an 
analysis of validity claims to normative rightness. 
And if we remember that for Habermas speakers are reflective 
in the way they deal with raising validity claims, relativising 
their utterances against the possibility that their validity 
will be contested (ibid p99,1987a p120), then we may also say 
that the use of rhetorical devices exemplifies the reflexive 
monitoring of communication in which validity claims may be 
contested (see Part Three below). 
Finally, many of the above arguments appear to hinge upon how 
rhetoric is defined4O. I have been proposing above a notion of 
rhetoric as dialogue and argument, as an approach to everyday 
1 if e which stresses the two-sidedness of human thinking (Bi 11 ig 
1987 p49, Holmberg 1977) but which as critique demands the 
provision of good reasons4l. The latter is close to Habermas' 
idea of communicative action. But incorporated within the ambit 
of rhetoric is the whole battery of rhetorical figures. Such 
devices may be used to persuade, but persuasion can be oriented 
to either truth and agreement, or to deception and 
manipulation, or simply to the pleasure of argument. If 
rhetoric is taken in its pejorative sense then it is not 
compatible with communicative action. However communicative 
action itself cannot avoid drawing upon rhetorical figures of 
speech, and in this sense rhetoric is an unavoidable 
40 Dixon (1971 pl) suggests that It Is notoriously difficult to get hold 
of, rather like a jellyfish. I am unfortunately unable to offer 
anything like a history of rhetoric here. 
41 The notion of rhetoric as argument has a long history stretching 
back to the law courts of ancient Greece. 
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part of all talk (cf. Gadamer 1975/79,1976, Lakoff and Johnson 
1980)42. 
A New Constellation: Habermas and Discourse Analysis 
In the debates about modernity Habermas can be located as a 
defender of the Enlightenment tradition. However it would be 
a mistake to conceive of his work as exemplifying yet another 
totalising system. In terms of the philosophy of history, 
Habermas indeed rejects grand meta-narratives (Bernstein 1991 
p205). His approach is rather to outline those formal grounds 
which may have universal applicability. This does not allow us 
to specify in advance any normative or moral (or even less, 
value) content, which becomes a matter for participants 
themselves (Habermas 1990 p103 passim, Dews 1986 Introduction 
pie and passim). 
On the other hand there are those advocates of 'postmodernityl 
who offer not groundings but their impossibility, via a kind 
of permanent disruption, challenging, or undermining of 
traditional understandings and practices. In Woolgar's terms 
this takes the form of a 'dynamic irony' (1983), an 
interrogation of the author and of 'ideologies of 
representation' (1988a). This relativism may become even more 
42 Richard Lanham has raised an Interesting point that rhetoric 
offers a form for argument but not for compromise. He maintains 
that in suggesting that all arguments are, or can be, polar 
opposites It I ... does violence to any issue that falls into the "both- 
and" rather than the "either-or" category' (quoted In Dixon 1971 
p69). And certainly Billig's picture for example Is of Interminable 
debate, of the 'intrinsically argumentative' nature of discourse 
(Billig 1991 p206). I think Lanham Is wrong however. The 
understanding that there Is always another side to an argument 
may Itself foster conciliation while recognising that some 
arguments are more reasonable than others (Habermas 1984, Billig 
1991 p25). Also, the logic of 'two-sides to an argument', like two 
sides of a coin, Itself contains both identity and difference. 
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sophisticated in so far as it attempts to deconstruct the very 
opposition of realism-relativism, or objectivism-relativism 
itself43. 
Woolgar (1983) celebrates a reflexivity in which the ironicist 
encourages ambiguity and ambivalence in the effort to bring the 
reader to a'kind of experientia. 1 awareness in the joy of irony. 
This effort to push reflexivity to the limits, to 'radical 
constitutive reflexivity, (Woolgar 1988b p2l), has resulted in 
the exploration of new ways of expression, in 'New Literary 
Forms' (e. g. Ashmore 1989 p66, Potter and Wetherell 1987 p183, 
Woolgar 1982,1988b, 1989, and cf. Atkinson 1990, Billig 1991 
ch 9, Brodkey 1,987b, Krieger 1984). These textual methods, 
which attempt to perpetuate I dynamic irony arguably of f er the 
means to reflexively comment upon one's own constructions, 
one's own rhetoric, without in the process establishing a 
further metaphysical centre, or authorial 'presence', immune 
from the strictures of one's own argumentS44. 
43 1 might Include here Rorty (1982), for whom there only seems to 
be 'conversations of mankindllwithout foundations or grounding, 
as well as Derrida and Foucault. See also Pollner (1991). The link 
between reflexivity and madness can be gleaned from the 
-predicates used by Pollner to characterise his 'radical reflexivity' 
(cf. Woolgar, above), viewed from the perspective of traditional 
social science, thus: 'incomprehensible', 'Intolerable', 'unsettling', 
'insecurity', 'wild', 'absurd', 'pointless', 'subversive', 'abnormal 
discourse,, disrupting'. 
44 The discourse analytic approach advanced In Part Three below Is 
Itself seen by Potter (1988) as one such new textual form: ' ... the 
researcher's entire reasoning process from discursive materials 
to conclusions Is documented in detail. The discourse analytic 
report Is thus Itself a New Literary Form; that Is, a specific 
textual organisation designed explicitly to draw attention to the 
constructed nature of the analyst's readings. As such the reader 
Is given the opportunity, indeed challenged, to offer alternative 
readings or better constructions. ' (p49). I shall consider in detail 
below whether this version of discourse analysis solves the 
problems it claims to solve. At any rate Its own kind of reflexivity 
Is less textually ornate than many, Including that offered in 
Appendix D below. 
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These perspectives of modernity and postmodernity overlap in 
certain respects but remain apparently irreconcilable in others 
(cf. Papadakis 1989, Richters 1988, White 1988) . It may be 
possible to imagine them, in the manner of Bernstein (1991), 
as comprising a new constellation451 in which both have their 
place, and in which neither dominates the other; indeed in 
which each is the other's other' (ibid p219), and in which the 
logic of both/and, replaces that of either/or46. 
From the perspective of an empirical research project concerned 
with madness and exclusion, critique becomes an inevitable 
issue (as it may be in all understanding, cf. Habermas 1984). 
The question then is I from what place may this critique speak? I 
In line with Bernstein's recent efforts I propose in this 
project a juxtaposition of modern and postmodern moments to 
answer this question. The aspect of modernity is provided in 
particular by the work of Habermas. I have attempted here the 
basic effort of showing how his often very abstract theory of 
communicative action and formal pragmatics may be drawn upon 
in an empirical programme in a useful and critical manner. 
References to Habermas and validity claims are sprinkled 
throughout Part Three. And perhaps ironically I have suggested 
that a rhetorical analysis conducted in chapter 14 may itself 
be used to identify the -kinds of validity claims which are the 
most problematic for local people, the kinds of dilemmas which 
45 Bernstein has always been good at reconciliation, see 1983,1986. 
The phrase new constellation' had already been used by 
Habermas (1984 p2). 
46 Although this In Itself might be said to privilege the 'postmodern', 
In so far as It Is an aim to deconstruct either/or logic. See Culler 
(1981), Sampson (1989). On the other hand, by opposing both/and 
to either/or so that we have to choose between them, he 
privileges the logic of the latter. 
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people face. These problematic claims, once identified, become 
candidates for thematization in a 'discourse' or 'critique, 47, 
in Habermas' terms, whereby they may be subjected to the power 
of the better argument, thereby connecting up an otherwise 
abstract textual analysis to the (formal) pragmatic issues and 
problems of the real world". 
It is in this way that the method of discourse analysis of 
Potter and Wetherell, drawn upon in chapter 14, may be accorded 
a critical moment which their 'theory' might otherwise deny 
them49. Discourse analysis may then be seen as a form of 
critical social action in Chilton's (1990) terms, which 
addresses the validity claims of speakers. in this fashion 
therefore I have tried to show how rhetorical and formal 
pragmatic analyses may complement each other". 
47 In his later work (1984 p42) 'discourse, refers to situations In 
which participants suppose that problematic validity claims can 
be rationally addressed; and 'critique' to the use of arguments 
In situations where participants need not presuppose that the 
conditions for speech free of external and Internal constraints are 
fulfilled. ' 
48 It might be objected that a formal pragmatics linked to 
counterfactual reconstruction oriented to the model of the 
suppression of generalizable Interests, Is Itself abstract, or 
extravagant. But Habermas regards It as concrete and worldly (cf. 
Habermas 1986b p176,1990 p103). 
49 Or put another way, formal pragmatics provides an extra 
dimension which links rhetoric with critical theory. 
50 Further, we may say that a central task of rhetorical analysis, 'to 
make explicit the functioning of rhetoric In the production and 
reception of discourse' (Gaonkar 1990 p358), Is not a million miles 
from Habermas, concern with the analysis of 'systematically 
distorted communication'. Compare Habermas (1984 p105) In 
relation to unconscious processes: 'The Interpreter can ... uncover the systematically distorted character of processes of 
understanding by showing how the participants express 
themselves in a subjectively truthful manner and yet objectively 
say something other than what they (also) mean (unbeknownst to 
themselves)., 
. Philosophical and Methodological Issues 109 
However in this new constellation it is important to be careful 
not to simplistically identify rhetorical analysis with the 
postmodern (cf. Derrida 1988, Culler 1981), for as Derrida 
points out, rhetoricism may be just another face of 
logocentricism (Derrida 1988 pl56), 51. Rather, the 'postmodern 
moments' of the thesis may be 'found' in the juxtaposition of 
the literal and the figurative, of 'realist' and 'relativist' 
genres, out of which further meaning emerges. or, it may be 
more accurate to say that the postmodern moment is relegated 
to Appendix D, the experimental chapter. This sets out to 
reconstruct a dialogue between villagers and patients while at 
the same time re-presenting the dialogue within a graphically 
configured relationship. It attempts to provide an evaluative 
and evaluating framework within which the validity claims 
raised by villagers can begin to be debated. 
In this way I hope that I may be able to capture not only 
something of the way of life in this particular place; the 
problems and dilemmas faced by villagers, the relationship 
between villagers and patients, village and hospital, but also 
something of the sense in which sociological methodology also 
faces a dilemma about rationality. How to allow some room for 
the problems of objectivity, relativism and reflexivity, in a 
manner which is not simply confined to theoretical debate? How 
to allow madness some textual and methodological room or slack 
(Connolly 1983,1987) if such room courts contagion and risks 
losing the sense of the whole? These are the questions of text 
and method with which I have been struggling, perhaps in some 
And see BillIg's (1991 p195 ft) discussion of the relation between 
postmodernism and rhetoric. In the revival of rhetoric Billig wants 
to avoid accusations of encouraging 'pragmatic rhetoric' (a co- 
option of rhetoric In the Interests of a pragmatic persuasion) or 
'romantic conservatism, (which looks backwards to a past'golden 
age' of rhetoric). The nature of the 'new rhetoric' Is clearly In the 
process of being 'hammered out' to use Rorty's (1980 p330) 
phrase. 
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ways reminiscent of those struggles and dilemmas faced by 
villagers in relation to the hospital and its patients. 
111 
Chapter 6 
The Research Se+qýzzence 
. ýz--om . Participant-Observation to 
. Discourse Analysis 
4 
Introduction 
In these pages I provide an account of the practical and 
theoretical difficulties which I faced during the Shenley 
study, and how the -research itself developed. The provision of 
a 'natural history' of the development of the project and its 
problems is arguably necessary in the interests of providing 
the fullest grounds upon which the adequacy or otherwise of the 
research program and material may be judged. In this respect 
I concur with Clarke (1975). Such accounts have found favour 
in recent literature (e. g. Fielding and Fielding 1986, 
Hammersleyý and Atkinson 1983, Shaffir et al 1980 and see 
Johnson 1975). First then, why Shenley? 
In the early days of this project I had set my sights upon a 
naturalistic study which I believed had considerable advantages 
over 'attitude' studies. What I sought was a way of examining 
how people 'actually" behaved in situations and cultures where 
they are faced with others whom they believed to be psychiatric 
or former psychiatric patients. 
The Inverted commas around the word actually serve to Indicate 
the problematic nature of this quest and account to a some extent 
for the more recent design changes as I show below. 
I 
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I chose Shenley village in part because the village and 
hospital were very closely related, at least in physical 
distance, while I had previous knowledge that patients used the 
village for various purposeg and that villagers were therefore 
likely to have contact with, or at least to come across, 
patients in the ordinary course of village life. The village 
itself was considered to be a manageable size for a 
participant-observation study and it had the further advantage 
of being accessible in terms of distance from my home. 
An Overall View of the Research Design. 
Broadly conceived, I adopted three complementary methods of 
research and information collection: I talked with people both 
informally and on occasions using a tape-recorder and a semi- 
structured interview schedule; I observed interactions between 
villagers and others including patients; and I collected and 
read a large amount of written material (detailed below). 
From one perspective these methods can be viewed as attempts 
to articulate validity and reliability via a triangulation' 
which is brought to bear upon social reality (see especially 
Denzin 1970, also Fielding and Fielding 1986, Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1983, and Woolgar 1988a for a critical review of this 
concept). However I prefer to theorise the research in terms 
of a flexible if critical process or hermeneutic endeavour. In 
practice this means that an objective in research design, as 
the Fieldings (1986 p9l) argue, must be to make our methods 
readily accessible to f ine-tuning, ongoing critique and running 
repair. ' 
An initial research dilemma turned on whether to use, in 
particular, discourse (including, that is, texts of accounts) 
as directly informative by its content of the reality of 
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practices in Shenley, in other words as a resource; or whether 
to lean with ethnomethodology and certain forms of discourse 
analysis towards accepting such discourse as a topic in its own 
right, and which includes taking into account the position of 
the researcher in his reflexive contribution to the context of 
action (see e. g. Habermas 1984, Heritage 1984, Pollner 1987, 
Zimmerman and Pollner 1970 as well as Yearley 1988)2. 
My position is that it is quite legitimate to take different 
theoretical and analytic attitudes towards one's research 
material, and that it is possible to theorise basic research 
methods in different ways. I therefore argue that there is a 
discernable reality to the reactions of villagers, but also 
that villagers' practices recreate this reality, and that these 
practices may themselves be investigated. My general position 
on social research is that it must be seen as a dialogue 
between the researcher and his or her subjects. 
In his recent review, Yearley (1988) has shown how, when viewed 
from the perspective of the other, each side (referred to as 
lactionists' and laccountists') faces both methodological and 
epistemological difficulties, while simultaneously evincing 
particular advantages, so that Yearley's solution' is a 
'tolerant pluralism'. From Yearley's position there is no 
unifying framework. 
In this thesis I have attempted a juggling act, to derive poise 
from a blur, in Moerman's (1988 pxiii) words, by utilising in 
Parts Two and Three a variety of analytic methods and textual 
forms, the structure of which I have outlined below (p130). At 
2 However this dichotomy between resource and topic Is problematic 
In certain respects, for example the way that ethnomethodological 
studies cannot themselves avoid drawing upon (other) 
unexplicated 'resources' In analysing topics'. See Atkinson (1985), 
McHoul (1982), Silverman (1985) for related comments upon the 
topic/resource distinction. 
 The Research Sequence 114 
the same time I have drawn upon the formal pragmatics proposed 
by Habermas as a kind of umbrella under which, so to speak, 
both resource and topic may shelter. It may be useful to 
rehearse some of the arguments briefly here. 
With the acknowledgement that speech acts exhibit a 'double 
structure' of propositional content and illocutionary 
component, indicating two communicative levels, we might 
propose the idea that research which takes speech as a 
'resource' focuses principally upon one level, adopting in 
Habermas' terms a 'cognitive orientation, to language, in which 
the content of the communication is thematised while the 
interpersonal relation between speakers is only indirectly 
expressed (Habermas 1979 p53). 
On the other hand, (and stretching Habermas, arguments 
somewhat), to take discourse as a 'topic' indicates a concern 
with both levels in which the metacommunicative and reflexive 
component may also be thematised as well as the propositional 
content3. In other words by allowing for both the cognitive and 
the interactive uses of language we may grasp both the content, 
the reported facts (be they related to the external, the 
internal, or the social worlds) and the discursive processes 
of the immediate interactive relation within which these facts 
3 And consider the discussions In Atkinson (1985 p130), and also 
Silverman (1985 p170-2) who considers these Issues In relation to 
social scientific interviews: I ... when Interviews take place, we witness both artful and possibly universal conversational 
practices and the display of cultural particulars expressing 
variable social practices. Put another way, the Internallst concern 
with form and universality and the externallst commitment to 
content and variability are complementary rather than 
contradictory., (p170). My argument here Is that Habermas, formal 
pragmatics provides another framework from which to understand 
this complementarity. 
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are recreated4. To pursue this line of thought leads to the 
examination of the relationship between Habermas and rhetoric 
which is tackled in chapter 5 above. 
An additional and important point which devolves from the above 
analysis is that the researcher's discourse (as discourse or 
as subsequent text) also raises the same validity claims as 
those raised by his or her subjects. 
The Criteria for Completion 
A number of criteria exist which might indicate when the 
empirical component of the study is or should be finished. In 
the manner of Glaser and Strauss (1967) it may be suggested 
that the study continue until a coherent theory is developed 
which accurately reflects the data. Or, in the manner of 
Cressey (1953) that the (causal) hypothesis be modified until 
it is no longer falsified by cases or events. 
Alternatively, appeal might be made to tests of validity, to 
whether the researcher has acquired sufficient knowledge to be 
able to 'pass, as a member of the research setting (Douglas 
1976 p123), or whether the research subjects themselves concur 
with the account as presented to them by the researcher (cf. 
Douglas 1976, Rock 1988). 
4 However there Is a caveat here, for as Habermas makes plain (1979 
p 43) It Is not possible to simultaneously perform and objectify 
an illocutionary act. We can therefore only analyse the structures 
of speech In an objectivating attitude with the consequence that 
metacommunications can only be thematised retrospectively. I 
cannot In other words make meta statements about the form of 
discourse In which I am engaged without simultaneously raising 
a new non-objectified metacommunicative level (in which 
statements cannot be made). The functions of language use 
transcend validity claims, but may only be discursively addressed 
through such claims. 
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There are further criteria which may be less theoretically 
adequate. I would argue that much research anticipates certain 
obstacles which de facto set limits to the investigation but 
which may be rationalised after the event in terms of plausible 
theoretical statements. These criteria are essentially 
pragmatic and are to do with finances, energy and time. Given 
that the study of (social) reality is potentially never 
completely exhaustible then Smith's thoughts on literary 
composition may apply equally well here: 
The completed work is thus always, in a sense, a temporary 
truce among contending forces, achieved at the point of 
exhaustion, that is, the literal depletion of the author's 
current resources or ... the point where the author simply has something else ... to do. (Quoted in Brodkey 1987a, 
p43)5. 
Research Phases 
It is possible to think in terms of phases through which this 
project developed. For example, for approximately 18 months I 
spent time, as indicated above, taking part in village 
activities. This period was important and allowed me to get to 
know a number of people within the village and enabled me to 
gain the co-operation (and perhaps the trust) of certain 
villagers who would not, I am sure, otherwise have agreed to 
5 From my own point of view the constraints which have been most 
felt have been those which have related to CNAA regulations 
concerning the length of the thesis, and my own domestic 
situation, in particular the effort to do research and remain 
married. Janice: 'I remember when we were sitting In the Duke of 
Marlborough and you said "Can I do a PhD? ", and I said "No", and 
you went ahead and did It anyway. You said, "Of course I'll be 
able to work, have a family and do a PhD at the same time, and 
wash up and hoover ... 11 1 
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be interviewed by me, and others who may not otherwise have 
been so candid6. 
It is from within a long-standing ethnographic tradition that 
it is argued that the phenomena under study can most faithfully 
be grasped using the method of participant-observation where 
understanding comes about through the physical accompaniment 
of actors in some of their day to day routines. 
It is clear that the emergent nature of the 'problem' during 
such research is a result of the dialectical or hermeneutic 
play between the general (the overall informing theories and 
hypotheses) and the particular (the substantive engagement with 
an often obstinate reality) (see e. g. Bromley and Shupe 1980, 
Hammersley and Atkinson 1983). That this type of research is 
also susceptible to, as well as reliant upon, the 'accidental' 
(that is; meeting, liking, understanding), can be readily seen 
from a perusal of many such studies (e. g. Johnson 1975, Whyte 
1943/1955,1984, Karp 1980). 
Serving a number of functions, this part of phase one provided 
a preliminary description and account of those interactions, 
both verbal and non-verbal, between villagers (and others 
within the province of Shenley village) and Shenley patients, 
interactions which have occurred predominantly within the 
locale of the village. It also served as an opportunity to 
explore the background expectancies, norms and routines of 
village life; the taken for granted common-sense 
understandings, knowledge and practices of members of this 
particular lifeworld; to consider whether patients were 
included as an ordinary aspect of this world, incorporated 
conceptually and practically within it by the villagers (indeed 
6 At the same time my request of other people for Interviews led to 
new opportunities to take part In village activities. 
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whether they were accepted as villagers) or whether the 
everyday practices of villagers differ according to the 
presence or absence of people who were patients. Observation 
and participation in village life was therefore conducted both 
in the presence and the absence of patients and took place in 
formal and informal settings. 
In addition to participant-observation, the first phase 
involved the collation of documentary material concerning both 
Shenley village and Shenley hospital. This entailed 
investigation in the hospital staff library as well as the 
nearby local authority library in Borehamwood; making 
arrangements for the weekly collection of the two local papers 
which in part cover the Shenley area - the 'Borehamwood Times' 
and the 'Borehamwood and Radlett Advertiser'; subscription to 
the monthly Shenley Parish News Magazine published and 
distributed by members of the Church of St. Martin and helpers; 
the application to Hertfordshire County council and Hertsmere 
Borough Council for information concerning both the demographic 
details of the village and more specifically planning and 
redevelopment proposals for the Shenley Hospital site as well 
as details of the planning application of, and objections to, 
proposals of the Praetorian Housing Association to extend their 
premises. Other sources have included the local authority 
Social, Services Department, concerning their involvement in 
Shenley village; the Hospital League of Friends; and the 
Hospital Managers who have supplied details of in-patient 
statistics. The aim of this kind of documentary research was 
primarily to supplement and check data obtained from other 
sources on topics outlined above. A small number of villagers 
were also more, formally interviewed during this period, and the 
interviews tape-recorded. 
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After this initial period I concentrated upon semi-structured 
interviews with villagers and patients. During this second 
period I also researched a number of old Hospital Management 
Committee documents, back copies of the Herts Advertiser, and 
other local newspapers held in the British Library Newspaper 
Section. I also visited the Herts County Archives in search of 
old copies of Parish Council minutes, and was grateful to be 
given access by the Parish Council to more recent minutes. 
At the same time during the process of participant observation 
I came more clearly to realise that this method in itself was 
extremely time-consuming and in certain respects problematic. 
In the following pages I shall consider some of the problems 
I encountered. 
Participant-Observation: Some Problems in Practice 
1: The Nature of Evidence 
From the ontological and methodological concerns of 
interpretative sociology, evidence is said to derive not from 
'indicators' or 'variables' but participation in lived human 
experience in a human culture (e. g. Bruyn 1966, Ford 1975, 
Hammersley and Atkinson 1983); or less traditionally and more 
recently, to the 'making of texts' (e. g. Atkinson 1990, Brodkey 
1987a, 1987b, Clifford and Marcus 1986, Van Maanen 1988). The 
suggestion here is that to frame the question or the answer 
solely in terms of observables is to imply an inappropriate 
behaviourism. Nevertheless the question of what criteria of 
evidence might count as demonstrating the exclusion, 
discrimination or 'status engulfment' of patients, or indeed 
the opposite, the acceptance, inclusion and systematically 
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impartial or affectionate treatment of patients by the 
villagers, is one which has preoccupied me throughout the 
project7. 
Evidence, it seems, may be attached to a variety of criteria 
derived from several sources. Previous empirical research has 
addressed- the many ways people who are former psychiatric 
patients may be excluded by others. My own experiences and 
knowledge concerning racial, sexual and other discrimination 
are equally important sources. As Garfinkel (1967) and others 
have shown, -research in sociology and other human sciences 
inevitably has recourse to such personal knowledge although 
this may often go unacknowledged as a resource. 
An analysis of theories of power and domination is also 
suggestive of the various means whereby people may be 
excluded8. The relationship between situated action and social 
structure is of enduring interest for power theorists (see e. g. 
Barbalet 1987, Clegg 1989, Lukes 1974, as well as Giddens 1979, 
1981,1984). From the realist perspective social structures 
have reality and 'are no more or less than the ways in which 
historically situated human practices are done' (Isaac 1987 
p59). However from Giddens, position such structures do not 
exist in space-time and are hence non-empirical conditions of 
activity although their adequate theorisation does rely upon 
historical and empirical knowledge. Precisely how a social 
71 suspect It reflects a residual positivism on my part. 
8 From non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, Clegg 1989 
p77) through Marxian concerns with structural relations (e. g. 
Isaac 1987), via structuration (Giddens 1981,1984), to 
'postmodern' accounts (e. g. Clegg 1989, Foucault 1980), underlying 
all accounts of power there exist normative, political and 
philosophical positions which pertain to the nature of the 
constitution of the actor and society. 
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structure which is non-empirical may be investigated 
empirically gives pause for thought. One answer is to adopt the 
perspective of viewing interactions wherever possible as 
inquiries into, negotiations and reconstructions of, social 
structure, the kind of approach favoured by ethnomethodology 
(see for a recent example Sharrock and Watson 1988). A second 
is the time-geographic framework adopted by Giddens and Pred 
in which structuration is seen in terms of the intersection of 
individual paths with institutional projects. Both of these 
approaches are drawn upon in Parts Two and Three of this 
thesis. 
The start of fieldwork led me from my initial supposition that 
there would be "exclusion' of patients, to examine the claims 
of some villagers that patients are in fact 'accepted' by 
villagers. But the position became complicated by the competing 
accounts and opinions of villagers. Some villagers have accused 
others, for example, of being intolerant and so forth. And some 
patients have regarded villagers, behaviours as warranted, 
while other patients have been quite critical. This very 
heterogeneity pushed me inexorably towards the fine-grained 
analyses of villagers' talk as one method of addressing and 
understanding variability. 
2: The Diversity of Practices and Sites. 
Although Shenley was chosen in part for its size, and indeed 
it is not a large village (the distance between the hospital 
at one end and the store at the other being no more than one 
half mile), in terms of fieldwork it proved to be practically 
and experientially very large indeed. It became impractical to 
hope to participate in and observe the whole range of places, 
events, meetings and practices of village life, and a small 
number of sites and types of event therefore had to be 
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specified, excluding a large chunk of Shenley reality in the 
process. 
Fieldwork which was geared to observing patient-villager 
reaction was focused primarily at sites along the major pathway 
used by, patients (thereby making an assumption about patients' 
routines), a route which anyway contained a large proportion 
of more formal facilities, so that I tended to focus in 
particular upon the village store, two of the four village 
pubs, and the village hall. However fieldwork was also 
conducted at other locations as I shall later show. In addition 
to some of the less formal sites of interaction, I attended a 
number of more formal functions, such as meetings of the Parish 
Council, the Village Society, the League of Friends, and the 
Village Hall Society. The aim here was to investigate the 
possibility of exclusionary practices as they might be 
manifested in these settings but also to assist in building a 
picture , of village life and village concerns as I have 
indicated above. 
Part of the problem in this respect was that I had to work to 
a large extent on my own. On occasions my wife and son 
accompanied me on field trips and an effort was also made to 
co-opt a member of the village as an informant/assistant. This 
had some limited success but the project remained primarily a 
one-researcher effort, with its inevitable and associated 
problems of labour economy. 
The narrowing down of the study to a limited number of sites 
in the interests of research economy nevertheless failed in 
certain respects to overcome an ongoing problem, for the direct 
observation of patient-vi 1 lager interactions logical ly entai led 
the co-presence of both villagers and patients (or others the 
villagers might believe to be patients). But it often proved 
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very difficult to predict the presence of patients in certain 
places at certain times so that many hours were spent in 
disappointment, although attempts were always made to turn such 
hours to gain, in discussions with local people. The converse 
has also been the case, however, so that in some instances when 
patients have been present in substantial numbers, villagers 
have been absent. 
3: The Patients. 
Alongside the problem of how to refer to patients (i. e. as 
'people', 'patients', 'them'), there rode the analogous 
question of how I might actually identify patients. To a 
considerable degree I found myself in the same position as 
those villagers and others who have been unclear about the 
identity of another person. Relying upon commonly held notions 
of what a 'patient, might look like, say and do, I have also 
been tempted to draw conclusions from my own observations about 
the paths which I have seen people travel. For example the fact 
that a candidate for a 'patient, ascription emerges out of the 
entrance to the hospital could be taken as lending further 
weight to such a judgement. 
From the point of view of procedures of identification I was 
forced to depend initially upon the help of villagers. 
Eventually, however, when I had gained the consent of the 
hospital ethics committee, I was able to introduce myself to 
patients on the hospital wards and in this way became clearer 
about the identities of at least some of the people observed 
within the village9. 
'It may be of Importance that one (virtually) certain method of 
Identifying people who are psychiatric patients as patients Is to 
meet them on the hospital ward. In chapter 14 1 show how 
villagers tell how they know. As I show elsewhere (Southgate 
1992c) those formal procedures for warrantably Identifying 
Insanity (which Is not the same as Identifying a 'patient') are, or 
should properly be, essentially discursive. 
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4: Practical Problems of 'Participation'. 
The literature on ethnography indicates a potential range of 
possible degrees of involvement, so that the fieldworker's 
orientation may lie towards one end or other of a spectrum 
stretching from a detached observation of behaviour, the 
Skynnerian end which retains no vestige of involvement with the 
'data' apart from supplying it with food, to the opposite pole 
where Winch persuades Evans-Pritchard to throw away his notepad 
and join the Mande as their motor-mechanic (e. g. Ford 1975, 
Hammersley et al 1983, and especially still Gold 1958). 
My own research position has been somewhat ambiguous and in 
this respect is perhaps not unusual. The effort of trying to 
maintain sufficient 'distance' to be 'objective', while at the 
same time trying- to draw close enough to people to gain 
adequate understanding and privileged information was 
demanding. And the fact that my time was limited, that I had 
a part-time job to perform, and a family to be part of, meant 
that it was impossible to become as involved in local life as 
I might have wished (although of course close involvement 
brings its own problems). 
To some extent it might be argued that my anxious experiences 
in attempting to gain access to village life may closely 
parallel those of others such as patients, who attempt a 
similar feat (see Sanders 1980 for this kind of view, and also 
Clarke 1975, Johnson 1975, Wax 1971, for a consideration of the 
personal and experiential dimensions of fieldwork). Although 
it smacks a little of the empathic orientation of an old style 
interpretive sociology, there may nonetheless be something in 
this. Rubin (1981) is one sociologist who has been convinced 
of the importance of listening to her feelings during the 
research process, as one valid means of gaining insight into 
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the reality of her respondents, rather in the manner of a 
therapist using the counter-transference". 
However it would not be correct to say that my fieldwork 
orientation has been consistent. Rather, I have utilised 
different modes of participation for different places and types 
of occasion, a flexibility which has been advocated by for 
example Schatzman and Strauss (1973). In other words my 
involvement was greater in some settings than in others, not 
necessarily as a result of differential attempts or strategic 
planning on my part but mainly as a result of the exigencies 
of particular settings which have brought their own practical 
difficulties of involvement and observation. 
While the village store, for example, provided the most 
welcoming atmosphere for my researches it was nevertheless 
physically tiring, sometimes embarrassing as well as 
occasionally monotonous to 'hang around' the store for any 
length of time. 
on the other hand while the public houses provided seats, it 
proved more difficult to engage people in direct discussion 
about patients when they were more interested in talking about 
'the races', Gower's feeble attempts at captaining England and 
Arsenal Is chances for the next season, without at the same time 
being too obtrusive. 
This raises a further and related point, which I have touched 
on above, concerning the apparent inability (or unwillingness) 
of people to talk about patients, for it often seemed the case 
10 To allow credence to this view need not Imply acceptance of her 
underlying tenet that 'the beginning of all knowledge lies Inside 
the Individual,. 
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that people had very little to say in any spontaneous way about 
others who were patients without being probed on specific 
issues. The setting, however, often precluded lengthy debate 
about the subject, sometimes because of the to and fro movement 
of people within the room or the fact that other topics were 
already being discussed, or at other times because I felt that 
it would be inappropriate to raise the subject at that 
particular moment - perhaps a kind of squeamishness about 
introducing a possibly 'Ugly' topic. This feeling may have come 
out of those attempts to start discussion which were dealt with 
in summary fashion by villagers. 
5: Recording. 
Accounts of fieldwork were recorded as soon as possible, 
usually within an hour, with the help of a dictating machine, 
and the recording was later transcribed. From a practical point 
of view it did not always prove possible to rush to the toilet 
every twenty minutes to jot down notes (see e. g. Festinger 
1956) without drawing undue attention to myself". As a result 
fieldwork sessions were usually limited to a maximum of two 
hours at a time, by which time I would often feel exhausted12 
with the combined effort of managing interactions and 
remembering events. It therefore proved impossible to record 
conversations in any systematic word for word fashion. 
21 Hammersley (1990 p121) has described how on one occasion, in his 
research, he jotted down notes In the teachers, common-room on 
his Guardian. I have always found this method tricky to say the 
least. 
12 1 
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From Participant Observation to Discourse Analysis. 
In the above pagesJ have'aetailed a number of problems which 
I experienced -in my efforts to participate in village 
activities as a researcher. These problems contributed to my 
turn towards a discourse analytic approach and my concentration 
in phase two upon more formal interviews with villagers. The 
idea of a discourse analysis had been present at the early 
planning stages of the project, but it was only after I had 
subjected some of the preliminary interviews with villagers to 
such an analysis that I more clearly realised its potential. 
Nevertheless it would be a mistake to imply that this time had 
been unproductive. At the very least, as noted above, I believe 
it -contributed to easier and more candid interviews. A 
conventional view of the relationship between fieldwork and 
semi-structured interviewing as presented by for instance Zweig 
in 1948, is that such interviews cannot be started without 
prior detailed knowledge obtained through participation or 
observation (referenced in Fielding and Fielding 1986 p5O). 
However as the Fieldings also point out, the reverse position 
may also be true, so that observation can be seen as being 
informed by interviews. In Part Two of this thesis I provide 
a picture of the relationship between villagers and patients 
for which I have drawn primarily upon my fieldwork notes, but 
which cannot help but also be informed by other sourceS13. 
13 Although In Part Three I focus In particular upon the discursive 
methods which villagers and others use to construct identity' or 
'difference', this should not be taken to mean that extra- 
discursive practices should not equally be viewed as constructive 
of (e. g. ) Identities. In Part Two below I argue that the routines 
and physical practices of villagers or others must also be 
examined for their structures of discrimination and stigma In 
relation to patients, not In Isolation from, but In addition to, 
language In use. 
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And I also believe it to be the case that my interpretations 
of, interview transcripts, presented in Part Two below, were 
again made that much easier by some understanding, albeit often 
semi-articulate, of local practices, which I gained from 
fieldwork. I would argue then that discourse analysis relies 
upon an understanding of context. But that things cannot be 
quite so simple becomes clear when we understand that context 
cannot itself be viewed as independent of the practices which 
constitute it (Garfinkel 1967 p76), as more solid' or 'real' 
or less 'interpreted' than discourse; or that ethnographic 
context is actually a constituent part of talk so that the 
distinction between talk and ethnography collapse 514. 
My focus upon recorded interviews and the discourse analytic 
approach of Potter and Wetherell therefore emerged from various 
considerations over time. To bring these threads together here, 
the first point is that I had an interest in this method from 
the beginning of the project. Secondly, after attempting such 
an analysis at an early stage I came to believe that it might 
have potential in terms of its ability to illuminate the local 
life of the village together with villagers' views about 
patients within an argumentative context. Thirdly I had an 
interest in the way that discrimination might be a largely 
'hidden process' (Gumperz (ed) 1982) and have an often subtle 
linguistic dimension. Participant-observation did not provide 
me with sufficiently fine detail of conversations. And finally 
other problems thrown up in attempting to do ethnography, 
14 1 discuss this problem a little more fully In relation to the work 
of Potter and Wetherell, and offer some solutions, in Southgate 
(1991). In his Introduction to a recent debate, Watson (in Watson 
and Seller (eds) 1992 pxv) says: 'It Is by Invoking ethnographic 
context that most contributors to this volume resolve the 
predicament that, while there is nothing but the text, not 
everything needed for Its analysis Is In the text. ' 
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described above, encouraged me to look more closely at 
discourse analysis. 
The aim of the type of discourse analysis presented in Part Two 
is to examine the construction and functions of discourse, 
intez- alia its argumentative and rhetorical features. It is 
concerned with those discursive methods used by villagers to 
recreate difference and identity within an argumentative 
context, and yields a sense of the dilemmas facing villagers 
in their relations with people who are patients and the 
hospital. 
Sampling 
Details of the numbers of people interviewed, the kinds of 
questions asked, and the general format of the interviews are 
provided in chapter 13 below. However it is important to 
consider the process whereby interviewees were recruited. 
During the project I had to consider whether to attempt to 
obtain a-random sample of interviewees or whether to remain 
within a traditional ethnographic form whereby the researcher 
draws a purposive sample from those people he or she comes to 
knowI5. I chose the latter. 
To the extent that the 'findings' of discourse analysis 
constitute a specification of the reality of the village, then 
arguably some kind of 'representative' sample seemed called 
for, since it could be the case that one section of the local 
community might use different argumentative methods and draw 
upon different interpretative repertoires than another section. 
25 Compare 'theoretical sampling', Glaser and Strauss (1967), or 
alternatively snowball sampling' where Interview subjects provide 
the researcher with further names of potential Interviewees. 
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But the sheer effort involved in fully transcribing and 
analysing interviews made it clear that the sample would be too 
small to be statistically significant. At the same time I had 
difficulties in specifying precisely the universes from which 
random samples might be taken16. In addition I still have some 
reservations about the way statistical significance is, or can 
be, used to imply substantive significance and lend a sheen of 
legitimacy to research projects. Without implying the rejection 
of statistical evidence for the social sciences, I came to 
believe that this project would benefit little from the 
application of devices of statistical significance (for some 
of the arguments see Camillari 1962, Henkel and Morrison 1970, 
Irvine et al 1979, Kish 1959, McGinnis 1958, Selvin 1957, 
Willer and Willer 1973). 
Although the representativeness of respondents is therefore 
not assumed, a simple statistical breakdown is presented in 
chapter 13, specifying age, sex, and length of stay in the 
village, but without the accompanying imputation of statistical 
significance. 
Structure, Theory and Textual Modes: An Ethnography__of the 
Text17 
In Parts Two and Three of this thesis I have drawn upon several 
different theoretical, philosophical and analytic orientations 
to the research material. It is possible to view these 
differing approaches as if they were different windows through 
which the object may be perceived; or, in a manner more 
appropriate to the 'linguistic turn', as contributors to, or 
16 For example I wished to Interview villagers who drank at certain 
pubs, but the universe of such drinkers seemed Indeterminate. 
17 This phrase Is used by Woolgar (1988b). 
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partners in, a dialogue concerning mental disorder and 
discrimination; or further, from the perspective of the 
'rhetorical turn, (Simons (ed) 1990), a juxtaposition of 
different rhetorical modes. Together they form a 
'constellation' of perspectives (Bernstein 1991 and cf. 
Atkinson 1990 p168, Hammersley 1992 p54, Richardson 1990 p49). 
In chapter 71 provide basic information about the village, 
hospital and patients by setting this information after a short 
analysis of a village story, drawing upon the framework of 
Habermas' formal pragmatics. 
Chapter 8 provides an account of the travels of patients in the 
village together with their interactions with villagers, in a 
manner informed by, intez, alia, the time-geography of Allan 
Pred. This chapter has been constructed predominantly from 
fieldwork experiences and notes made during a period of 
participant-observation in the village, but also includes some 
material obtained from semi-structured interviews with 
villagers. It is written in a realist mode; that is, as though 
the , descriptions, events, thoughts and so forth 
unproblematically exist separately from my own interventions, 
although it has recourse to a theory of structuration. 
Chapter 9-presents a history of the relationship between the 
village and the hospital which draws upon the work of Emerson 
and Messinger who furnish a non-deterministic framework in 
which the labelling process may be understood. The material 
used in this chapter derived primarily from searches of local 
newspapers, documentary material found in the Hospital library, 
the remaining Hospital Management Committee minutes, minutes 
of Parish Council meetings, and interviews and discussions with 
villagers and present and former hospital staff. Again, while 
the theory stresses process, contingency and negotiation, the 
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textual mode is realist, portraying these events as if they 
possessed autonomy and independence from the author. 
In Part Three, chapter 14, by far the longest, is devoted to 
a rhetorical analysis of tape-recorded interviews with 
villagers, drawing upon the discourse analytic framework of 
Potter and Wetherell and interweaving it with the formal 
pragmatics of Habermas. Here I have attempted directly to 
explore the argumentative context of opinion and attitude. 
Realism and anti-realism again become intermingled here. On one 
level it possesses an anti-realist textual orientation; that 
is, in terms of theory and content it presents the reality of 
patients' and villagers' identities and local facts as an 
outcome of discursive practices. On another level it tends to 
invest interview transcripts themselves with an existential 
certitude, thereby retaining in its form of writing a realist 
residue. 
In these three chapters, 8,9 and 14, the precise theoretical 
component is detailed as part of that particular chapter, 
rather than being separated off in Part one from the empirical 
material. In this way I hope to maintain the now commonplace 
point that theory and data are intertwined; that how we read 
historical material, observe interactions, even interpret our 
own fieldwork notes and so forth, is soaked in theory', in 
Popper's terms, or in Gadamer's terms becomes a hermeneutic 
endeavour. Thus the hermeneutic orientation of theory is 
juxtaposed to the often realist manner of writing. 
The experimental Appendix D has already been touched upon above 
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(pages 11,22 above). It includes (or comes with'8) an 
Introduction and Annexure, the general form in which it was 
presented to the DARG reflexivity workshop at Brunel University 
in April 1992, with slight modification. It serves partly to 
provide a space from which patients' voices may be heard but 
in addition it sets out, in the manner of a constitutive 
reflexivity' (Woolgar 1988b, 1991), to disrupt some of the more 
comfortable assumptions of method which have gradually built 
up in the previous chapters. 
18 My original paper was entitled 'An Appendix, Its Introduction and 
Its Annexurel. Thus the Appendix In this paper 'comes with' other 
parts. However Appendix D In this thesis 'includes' certain parts, 
Including 'An Appendix, etc. 
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PART TWO 
Chapýt ýr 7 
V. 122-caqw- zuwl 
A Village Story 
All ethnographies begin in stories. 
(Brodkey 1987a, p32) 
For the few years up to 19891 village talk was consumed to an 
overwhelming extent by arguments concerning the hospital. 
Following the publication of plans to close the hospital and 
sell the site (see Hertsmere Borough council 1986,1987) 
villagers were involved in an ongoing and sometimes acrimonious 
debate about the implications of this development for the 
future of the village. Letters appeared in the local press 
voicing fears of the destruction of the local community, the 
Village Society fought a rearguard action, opposing the plans 
and, collecting a petition of 667 signatures which was sent to 
the Secretary of State for the Environment, while at the same 
time the Parish Council supported the planning proposalS2. 
This section of the thesis was originally written In October 1989 
and revised In February 1992. During this period both the village 
and the hospital have changed In many ways. At the present time 
of writing (1992) neither are quite as I depict them here. As a 
consequence of this revision, the verbal tense used In the 
following pages oscillates a little between present and past. This 
serves to highlight the part that rewriting plays In the 
construction of such a text. 
2 Headlines In the Radlett/Borehamwood Advertiser on 14th 
November 1986 read: 150m hospital row splits village. ' 
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The story which attends this local social storm is quite 
simple. Many villagers recount that although villagers resisted 
the building of the hospital in the first place, although they 
were adamant and united in opposition, and although many have 
complained over the years about the hospital, some of the same 
people are now heartily resisting its closure (although at the 
time of re-writing most resistance has petered out in the face 
of what has appeared to many to be the obduracy of central 
government decision making). The irony of this about-face is 
usually pointed out by the teller of the tale in its telling. 
This identification by the villagers of the irony of the 
present situation, itself the focus of the story, has been lent 
greater poignancy by a central addition, varying in precise 
detail, recounted to me by a number of villagers and hospital 
staff. For I have also been told that the land of Porters Park 
Estate was originally sold to the Middlesex County Council in 
1924 by its owner Cecil Raphael with the specific condition 
that a mental hospital be built on the site, in order for the 
owner to extract vengeance upon the village for his exclusion 
and stigmatisation by some of the local people. In this case, 
the story goes, the problem was that the owner was a JeW3. This 
part of the story it seems has become part of local folklore, 
folklore which is sustained in the telling. 
In Nazi Germany the murder of mentally disordered people began 
before that of Jewish people. Some 100,000 mentally Ill or disabled 
people are estimated to have been exterminated (Meyer- 
Lindenberg 1991 p7), with the complicity of many, but not all, 
German psychiatrists. Already In 1920 Binding and Hoche were 
advocating the 'extermination of worthless life', while the first law 
concerning hereditary health was passed In 1933, the first year 
of Nazi rule (Ibld). See also Gardner (1982), Hill (1983), Meyer 
(1988), Proctor (1988), Wertham (1966). 
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There are a number of ways in which this story may be decoded'. 
Approaching the story from the perspective of Habermas' formal 
pragmatics (1979,1984,1987a), the teller may be said to raise 
validity claims to truth, sincerity and normative rightness, 
which each assume a particular relationship between actor and 
the world5. One advantage of analysing a story from this 
perspective is that it points not only to the putative 
functions of the story but also to those avenues along which 
the claims of the story may be criticizable, to the way the 
validity claims raised in the telling may be thematised. At the 
same time it shows how the story itself is oriented to 
critique, in the way that the story portrays some actions as 
morally wrong or at least morally problematic. 
Thus the truth of the claim about Mr Raphael could be 
questioned, as well as the proposition that the villagers were 
in fact united against the hospital. 
Claims are also raised concerning the inner world of the 
speaker - the sincerity of the person making the utterance - 
so that we may question whether this person believes what he 
or she is saying or 'genuinely' feels it to be true, or whether 
4 Narrative analysis Is of course an extremely wide field. See for 
, 
example Polanyl (1979,1981,1985,1989) and Linde (1986). A 
modern classic analytic scheme has been provided by Labov and 
Waletsky (1967). Atkinson (1990), Eagleton (1983), Polkinghorne 
(1988) provide good overviews of narrative analysis, while Culler 
(1981) (and see also Young 1987) deconstructs the double logic, 
of Story (content) and Discourse (form or structure). In his study 
of prejudice and discourse Van DIjk (1984) draws upon the scheme 
of Labov and Waletsky. My use here of formal pragmatics reflects 
my efforts to sustain a Habermaslan theme throughout the thesis, 
and to explore the use for everyday empirical work of formal 
pragmatics. For a different treatment of a village story which 
draws on the work of Polanyl (above) and Smith (1978) see 
Southgate (1991). 
5 See especially chapter 5, and Southgate (1992c). 
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the telling of the story in the present is being used to 
demonstrate local knowledge and local understanding; that is, 
as a management of impression and identity. 
A further interpretation of the place of this story in village 
life, which emphasises its internal and affective component, 
provides for the idea of double punishment; not only, the story 
implies, has the village been punished in the past by the 
hospital but it is presently being punished again by the 
hospital. Having adapted to some degree to their punishment, 
having made the punishment routine, regular and almost 
subliminal, the rug is being pulled, in a manner of speaking, 
from under the villagers' feet. 
I have also been struck by the way this story in its elementary 
or embellished form has been told to me by people comparatively 
new to the village in a manner which suggested that they were 
almost present at the time of the first visitation'. The story 
of Shenley Hospital and Shenley Village may therefore pull into 
its ambit or event horizon villagers whether of recent arrival 
or of long standing. Its subscription serves to draw newcomers 
into one or other of the village folds. All may draw upon the 
irony who share in the village, while the telling serves to 
perpetuate the myth and confirm the teller as a putative 
villager even in those situations where he or she has in fact 
a relatively tenuous connection with the village (such as the 
researcher). In this respect the telling of the story raises 
claims to more than just truth and sincerity. It serves to 
raise a further validity claim, that of normative rightness or 
correctness, which connects as it were the actor with the 
social world and the locale, actualizes an already established 
pattern of relations, and provides the relational aspect in 
which the content is to be understood. This, it appears to 
remark, is what is correct to say here. 
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This claim to normative rightness also points to an 
understanding which may be more than local. The very fact that 
this, is comprehensible to readers as an ironic story shows us 
how stigma retains a certain currency as an important concept 
in relation to mental disorder. It is, in other words, 
normatively right to recount this story about discrimination 
in this place in the confidence that it will be understood as 
such even by those who do not originate from the village. The 
fact that it is told now, displays stigma as an issue still 
worthy of attention, as still Istoryable'. 
Although the story does not explicitly state that 
discrimination is morally wrong, it does none the less seem to 
problematise the issue of discrimination, to highlight what may 
otherwise be a taken for granted background assumption. 
This 'formal pragmatic' analysis shows how the telling of the 
story does more than just transmit and renew cultural 
knowledge. Although we may thematise and attempt to redefine 
the-situation in relation to the three formal world concepts, 
as suggested, above, this analysis already shows that 
communicative action also functions to assist social 
integration and establish solidarity, as well as serving to 
demonstrate and reconsolidate individual competence and 
identity. The formal pragmatic analysis may therefore be said 
to point beyond itself to those symbolic structures of the 
lifeworld which Habermas has identified as culture (stock of 
knowledge), society (social integration and solidarity) and 
person (socialization) (1987a p138)6. In the process of telling 
Habermas makes it clear that the structures of the lif eworld are 
not Identical to the three formal world concepts and their validity 
claims. The lifeworld Is constitutive for mutual understanding as 
such. The formal world concepts however are those things about 
which we may debate, argue and attempt to reach agreement 
(Habermas 1987a p126). In other words, if we debate social 
integration, we are thematising that part of our knowled_qe of It, 
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and no doubt as an unintended consequence, the story draws upon 
and serves to reconstruct part of the very reality and life of 
the village itself and the identity of the teller. 
It is clear that the logic of this ironical story depends upon 
the present historical context. Someone investigating Shenley 
ten years ago would not have been provided with quite the same 
account simply because there were no immediate plans to sell 
the hospital site. In this sense, although told in the present 
and affecting the present, the orientation of the story can be 
said to lie with the anticipation of future events. It is 
possible to argue therefore that the telling of this story has 
to be seen in the real historical perspective of a psycho- 
social and cultural transition, rather like the analysis of the 
importance of myth for the pupils in Measor and Woods (1983) 
study, for the changes facing villagers may be extensive. 
Following Brodkey (1987a) the telling of and listening to 
stories can therefore be seen as 'twice encoding' culture, so 
that stories are at once both practices and artifacts of 
culture. In her excellent article Brodkey goes on to argue 
that: 
One studies 'stories not because they are true or even 
because they are false, but for the same reason that 
people tell and listen to them, in order to learn about 
the terms on which others make sense of their lives: what 
they take into account and what they do not; what they are 
and are not willing to raise and discuss as problematic 
and unresolved in life (p47). 
which Is discussable. For Habermas, 'tests' of social Integration 
and socialization are not measured directly via criticizable validity 
claims or standards of rationality but against standards for the 
solidarity of members and for the Identity of socialized Individuals (1987a p139). 
uVillage and Hospital 140 
However, any analysis of myth or story needs have recourse to 
factors which lend validity to its decoding. In the present 
context this may begin to be provided by a limited description 
of the area, the cultural and economic resources of the village 
and the possible futures faced by the villagers. But at the 
same time the rest of the thesis can itself be read as an 
elaboration upon the theme of this story, which may be said to 
encapsulate the truth of the relationship between village and 
hospital7. 
The Village: Geographic and Demographic Data 
Shenley village is geographically situated 5 miles south-south- 
east of the-city of St. Albans in Hertfordshire and 4 miles 
north-west of the town of High Barnet in North London, as the 
crow flies. - In a direct line it is approximately 14 miles from 
the centre of London (Marble Arch), and, postally is allocated 
a position near Radlett. According to the most recent 
Hertfordshire County Household Survey of 1986, which was a 
sample survey and subject to sample error, Shenley village, 
identified by the coterminous boundaries of Parish and Ward, 
consisted of a total of 695 households of which 340 were owner 
occupied, 159-local authority owned and 153 privately rented. 
Figures provided by the Hertsmere Borough Council Housing Dept 
however show that in 1989 there existed 178 council housing 
units in Shenley village, so it may be assumed that the number 
of owner-occupied and privately rented units in Shenley is 
correspondingly less than that indicated by the Sample Survey. 
Keeping in mind therefore the likely error, the Survey 
indicates that in 1986 Shenley had a population of 1325 people 
aged 16 and over of whom 911 were 'economically active' and 414 
'economically inactive', that is students (31) retired persons 
7 Alternatively we may say that the story grasps a truth of this 
relationship. 
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(228) and lother'(155). The same survey, analysing residents 
by sex and age, gives a figure of 299 men and women over the 
age of 65., 
In 1986 according to this survey, Shenley had a total 
population of 1778 people of all ages, while the 1981 census 
indicates a total of 1943. 
Village Institutions and Culture 
From the- one half mile which separates the Hospital to the 
north from the village store to the south, the traveller 
through Shenley on route B5378 might observe four Public 
Houses, two churches, an estate agents, a school, village hall, 
public toilets and a type-copy shop, a garden centre, as well 
as a number of houses, some terraced, some flats, a home for 
retired people and residentially grander properties. Next to 
the King Harry pub and the village pond is situated 'The Cage', 
an old lockup of indeterminate age. The mottos carved in stone 
tablets which, adorn the Cage have been investigated by a 
Shenley scholar, Ted Stebbing, who has provided an account in 
the village magazine of their misrepresentations in various 
books and articles on Hertfordshire. The mottos suggest 'Do 
well and fear not' and 'Be sober, be vigilantI8. The structural 
problems of the Cage and the cost of its restoration have 
recently been under investigation by the Parish Council. 
on the southern edge of the village beyond the store lies a 
petrol station and garage, and a Bonsai nursery. Further still 
on the way to Barnet and still on the main road, there are 
several farms and a vetinary surgeon's practice. The village 
The second motto probably derives from 1 Peter 5,8: 'Be sober, 
be vigilant: because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, 
walketh about ... I 
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store provides food, alcohol, general domestic consumables and 
incorporates a post office. The hinterland or back regions of 
the village contain inter alla further farms, residential 
housing9, some light industry, an equine stud farm, a hotel and 
playing fields. Shenley is therefore primarily linear in 
structure, built along an important route into London. 
This main road which runs through Shenley and crosses the M25 
motorway provides a direct link from St. Albans to North London. 
It is a small, sometimes narrow road, which is nevertheless 
very busy. In other words there is a considerable amount of 
through traffic some of which may stop in passing at the store 
or the pubs. A rail link, a fast line-Anto London, is available 
to villagers from nearby Radlett or Borehamwood. 
A preliminary study of village life suggests a cultural 
heterogeneity which I have chosen to structure in a particular 
way. Some indication can be provided from the Parish magazine 
which every month provides a list of village activities. This 
list is of interest not only for what it includes but also for 
what it leaves out. In addition to this official program, less 
formally organised activity proceeds apace, much of which is 
centred an the public houses. While the Hertsmere Borough 
Council Shenley 50+ group meet every Wednesday afternoon in the 
village hall and older members of the community may attend a 
luncheon club on Thursdays from midday at the village school, 
an alternative 'club,, a loose informal group of retired 
villagers meets daily at the King Harry public house from 
around 12 p. m. Although this group has no official name and is 
In spite of the proximity of Shenley village and hospital, house 
prices In the village have tended to be high In comparison to 
those In nearby St. Albans. See research by Dear (1977) and 
Boeckh et al (1980) on the relationship between mental health facilities and property values In Philadelphia and metropolitan 
Toronto. 
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not included in the village magazine it arguably constitutes 
an important part of village life for its members. In addition 
the landlord and landlady of this particular pub organise 
regular coach trips for the regulars to the races. 
During the hot summer months of 1989 the pub barbecue was a 
regular feature of Shenley night life. The pubs draw custom 
from both within and outside the village and clearly act as 
social centres, particular territories where informally linked 
and local friendship networks are developed, maintained, and 
solidified. A more detailed account of this is provided below. 
one bastion of more formal activities is the church. Although 
only a relatively small number of events are held on church 
premises, there exists locally a small group of people, mainly 
church members, who are involved in the organisation of many 
local events such as coffee mornings at St. Martins church, 
jumble sales at the Methodist church and Village Hall and so 
on. This church-related activity also plays a vital part in 
village, life, although the Church of England vicar voiced 
concern about the ageing nature of his congregation. By 
'church' here I am referring to members of three local 
churches: Church of England, Methodist and Catholic. There is 
a further building in Shenley, next to the Praetorian cottages 
(see below: The Housing Association, p153), which is the 
redundant church of St. Botolphs, and within the walls of which 
a house has been built. In its graveyard lie the remains of 
Nicholas Hawksmoor. 
In another sense the church has further power to the extent 
that it controls one of the formal means of dissemination of 
information within the village, the Parish magazine, 'Shenley 
Parish News' . However it is likely that people gain as much or 
more information through talk and gossip, chats with the 
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neighbours, conversation in the village store, with the 
milkman, in the pubs, or in the street. 
In addition to churches and public houses as major centres of 
organisational power within the village, there is the Village 
Hall. This is situated on the main road and is managed by its 
own committee, which stages local events, including day-time 
fund-raising activities such as jumble sales, and evening 
entertainment of, for example, music and theatre. The Village 
Hall also hosts meetings of local organisations such as the 
Parish Council and the Village Society AGM10. 
A further institutional resource which for many has focusing 
power, that is, the organisational structure of which can 
channel everyday interactions, is the school. This is a first 
school I from which pupils must move at the age of 8 or 9 years. 
The school tends to provide for the possibility of conversation 
andýinformal talk for adults who have young children. As with 
many primary schools throughout the country, mothers and 
occasionally fathers meet outside the school at home-time 
waiting for the children to emerge. Small groups form, 
information is exchanged, arrangements made. In addition, 
school functions, including jumble sales, or evening events 
such as discos for parents, provide chances for social 
activity. 
There are also a number of other important village 
organisations and activities. The role of the Parish Council 
will be highlighted in a later chapter. The Village Society has 
been in existence since 1965 and the Women's Institute for 
considerably longer. 
20 The more frequent Village Society committee meetings are held 
at the houses of committee members. 
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The hospital has in some respects more ambiguous influence. No 
groups of local people meet outside its walls to talk as they 
do at the school. The hospital does not organise events for 
local people, apart from the occasional car-boot sale or the 
hosting of craft fairs, and in former years hospital dances (of 
which I have seen none advertised over the course of this 
study). However, none of these events was advertised in the 
Parish magazine over the period in which I monitored it. 
Neither it seems does the village organise social events for 
the hospital or patients. Although a number of patients do 
attend functions in the village, these functions appear to be 
organised principally for the benefit of the villagers. on the 
other hand many villagers depend upon the hospital for 
employment, while many are also former (retired) hospital 
staff. Economically then the village has come to rely to a 
considerable 'extent upon the hospital and not only from the 
point of view of the employment of labour. The vicar's tea 
party (of which more later), a successful fundraising event for 
the local Church of England, has probably benefited financially 
from the attendance of patients, while the village store (see 
chapter 8 below) has similarly gained in turnover. 
The Death of a Nice Village? 
The village is facing probably the most important changes since 
the hospital was built. It is unclear whether Shenley village 
will be able to maintain its identity or whether, without the 
geographical and cultural buffer of the hospital, it will be 
absorbed into Radlett, perhaps eventually Borehamwood, and 
become part of another sprawling suburb of Greater London. 
These have been villagers' fears. 
Although, when pressed, people will often express ambivalence 
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about the village, most of the people I have spoken to say that 
Shenley is a special place, a nice place, in which to live. It 
is situated in pleasant surroundings in Green Belt country; is 
leafy and rural in spite of being close to London; is small 
and compact in the sense that it has no sprawl, and is quiet 
in so far as it has no major entertainment attractions to lure 
people from the surrounding areas in search of a good time. 
Situated in rural idyll, it nevertheless offers conveniencell 
as Estate Agents might say, for journeys into London. Shenley 
has no crime to speak of, a small community of people who know 
and support each other. 
There is some truth in all of this, although Shenley is never 
quite what it is made out to be. Short of the kind of glimmers 
of terror lying just below the surface of ordinary life 
portrayed in some sociological literature, for example 
Goffman's (1961) reference to 'status bloodbath"' or his 
marvellous (1971) depiction of the paranoid logic haunting 
'Normal Appearances', the village is at once as simple, more 
complex and in some respects less idyllic than people who live 
in it are inclined to make out. 
Following a talk with the village constable, for instance, I 
was led to believe that he dealt informally with any potential 
lawbreakers and that crime failed to exist in the village. The 
policeman, who has lived in the village for 25 years, and has 
been the village constable for 13, knows most families, is 
aware of who is involved in what, and simply has to 'have a 
quiet word in someone's earl to solve any potential problems. 
This view has coincided with the conclusion gained from the 
content analysis of local newspapers. Full of reports Of 
muggings, thefts, fights etc in the surrounding areas, over the 
Compare the use by the psychiatrist R. D. Scott (1974) of the term 
, identity warfare, to refer to the battle for emotional and psychic 
survival between patient and relatives. 
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twelve months to October 1989 there were no accounts in the 
press of any such incidents occurring in Shenley village. 
It is, not difficult to explain this absence in terms of 
selective reporting and indeed it was not long before I was 
told across the bar of one pub how one villager had just had 
his, car stolen from its usual parking space in the village for 
the second time, and how a lot of other cars parked nearby had 
been vandalised, yet nothing appeared in the local press. This 
is not to imply that local people were necessarily involved as 
perpetrators, only that Shenley village is not quite as 
incident free as it may be made out to be. 
There are other problems of which the researcher has gained a 
whiff on occasion. During my researches a member of the 
community was said to have attempted suicide following an 
argument with his wife. A number of male drinkers clearly have 
alcohol problems -that is, they routinely drink quantities of 
alcohol well beyond the current recommended limit. There may 
be a direct link with the hospital here for the hospital 
authorities recognise that the alcoholism rate is high amongst 
nursing staff and the local G. P. s acknowledge that such a 
problem exists. In addition the G. P. s have conceded that it is 
not unusual for villagers in the privacy of the consulting room 
to voice anxieties about 'going mad', and they have suggested 
(without caring to support their assertion with data) that the 
referral rate of villagers to the psychiatric hospital for 
their area has been quite high. If they are correct then it may 
be reasonable to conclude that the presence of psychiatric 
patients may not always act as an 'immunity' to madness. 
Unfortunately my approach to the hospital in question, Hill 
End, requesting some indication of the admission rate from 
Shenley village failed to secure a reply. The Social Services 
Department covering the area was more helpful but failed to 
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find any record of compulsory in-patient admission from the 
village 'within living memory'. The home help organiser 
reported that referrals to her service were similarly few and 
far between. The conclusion she drew was that Shenley villagers 
were on the whole supportive of their neighbours and relatives 
and did not require the use of council services. There may be 
other explanations for this lack of service up-take, but the 
overal 1 point -here is that it has been very dif f icult to obtain 
data relating to the mental health of the villagers themselves. 
As I have already noted, there is also the fact that Shenley 
village is built along a busy main road. Cars often speed 
through its main street and there is constant danger of 
accident. The Parish Council have pressed for further speed 
restrictions but it appears that the traffic problem is an old 
one and likely to become worse following the anticipated 
development of the hospital site (see below). Ted Stebbing, one 
of the local historians, has provided an account in the Parish 
magazine of traffic concerns in 1931 when schoolteachers were 
reported to have been worried about 'the heavy vehicular 
traffic constantly streaming through the village'. 
Village Futures 
What, then, does the future hold for the village? Plans for the 
hospital site include an estate of 900 housing units to be 
built in several phases and including a park. Provision has 
been made for the, possibility of another school and there are 
plans for three shops on the site, light industry and some form 
of 'health care facility, or residential home. The last of the 
patients will probably not be moved from what then remains of 
the hospital until well into the next century. 
The village is therefore faced with a major influx of people 
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who, it is feared, will bring with them cars, congestion, noise 
and chaos. The character of the village is likely to change as 
a result, so that it may become quite impossible to describe 
the village as being akin to an isolated rural jewel on the 
edge of London. 
The economy of the village will be affected directly, 
positively for some and adversely for others (cf. Moore's 1981 
study in New York State). Local pubs are likely to increase 
their trade, while the manager of the village store has not 
ruled out the possibility of bidding for one of the proposed 
new retail units. A number of local people who have been 
employed at Shenley Hospital have already been redeployed by 
the Health Authority to staff new mental health projects in 
London. The future of other local staff is less certain. Indeed 
many of the hospital staff live in hospital accommodation and 
have been concerned about the security of their tenure. In 
addition the village will lose its patients. 
Patients and Hospital 
From figures provided by the hospital managers, Shenley 
Hospital had a population of 656 patients in July 1989. The 
average patient age was 59.8 years while the average length of 
stay of all patients was 15 years. Although there is therefore 
a substantial long-stay and elderly patient population, a small 
proportion of patients are still short-stay and young, e. g. 42 
patients were 35 years old or younger at the registration date. 
The 'acute' wards were moved from Shenley to the Central 
Middlesex Hospital in 1988 but Shenley still retains a 
'disturbed' ward which tends to have younger patients and also 
a mother and baby unit which accepts referrals from outside the 
normal Shenley catchment areas. The disturbed ward will 
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continue in existence until appropriate buildings are built or 
found in London. The immediate future of the mother and baby 
unit is unclear. ShenDay-hospital serves and accepts patients 
principally from two areas, the London Boroughs of Harrow and 
Brent. Exceptions include the mother and baby unit as 
indicated but also instances by arrangement where staff at 
other psychiatric hospitals need psychiatric admission or 
attention. 
Shenley hospital therefore has an unusual mix of patients 
compared to other local psychiatric hospitals such as Napsbury 
or Hill End which still operate acute admission wards. However 
this should not be taken to mean that during the period of this 
research Shenley patients were necessarily less psychiatrically 
'disturbed' than patients elsewhere12. And in spite of the 
closure of the acute wards, several young patients (see above) 
continued to travel into the village. 
The hospital itself has substantial facilities. Several wards 
accommodate semi-independent patients; there are occupational 
therapy facilities, a hospital patients, shop and social club, 
and a small 'farm' area with a number of animals, together with 
a newly opened social centre for elderly patients called the 
Evergreens. Staff have their own social club. 
12 Compare for Instance Leff Is (1990) analysis of data concerning 770 
'long-stay, non-demented, patients at Friern Barnet and Claybury 
Hospitals, of whom 50% had been In hospital for over 20 years. 
Their modal age was between 60 and 65, and the diagnosis 
primarily that of 'schizophrenia'. Leff concluded that I ... no convincing picture was found of a clear decline in psychotic features over time' (p30). In other words, at least for this 'long- 
stay' sample, there had been no 'burn-out' of symptoms. 
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In The Hospital Archives 
Shenley Hospital is situated at the northern and western end 
of Shenley village and its entrance is approximately 100 yards 
from the nearest village pub. opened in 1934, it was one of 
the very last of the large mental asylums to be completed in 
this country and the first to be opened by a King and Queen, 
King George V and Queen Mary. Based upon what was considered 
at the time to, be a revolutionary villa system, it is arguably 
best known within psychiatry by its association with the 
treatment practices, research and philosophies of Cooper, 
Esterson and Laing. Cooper was a Senior Registrar at Shenley 
when he cooperated with Laing in 1964 on 'Reason and Violence' 
and with Esterson and Laing on a joint research paper (Esterson 
et al 1965). Thereafter he continued to publish widely on 
themes which became popularly known at the time as lanti- 
psychiatry' (Cooper 1967,1974,1980). Villa 21, which Cooper 
founded and which became known for its unconventional treatment 
methods, was subject to criticism in a confidential13 NHS 
Hospital Advisory Service report in 1973, where it was 
recommended that the villa's patients be transferred to other 
wards ý(H. A. S. 1973). Interestingly the same report makes use 
of references to the local village to help justify its 
recommendation to close the ward: 
The team found obvious signs of apprehension on the part 
of the nursing staff in case a patient should abscond (via 
the ward garden) and appear in the adjoining village of 
Shenley. Such patient appearances in the past have 
contributed to the state of tension which appears to exist 
between the hospital and the local population. (Brackets 
added) 
This appears to be the only apprehension of nursing staff noted 
23 This report was marked 'confidential' but was freely available to 
any Library user. 
@Village and Hospital 152 
in the report although the latter does suggest that the 
'possibility' of injuries to the staff as a result of the 
patients' phases of "excitement", "have to be born in mind". 
Whether any nurses were injured and the extent of any 
disturbances within the village remain unaddressed. 
Whatever the reality of the situation in 1973; whether or not 
this particular ward group did constitute a danger to staff and 
a problem for villagers, ý or whether these grounds might be seen 
as rational isations for closing a ward unpopular for other 
reasons (see e. g. Wood 1973, for an analysis of a DHSS 
investigation at nearby Napsbury hospital), it is clear that 
the hospital in 1989 was taking fewer chances over the possible 
absenteeism of patients on the 'disturbed, ward, if the present 
height of its garden fence is anything to go by. 
As indicated above, Shenley Hospital accepts patients from the 
catchment areas of the London Boroughs of Brent and Harrow. It 
does not therefore take local Shenley people although one or 
two of the villagers said they had heard of villagers being 
admitted. Officially, should they need psychiatric hospital 
admission or out-patient care, residents within the village are 
referred to Hill End Hospital in St. Albans, which is also 
scheduled for closure. That Shenley is not 'their' hospital has 
been cited on many occasions as the reason that villagers are 
reluctant to become too involved with it or its patients14. 
Whether villagers would be more or less interested if some of 
their number were in-patients in Shenley hospital remains an 
open question. As I have shown, some of the previous research 
on stigma and mental disorder indicates that people do not like 
being seen to attend local psychiatric units and prefer the 
14 On the other hand, and according to the argumentative context, 
villagers may also refer to Shenley Hospital patients as our' 
patients (see ch. 14 below). 
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comparative geographical and social isolation of a hospital 
away from their home (see ch 4 above). 
A search of the Hospital library'5 provided little else of 
reference to the relationship between the hospital and the 
local population or to the village itself apart from some 
documents concerning the opening of the hospital, although one 
directive issued by the Nursing Managers in June 1976 (revised 
1978) could have had implications for the local population. 
It is the policy of Shenley Hospital that sexual intercourse between patients is not permitted within the confines of the hospital. 
If carried out to the letter by nursing staff then this 
directive would have meant that patients either had to desist 
completely, become much more covert in their operations, or go 
elsewhere - out of the hospital grounds, perhaps to the 
village. 
The Housing Association 
In addition to Shenley Hospital, this particular corner of 
Hertfordshire is remarkable for a fairly dense concentration 
of mental hospitals and hospitals for those with learning 
impairments. Within an area which covers Shenley, Radlett and 
St. Albans, there are five old hospitals of this type; three 
psychiatric and two 'learning impaired'. Both Harperbury 
hospital and Napsbury hospital are within just a few miles of 
Shenley village. 
is on the occasions when I conducted the search of the Hospital library I was struck by Its sense of neglect. Most of the 
periodicals were old and out of date, the librarian was in the 
process of leaving and the library was usually empty of staff. 
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Approximately, one mile north of the village, at the bottom of 
Black Lion Hill, there are a number of cottages, some of which 
are occupied by Shenley Hospital staff and others which belong 
to the Praetorian Housing Association and which are offered as 
accommodation primarily to people discharged from psychiatric 
hospitals. Opened in 1984 by the Duchess of Gloucester, there 
are places here for up to twenty people, the majority of whom 
are former Shenley Hospital patients although some residents 
come from other hospitals in the area. A number of these 
residents use facilities within Shenley village. 
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An individual is not distinct from his place; he is that 
place. (Gabriel Marcel, cited in Relph 1976 p43) 
. 
Introduction 
The following analysis provides a way of orienting the 
description of discourse to be provided in chapter 14 below. 
It provides a way of thinking about the possible 
interpretations of discourse, and a background in front of 
which interpretations offered in that chapter may achieve 
perspective and enhance cogency. But focusing as it does upon 
space-time paths, sites of interaction and the movement of 
bodies, this chapter can also be read from a theoretical 
perspective as an 'embodied' corrective to what could otherwise 
be taken to an undue emphasis upon language'. 
In the 
- participant-observation study I set out to focus 
principally upon the village store, two public houses, the 
village hall and church 'related places, sites of more formal 
occasion including the Parish Council and Village Society and 
finally the 1/2 mile of road and pavements, including benches 
To recontextuallse Moerman's (1988 p90-1) comment on de Saussure and Chomsky, the embodied world Is, we might say, more than Just a speech Impediment. And cf. stimson (1986) who makes 
a plea for the reincorporation of place and space Into sociological fieldwork. 
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and bus-stops, which stand between the hospital and the shop. 
Most of my time was spent, however, in the pubs and the store 
and it proved to be in the latter place that I felt Most 'at 
home' and most accepted by staff. This account draws primarily 
upon the fieldwork notes taken during this period, but also 
occasionally from material obtained from tape-recorded 
interviews with villagers and patients and other sources such 
as newspapers, minutes and other documents. 
During the process of the participant-observation study I began 
to realise that one guiding concept of the project should be 
that of 'place . This understanding has a number of components - 
Toýbegin with, the guiding theme of place could almost be read 
as a natural outcrop of the first phase of the research design; 
the emphasis on observation at particular places within the 
village; the choice of this village as opposed to another; the 
weighty spatial presence of a psychiatric institution; an 
analysis of exclusion or social closure, all inevitably involve 
at least a consideration of 'place'. Several of these factors 
might however be said to apply to the majority of participant- 
observation studies. 
The works of Goffman (1961/68,1969/1971) and Rosenhan (1973) 
as well as Scott (1973a and b, 1979) have also provided in 
their different ways an impulse towards a conceptual isation of 
madness as 'place'-related. At the same time, and in a manner 
which I hope will become clear in due course, I was struck by 
the importance for the vi 1 lagers (and patients) not only of how 
patients behaved, but where they behaved. I came to realise 
that patients routinely (or chronically) trod fairly well worn 
paths through the village. It seemed almost as if they were 
channelled somehow by a conduit which comprised a discipline 
of sorts along which institutional projects almost conspired 
to steer them. 
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In my effort to theoretically unpack these observations 
regarding 'place' I have drawn from time to time in the 
following pages upon some concepts from 'humanistic' or 
phenomenological geography, in particular from the work of 
Relph (1976) and Seamon (1980) as well as those of time-space 
geography and structuration theory (Pred 1982,1983,1985, 
Giddens 1984). The 'Institutional Ethnography12 of Dorothy 
Smith (1988) has provided a useful complement to these 
approaches. In addition, the works of de Certeau (1984) and 
Shields (1991a, 1991b) have proved helpful in offering further 
ideas about how to conceptual ise I place I. The approach proposed 
here is therefore to some degree congruent with a recent 
convergence between geographic and other social sciences in 
relation to mental health and especially de- 
institutional i sat ion (e. g. Dear and Taylor 1982, Dear and Wolch 
1987, Smith and Giggs (eds) 1988, C. J. Smith 1984, Rabkin 1984, 
Rabkin et al 1984, Segal et al 1980). 
However I do not intend a systematic mapping of space-time 
paths or the use of space-time diagrams advocated by Pred (eg 
1985 p3l) and Giddens (1984). It is also important to note that 
because of the space-time restrictions upon my own project I 
do not attempt to provide here a comprehensive time-geographic 
theory of exclusion or closure, although this account could be 
read as a prolegomenon to such a theory. 
In my attempt to map the journeys of patients through the 
village I have drawn in an often ad hoc fashion upon those 
concepts which have provided the heuristic means by which the 
interactions between villagers and patients might be more fully 
2 Smith Is also Interested to show how everyday Individual 
practices Intersect with Institutional projects. Her aim Is to 
unpack the 'implicit organisation' of ordinary daily scenes, by 
which local settings are tied to larger generalised complexes of 
social relations, (1988 p156). 
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described and understood. I therefore aim to bring the journey 
into focus from several 'dimensions', just as Smith (1988) 
allows us to see the everyday in a new light3. The following 
pages are intended to show how the everyday paths which 
patients tread through the village are both negotiated with and 
constrained by institutional projects in Pred's terms, and how 
patients contribute to the process of the Istructuration' of 
the locale. Because the understanding of 'place' and the 
guiding imagery derives in large measure from the work of Allan 
Pred, a brief account of his work will be provided here. 
Time Geography 
Pred has provided a way of understanding the 'becoming of 
place' as human practice via the integration of structuration 
theory (cf. Giddens 1979, Bhaskar 1979/1989, Bourdieu 1977) and 
space-time geography, so that 'the structural properties of a 
social system express themselves through the operation of 
routine and non-routine daily practices' (1985a p8)4. A central 
component of his theory is the idea of the intersection of 
'individual paths' with linstitutibnal-projects' occurring at 
specific temporal and spatial locations (1985a p1O, 1983 p46, 
1982 p163). An individual path concerns movement of an actor 
through space-time. A project refers to the sequence of tasks 
'necessary to the completion of goal-oriented behaviour' (1982 
3 One problem I have faced here concerns that of the sequence of 
writing. The section on public houses was one of the first to be 
written, followed by the history chapter, then the discourse 
analytic component, after which I returned again to the 
participant-observation study, to complete the 'Journey'. The 
latter has been very difficult to do without anticipating and 
Intruding upon In particular the discourse analysis. 
4 It should be noted that although my emphasis below is upon 
routinization, In principle this by no means excludes the notion 
of strategic action. Indeed as Barnes (1988 px1J1, p167) has argued 
calculated action and routine are, pragmatically and conceptually, 
mutually dependent. 
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p165), while an institution is 'synonymous with the everyday 
and longer term projects for which it is responsible. ' (ibid) - 
In other words both individuals and institutions can be said 
to have projects which themselves involve space-time paths. 
Institutional projects possess a relatively enduring nature 
although they remain the outcome of the most important power 
relations and practices within a particular place. Thus: 
In any becoming place certain institutional projects are 
dominant in terms of the demands they make upon the 
limited time resources of the resident population and the 
influence they therefore exert upon what can be done and 
known. (Pred 1985b p341) 
These dominant institutional projects can therefore be said to 
occasionally or regularly structure daily paths by influencing 
the sequence and pace of other institutional and independently 
defined projects undertaken by individuals, and by constraining 
participation in yet other projects (ibid p341-2), what Pred 
calls 'coupling-constraints' (1982 p177). In the process they 
are likely to reproduce the dominant structural relations. The 
most substantial social transformations therefore result from 
significant changes (or abandonment or inception) of dominant 
institutional projects. Thus in advanced capitalist societies 
the dominant projects are those of 'large-scale, corporately 
owned, and distantly controlled business organisations, and 
those of economy-intervening and service-providing 
organisations that are part of the state apparatus. (1982 
p175). 
For example from the perspective of people who are patients, 
a dominant institutional project, the formal organisation in 
Habermas' (1987a) terms, of Shenley hospital, regulates the 
possible bodily movements of patients by restricting individual 
projects and projected space-time paths into the life-world of 
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the village. It does this, for example, by its use of formal 
law (eg the 1983 Mental Health Act and its related regulations) 
or by formalised administrative codes which specify the times 
which even 'informal' patients may be allowed out', or by 
other informal means. In order to retain an 'informal' status, 
patients must conform to some considerable extent with these 
rules. They must receive permission from nursing staff to stay 
out overnight, and will otherwise be expected to return to the 
ward by a particular time at night, for meals, and so on. At 
the same time patient-paths and projects in the village are 
also enabled and/or constrained by their intersection with the 
paths and projects of others and village-based institutions. 
In Pred's terms, hospital, village store, churches, pubs and 
village families are all institutional projects. Buildings, 
paths, walls and so on in the village are sediments, objects 
deposited in turn by these or other projects. 
For Pred, people both produce and are produced by, history and 
places. In a play upon Marx's famous dictum, Pred suggests: 
'People do not produce history and places under conditions of 
their own choosing, but in the contexts of already existing, 
directly encountered social and spatial structures-' (1985a 
p198). Social reproduction is inseparable from everyday labour 
and other practices and also 'from the reproduction of the 
material world of buildings, transportation facilities, eating 
utensils, tools, furniture and other man-made objects' (1982 
p159). 
From this perspective, humanist or so called phenomenological 
geographers who are concerned with the notion of I sense of 
place', that is, place as a focus for emotional or sentimental 
attachment, or as felt significance (Pred 1983 p49), betray 
their idealism and voluntarism (ibid p50, and cf. Entrikin 
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1976, Hudson 1979, Sayer 1979). In a fairly easy critique Pred 
argues that 'sense of place is too frequently seen as a free- 
floating phenomenon, in no way influenced either by 
historically specific power relations that enable some to 
impose upon others their view of the natural and acceptable, 
or by social and economic constraints on action and thereby 
thought' (ibid). Pred therefore aims to rethink 'sense of 
place' to make it an embodied by-product of structurations. For 
Pred, social structure comprises 'generative rules and power 
relations (including the control over material, symbolic or 
authoritative resources) that are already built into a specific 
historical and human geographical situation or into an 
historically and geographically specific social system' (1985 
p9). However, such rules and power relations do not Just 
constrain and enable human action, but also emerge out of human 
agency and practice. They in turn are reproduced via the 
intersection of individual paths and institutional projects 
(1982 p175). These underlying and human-produced rules 'form 
the underlying grammar of activity and behavior in particular 
contexts' (1985 p9). 
The analysis of space-time paths and routines and their 
deviations affords a way of beginning to grasp the dialectic 
of social action and social structure which in a sense can be 
5 Nevertheless It might be argued that Pred still retains a 
humanistic residue In his conception of space-time and place in 
so far as he emphasises, like Giddens, the centrality of human 
agency in reproducing social and spatial structures. (For 
critiques of Giddens see e. g. Layder 1981,1985,1987, Clegg 1989). 
As Sayer (1985) for example points out, the spatial Is only partly 
constituted by the social. Spatial structures may for Instance be 
constituted primarily by 'natural, rather than social phenomena. 
But Sayer also argues that although space can exist only In and through objects (social or 'natural') it cannot be reduced to them (p5l). In other words space Is Independent of the types of object 
present (p52). Yet If space does make a difference, Le. becomes 
significant, It is only through the nature of the particular things 
which constitute It and their causal powers and liabilities (p52). 
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said to materialize or take fleeting shape at particular sites. 
Here, there is also a potential for understanding relations of 
power, sketched in terms of the movement of bodies, objects and 
materials in space/time6. Thus for Pred (1985a p26), following 
Foucault, to exercise power 'is to structure the possible field 
of action of othersv7. 
In the intersection of paths and projects, power plays a 
central part and may be analysable in terms of the dialectics 
of practice and structure in a particular historical and 
geographical setting (1985a p3). Pred argues that: 
Thus, whatever power relationships are, however elusive 
they may be and whether they exist at some micro- or 
macro- level, they ultimately cannot be separated from the 
realm of action and daily practices or from the direct or 
indirect control of who does what, when and where. (1985a 
p26) 
Language occupies a fundamental role here. In the terms of the 
discourse analysis presented later, language may be seen as a 
resource which is differentially and creatively drawn upon and 
which performs a number of functions. But while language pre- 
exists individuals, it is also reproduced by them and as such 
6 Variations on this position have also been adopted In other fields, 
for Instance In the sociology of social work (Sibeon 1991 and cf. 
Hall 1991), and the sociology of scientific knowledge and 
technology (Law 1986, (ed) 1991). 
7 Foucault has of course devoted considerable space-time to the 
relationghip between power and space. As he finally concedes In 
Questions on Geography (1980 p77), 'Geography must Indeed lie 
at the heart of my concerns. ' And elsewhere, 'A whole history 
remains to be written of spaces - which would at the time be the 
history of powers,... ' (1980 p149). For Foucault, modern 
technologies of discipline and power advance via the organisation 
of Individuals In space (cf. Shields 1991a p39, Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982 p154-5, Foucault 1975/1979). See also the essays In 
Rabinow (ed)(1984/1986). 
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can be seen as an important part of the dialectic which Pred 
is addressing. 
Pred argues that language is essential to the achievement of 
path-project intersections because it provides a foundation for 
describing, grouping and differentiating objects, events and 
experiences; because it is essential to legitimation; and 
because it is the medium through which the component tasks of 
institutional projects are routinely or creatively defined, 
made mutually understandable and subsequently recounted (1985a 
p16-7). Following Habermas (1984,1987a), we might say that 
language constitutes the means whereby people may cooperate in 
and coordinate their space-time paths. From Pred's perspective 
the linguistic and discursive form and content which an 
individual evidences cannot be divorced from the host of path- 
project intersections generated over time. Discourse and 
bodies, affect and cognition become in this process 
inextricably connected. Pred further connects these up in a 
variety of ways. 
Pred's view of the world is extremely rich and utilizes a range 
of other concepts, such as the 'dialectics' of corporeal action 
and mental activity and intention (the external-internal 
dialectic), and life-path (the biographical) and daily path 
(the everyday). He provides a non-mechanical view of individual 
and society in which contingency and structural inertia both 
play a part and allows one to see how agency, structure, space- 
time and everyday life are interlinked. For example it becomes 
possible to visualize an individual and her biography (itself 
the outcome of path-project intersections) negotiating the 
paths and projects of others and institutions and thereby 
contributing to the life-paths of others and reproducing social 
structures. In this way socialization is not confined to 
childhood but persists throughout an individual's life, 
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although the opportunities for further movement and choice 
change according to the way the person's life-path/daily-path 
dialectic has evolved since birth. 
The vision here is of a medley of bodies and biographies moving 
in space-time. But even something as mundane as sitting quietly 
reading a book can be configured in terms of a space-time path 
intersecting with the product of an institutional project. 
Indeed this analytic structure also points to the intersection 
of my own research project with those of villagers, patients 
and institutions. Out of this an account is born which, 
reified, may itself become a resource of an institution and at 
some point intersect with other space-time paths (including for 
example that of the present reader). 
Other Places 
But this overview of ways of conceptualising place is 
incomplete as it stands. Theorised as 'context', the notion of 
place can be said to have become a commonplace in branches of 
social science which emphasise the locally organised and 
contingent nature of social practices (e. g. Garfinkel 1967, 
Sacks 1972, Sacks et al 1978, Eglin 1980). But in particular 
it is the notion of 'commonplace' itself that I also wish to 
explore briefly. 
The concept of place arguably provides a bridging theme between 
the analysis of movements of bodies and space-time paths in the 
village and a discourse analysis which is represented as an 
inquiry into those rhetorical devices and argumentative 
structures displayed by villagers in talking about patients. 
Within the tradition of rhetoric, 'place' has played a central 
role as a method, an aid to memory for rhetoricians of the 
ancient world who spoke without a manuscript: 
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While he delivers his oration, the speaker's mind is 
supposed to walk through the rooms or parts of the 
building, stopping to consider the things onto which he 
previously (and habitually) conferred the status of 
"places" of memory... (Fabian 1983 p110). 
Hence the Itopoil (Greek) or the 'loci' (Latin), of rhetoric; 
those items, positions, or strategies which 'effect an entry 
or give the writer an initial hold on the subject' (Nash 1989 
p7); positions from which to discursively manoeuvre. But where 
such 'topics' consisted less of strategies than of appeals to 
ordinary and everyday experiences then they were known as 
'commonplaces', Ikoinoi topoil (Greek) or ? loci communes' 
(Latin) (Nash ibid). As Nash also notes, while 'commonplace, 
may today have become a pejorative term, commonplaces were once 
regarded as repositories of shared wisdom and experience. 
And so in chapter 14 below I attempt to identify those 
commonplaces used by villagers in their discussions and 
arguments; the (rhetorically organised) wisdom of the village 
as lit relates 
to people who are patients at the psychiatric 
hospital, a wisdom which we might argue is distinctly place- 
related. And indeed which draws upon 'place' itself in a manner 
which has rhetorical implications, as I shall show8- 
Drawing in particular upon the core concepts of 'paths and 
projects', I intend to provide below an account which stems 
primarily from participant-observation within the village which 
covered a period from October 1988 to April 1991, and which was 
Drawing upon Foucault and Bourdleu, de Certeau (1984) has 
provided an Interesting 'rhetoric of walking', which poetically 
elaborates upon rhetorical 'tropes', thus: 'The walking of passers- 
by offers a series of turns (fouz-s) and detours that can be 
compared to "turns of phrase" or "stylistic figures" 1. And ' ... the "tropes" catalogued by rhetoric furnish models and hypotheses 
for the analysis of ways of appropriating places. ' (plOO). And see 
p183 and footnote 40, p397 below. 
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at its most intense -over the twelve months of 1989.1 have 
focused in particular upon the sites of two village pubs and 
the village store. The sequential depiction of these sites, 
from the Black Swan to the King Harry, along the main road to 
the village store, retraces the outward journey through the 
village by patients along routine paths which encounter and 
intersect with certain institutional projects. In this way it 
may be possible to begin to understand how patients both affect 
and are affected by the village in terms of the space-time 
constituents and parameters of social action and material and 
symbolic reproduction of the life-world. 
Public and Private Houses 
The observations in public houses referred to below relate 
primarily to lunchtime hours, from eleven o'clock to 2 or 3PM. 
These observations have taken place on various days of the week 
and at two principal sites. - 
The Black Swan9 is nearest to the hospital, just across the 
road from the main hospital entrance, and the King Harry is 
approximately 100 yards further along the road. The pubs are 
different in many respects, according to character, age, bar 
staff, - internal spatial structure, clientele and not least 
prices. Both pubs can be read as institutional projects in 
Pred's terms. 
The Black Swan is said to be some 300 years old. Its last 
landlord stayed for 30 years and the present incumbent has been 
in post for a-few months only. The pub can be entered via two 
outside doors, one giving. access to the public bar and the 
other to the saloon. The two drinking areas are separated by 
91 have altered the names of the public houses referred to here. 
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the bar itself. Both bars are linked by a passageway that leads 
to the toilets and to the landlord's accommodation, and there 
is further access to the bars from the garden at the rear of 
the pub. The garden is furnished and has a barbecue area. 
The two bars are very different. The saloon, in traditional 
form, -is better furnished. It has a number of small tables, is 
larger, and has a more refined atmosphere. The public bar on 
the other hand is in poor repair, with holes in the seat covers 
(although the landlord has been talking about replacing the 
furniture). It has several long tables - which can be quite 
difficult to sit at without disturbing others who are already 
seated (rather like the problem with cinema seats), and in 
addition it sports a 'fruit' machine, a darts board and a 
photograph of the landlord. Both bars and the outside windows 
and doors have received a new coat of paint recently. 
The landlord and landlady live on the premises together with 
their two children, but also employ bar staff some of whom live 
outside the village. Following in the tradition of his 
predecessor the new landlord keeps the price of drinks high in 
comparison to those of the King Harry. 
Although there is no rigid demarcation between the two bars, 
it is fairly clear that the public bar enjoys the status of a 
'regulars' bar whereas the saloon bar attracts a wider range 
of customers including some regulars. The saloon bar, then, is 
more likely to entertain the casual or irregular drinker, the 
person who wants a quiet drink but also staff from local 
offices or the hospital who may or may not be 'regulars'. The 
public bar on the other hand accommodates people who tend to 
know each other or who have mutual acquaintances and who are 
known by the barstaff. The researcher's experiences in the 
public bar were often those of acute discomfort, feelings which 
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were not engendered in the saloon bar. There were occasions 
when regulars in the bar made it clear that the researcher was 
interloping on home territory. Attempting to look 'safely 
disattendablel in Goffman's (1971 p328) terms, sometimes by 
hiding behind a newspaper, other times by trying to sustain a 
studied interest in a drink or the wallpaper, led on occasions 
to continual glances of enquiry from regulars and bar staff, 
enquiries which have been largely absent when seated in the 
saloon bar. Unfortunately there was insufficient time to strike 
up relationships with people in the public bar but some useful 
information was gleaned. 
From observation and conversation in both bars from opening 
time to lunchtime it is possible to construct a pattern which 
may to some extent be indicative of relationships between 
patients and non-patients in this context, although such a 
pattern does not of course have the status of an invariant 
rule, and its instantiation on any particular day cannot be 
entirely predicted. 
The first point is that patients who drink in the pub at 
lunchtime are more likely to use the public bar than the 
saloon. Their motivations for this practice are unclear but the 
practice itself has repercussions of a particular kind, for 
unaccompanied'O patients choose that very place most likely to 
elicit a territorial defence by regulars' (see e. g. Katovich 
and Reese 1986, Lyman and Scott 1967). However, the likelihood 
of such defences being activated is minimised by the patients' 
simultaneous management of time, for their attendance at the 
public bar in substantial numbers" has occurred particularly 
10 BY 'unaccompanied' I refer to patients not escorted by staff. 
Groups of escorted patients may be led to the saloon bar. 
I have observed up to six patients Independently enter the public 
bar at the same time and before other clients arrive. 
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when regulars are less likely to be present e. g. immediately 
the pub is opened and before the lunchtime clientele arrive. 
In this sense it can be argued that patients have colonised 
their own place at the Black Swan which is separate from the 
territory of others. However the situation is further 
complicated by the question of whether or to what extent some 
patients themselves can claim the status of 'a regular'. 
The analysis provided by Katovich and Reese (1986) of the 
establishment and negotiation of full-time membership and 
, regular' status in an urban American bar provides some useful 
pointers. For Katovich the negotiated status of 'regular' is 
indicated by a number of factors. The authors argue that the 
routine structuring of space/time permits the construction of 
a shared past and the practice of projecting a shared future. 
Membership includes here the process of becoming memorable and 
, talked about'. Maines (1989) has put this latter point 
succinctly: 'Regulars become narrators of other people's lives 
and their membership is secured when their lives become the 
stories other people tell 1 (p 198). In this respect membership 
is defined in terms of biographical knowledge and its telling, 
the occasion of which is space-; -time structured12. 
12 It Is of course arguably the case that human conduct Is 
Irremediably 'storied' and that narrative Is a basic and everyday 
means of representing and structuring the world (Mitchell 1981, 
Polanyl 1981, Polkinghorne 1988, Sarbin 1986). Narratives and 
their analysis have been of Interest In for example philosophy 
(MacIntyre 1977,1981, Lyotard 1979/1984), in social psychology 
(Mishler 1986, Gergen 1988, Sarbin 1986), sociology (Plummer 1983, 
Thompson 1984), linguistics (Labov and Waletsky 1967, Polanyi 
1981, Linde 1986), literary criticism, as well as within the world 
of psychotherapy (Bettleheim 1976/1986, Cox and Theilgaard 1987, 
Keen 1986, Sarbin 1986) and neurology (Sacks 1986). As Barbara 
Hardy has written 'we dream in narrative, day-dream In narrative, 
remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe, doubt, plan, revise, 
criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love by narrative' 
(quoted In MacIntyre 1981, p211). For the link between 
ethnography and 'story' see for example Atkinson (1990), Brodkey 
(1987a), Clifford and Marcus (1986), van Maanen (1988). 
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Although patients may routinely make spatio-temporal 
delineations within the pub, those who drink in the Black Swan 
and other pubs cannot readily be included in the category of 
'regular' as defined by the telling of personal knowledge. Even 
as a group, patients do not interact greatly with each other13 
but perhaps more importantly even those patients who share 
their own biographical knowledge are seldom talked about by 
other people except in the generic sense of 'them' or 'the 
patients'. There are exceptions to this rule of course, 
exceptions which may occur in those circumstances which are 
especially unusual and disruptive of local life. Such an event 
occurred for example when a well-known patient went missing and 
was later found dead in a nearby field. During this time a 
collection for flowers was organised by the landlady at the 
King Harry, and especially significant, a story began 
circulating around the village about the circumstances of her 
death to the effect that these circumstances looked suspicious. 
Katie, in other words, had finally become talked aboUt14. 
In'the routine life of the pubs, however, individual patients 
have not generally constituted a focus for discourse. This 
'silence' leads to the conclusion that the status of patients 
within the Black Swan should be seen as that of regular 
irregulars, a term used by Katovich and Reese to describe those 
people who* often frequented the bar but who remained outside 
the discourse, gossip and chatter of the regulars'. On the 
whole, those patients who drink in the Black Swan at lunchtime, 
13 See Sommer (1959b, 1969) and Horowitz et al (1964) for studies of 
how 'schizophrenic' and other psychiatric patients use personal 
space, and Ainlay et al (1986) for an interpretation of 
interpersonal and spatial distance based upon stigma as a major 
variable. Goffman (1961/68) has also analysed the use of space by 
psychiatric Inpatients. 
14 A history of incidents which have led to complaints by villagers 
is presented In chapter 9. 
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although they may be well enough known for the barperson to 
address them by name, sit by themselves and do not engage 
others in discourse or encourage others, approaches at 
conversation. Again there are exceptions as I show below. 
A further criterion for the achievement of 'regular' status is 
the demonstration of 'impressive' drinking, which allies 
consumption of alcohol with sustained reasonableness, a 
lighthearted approach to interaction and a willingness not to 
disrupt the conversational flow. As I have noted, most patient 
drinkers sit on their own but there are occasions when a 
patient may be voluble, rude and disruptive of ongoing 
conversation. This also marks him out as ineligible to be a 
'regular' but may qualify him for another part. 
What has become apparent in these situations, particularly in 
the Black Swan, is the way such behaviour within certain limits 
may on occasions be laughed at and encouraged. one patient 
named Harry would make a practice of addressing anyone and 
everyone in the public bar regardless of whether or not they 
wished to talk, and chat about his problems, the inequities of 
other landlords, and the great film parts he has played or 
wished to playý his favourites being Genghis Khan or the Czar 
of Russia. Those non-patients in the bar have smiled, laughed 
and joked with him and the landlord has bought him beer. 
In their 1985 paper Nieradzik and Cochrane have argued that 
, toleration' of mentally disordered people derives from the 
assignment of an extra role to a person otherwise seen as 
mentally UL. For example the role of 'comic, or gifted 
painter', which are not incompatible with mental illness but 
which may ameliorate it in some way. In the Black Swan the 
landlady's epithetic reference to Harry as the cabaret' 
suggests that this reclassification of Harry may make his 
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behaviour more tolerable for others, and may prevent Harry's 
more immediate eviction from the premises. 
But on other occasions when Harry has been swearing about a 
particular injustice or directly addressing a regular in an 
overly familiar manner he has had abuse and invective turned 
upon - him. Harry has responded with equanimity, apparently 
without taking offence, and it has been hard to resist the idea 
that this to and fro brings him nearer to achieving a kind of 
authenticity, if not 'regular' status, within the pub culture. 
However, further occasions on which Harry has tried to persuade 
a regular to buy him a drink have met with simple unelaborate 
negation from which he has quickly retreated. 
It is possible of course that this situation comprised a 
temporary stage resulting from the arrival of a new landlord 
who was testing out his own and others' limits - exploring and 
reconstituting in other words the possibilities of local rules, 
for it certainly appears to be the case that patients are dealt 
with differently in the two pubs examined here. 
Although it has not been possible to explore what it is that 
constitutes a non-patient seriously 'stepping out of line' in 
the Black Swan, a preliminary impression is that the criteria 
of exclusion are probably not very different for these two 
groups in this pub and indeed that the kind of intrusive 
behaviour demonstrated by Harry, which Davis and Schmidt (1977) 
have identified with a particular 'psychological type, named 
'the obnoxious,, may be more likely to be tolerated if it is 
exhibited by a patient who is 'known, (although not talked 
about in his absence) as opposed to aI strange I patient or even 
a prospective regular. That very different criteria exist 
between the two pubs will be shown below. 
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Before moving on to examine the King Harry, an important 
distinction needs to be made between the reality of the Black 
Swan as it has existed during my observation and that of the 
'Big Derby Lounge' of Katovich and Reese. For the regulars of 
the latter there were certain groups, categories or traits of 
people which were never welcome and 'totally intolerable' to 
the community, people who were treated as intruders to be 
'ignored, isolated, insulted, asked to leave and even 
"escorted" out if his departure was not imminent. He was 
persona non grata' (1986 p327). Such people, the authors 
recount, included 'emotionally disturbed people'. It has become 
clear that such people are not immediately evicted from the 
Black Swan, that to some extent they have colonised their own 
spatio-temporal territory within the pub and that they may be 
encouraged to 'entertain' others. That entertainment' implies 
an ambivalence and condescension will be addressed later, but 
is not presently at issue. 
The King Harry public house has a different internal structure 
from the Black Swan. Two doors situated on the main road both 
lead directly into one long drinking area. This area -may- be 
divided functionally and socially into different sectors. At 
one end are the tables which at lunchtime are set out with 
placemats and cutlery, and through which one may go to reach 
the garden. In the center is the long bar along which stand a 
number of tall stools. A -fruit machine stands by the wall. 
Alongside, and at the other end of the bar there is a space 
large enough to contain several tables some of which are set 
into the bay window. Finally there is a smaller side room which 
is served by an extension to the bar and which is more spartan, 
contains tables and chairs and a dart board. The landlord, 
landlady and their children live on the premises and have been 
resident for approximately four years. 
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one principal difference, then, lies with the arrangement of 
space. Unlike the Black Swan where there are two bars each with 
their own door, entry into the King Harry is by way of the 
central long bar. There is no sense here of there being two 
separate bars. The side room has seldom been used in my 
presence and most of the activity has gone on in the long area. 
Within this area however there are discernable social-spatial 
and temporal partitions, some of which are more f luid than 
others. From opening time onwards a distinct movement of 
different groups of drinkers occurs. The first to arrive are 
the retired and elderly group, the members of which always sit 
in the same place, the most informal and comfortable area. 
After one or two hours this group is joined by 'regular' local 
workmen. Office workers who may be known by name but who are 
not 'members' then arrive, by which time some members of the 
group of older villagers have left and others taken their 
place. This elderly group is not entirely cohesive, for one or 
two older drinkers sit at the bar with their backs to the main 
group, quietly consuming alcohol, and remaining independent of 
the others. 
Nevertheless there is a distinct sense in which this particular 
space and time zone both enab 1 es /constitutes and is constituted 
by an area of Isociability'15 in which membership is tacitly 
acknowledged and from which those who cannot exhibit the 
correct credentials are excluded. Such credentials, in addition 
to age, include those discussed above. 
Following Simmel (1950), Byrne (1978 p428) defines sociability 
as I ... the feeling of being In a mutually acknowledged relationship 
with others with a derived sense of satisfaction', and ' ... an 
experiential substance of felt significance In the now... ' (Ibid). 
Sociability might therefore be said to constitute the experiential 
component of communicative action. Habermas speaks of 
communicative action as a principle of Isociation' (Vergeselischaftung) (e. g. 1984 p337) (and cf. Amirou 1989, Frisby 
1988 p124). 
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Although predominantly a male domain (cf. Hey 1986), one or two 
women may take part with their husbands and play an active part 
in the proceedings. The time here is spent mainly in talking 
and drinking. Topics of discussion include sport and politics 
but also reminiscence and the recounting of anecdote, personal 
histories and local village events. In addition there has been 
a substantial amount of joking about sex and the sotto voce 
bandying of profanities, while members have also shown 
considerable interest in matters of physical health and 
illness. Membership is not confined, as Katovich and Reese have 
also shown in their study, to those present, for absent members 
are often discussed, praised, ridiculed, sympathised with, 
laughed about, and 'storied'. The point here is that they are 
talked about, and it is this 'talking about' that links them 
to the group. Or as de Certeau (1984 p122-3) puts it, the 
telling of such stories 'found' and demarcate spaces and 
boundaries. 
Paraphrasing Kirby (1988), what is at issue here is a 
continuous process of reproduction which is rooted, contrary 
to the argument of Meyrowitz (1986), in particular places, and 
which perpetually recreates what Vico has termed sensus 
communis, a common sense -a unity which is subtly different 
to that which takes place elsewhere (see also Shotter 1986). 
A preliminary comparison of the two pubs has illuminated the 
relative absence of patients from the King Harry. Throughout 
many hours of observation and in spite of the landlady's claims 
to the contrary, only two female patients have been seen in the 
pub during lunchtime hours and these have paused only long 
enough to buy a box of matches. One possible implication here 
is that the landlady has wanted to provide a good impression 
about her track record with patients, at the same time that the 
pub may have been actively discouraging 'patient' drinkers. But 
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it can also be hypothesised that other factors identified as 
being operative in the King Harry may'directly contribute to 
the absence of patients. 
Firstly, as outlined above, there exists in the King Harry, 
fairly soon after opening hours, a clearly demarcated group of 
people who exhibit an intensity of camaraderie which might be 
off-putting to putative interlopers and who appear to be 
content with their membership, whereas the Black Swan has a 
vacant and separate space in which patients may gather". The 
principal interpretation of the King Harry is that at lunchtime 
it has a more 'regular' and intimate client group. Perhaps some 
testimony to this may be found in the dozens of coffee mugs to 
be seen hanging behind the bar, brought by regular customers 
following journeys to faraway places and sporting motifs, 
mottos and chauvinistic slogans. These mugs signify by their 
giving not only 'membership', but also the fact that the 
customer was thinking about, if not actually talking about, the 
local I during his or her absence. The implication is that the 
customer also expects and indeed wishes to be talked about by 
those left behind. 
Secondly, the landlady has made it clear that although she 
still has customers from the hospital, she will personally only 
tolerate a small number of patients at any one time for several 
reasons. She recounted how she 'had a bit of trouble' when she 
first moved in a few years ago. This 'trouble' consisted of 
patients arriving at the pub in 'large groups'. Her philosophy, 
she explained, is that the patients are alright in small doses, 
so that she says she can only tolerate two or three in the pub 
at any one time: 
16 Of course the contrary could also be asserted; that the 
colonisation of the public bar In the Black Swan by people who 
are patients has led to non-patient others becoming reluctant to 
frequent It at that time. 
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You can't have the sane and the insane together otherwise 
we'd all go mad. You've got to keep them separate. 
A further reason provided by a barman in the King Harry was 
that the patients were lazy and could not be bothered to walk 
the extra hundred yards involved. However any study would show 
that patients, including some of those who drink in the Black 
Swan, have no hesitation in walking to the village store on 
occasions, which is further from the hospital than the King 
Harry, and this in spite of the fact that the Hospital has its 
ownpatients, shop. This 'distance, explanation therefore seems 
unlikely to stand up to close scrutiny. 
The difficulties of properly identifying stigma, 
discrimination, inclusion or exclusion, have been exemplified 
in this context by particular interactions between members of 
this group, interactions of a subtle nature. 
Sitting at the edge of the group in the King Harry, listening, 
observing and making such comments as might appear appropriate 
for an 'outsider', I have become on occasions aware of the 
potential and subtle difference between the playful collusive 
glances that are about intimates and those glances which 
effectively lexcolludel another (see Goffman 1981). When Bert's 
wife winked at me when Bert had made a social gaffe, not only 
did she not mind that her husband would see her wink, but the 
fact of her wink was an essential prop to her husband's 
management of his impression - that of 'the fool I. In this case 
what appeared to be a collusion between Bert's wife and myself 
was actually a collusion between Bert and his wife aimed at an 
audience and involving, a bit player. Such collusive and 
lexcollusivel glances may be of a different order in relation 
to patients. For example, the winks and smiles that the 
landlord of the Black Swan pointed in my direction when 
discursively jousting with Harry did not appear to be intended 
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to be seen by Harry, although again the possibility of a 
further unconsciously staged drama cannot be ruled out. 
A further incident in the King Harry brought home the 
difficulties of defining the practices of stigma. Members of 
the retirement group were busy criticizing one of their absent 
members, talking about his bossiness and overbearing habits, 
when the man in question walked in. The group members instantly 
changed the subject and welcomed their member in a positive 
fashion. It became clear eventually that in spite of the 
complaints and gossip Sam was a valued member of the group, and 
he proceeded to -join them in exchanging stories and rumour. The 
point here is that if taken at face value without the 
subsequent observation of further events or discussion with 
subjects, it would have been easy to draw overly simple 
negative conclusions. If then the group had been talking about 
a'particular patient in the same way, such discussion could 
have been used in the researcher's description of negative 
responses without the researcher being aware of the complexity 
of the picture. - 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this preliminary 
examination of the interactions in two public houses - But first 
I want to note two virtual paradoxes which flow from the above 
appraisal. 
The first is the paradox of paranoia. If the above analysis is 
correct then a central aspect of belonging, of being a member, 
or a 'regular,, is that one both 'talk about, and be 'talked 
about' at particular discourse sites, with the proposed 
corollary that one be aware at some level of consciousness of 
, being talked about. In other words the understandingq that one 
is most likely being 'talked about' is a positive, valued and 
sought-for experience., But believing that one is being talked 
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about is also considered to be a sign of paranoia, of mental 
disorder expressed paradigmatically in terms of an obsession 
about being talked about and plotted against, when in fact this 
is not the case. From an interactionist perspective therefore 
this disorder may be seen as a caricature of the mundane. It 
both refers to and exposes what everyone desires and at the 
same time expresses an ambivalent longing for the same state 
and social conditions". Madness and sanity are linked here by 
division and unity, where the unity relates formally to 'being 
talked about' and the difference lies in the perceived and 
substantive possibilities for its attainment - in the case of 
the Shenley pubs, the separation from patients of that 
discourse. 
of course the paradox also includes the fact that 'being talked 
about' by members may itself cultivate a paranoia as Lemert 
(1962), for example, has shown. What seems important here is 
that the talk be matched within the group by extra-discursive 
(but discursively mediated) actions which succour authenticity 
and wherever possible combat possibilities of paranoid 
misrepresentation. Within pub culture such actions are varied. 
In the King Harry they include the routine buying of drinks for 
others and the inclusion of regulars in Ifieldtrips' to the 
racecourse -a kind of family outing. 
A further issue attends this discussion. I have been arguing 
here that the experience of being talked about and also the 
talking about of others is closely related to those socio- 
17 Keen (1986) has argued that the paranoid person Is not just 
lonely but also wants to be left alone. My suggestion here Is that 
the paranoid person, In articulating talk and story as themes, not 
only highlights the mundane centrality of such talk, but also 
points to the possibility of some residual if ambivalent desire for 
integration and sociality, of sharing stories; albeit a desire which 
may be experienced as hopeless (cf. Cameron 1943). And see the 
comments by Laura In Appendix D, p490. 
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temporal i. e. 'placiall possibilities for their achievement. 
Paranoia on the other hand may contain both a placed aspect and 
a placelessness, so that reference may be made in discussion 
with the prospective patient to particular space/time locations 
when he or she felt abused, but may also refer to a generalised 
and free floating sense of persecution by everyone in all 
places. In the latter sense we might say that the paranoid 
person has lost his or her 'sense of placells. 
A further virtual paradox turns on the question of 'self-talk' 
(Goffman 1981). Goffman has drawn attention to the situational 
requirements for those comments, sounds or cries which are 
directed at oneself, at no-one in particular, or overhearers 
in general. As Goffman shows, in our society 'self-talk' , i. e. 
talking to oneself, is in most circumstances, taboo: 
... In our society at least, self-talk is not dignified as 
constituting an official claim upon its sender- 
recipient... There are no circumstances in which we can 
say, "I'm sorry, I can't come right now, I'm busy talking 
to myself. " (1981 p8l) 
Goffman continues by pointing out the serious fact that an 
adult who continually fails to attempt to conceal his self-talk 
or to stop if discovered and if necessary offer some covering 
comment may be open to the ascription of 'mental illness' . This 
position characterises that of a number of the patients (but 
by no means all) who frequent Shenley village. 
From the perspective of a customer at a village public house 
there follows an interesting implication, for 'self-talk' is 
also conventionally related to drunkenness. It may indeed be 
the case that in some of the pubs e. g. the Black Swan, self- 
18 This may also apply to other types of psychiatric disorder. 
Compare Godkin's (1980) proposals for 'place-therapy'. 
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talk which is attributed to mental disorder may be more 
acceptable to the barstaf f than the implication and attribution 
of drunkenness. Goffman reports the following story: 
An instance is reported to me of a barroom self-talker 
being misframed as always having had too much and 
temporarily solving his threat to his drinking rights by 
retreating to the tavern's telephone booth to do his self- 
talking. (ibid p82) 
_ 
It is yet an open question whether Shenley village drinkers 
purposefully. refrain from either drinking so heavily that they 
may inadvertently talk to themselves as a result or whether 
they have developed sufficient self control to be confident 
that they will not talk to themselves even if they are roaring 
drunk, or whether indeed they ever consider this to be an 
issue. 
This 'virtual paradox' points again to the social and 
linguistic intertwining of madness and sanity, their conceptual 
and substantive relations. Like the dialectic of Hegel Is master 
and slave, the relationship between the concepts mental 
disorder and sanity are logically related while the real, 
substantive relations between patients and non-patients bespeak 
relatively durable social relations between groups of people 
in the performance of definite social practices i. e. they 
constitute a social structure of sorts existing in the real 
world, a structure which although not entirely monolithic is 
still relatively 'enduring' (cf. Isaac 1987). 
The knowledge of 'place', indicated by a routine management of 
space-time and of the social relations embodied in space-time, 
has both interesting repercussions and exceptions. There have 
been occasions in the Black Swan public bar and The Crooked 
Chimney (a public house not otherwise addressed here) when I 
have become aware of single women entering the pub, ordering 
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aý drink and sitting by themselves. I have had independent 
reason to believe these women to have been patients at the 
hospital. This practice has not otherwise been noticed in 
Shenley pubs, so that non-patient single women have only been 
observed entering a pub on their own to meet up with friends. 
The conclusion then is that one can routinely follow a path 
already opened up by others and at the same time 'break 
through' what I call barriers of place, i. e. place-related 
social barriers. To what extent this encourages or discourages 
local women from pushing at these barriers themselves is an 
open question (cf. Hey 1986). 
Within the village, patients can, as I shall show, be seen as 
relating to and negotiating places which range from the most 
public to the most private and with various consequences. The 
public houses, institutional projects in Pred's terms, which 
I have focused on above largely as sites of routine interaction 
can be seen as both public and private places. They are open 
and public to the extent that almost anyone can enter them, but 
private to the degree that they constitute a sensus communis 
which is potentially and often actually exclusive. This 
exclusion is place-related in so far as it may involve a ban 
from the pub itself or internal barriers of place which cannot 
easily be breached. The experiential corollary is that while 
the lone drinker may be able to 'see and feel the community as 
it flows amongst the regulars' (Katovich and Reese 1986 p320)) 
he or she may nevertheless also feel excluded and isolated 
amongst a 'private' gathering. 
But taking leave of the pubs we step out again onto the main 
road. 
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The High Road 
In summer or winter, rain, sun or snow, people who are patients 
may be seen walking backwards and forwards along the main road 
which links the hospital and the village store. Often they may 
be poorly dressed. Night provides a 'frontier, (Melbin 1978) 
beyond which patients do not often tread, except on early 
winter evenings. I have also seen one patient walking to the 
store before sunrise at 6 a. m. 
In his discussion 'of 'pedestrian speech acts' de Certeau 
suggests: 
... if it is true that a spatial order organizes 
an 
ensemble of possibilities (eg by a place in which one can 
move) and interdictions (eg by a wall that prevents one 
from going further), then the walker actualizes some of 
these possibilities. In that way, he makes them exist as 
well as emerge. But he also moves them about and he 
invents others, since the crossing, drifting away, or 
improvisation of walking privilege, transform or abandon 
spatial elements. (1984 p98)19. 
Walkers, in other words, make selections about where they will 
walk; they may go here rather than there, may take shortcuts 
and detours, or may forbid themselves to take paths generally 
considered accessible or even obligatory. Thus the walker may 
condemn some places to extinction or with others compose 
spatial 'turns of phrase' that are 'rare', 'accidental' or 
illegitimate. (ibid p99). 
But to a large extent the walkers from the hospital find their 
opportunities for deviation curtailed by the institutional ised 
19 In this respect consider for example the tussle between farmers 
and those who walk the countryside footpaths In order to keep 
them open. 
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channel itself. I have described the route through the village 
as a conduit, a channel which conducts patients and others. For 
Foucault this ambiguous term 'conduct' is useful for 
understanding the specificity of power relations, thus: 'The 
exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of 
conduct and putting in order the possible outcome' (1982 p221). 
The main road, its pavements, and its flanking private property 
can both be read as indicative of, or as constituting, 
significant and powerful institutional projects in Pred's 
terms, - legitimated in law, which conduct patients and others. 
For example, although a 'public' highway, the road may not be 
defaced or dug up without authority. Neither may new roads be 
laid without approval by planning departments and without 
adhering to local planning regulations. It becomes as it were 
a power channel from which pedestrians and (especially) 
motorists alike cannot readily escape2O. 
This power channel is itself perpetually sustained by 
imperatives which f low from a variety of institutional projects 
and in various ways. Not least we might say is the (small) role 
the smooth road plays in the perpetuation of an ethic of 
individualism, the myth of personal freedom and the happiness 
of consumption of one's new car. But not only is this a power 
channel, but it is also both potentially and actually lethal. 
During the period of participant-observation at least 2 
patients died trying to cross the road, and I heard of several 
other accidentS21. Such accidents are in a sense no accidents 
at all but the specific outcome of a institutionally enmeshed 
20 Motorists are In a good position to appreciate the significance of this especlaRy when they are sitting In a traffic jam. 
21 One way of limiting its power Is to change its form by laying 
'sleeping policemen' or to 'strangle' It, by drastically narrowing Its Width. At nearby Napsbury hospital the road has been 
narrowed to some extent by the use of central bollards. 
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and particularly lethal transport system (cf. Jacoby 1975 p141, 
Perrow 1984). 
In addition however the road is f lanked by private property of 
various kinds which serves to reinforce and define the 
boundaries of the channel (and, conduct) itself. Historically 
in fact private property has an interesting relationship to 
mental disorder. For John Locke, for instance, there existed 
an equation of property and rationality so that only men of 
property I .. -. are capable of that rational life - that voluntary 
obligation to the law of reason - which is the necessary basis 
for full participation in civil society, (quoted in Sayer 1991 
p86) 22. 
If the majority of patients (especially longer-stay patients) 
are in fact propertyless, then their channelling along the road 
points to the intersection of relatively impoverished personal 
projects with the dominant organising principle and project of 
our society. Patients are conducted by private property which 
is institutionally guaranteed and secured. In relation to 
private residential houses in particular, social relations 
embedded in these institutional projects extend beyond the 
, local' or locale to implicate the property market, the work 
of the legal profession; estate agents, building industry, DIY 
and furniture markets, as well as employment and educational 
opportunities, laws of inheritance and so forth. In other words 
something which we may take to be as simple and as local as a 
house, implicates the state and a host of interlinked, 
institutional, national and international projects which 
articulate (or are built around) the principle of private 
property (cf. D. E. Smith 1988 p156). 
22 Similarly Hegel held that 'It Is In property that person primarily 
exists as reason, (quoted In Hawthorn 1976 p47). 
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However, the regular distinction which I have raised here 
between public and private space is a difficult one to sustain 
for too long (cf. Hammersley 1990 p132) so that it quickly 
becomes clear that even the private spaces of houses are not 
immune to intrusion by for example formal state organisationS23. 
And as I show below this distinction is also directly 
challenged by patients. 
And as Iýhave pointed out the 'public' houses described above, 
although they are 'open' to the public and meet a variety of 
social needs, are nonetheless also private enterprises 
functionally linked to, constrained and supported by, a whole 
matrix of private corporations and markets, advertising and 
production processes, as well as various state agencies. These 
houses may also be regarded as powerful institutional projects 
in Pred's terms, with which the paths of patients intersect. 
Channelled along the main road, patients have a number of 
opportunities for legitimately stopping off en route. I have 
witnessed patients attend: a vicar's cream tea afternoon held 
on the ývicarage back lawn; jumblesales and bazaars at the 
village hall; the school fair; village ffite, coffee morning in 
a church sideroom; and jumblesale at a second church. On the 
majority of these occasions I have noticed only a handful of 
patients at any one event, one exception being the vicar's 
cream tea party. At most events patients have quietly kept to 
themselves, with the exception of Bill and Janet, a patient and 
an former-patient who have made themselves well known to 
villagers and attend a variety of village events. of these two, 
Janet appears to be the most welcome to the extent for example 
that women at the vicar's tea party made room for her to join 
them at their table. Bill is known by name by many villagers 
23 Compare Habermas (1987a) thesis of the 'colonization of the life- 
world'. 
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who stop to chat to him, although some complain about his 
verbosity24. At the tea party Bill was asked to leave by an 
organiser because he was being I cute I. That is, although he was 
said to have money, he was alleged to be attempting to 
freeload. On another occasion, at a church coffee morning, Bill 
was interactional ly excluded by the simple manoeuvre of another 
coffee drinker moving his chair and turning his back to him. 
It is often the case that in these places villagers' responses 
to patients are subtle and sotto voce (cf. S. J. Smith 1984, 
1988)25. On occasions all that may be discerned is an exchange 
of smiles or knowing glances, or a casual nudge to the person 
sitting alongside, when someone who is a patient walks in or 
leaves. During one village hall bazaar a non-patient (my wife 
in this instance) was served before Janet even though Janet had 
arrived before her at the drinks counter. And although Janet 
sat at a table with villagers she sat largely silent, while the 
others at the table talked to each other. In other words 
patients are not explicitly excluded from such events, and at 
some appeared to be more or less welcomed. on the other hand 
I began to develop a sense that villagers experienced an 
ambivalence and that they often concealed a certain antipathy 
towards patients. Such antipathy may find expression in a 
variety of ways including the reluctance to make an effort at 
translation. 
24 Some patients appeared to consider themselves to be on very good 
terms with villagers, although villagers often complained about 
them. Such patients could be said to evidence 'pronoial (Goldner 
1982)! 
25 For Goff man (1961/68) subtle and sotto voce remarks constitute 
everyday ways by which people resist domination (p269). See also 
J-C. Scott (1990) who prefaces his book by quoting an Ethiopian 
proverb: 'When the great lord passes the wise man bows deeply 
and silently farts., In the context of Shenley, subtle nudges and 
glances may bespeak a more complex relationship between 
villagers and patients, village and hospital, as I hope to show. 
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On one occasion for example a small group of three people whom 
some villagers later thought were probably former Shenley 
hospital patients, attended a Saturday evening Village Society 
AGM. The discussion of the meeting centred around the 
opposition of the Society to the closure of the hospital. One 
member of this small group then raised an issue concerning the 
courtesy stigma (Posner 1976) which attached to Shenley village 
via its hospital. The gist of his contribution was that the 
village would lose "what some people refer to as the curse of 
Shen 1 ey . When further af ieId vi 11 agers wou 
1d not have to worry 
about saying in public "Oh, we're going back to Shenley now". 
Would the villagers be sad or happy that the hospital was 
disappearing, the speaker wished to know. The questioner was 
not engaged by anyone else, and left with his companions 
shortly after. Villagers later said that they did not 
understand what his point had been26. 
In addition to public houses and shops, village hall and church 
coffee room,, there are other openings and opportunities along 
the route. As well as side roads and small footpaths there are 
small areas such as a green with a seat by the war memorial, 
a pond and its surrounds and a public toilet with a seat 
outside, shielded from the road by a shrubs and bushes. Indeed 
it was some while before I realised the seat was there. I had 
been told that it was a favourite seat of the patients, but on 
those occasions when I looked, I found only indirect evidence 
in the form of large numbers of well-smoked cigarette ends by 
the bench, perhaps territorial markers (Goffman 1971 P65) 
indicative of visits by patients (cf. Webb et al 1966). 1 have 
a vision here of patients sitting huddled together conspiring 
with each other, voicing the dissent and resentment which they 
26 Of course villagers may simply have felt that a debate about 
stigma would have been tangential to their main concern, that of 
resisting the closure of the hospital. 
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could only voice in an offstage space shielded from 
surveillance, a space which they had themselves colonised (cf. 
Scott 1990 pXii)27. But less dramatically perhaps, and 
unfortunately for them, it may be more likely that they sit 
apart and largely silent. other benches are also sited along 
the route28. 
Nevertheless I came to understand that patients took advantage 
in a variety of ways of the gaps and cracks in the discipline 
of the hospital and village to slip out and find their own 
space in certain parts of the village, and at the same time 
that their trips to the store, the pubs and the relatively 
unguarded open spaces of the village were not simply a function 
of their desire for 'a drink', for food from the store and so 
on, although such desires no doubt played. a part, but also for 
space, comparative freedom and a kind of sociability. The 
direct evidence for this is sparse, although one or two 
patients I interviewed told me that they needed places to go, 
outsideýthe hospital, and several villagers felt that patients 
came to the store to be closer to 'ordinary' ýpeople. To extend 
27 Compare Goffman's (1961/1968) description of the use of hospital 
toilets by patients: 'It was here patients were sent who wanted 
to smoke, and here It was understood attendants would exercise 
little surveillance. Regardless of the smell In this section of the 
ward, some patients elected to spend part of the day there, 
reading, looking out of the window, or just sitting on the 
relatively comfortable toilet seats., (p207). 
28 1 did not spend any time researching the toilet Itself, although 
this may have proved Interesting In terms of Interactions between 
patients and villagers. To what extent for example do patients 
conform to the typical behaviour of treating Immediate others 
(villagers) In such places as nonpersons' (Cahill 1985 p4l, 
Goffman 1963 p84)? It Is also possible to view public toilets as 
status and Identity levelling devices. As Cahill (1985 p53) put it, 
behaviour In public toilets I ... often contradicts the parts or roles that Individuals publically perform. ' In such places socially 
constructed differences between group members may not easily be sustainable. In this respect perhaps public toilets should be 
called places of deconstruction (or decomposition). For a famous 
study see Humphreys (1970). 
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a concept advanced by Lewis and Hugi (1981) and Segal and 
Baumohl (1985,1988) we might say that patients utilize places 
along the-route as 'therapeutic stations, 29. 
one central criticism of hospital life is that it is simply 
dull, - monotonous and boring, and it may be readily 
understandable that, at the very least, patients should seek 
diversity for a while and to escape from enforced idleness. 
Goffman (1961/68 p67) for example wrote of the 'sense of dead 
and, heavy hanging time' in the hospital which he saw as 
explaining the pursuit of 'removal activities'. This need may 
speak to us all. As Relph (1976 p4l) put it 'The places to 
which we are most committed may be the very centres of our 
lives, but they may also be oppressive and imprisoning. ' And 
for Robert Burton in the Anatomy of Melancholy I ... death 
itself, another hell... to be tied to one place. ' (quoted in 
Relph, ibid)30. 
From the villagers' perspective, however, patients from time 
to time presage the incipient breakdown of the ordinary world 
(e. g. Habermas 1979 p3,1984 p131, Pollner 1987, Wuthnow et al 
1984). The taken for, granted and everyday becomes problematic. 
Something gets out of hand. Routines break down or become 
29 The authors use this term to refer to the way Impoverished and 
'chronic' former-patients may selectively use institutional sites 
and personnel for purposes which differ from the stated aim of 
the Institution. Thus: I ... the hospital Is not viewed as a site of treatment, but as a temporary refuge; the aftercare clinic not as 
a site of therapy but as safe place to make contact ... I(Segaland Baumohl 1988 p260). 
30 For first-person 'pseudo-patient' accounts which emphasise the 
boredom of being a patient In a psychiatric Institution see Caudill 
et al (1952), Deane (1961), Goldman et al (1970). The latter suggest 
that many patients were 'painfully bored' and that I ... contrary to the views of many of the hospital staff, mental patients themselves 
were not at all oblivious to the barrenness and emptiness of their 
physical surroundings. ' (p430). 
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highlighted. The ordinary is no longer ordinary. Life suddenly 
becomes less ordered, less reliable and more precarious. 
Stories tell of this. And even in a place where the extra- 
ordinary is ordinary, there still exists the unusual, the 
bizarre, the extra-ordinary extra-ordinary. For villagers, such 
problems may occur when patients challenge the 
institutionalised framework and arrangements of space/time 
paths; when they deviate from the paths which are laid down for 
them, and for others, to follow, and slip through the cracks 
in the institutional order3l. 
Although, as I have indicated, patients, may be said to 'know 
their place' in the village while continually renegotiating it, 
there are nevertheless occasions when some patients deviate 
radically from those paths previously set down and with a kind 
of revolutionary zeal attempt singlehandedly to carve out new 
paths at tangents to the old. Such patients may simply lie down 
on a front lawn, or find their way into the seat of a car left 
briefly unattended (see ch. 14.4 below). or, more radically, 
reach an unoccupied kitchen of a village house by walking in 
through an open door, or even, (villagers recount), find their 
way into bedrooms and onto unoccupied beds. 
Such movement is understandably considered by villagers to 
amount to, invasion and attempted colonization32. For not only 
may the patient enter a private place but he or she may slide 
directly into a back region (Goffman 1959) without first 
31 Compare Goffman's (1961/1968 p280) suggestion that sense of 
selfhood is related to resistance to the pull of social belonging: 
'our status Is backed by the solid buildings of the world, while 
our sense of personal Identity often resides In the cracks. ' 
32 See my unpublished paper 'Life World and System' (1992) for an 
account of such Incursions by patients from the perspective of 
Habermas' (1984,1987a) thesis of the 'colonisation of the 
lifeworld'. 
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knocking at the front. These back regions have been presented 
by Goffman as those most intimate places where people may let 
down their guard; places which are considered essentially 
private and which permit the expression of 'regressive 
behaviour'. While the kitchen, a frequent point of entry, may 
not be as intimate as the bedroom, nevertheless it may yet have 
very considerable personal, territorial and private 
significance. The expected result of such perceived attempted 
invasion is therefore invariable 'defeat' for the patient. 
However, one possible implication of a sudden and unexpected 
challenge to private space is that the patient may 'catch' the 
villager doing something which he or she would not ordinarily 
expect to be caught doing, and certainly not in public. The 
patient who walks uninvited into a back region stands a chance 
in other words of finding the villager behaving in much the 
same way as the patient him or herself is seen and thought to 
behave. 
A final significant institution en route to the village store 
is the school. Situated directly on the main road, Shenley 
First School takes children up to the ages of 8 or 9 years. It 
is protected by iron railings. Patients have on one or two 
occasions wandered into the school and parents have expressed 
worries to the headmistress about their children's safety. But 
such anxieties appear exaggerated. For instance the 
headmistress recounted the following: 
Children will come up and say 'A patient talked to me. He 
said something rude. ' So I would say 'What did he say? ' 
'A swear word. ' 'What was it? ' And it would be 'Hello there, what are you doing., 
On one occasion I was told that a patient had applied for a job 
at the school in the canteen or as a cleaner, but when she 
admitted to being 
-a 
patient at the hospital her application was 
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not pursued, for the reason that 'the Council would not have 
allowed it. ' 
And of course, at least in the past, some schoolchildren have 
taunted and "tormented" passing patients, calling them names 
and "Jeering" at them, so that the passage to the village store 
for a patient has entailed a re-enactment of mortification 
processes in which the patient's moral career becomes almost 
geographically articulated (cf. Goffman 1961/68 p3l)33. 
The Village Store 
The village store, historically the last remaining retail food 
and hardware outlet in the village, incorporates a post-office. 
It stocks a whole range of goods including fresh, tinned and 
frozen food, alcohol, cigarettes, newspapers and magazines, 
sweets and ice-cream, and small domestic wares. Its top selling 
magazine is the 'Horse and Hound'. Shoppers serve themselves 
using baskets, but cigarettes and spirits are kept behind a 
serving counter. The store is sited on the main road and draws 
a substantial amount of custom from passers-by who neither live 
nor work in the village, but it is also patronised by a large 
number of villagers. Opposite the store another village pub has 
parking spaces which shoppers also use, and there is a bus-stop 
and post-box immediately outside the store. The manager of the 
store and his family live to one side of, behind, and above 
the premises. 
The store has an IL'-shaped spatial structure, with the 
protected post-office accommodated in the smaller arm. The 
store till area is situated by the door so that shoppers must 
go past it on entering and leaving. In this respect it has an 
33 The headmistress assured me that the children's behaviour had 
Improved over the previous 6 years. 
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interesting resemblance to many psychiatric (and other) 
hospital wards, where the nursing station is strategically 
positioned by the entrance/exit34. The till area in fact has two 
tills side by side. During light business it is 'manned' just 
by one person but a certain flexibility normally exists whereby 
a second till can be opened quickly when business becomes 
brisk. If they are not at the till, staff will normally be busy 
stacking or pricing goods, and there are usually at least two, 
and sometimes perhaps three or more, staff in the store at any 
one time. 
Although it has quiet periods, the store is frequently busy. 
In contrast to the public houses where people often expect to 
sit down, the store is characterized by a constant motion of 
bodies and short queues. The only seat in the store is for the 
use of staff, although customers have occasionally squatted on 
the window ledge. Customers draw up outside in a car, rush in 
to buy cigarettes or paper, and drive off quickly. Others walk 
to the store, pick up a basket in the usual manner and finally 
queue to pay, while people queue at the separate post-office 
counter for stamps or to cash pensions and benefits and so on. 
During this whole process shoppers will often take the 
opportunity to gossip, to chat to each other and to staff. 
Clearly many shoppers know each other, the manager and staff 
address many customers by name, and in turn shoppers address 
staff by name. 
There is a strong sense here of the store being a central 
daytime focus of the village, a place which attracts people not 
just for the goods it has to offer but also for the people one 
might 'bump into' (cf. Bauman 1972, Wiseman 1979, Shields 
34 For an account of the way space is strategically organised in a 
second-hand clothing store see Wiseman (1979). 
mThe Insanity of Place, Revisited 195 
1991a). Certainly for at least one member of staff a job in 
the store offered a chance to get out and meet people (cf. 
Maisel 1974). 
The store therefore constitutes a place where many individual 
space-time paths intersect with an institutional project. There 
is a certain energy and life here located in the regular and 
continuous flow of bodily movement, purposive action, and 
phatic discourse. In Seamon's (1980) terms one may witness or 
sense here a 'place-ballet' (p159), a strong sense of place 
linked to such movement and routine (cf. Relph 1976, Buttimer 
1980). This place-ballet is of course not independent of actors 
but is sustained by the very chronicity of the intersection of 
individual space-time paths with this particular institutional 
project, a chronicity which nevertheless 'provides a foundation 
for surprise, novelty and the unexpected' (Seamon 1980 p163)35. 
Each person plays a part in recreating the ballet including, 
to be sure, people who are patients. Although patients enter 
the store, one or two often linger immediately outside. One 
particular man is well known for walking up and down outside 
the store, occasionally pressing his face to the window and 
peering in. Another man, a former patient, may sit in nice 
weather with pipe and paper on the wall across the road from 
the store, watching events unfold. The same gentleman has also 
stood silently inside the shop again watching shoppers. I came 
to think of these people as adopting a 'tourist gaze' (Urry 
1990, Shields 1991a), although it seems that the pleasure they 
35 The store Is only one such site In the village. The pavement 
outside the school at 'hometimel also constitutes a meeting place 
when parents chat, coordinate their plans of action, and so forth. 
The pubs also each exhibit their own sense of place. The store 
however Is distinguished by the perpetual movement of customers 
and In this sense more clearly evokes the notion of place-ballet, 
although this may be matched in the public houses during busy 
periods. 
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may take derives from the authentic daily round, rather than 
the inauthentic and contrived (cf. Eco 1986/1987)36. As Shields 
(1991a p6) puts it: I ... the sense of presence and social 
centrality - of something happening beyond the close world of 
oneself motivates many who are marginal, alone or simply idle 
to visit shopping centres as passive observers. 137 
The importance of time for the organisation and smooth flow of 
the store became apparent when there was a delay at the till 
and such delays regularly involved patients. At such times the 
second till would be opened quickly to speed up the process. 
The manager was keen that customers should not be kept waiting 
too long in a queue. This served both to increase the viability 
and profitability of the store and to keep customers happy. In 
relation to patients the delay often concerned the effort for 
staff of understanding what patients were asking for. Unlike 
the pubs, shoppers in the store enquire about a wide range of 
goods. And at the post-office counter people might need help 
36 1 also came to think of this man as a 'patient-researcher, who, like 
me, was checking out, and contributing to, the reality of the 
setting. It Is also the case that the stance of tourist or 
observer/researcher can both be risky postures to adopt. 
Elsewhere (Southgate 1992b), I have referred to how In their 
equivocality, or ambiguity of signification, patients constitute, one 
might say, system ciphers, 'living question marks' (Oswald Boltz 
quoted in Fullinwider 1982 p156, and cf. Goffman 1961/68), or even 
living exclamation marks! (Cipher: A method of secret writing, or 
secret message, or Its key. Or a person or thing of no 
importance). Abstracted from friends, neighbourhood and family, 
pushed or pulled Into the psychiatric system and psychiatric 
space (R. D. Scott 1979), patients' meanings may become, so to 
speak, reduced to grammar, In a living text of absences (cf. 
Atkinson 1990 p134). 
37 The notion that places have existential significance for people In 
general Is not a new one (Relph 1976) but has also been addressed 
In the psychiatric literature as Godkin (1980) points out (e. g. 
Wenkart 1961, and see also Sommer 1959a, b, 1969, and Goffman 
1961/68). In other words we all need access to places which enable 
us to shore up or reconstruct our sometimes fragile identities. 
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in claiming money, filling in forms, understanding leaflets 
and so on. In this respect the tasks of store personnel are 
more complex than those of barstaff in public houses. 
On the majority of occasions of delay, staff, patients and 
other customers were patient and uncomplaining, but time was 
obviously an important consideration. Jim, the manager, 
recounted how on one occasion a patient came into the store and 
asked to exchange some 2p coins for ip's. Shortly afterwards 
the man returned to ask for them to be changed back again and 
was told to 'stop wasting time' and speedily dispatched. Anne 
provided another example: 
Then there's the old man who comes in. Very intelligent, 
man. He's the one who comes in for the er, Financial Times 
and the Telegraph every day. And er, he takes ages giving 
you his money. Cos he wants to give you the right money 
or the nearest to it or, if there's a2 he wants to find 
a 2, you know. So you're serving other people while he's 
still, and that's the same every day. He's just standing 
there and you get on serving other people because he just 
will not hurry. He mutters to hisself the whole time. He's 
an old man, grey haired. But I mean, he's intelligent. 
(Anne and Arthur p25) 
It became clear after a while that a further issue for staff 
concerned the identity of shoppers. Some members of staff 
commented upon how difficult it could be to distinguish 
patients from others, while one member in particular told me 
how the f irst thing she had to do was decide whether the 
shopper at the till was, or was not, a patient. Certain 
practical consequences devolved out of this identification. 
These consequences concerned the interpersonal methods which 
staff might then use to address the shopper and involved the 
issues of 'danger and threat, and 'responsibility'. These 
issues are thematised in a later chapter and so the discussion 
here will be brief. 
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Once identified as a patient then a certain caution and tension 
could creep into the way staff spoke to customer. Maggie for 
instance told me that: 'You can only say so much to them but 
no more. So you have to be careful what you say to them. ' 
However, this stance was by no means taken with all patients. 
Women for instance engendered less fear in staff than men who 
were patients. On the other hand those men who had become 
'regulars' in the store and especially those who took a little 
(but not too much) time to chat to staff were often considered 
less of a threat, although a sense of disquiet could still 
linger. Unlike some of the female staff, the male staff did not 
admit to fearing for their safety, although one or two spoke 
of a certain apprehension. 
Yet pragmatically defensive manoeuvres were not the sole 
outcome of identifying a shopper as a patient. A further issue 
concerned responsibility and accountability. Staff considered 
themselves confronted by a dilemma. Should they treat people 
who were patients as fully autonomous and independent citizens, 
able to determine their own affairs, and thus as ordinarily 
accountable? Or should they treat them as if they lacked 
responsibility, agency and accountability and in need of care 
and external control? 38. This dilemma manifested itself both 
38 This Issue of 'responsibility' Is a perpetual theme In the literature 
concerning mental disorder and may be addressed from various 
positions. Erikson (1957) for example argued that the role of 
'mental patient' Is contradictory, Insecure and confusing, In so far 
as one is expected to take some responsibility for recovery 
(Parsons' sick role) while at the same time being, by definition, 
unable to take such responsibility. This also becomes a source of 
confusion for staff (Batt 1976, Ludwig and Farrelly 1967). others 
have suggested that patients are autonomous enough to 'use' 
their symptoms for their own purposes (e. g. Braginsky, Grosse 
and Ring 1966, Braginsky and Braginsky 1967,1976, Braginsky et 
al 1969, Ludwig and Farrelly 1966,1967, and see Lewis and Hugl 
1981). Braginsky and Braginsky (1976) maintain for example that 
for patients, hospitals are resorts, within the shelter of which 
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in relation to perceived threat and danger and also in terms 
of dependency. In other words staff were unclear about whether 
they should be helping patients who were having trouble for 
example filling in forms at the post-office, and also whether 
it was economically viable to intervene regularly with 
assistance, and run a profitable business at the same time. 
In one respect the problem of responsibility found a pragmatic 
solution in the way staff often spoke to customers identified 
as patients, that is, as if they were young children39. This had 
a number of consequences: it meant that patients could be 
allowed to remain, as it were, human, if vulnerable; they could 
be allowed some agency short of full autonomy; and they could 
legitimately be 'told off' by staff if they stepped out of 
line, allowing staff to maintain a 'caring' approach. In this 
way the concept of 'child' and its practical correlates was 
drawn upon by staff to solve a practical problem. As far as I 
could see patients feelings on this matter were seldom taken 
into account. 
A story told to me by staff suggested that other villagers had 
also been aware of t' he importance of identity and time within 
the confines of the store. Jim recounted how a villager had 
approached him to say that her friend had become concerned 
because she had dropped some money in the store, had caused a 
delay, and was worried that she might be banned from the store 
fears of muggings, thefts, rape and murder virtually disappear. 
They ask 'Is there an informal Baedeker's guide to mental 
Institutions? ' (p84). For a legalistic perspective see HMSO (1991), 
Campbell and Heginbotham (1991). The latter argue strongly that 
I ... mental Illness Is not to be Identified with the absence of 
autonomy In any of Its different sensesl(pl39). See also my 
discussion In chapter 14.4. 
39 
_I 
later Interviewed 10 members of staff, the majority of whom 
took the view that this was an appropriate attitude to adopt. 
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"like some of the patients". Jim wondered whether she had 
overheard him, othreaten' one or two patients, and expressed his 
intention to reassure her on this point, although he felt that 
she was being over-anxious. But, even if over-anxious, the fact 
that her worries had been comprehensible at all to staff 
suggests that she had tapped into an important issue for the 
store and for the village. 
An extract from my fieldwork notes made at the time and dated 
26th May 1989 provided the following detail which suggests that 
time and identity and subtle everyday conventions may sometimes 
conspire against people who are patients: 
While I was talking to Jim a middle-aged man came into the 
store. He wore an anorak in quite warm weather this 
afternoon. Picked up a shopping basket and put one can of 
Coke in it. He then stood near the checkout desk. He 
seemed to be standing in just the wrong position, just 
outside the other people waiting at the desk, not quite 
in the queue. Everyone seemed to ignore him. It was as 
though he wasn't there. No-one turned to him to say 'are 
you waiting'. He eventually got served when the shop had 
emptied and he was the only one left. He also bought a 
number of loose cigarettes. He was very slow and his 
speech was difficult to understand. 
Unfortunately it proved impossible at the time to check out 
whether the member of staff at the till had in fact been aware 
that this man was waiting and had chosen for practical reasons 
to leave him until last; or indeed whether the man himself was 
consciously exercising delay because he knew the member of 
staff might have trouble understanding him, and he wanted to 
wait until the shop was empty to make his request. Such 
possibilities again point to the difficulties inherent in 
determining meaning. 
But if patients constituted 'grit' in the machinery of everyday 
store life, they were also seen to pose another problem for 
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staff, that of 'dirt'. Several female members of staff 
expressed a fear of contamination (cf. Douglas 1966, Goffman 
1971 p7l, Jodelet 1991, Wuthnow et al 1984)40. This issue came 
about when a patient for example presented his money with 
sweaty hands, or when another had a runny nose, or a third took 
his money out of his shoe to pay for goods. on these occasions 
some staff would take the first opportunity to run and wash 
their hands at a sink in the rear of the store. From the 
Durkheimian perspective of Douglas 1966 (and cf. Erikson 1962) 
this washing of hands could be read as a ritualistic 
reassertion of the boundary between patients and villagers, 
sanity and madness. That it occurs in a store makes it no less 
a sacred ritual, a purification which repairs the moral order. 
The counter in this case represents the line where sanity and 
madness touch, and because patients have travelled along and 
over the line they therefore signify danger (cf. Duerr 1985)41. 
40 Both Douglas and Goffman have drawn upon the sociology of 
Durkhelm. In her analysis of symbolic boundaries and everyday 
ritual, Douglas has also used 'place, as an organising theme. 
Purity and Danger for example expresses an equivalence between 
dirt and deviance; both signify something 'out of place'. From this 
perspective both deviance and dirt become functional for the 
moral order (and cf. Erikson 1962). 
41 In her fascinating study of a French community and Its 'colony', 
where local people take In men who have been psychiatric in- 
patients as 'lodgers', Jodelet (1991) leads the reader Inexorably 
to the seminal -secret of bodily secretions - sexual pollution; 
secrets of local children fathered by patients and the even 
greater threat of linter-marriage'. As she puts It (p277): 'Sexual 
taboo, marriage taboo, emotional taboo, organic contagion and 
physical contagion join forces to multiply the protective 
partitions. ' However the circumstances of Shenley village have 
been very different to those of Ainay-le-Ch&teau. Nevertheless, 
villager fears for the safety of their children have sometimes 
possessed a sexual flavour, and on one occasion a woman patient 
told me how she had been courted partly for sexual favours by 
a local man, who had lived just outside the village. 
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These fears were mitigated to the extent that the person with 
the runny nose, for example, was able to provide apologies and 
an account, to undertake 'repair' work (Goffman 1955,1971, 
Scott and Lyman 1968, Brown and Levinson 1978/90). To the 
degree that his account counted and the accused took remedial 
action (see below), the source of the body fluid would remain 
acceptable and the bodily fluid in question would itself be 
rendered less poisonous and more easily discountable by staff. 
Patients, in other words, could offset the charge of 
contamination by demonstrating their accountability and their 
sanity42. For example Penny provided a comparison between two 
patients: 
You can talk to quite a few of them in the shop. Alan, 
Alan Brown, do you know who I mean. To me he's quite, he 
comes in sometimes and he says, his nose is running, you 
know, he'll say "sorry, I've been put on some new tablets 
and they're making me dribble and me nose run". So I'll 
get him a tissue and say "there you are". Another one will 
come in, I mean a few weeks ago a patient come in and his 
nose, it was down there and I thought - Oh my God, what 
can I do, you know. It's going to go on the crisps so I 
said "There, would you like a tissue? ". And he just took 
the tissue and put it in his pocket. (Laugh) I just had 
to turn away. I mean, I didn't know whether to laugh, cry 
or what. I thought I'm either going to be sick or (2) 1 
just put my hand out for the money hoping that held avoid 
it, you know. (Penny p12) 
On occasions however the smell has been so powerful, and the 
problem of contamination has become so acute, often when other 
customers have complained, that the transgressor has been asked 
42 Compare Southgate (1992c) where I provide a formal-pragmatic 
analysis of warrantable insanity ascriptions. The issue of 
contamination Is also touched on In Appendix D; 'Patients speaking 
from an often unenviable position', especially p489. 
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to leave the store43. 
This account would be incomplete without mention of some of the 
additional 'complicating action, (Labov and Waletsky 1967) by 
which patients have affected, intentionally or otherwise, store 
routines. Two situations recommend themselves. Jim recounted 
how, when he first took over the store three years previously, 
he had attempted to stop selling single cigarettes. However the 
patients carried on asking for single cigaretteS44. The effort 
involved in continually explaining why he had decided to stop 
selling them finally led Jim to capitulate. By their sheer 
routine persistence patients had won a (minor) victory. And in 
fact during my period of participant-observation I also 
witnessed someone who did not appear to be a patient pop in for 
a single cigarette. When I inquired about the possible motive 
for this, staff suggested that perhaps the man in question was 
trying to give up smoking. This small story suggests that the 
intersection of individual paths with institutional projects 
is not a foregone conclusion and that power cannot adequately 
be grasped as, or reduced to, a balance sheet of resources or 
a zero-sum game (cf. Hindess 1982, Barnes 1988). 
Finally, one member of staff had a tale to tell concerning a 
customer who was a patient who regularly came in for a packet 
of 10 Berkeley. After Anne had rung it up on the till the man 
43 1 did not have the opportunity to find out what happened when 
others who are liable to carry strong smells, such as farmers or 
motor mechanics, came into the store. 
44 The patients' shop within the hospital still sells single cigarettes. 
In a recent study of a patients' club within the grounds of a 
large psychiatric hospital, Dunn et al (1990) concluded that 'Much 
of the social activity that went on was stimulated by an economy 
based around the purchase and exchange of tea and cigarettes... ' 
(p842). 
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would then always request a box of matches. on one occasion 
Ann challenged the man: 
... and you get it up and ring it up and he'll say 
land a 
box of matches I and he does that evex-y time. And the last 
time he came in I said, he said 110 cigarettes'. I said 
land... 1. He says 'Just 10 cigarettes' you know, and I 
rang it all up and he says I oh and a box of matches I, you 
know (laugh). (Anne and Arthur p6) 
It is difficult to resist seeing the interaction described here 
as a game which this person was playing with Anne, or as one 
in which Anne colluded. When this tale was told, Anne laughed, 
and yet her amusement was tinged with a hint of annoyance that 
the other, a patient at that, should have prevailed again in 
their negotiations. 
Within the village store, in contrast to the public houses, the 
topic of patients achieved a certain currency. Amongst staff, 
patients were talked about here. Patients constituted one of 
a range of topics but I gained the unflattering sense that for 
staff, interactions with patients could brighten up what might 
otherwise be a long and tedious day. 
Such talk often related to unusual happenings such as Katie's 
death, but also encompassed the more regular and mundane 
topics. For example the fact that staff had not seen a 
particular patient for some weeks; that a patient they knew did 
not look too well; or the fact that they were 'fed up' with 
someone's behaviour. 
And in addition staff often felt that they made an effort to 
encourage patients to talk and derived a certain sense of 
satisfaction by being able to elicit a response from someone, 
normally regulars, who had not previously spoken. A sense of 
challenge obtained here which also applied to people who were 
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not patients but who also did not speak. As Lou put it, albeit 
perhaps in a patronising manner, encouraging a patient to talk 
helps you to see that I There Is something there I. Carol, who had 
worked behind the post-office counter, told me: 
There's one patient, Ken his name is, and it's taken all 
these months f or him to say good morning back to me. I 
find it a challenge. He's very introverted and like 
usually if you say good morning 'and he doesn't answer 
you'll say, oh blow you, I won't. I thought no, persevere 
and see what happens, you know. And amazingly about a 
month ago he mumbled a good morning (laugh). Because I 
used to ask him a little question about his transaction 
and he wouldn't really answer whereas now he's beginning 
to. 
Several staff in the store had received letters from patients. 
These letters varied in design and purpose. Some appeared to 
be straightforward efforts to maintain a continuity in 
relationships with staff. Others were critical or perhaps 
apologetic in tone. One man wrote to Sid to apologise for not 
speaking in the store and to explain the reason for this. 
Clearly endowed with a sparkling wit this man addressed his 
letter to Shenley Stores,, 'The Sleepy Backwater of Homely, 
Hearty, Loving Hertfordshire. ' He rendered his own address as 
'The Dump on the Hump'45. 
45 The 'Hump' presumably refers to the fact that Shenley hospital 
(and village) Is sited on a hill from which there are excellent 
views across St. Albans. Whether this term was the Invention of 
this particular person, or whether It was in general use by 
patients and/or staff, I do not know; at any rate I am grateful for 
it. Store staff were not the only people In the village to receive 
letters from patients. 
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Conclusion 
In the above pages I have attempted to describe some of the 
routes and paths which patients have taken within the village 
and the institutional projects with which their paths have 
crossed. 
This'analysis has, I believe, drawn attention to the way that 
an investigation of 'closure' or exclusionary practices within 
the village and in relation to those people who are patients 
at the hospital may be linked to an analysis of 'place', 
theorised mainly from the perspective of time-geography. I have 
suggested that the concept 'place, provides a bridge which 
connects patients to routines, local knowledge, discourse and 
social structure. In contrast to the 'pre-patient' phase of a 
moral career (Goffman 1961/68,1971) the majority of patients 
observed in interactions with others in Shenley village appear 
to 'know their place' (cf. Goffman 1967). This 'knowing of 
place' can be read in a number of ways. 
It refers for example to the way that patients appear for the 
most part to travel routinely along particular paths in the 
village, through and to particular places. Following and making 
paths and places is a process continually negotiated but in 
this case not so much discursively as physically and bodily, 
and not necessarily very skilfully. In Shenley it is of course 
negotiated with villagers and the course of the negotiations 
is affected by institutional influences or projects. 
In the above analysis I have considered how discourse and place 
are directly related by focusing upon interactions at 
particular sites within the village and I have suggested that 
what is not said about people may be as important as what is 
said about them. This analysis has7 indicated that the degree 
mThe Insanity of Place, Revisited 207 
to which patients are talked about (or storied') by villagers 
does vary from site to site, while patients themselves, with 
occasional exceptions, have been portrayed above as often 
largely silent. 
However, as well as being situational ly specific, any discourse 
which is about and with patients within Shenley village is also 
likely to demonstrate a trans-situational or trans-placial 
pattern. Andrew Sayer (1985, p63/4) has nicely caught the 
implications: 
If our consciousness is shaped by the particular unique 
material circumstances in which we live then it should 
vary spatially with these conditions. But matters are not 
-as simple as this for we can only interpret our 
surroundings through an available language and a range of 
concepts. To a certain extent these are common to a range 
of different groups at different times and places, indeed 
the whole function of communication is to span such 
differences, for without differences in experience to 
share, communication is redundant. 
This understanding depends upon what Habermas has called the 
'paradox of intersubjectivityl: 
Subjects who reciprocally recognise each other as such, 
must consider each other as identical, insofar as they 
both take up the position of subjects; they must at all 
times subsume themselves and the other under the same 
category. At the same time, the relation of reciprocity 
of recognition demands the non-identity of the one and the 
other, both must also maintain their absolute difference, 
for to be a subject implies the claim to individuation 
(Habermas quoted in Dews 1987, p242). 
For Habermas the 'utopian' reconciliation of identity and non- 
identity can take place in everyday discourse so that in the 
reflexive use of language, which is part of the 'dual 
structure' of speech, we present inalienably individual aspects 
in unavoidably general categories I ... in such a way that we 
mThe Insanity of Place, Revisited 208 
metacommunicatively46 comment upon and sometimes even revoke 
direct information (and confirm it only with reservations). We 
do this for the purpose of an indirect representation of the 
non-identical aspects of the ego, aspects which are not 
sufficiently covered by the general determinations, and yet 
cannot be manifestly represented other than by just these 
determinations' (Habermas 1970b p211). In chapter 14 1 shall 
examine the particular use of those more general categories of 
discourse as they relate to people who are psychiatric 
patients. 
I have been arguing here that an analysis of routines of both 
villagers and patients is important in grasping the reality of 
structuration of the locale, the way that routine actions both 
consolidate pre-existing structures and at the same time are 
enabled by them. From this perspective social change therefore 
involves the challenging of routines in either subtle or 
radical ways, together with those dominant institutional 
projects which recursively sustain and channel them. I have 
attempted to show above how those practices which sustain 
divisions between the sane and the insane can be configured in 
terms of space-time paths and projects which are indicative of 
more than the phenomenological study of place (e. g. Relph 1974) 
or those interactionist studies of place (e. g. Goffman 1971, 
Rosenhan 1973), by illustrating the simultaneous enabling of 
action and the reconsolidation of structure. 
46 For Habermas metacommunication should not be confused with 
metalanguage since in the former, statements are not made. 
Metacommunication consists rather In a system of reciprocal 
expectations on the part of the participants in dialogue, which if 
themselves thematised will give rise to a further 
metacommunicative level etc. See Habermas 1979 p43, Dews 1987 
p241, and chapter 5 of this thesis where I sketch out Habermas' 
theory of universal or formal pragmatics. 
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In the next chapter I turn to examine the history of the 
village and the hospital, and to chart the development and 
dynamics of complaint by the villagers. 
210 
.Ac: »je 
They called me mad, and I called them mad, and damn them, 
they outvoted me. (Nathaniel Lee, 17th Century, quoted in 
Porter 1987 p3)1 
Introduction 
Public responses to social situations, organisations, 
behaviours or persons considered as candidates for the 
predicates 'trouble' or 'problem', may take a number of 
different forms. These range from the dismissal of the putative 
problem as a problem at all, through disattendance, studied or 
otherwise, in which the 'problem' is ignored (Goffman 1963, 
Lofland 1972), via a variety of informally organised efforts 
directed at conciliation or sanction, to the petition of 
assistance from official or quasi-official organisations 
(Baumgartner 1988, Emerson and Messinger 1977, Goffman 
1961/1968). The reaction in turn by the 'complained-about' 
person, organisation or institution may follow a similar 
pattern with the addition that the complaint may also be 
acknowledged by the defendant as legitimate. 
Porter provides two slightly different versions of this quotation 
In his two books, 1987 and 1987/90 (p2). He obtained it (them) 
from Byrd, M. (1974) Visits to Bedlam. Columbia: Univ. of South 
Carolina Press. 
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Rather than detailing the variety of individual efforts at 
defining and dealing with trouble, this chapter takes a 
slightly different position by focusing in particular upon the 
work of the local Parish Council as 'troubleshooter', that is, 
as an official 'champion', a body representing the local 
villagers in their complaints about patients and hospital2. 
The account developed here takes as its analytic guide the 
process-oriented model of Emerson and Messinger (1977) in which 
the definition of trouble can be seen as the emergent product, 
as well as the initial precipitant, of remedial actions. 
According to this model, deviant careers are seen as highly 
negotiable and non-deterministic, and the effort to do 
something about a trouble both helps decide the trouble's fate 
and'shapes how it is first perceived. The authors describe the 
way that a 'trouble' may undergo reinterpretation as new ways 
of eliminating, reducing or confining the troublemaking are set 
in motion in a recurring cycle in which trouble may be 
progressively elaborated and analysed, and in which third 
parties may be called upon to validate and deal with claims of 
complaint. This approach has, I believe, the merit of grasping 
some of the political subtleties of the labelling process 
without becoming overly deterministic. 
This chapter documents the often problematic relationship 
between village and hospital, together with the historically 
changing nature of the 'problem' or 'trouble' itself, from the 
time of the birth of the hospital to its old age and incipient 
2 References to other methods used by villagers can be found 
throughout the Interview transcripts. one publican gave an 
example: 'There was a patient in recently, a black man. I was 
advised to be careful of him, not upset him. Held lost his temper 
on the ward -a bit crazy. I went up to him and said "I hear you 
break windows. If you smash windows here, I'll ram your head 
through a window. " He laughed - It was OX. 1 
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demise. The history highlights the way that 'trouble' has 
changed over time from being an outcome of a straightforward 
dialogue from which 'trouble' emerges uncontroversially as 
clearly bounded, defined and dealt with, to being amorphous in 
nature, disputed, challengeable and challenged (Emerson and 
Messinger 1977; and see Scheff 1966,196B, Scott and Lyman 
1968, for work on negotiation and reality). It considers the 
tactics used by both sides to attempt to enforce their 
definition of the reality of the situation in the face of an 
historically widening reality disjuncture (Pollner 1974,1975 
and cf. Darrough 1978, Eglin 1979, Molotch and Boden 1985, 
Potter & Reicher 1987, Potter and Edwards 1990, D. E. Smith 
1978), which only of late appears to have subside(13. The 
account shows how mundane epistemology itself becomes an issue 
in the dispute which assumes an increasingly recriminatory and 
moralistic flavour, a 'stigma contest' in Schur's (1980) words, 
amplified by the local mass media (Scheff 1966, Schur 1980, 
Young 1971); and it also highlights the way that the 
introduction of a particular technology intended as a solution 
to a problem has in fact had quite ambiguous results. In its 
brief regard to the rhetorical structure of certain accounts, 
this history anticipates the following chapter on discourse 
analysis. It is intended that this chapter be of interest in 
itself, but also to set the historical scene for, as well as 
being contextualised by, the rest of the thesis, and in the 
process I have provided some early detail. 
I have drawn here upon material from four principal sources: 
local Parish Council minutes; local newspaper articleS4; early 
3 In a slightly different context MacIntyre (1977) has referred to 
the notion of 'mundane epistemological crisis, which may be 
resolved by the construction of a new and enlarged narrative. 
4 According to Rosaldo (1987) a source rarely used in academic 
writing. 
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Hospital Management Committee minutes; and interviews with 
villagers and hospital staff. Some periods of this history are 
inevitably sketchy. Later Hospital minutes, which might have 
enabled the resolution of certain lacunae, were unavailable. 
Two of these sources, Parish Council minutes and newspaper 
articles, are available to readers who wish to consult them. 
I have also had access to historical records of the Village 
Society and the Praetorian Housing Association, but their 
application in this history is minimal. 
Writing a history is, I believe, like the construction of an 
ethnography, always a creative endeavour. Rather than writing 
itself, a history is orchestrated by an author and constitutes 
the outcome of interpretative work deriving out of an interplay 
between the author's interests, a particular conceptual and 
analytic framework, the material selected and available for 
analysis, and the discourse of the institutional and 
organisational-nexus within which the history is produced. It 
is, I am sure, only one of many possible accounts and as such 
it has no pretension to be the sole history of the village. 
Indeed two histories of the village, one short, one long, have 
already been published, neither of which bear a remote 
resemblance to the present one (Boswell 1986, Stebbing 1988) 
and many other histories no doubt remain to be published. In 
addition it has been suggested to me by hospital nursing staff 
that the book 'Brother Lunatic, by Paul Warr (a pseudonym), 
published in 1957, depicted Shenley Hospital and its practices. 
My interest here however is not with a history of Shenley's 
success in the Best Kept Village Competition, nor the history 
of its 'Cage', but with a short and narrowly focused account 
of the relationship between village and hospital using 
particular sources' within a theoretical framework of the 
, micro-politics of patients-as-troublel as indicated above. 
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In terms of its construction this account can then be seen to 
share analytically the features, methods and processes of 
production of the documents upon which it draws, i. e. newspaper 
articles, council minutes etc. These may be understood, not as 
providing any simple evidence of a pre-existing reality, but 
as themselves the outcome of a range of interpretative work in 
which, in the processes of documentation and textualisation, 
shape is lent to events and happenings which mark them out as 
solidified happenings of a particular kind. The work of 
production may be viewed not as idiosyncratic but as 
organisationally situated in relation for example to the 
organisational demands and procedures of minute taking (for the 
Clerk to the Parish Council) or reporting and editing etc (for 
the local press) (see for the latter Molotch and Lester 1974; 
and generally D. E. Smith 1984). 
Although I have adopted a realist textual mode for most of this 
chapter, on occasions I have considered the rhetorical 
organisation of the available evidence. However I have not had 
the space or time to attempt to unpack the institutional* or 
organisational features implicit in particular texts, to look 
at how the practices of their construction and the readings and 
interpretative practices which they are produced to intend, 
articulate with wider political and institutional discourses5. 
Inevitably this chapter also glosses over certain other related 
aspects of the relationship between village and hospital. It 
makes practically nothing for example of the fact that in 
5 See for example D. E. SmIth (1981,1984,1988,1990). In an earlier 
paper Dorothy Smith (1978) showed how a particular text was 
organtsed In a manner which was Isomorphic with the structure 
of the conceptual scheme, mental Illness. In her later work she 
considers further how the Investigation of documentary practices 
can make visible organisational and political discourses which 
might otherwise remain obscure, e. g. her (1984) commentary on 
the use Of 'forms' and documentary records In the 
standardisations of the labour market. Compare Fairclough (1989). 
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earlier days villagers were able to make use of certain 
hospital facilities such as the X-Ray Department, and resources 
such as hospital furniture for the village fete; the fact that 
the hospital provided many villagers with paid employment and 
also cooked meals for the village luncheon club for older 
village residents; and the fact that some villagers 
participated in hospital staff functions and social activities 
such as hospital dances and that patients patronised and 
provided trade for village shops and pubs. It does however 
touch lightly upon wider socio-economic factors as they relate 
to one particular historical period. 
Although 'Patients-as-a-Probleml is the focus of the chapter 
it is important to note the absence of the voice of the people 
who are and were patients.. As indicated, the history charts a 
dialogue of sorts here between village and hospital, but a 
dialogue which is preeminently about, these people. There is one 
interesting exception which I shall document later. 
of equal concern is the grammar of public talk. Some of the 
examples presented later are suggestive of the way 'people' are 
transformed grammatically in public discourse to something 
else, something 'other' and which we may currently feel are 
archaic and often unhelpful ways of talking6. 
The occasional use in the remainder of this chapter of capital 
letters as in Patient, Villager, Hospital, is intended to mimic 
the grammatical form of a substantial proportion of the Parish 
Council minutes (compare Appendix C below). Names have also 
been altered where appropriate to protect identities. 
6 The still current use of the term 'mental patient' as In 'He's a 
mental patient' may be less than helpful. See Barham (1984) 
Barham and Hayward (1991). 
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The Birth of the Hospital and its Early Years 
Shenley hospital was officially opened by King George V and 
Queen Mary on 31st May 1934. By this date it had already 
acquired a substantial number of in-patients. The old Mansion 
House in the hospital grounds which had been administered by 
Napsbury, another psychiatric hospital 211 miles away, was taken 
over and became part of the new hospital on lst January 1934, 
along with its 115 patients, eight of whom were private. The 
private rate was fixed at 38s/6d by the Shenley Mental Hospital 
Standing Sub-Committee. The 'rate-aided' amount was 22s/6d. 
The official rationale for the erection of the new hospital, 
one of the last major psychiatric hospitals of its type to be 
built, was the alleviation of overcrowding at Napsbury and 
Springfield Hospitals. In December 1932 the 'Commissioners of 
the Board of Control to the Napsbury Mental Hospital' visited 
Napsbury and reported 'a general appearance of overcrowding, 
where extra beds had been placed. They noted '... a number of 
unoccupied patients in a room obviously too small for free 
movement and normal idling activities of that number' . The same 
commissioners reported that their spirits 'had been lifted by 
the sight of the building of the New Mental Hospital proceeding 
apace. ' 
By 17th February 1934 Shenley had''327 in-patients. One month 
later it had 440, and by 14th April the total had increased to 
655. In April the Medical Superintendent reported that Shenley 
had continued to take patients from Napsbury and Springfield 
Hospitals at the rate of 60/70 per week and that by April all 
patients from these hospitals awaiting transfer had been 
received. Of the 619 patients transferred, 174 were male and 
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445 were female. Some two years later, by March 1936, the in- 
patient total had risen to 985, of whom two-thirds were women. 
The Shenley Mental Hospital Standing Sub-Committee minutes 
record that a very small number of patients were also being 
discharged each month. In April 1934 for example 7 patients 
were recommended for discharge after being interviewed by the 
Sub-Committee. Six were diagnosed as suffering from 
'melancholia' and one from 'mania'. Various causes were listed 
which included principally certain forms of 'stress' (6- 
melancholia) and 'unknown' (1-mania). 
The first Medical Superintendent, Mr G. W. Shore, was appointed 
in 1933. He had previously been the Second Assistant Medical 
officer at Springfield Hospital for over 10 years. The somatic 
nature of psychiatric therapies of the time can be discerned 
from his application where he listed his experience in the 
following manner: 'In my work at Springfield Hospital I have 
carried out all modern methods of treatment, such as malarial 
and sulphur therapy, and I have had considerable experience in 
the treatment of mental illness by such means as artificial 
sunlight, continuous baths, foam baths and high colon 
irrigation'. 
The, opening ceremony was by most accounts a grand affair. In 
a letter from the Clerk of the Sub-Committee it was reported 
that 'their majesties' (sic) wished that every facility be 
given to Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, and schoolchildren, 'to see 
their majesties' (sic), and the Medical Superintendent 
undertook to 'secure the attendance of' as many children as 
possible. Numerous orders from the hospital administration for 
a variety of goods for the occasion are listed in the minutes. 
The sheer scale of the enterprise can be seen by reference to 
1 ton of f loor polish' 1000 yards of calico 1500 yards of 
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Damask' ; 1150 yards of Hessian'; together with 150 yards of 
Muslin'; and large amounts of clothing including 1600 pairs of 
Lisle stockings'. Some of the villagers still remember the 
opening. The King and Queen rode through the Village and 
stopped off at certain points but not all the villagers were 
pleased as one respondent recalled: 
Clare: ... granny went and sat by the, 
by the pond. They 
took granny Is chair and granny sat in state and of course 
she had seen the royals, 'cause living on the estate, 
obviously the royals were around, so granny had seen the 
royals, but granny was going to sit out, she was quite 
matronly, and she sat by the pond, and they were late. 
They'd stopped in Green Street to see some old girl who 
was a 100 or something and they were late so they went 
through very quickly and granny was furious about it ... 
In 1934 there was already some acknowledgement that the local 
'public' might have an interest in the fact that a mental 
hospital had been built, and in January 1934 the Sub-Committee 
minutes note a suggestion to 'throw the hospital open to the 
public before the admission of patients' (although it appears 
that there were already by then some patients on site) and that 
journalists and the medical practitioners of the neighbourhood 
, be invited to inspect it'. 
In the Village there had already been opposition to the 
erection of the Hospital. The same villager noted, in response 
to my question: 
DS: Did you have any impression about the local feeling 
about a psychiatric hospital then? 
Clare: Oh they were anti. Oh yes. This is why, I've said, 
it tickles me in a way that we're all fighting to keep the 
hospital and when it came they, everybody was up in arms 
and they didn't want it, you know. But um, you know. Oh 
yes, the idea of putting a mental hospital in Shenley was, 
oh God, yes. Oh yes, they were very anti (2) Well the same 
thing happens when they try to put, you know like a half 
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way house or anything in Borehamwood even, isn't it. I 
mean down what was it Beech Road all the locals were up 
in arms. 
This is echoed by other Villagers although often with 
reservations, for example: 
Wendy: ... the patients, the hospital has made the village 
as it is today of course because it was a big employer of 
labour. I believe it caused a terrible stir (laugh) when 
it was being put up. 
(gap of several lines) 
But um, er, I don't think all, all the people condemned 
it because it was a source of, work wasn't it really, when 
you think of it they must have been better paid up at the 
hospital than they, some of them were in the houses. 
What is perhaps surprising is that there appears to be little 
official or public record of this reported groundswell of 
opposition, or of any dispute or debate about the matter. This 
lack of documentation constitutes a potential methodological 
problem, for while the presence of documentation of dispute 
suggests, if not unambiguously, the presence of dispute, the 
absence of such documentation on the other hand does not 
necessarily indicate its absence. The question here is to what 
extent the relationship between Village and Hospital can 
reasonably be gauged by public records. Although the increasing 
public appearance of minutes, articles and letters over time 
about this relationship may be indicative of changes in the 
relationship itself, clearly the appearance of more public 
articles and notes may relate to changes in the use of the 
local mass media and Council minutes. 
However the tone of the first documented complaints of a 
'problem' lacks any hint of the 'problem' as one which was 
already ongoing and well established, while interviews with 
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some of the older residents in the Village have suggested that 
in the 'early days' of the Hospital, 'patients-as-a-probleml 
hardly existed, as I show below. 
The local newspapers of the time register, then, no complaints, 
no letters from local people. Local interest can be discerned 
from the Parish Council minutes, but the precise nature of that 
interest is not clear. The following entry appears in the 
minutes of the meeting held on 31st March 1924, nine days after 
an article containing news of the purchase appeared in the 
Herts Advertiser and St Albans Times, and ten years before the 
Hospital was officially opened. 
Mr Dashwood gave some particulars in connection with the 
proposed purchase of Porters Park by the Middlesex County 
Council for the purpose of a Mental Hospital and as it was 
a matter of public interest it was considered advisable 
to have a public meeting on the following Wednesday. 
Unfortunately no further reference appears in the minutes 
concerning this public meeting, nor in the local newspapers at 
that time. Nothing more appears in the Parish Council minutes 
concerning this matter until 24th May 1934, just one week 
before the royal opening was scheduled to take place. The entry 
reads: 
Mr Ruck asked what the Parish council intended doing to 
welcome the King and Queen and (sic) visiting Shenley to 
open the new Shenley Mental Hospital. The Chairman replied 
that he thought it should be left to the Middlesex County 
Council to make the arrangements, and after a little more 
talk on the matter the subject was dropped. 
The organisation of this minute, in particular the wording 'the 
subject was dropped', hints at controversy on this matter. And 
it is no doubt surprising that the Council was apparently so 
opposed to making some arrangements to welcome the royal pair, 
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bearing in mind that they would be passing directly through 
the village. A reading of this passage which is generous to the 
Royal Family suggests anti-hospital rather than anti-royalist 
sentiment7. 
The same Chairman of the council had, one year earlier, written 
to the Shenley Mental Hospital authorities in his capacity as 
Churchwarden at Shenley Parish Church in an effort to gain a 
financial payment which one might be temýted to read as some 
kind of perceived compensation or payoff: 
I am writing to you on behalf of this parish to ask you 
to be good enough to use your influence to persuade the 
Middlesex County Council to make some contribution to 
Shenley Parish Funds, in view of the ownership of Porters 
Park. 
But, even if this reading is correct, it is still clear, as 
previous extracts suggest, that not all the village was 
completely opposed to the development. In October 1934 the 
Rector's Warden at St. Botolph's church (now redundant), on the 
edge of the Village, wrote to the hospital authorities offering 
the use of the church for the patients, 'except between 10-45 
and 12-30 Sundays, so as to allow some margin on either side 
of the service itself. I Agreed by the Parochial Church Council, 
a discounted 'pew rent, of 10/- per sitting was suggested 
(reduced from 41) making a total of Z115 per annum. But 
although it extended the hand of friendship and the opportunity 
for worship, the offer is not unambiguous for it appears to be 
suggesting that people who were patients at the hospital should 
worship separately from the rest of the congregation, while it 
also illustrates a potential pecuniary interest. 
It might be argued that this minute simply shows the Parish Council demonstrating a realistic self-awareness of its 
unimportance in relation to higher tiers of Local Government. 
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In the early days of the Hospital, in-patients were strictly 
segregated according to sex, and many wards were locked and 
encircled by high iron railings. The book of 'General Rules' 
of the 'Middlesex County Mental Hospital, Shenley' was 
finalised in 1934. It contains reference to the degrees of 
freedom of movement of patients: 
Such patients as the Medical Superintendent may direct 
shall, at approved times and as he thinks expedient be 
allowed to take walks or to make excursions beyond the 
grounds of the Mental Hospital ... (p2o) 
Patients were allowed into the village but to begin with were 
generally accompanied by nursing staff as the following 
extracts from interviews with Villagers suggest: 
Wendy: And they would stream out of the hospital wouldn't 
they. And the nurses would bring them out to do their 
shopping, take them for walks round and um, so there was 
a lot of them, er. 
and in the following exchange 
DS: Did it kind of register with you at the time, because 
you were young, did it register that in fact it was a, a 
mental hospital that was being built? 
Anthea: Yes 
DS: And um, did you have any, do you remember any kind of 
thoughts or discussions with other people about that or 
what that might, might mean? 
Anthea: No. It didn't really because of course when the 
hospital was first built there were iron railings all 
round the wards. Patients couldn't get out (2) you see. 
So I mean they came out in crocodiles with two or three 
nurses but um, they didn't wander as they do now in the 
village. And in fact I remember the railings coming down, 
and one patient said to me loh dear,, she said, 'now 
anybody can get in' (laugh). 
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Many older villagers have referred to this line' or 
'crocodile' of patients escorted out of the Hospital grounds 
by the nursing staff, although the precise identity of members 
of a 'crocodile' is not entirely clear as the following extract 
from an interview with a respondent, who eventually came to 
work in the hospital, indicates: 
Henry: ... eventually, you know, 
the hospital got built and 
was very much separate from the village in my youth. I 
remember when the place was opened, as a schoolboy I came 
and was officially shown around the place. The people we 
were much more aware of were the Harperbury, the 
handicapped, because they came up in great crocodiles on 
a Saturday, nurses at front and back to do their shopping. 
DS: Right. Harperbury was built at the same time 
Henry: On the other bit of the estate. 
DS: On the other side yes. 
Henry: Yes, down the bottom, between here and Napsbury, 
yes. So one hardly became aware of it and of course the 
regimes I, whilst there's not a, there's not a wall or a 
fence round this place, there were fence, er, iron fences 
round certain wards. Um, they had the clever idea you see 
of putting the fence round our big block wards so that all 
the services could come into the back, and patients could 
go into the airing courts at the front. Well, along came 
of course the Fir, the Second World War. 
DS: Just before you come onto that, how did you know that 
the crocodiles of patients were from Harperbury rather 
than Shenley? 
Henry: Er (3) 1 suppose I saw them walking up the hill as 
opposed to coming out of the gates, and they were youth, 
of course youthful, younger, you see, younger people in 
the main. Along came the war... 
During the Second World War many patients appear to have been 
discharged8 and Shenley Hospital was used to house prisoners 
It Is not clear exactly where they were discharged to. It may be 
that at least some were discharged home. Referring to the Impact 
of WWT-T on psychiatric services, Ramon (1986 p219) states I ... no 
public outcry followed the discharge of many civilian psychiatric 
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of war as well as wounded Allied soldiers, while retaining some 
villas for pre-war functions. Parish Council minutes contain 
a single reference coming just before the war ended which 
suggests that some prisoners of war were having a better time 
than the Villagers: 
Mr Ruck asked if the Council would write to the 
authorities concerning prisoners of war and asked if their 
rations could be reduced to the same standard as civilians 
are obtaining. He pointed out the disgraceful conduct of 
the Italian prisoners of war and the young girls. 
One respondent suggested that the change in function during the 
war helped to bring village and hospital closer together: 
Henry: Wartime of course brought a great mixed bag and 
vast socially, I mean the hall here (at the hospital) 
became the social centre of the, of the, of the village, 
during the war, oh yes, yes. 
DS: Why was that, then? 
Henry: Well er, I mean er, with a military hospital here, 
one had, and a big one, one had first class entertainment 
by ENSA. First class. 
Following the war the size of the in-patient psychiatric 
civilian population began again to increase. But if the war had 
provided an opportunity for an improvement in relations between 
Village and Hospital in certain respects, and heralded 
cooperation and collaboration in particular projects, it also 
marked the recognition of the appearance of a 'problem': 
Henry: ... as far as the village, is concerned er (3) er (2) 1 suppose, yes, er (1.5) there started some 
cooperation with the village, i. e. in meeting in * after 
the war. Yes, and the problem wouldn't'have arisen prior 
so separate 
in-patients for the duration of the war, which resulted from the 
fact that hospital buildings were required to house wounded 
soldiers., 
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I can't recall a single in, I can't recall a single 
[incident]. 
The Emergence of 'Patients-as-Trouble, 
The first hint of the emergence of a 'problem' concerning the 
behaviour of people who were patients at the Hospital came in 
May 1952,18 years after the Hospital was officially opened. 
Headed 'Patients on Parole from Hospital', the Parish Council 
minutes briefly note: 
A discussion ensued in regard to complaints made by 
residents on the behaviour of patients from Shenley 
hospital when out on parole. 
Here the Parish Council can be seen to have taken on the role 
of 'Troubleshooter' (Emerson and Messinger 1977). Although no 
details are included of the exact nature of the problem, the 
consequences were highly significant. Following a meeting, 
which appears from the minutes to have been the first of its 
kind between the Chairman and the Clerk to the Parish Council 
and 'Senior Medical Officers', the Medical Superintendent of 
Shenley Hospital wrote to the Council making certain 
recommendations which the Council accepted and to which the 
Clerk was instructed to reply with thanks for the prompt action 
taken by the Medical Superintendent: 
That outside parole of both male and female patients 
should be restricted to the hours of lpm to 7pm 
except where a patient is sent out of hospital for 
some specific purpose such as to return home on 
leave, or to make some urgent purchase. 
2. That nursing officers should exercise supervision of 
patients on outside parole and that the hospital 
transport should be provided for this purpose. 
3. That more adequate shopping and cafe facilities 
should be offered to patients within the hospital 
thereby giving them less incentive to go outside. 
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The above proposed remedies can be regarded as aI test' of the 
definition of the 'problem' as defined by Villagers (Emerson 
and Messinger 1977 p123). The very fact that the Hospital 
authorities responded quickly and decisively can be read as a 
statement concerning the perceived correctness of the 
Villagers' complaint and their definition of the problem. There 
appears toý be no controversy here, at least none that is 
recorded. In direct contrast to later interventions by the 
Hospital, the Superintendent implements severe measures. There 
is accord between the two parties. 
However, these proposed 'remedies' to a 'problem' strongly 
indicate that between the opening of the Hospital and 1952, the 
original form of patient parole had been relaxed. This may well 
have been a gradual process happening by default or 
alternatively a conscious decision spurred on by wider 
processes of change within the institutions of psychiatry (see 
below). But there does appear to have already been a shift from 
the earlier routine supervision of organised 'crocodiles' of 
patients, to a less supervised freedom of patients within the 
local community. 
The above steps taken by the Superintendent may then be seen 
as constituting a substantial curtailment in the freedom of 
movement of people, many of whom would have had voluntary (now 
termed 'informal') status as patients. The Mental Treatment Act 
1930 which renamed asylums 'mental hospitals' allowed patients 
to be received on a voluntary basis (Rose 1986 p5l; Goodwin 
1990 P111). 
The first item in the minutes is self-explanatory. The second 
led to the provision of a 'village patrol I of motorised nursing 
staff. The third item is particularly interesting. It clearly 
suggests a link between the provision of increased internal 
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facilities for patients and the anticipated consequential 
reduction of the number of patients going 'outside,. 
No doubt it would overstep the bounds of credibility to see 
such increased internal provision as the direct result of 
Villager complaint, and it is possible that the Hospital 
authorities were already planning these developments, and that 
their motives were indeed at least in part therapeutic. The 
Superintendent may simply have been outlining to the Council 
the consequences for the village of action already determined. 
Nevertheless such detail does cast a shadow upon such 
initiatives. Compare for example the account provided in an 
article on Shenley Hospital in the Nursing Times (1977) which 
stresses only the 'progressive' nature of such developments. 
In 1952 the Management Committee investigated the general 
occupational facilities of the hospital. It found that 
when all the departments had absorbed their maximum number 
of patients to work on the land, over 100 able-bodied men 
were still left idle. Some hundreds of able-bodied women 
were in a continual state of enforced idleness. 
January 1953 saw the start of the building of an 
occupational centre, a vast undertaking where patients 
working under supervision began to erect workshops which 
could then provide permanent occupational facilities for 
an even larger number of patients. Money was made 
available. By April 1954 the finishing touches were being 
put to the completed building which has provided 
occupational therapy space for numerous patients ever 
since. More buildings have been built, the patients 
themselves undertaking every kind of activity necessary 
in their production. (Nursing Times, 9th June 1977) 
But however one reads this, it is also possible to gain a sense 
here of the way that labour and its discipline were, and still 
are, considered to be forms of therapy (Wing and Brown 1970; 
Kendell and Zealley 1983). And at the same time it is possible 
to see that this enforcement of labour served to incorporate 
these people, to include them in the self -realization of their 
own discipline and incarceration, by their (supervised) help 
in constructing the very buildings which would house and 
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entertain them during the times of their enforced exclusion 
from the village. Indeed the very developments in the 
philosophy of therapeutic communities may be read, as Rose 
(1986 p74) suggests, as a 'profound strategy of normalization 
of maladjusted selves". 
Of course these facilities now provide patients with a greater 
range of options for action, and it may indeed also have been 
therapeutic for many people to have had the chance to do some 
physical work. The Hospital orchards, gardens and farmland were 
already being worked by the patients. The point however is to 
see the possibility of alternative schemes and other designs 
related albeit in some minimal fashion to the perceived 
sensitive nature of local public reactions for the Hospital 
authorities. 
The prompt and extensive action taken by the Hospital may have 
assuaged local concern for a while for no further related items 
occur in the Parish Council minutes for some 3; j years. It looks 
as though many of the patients were being kept disciplined and 
busy building during this period. 
It may have been the experimental closure of the small Village 
police station for a period of 6 months, as detailed in a 
letter from the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 'in the 
interests of efficiency,, which contributed to an increase in 
local anxieties and the subsequent further reference to the 
'parole, of patients one month later in the minutes of December 
1955. There followed a subsequent meeting with the Medical 
9 Compare Foucault (1975/1979), Melossi and Pavarini (1977/1981), 
and on the commodification of time under capitalism see intez- alfos 
Giddens (1981), Lukacs (1971), E. P. Thompson (1967). 
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Superintendent and thereafter a statement by the Parish Council 
Chairman that I ... there appeared to be an improvement 
in the 
control of patients in the village. ' 
However in April 1956 an incident is referred to in the Council 
minutes and is also reported in the local press. This was said 
to have concerned a fight between two men, at least one of whom 
was a patient at the Hospital, within the Village. The 
newspaper report is quoted here in full in order to convey its 
flavour, in particular its ambiguity and its emphasis upon 
gendered responses. 
Hospital Patients in ShenleyFight 
Frightened women locked in village shop, Parish Council 
were told. 
A fight at Shenley last week, involving a patient from 
Shenley hospital, and in which "a knife was brandished and 
frightened women were locked into a shop for safety", was 
described at Shenley Parish Council meeting on Tuesday by 
Mr E. J. Broadley, who called for greater security measures 
by-the hospital authorities to protect villagers. "I want 
to withdraw my statement that there has been an 
improvement in the behaviour of patients" he said. It has 
got worse (new quotation marks missing in original). Last 
week there was an incident when a knife was brandished, 
and women got very alarmed. "The shopkeeper, Mr Maltby 
shut them in his shop. Apparently a fight took place 
between two men. One of them swept his coat off and a 
knife was drawn. Whether he meant to use it, I don't know, 
but the shopkeeper locked his shop with the women in it. 
I didn't see it myself but several people have told me 
about it". 
Mr VLVH Wild said "I had one case in my fields when I 
met a patient armed with a pitchfork. I was able to deal 
with him, but it is pretty alarming if there are any women 
about. " 
"I found another lurking in my mother's ground at dusk. 
I turned him off and he was very surly. They are wandering 
about aimlessly backwards and forwards". (Herts 
Advertiser, 13th April 1956) 
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The Parish Council minutes are in contrast very brief, but a 
sense of the perceived seriousness -of the problem can be found 
in the action proposed by the Council. Reference is made to an 
'incident between patients from the Hospital, which had 
occurred in the Village': 
After a full discussion it was decided that the Chairman 
ask the Medical Superintendent of the Hospital to attend 
the next meeting of the Parish Council and inform him that 
representation have (sic) been made to refer the matter 
to the Member of Parliament for the district. 
Both of these accounts are of interest for different reasons. 
In the newspaper report it is unclear whether both men are 
patients at the hospital or only one man is a patient. If the 
latter, then it is unclear who drew the knife. Allowing that 
both men were patients, then the starkest aspect of the report 
is in the contradistinction, the structure of difference, which 
is set up in the article, using the voices of male villagers, 
between 'dangerous male patients, and 'our frightened women'. 
The theme of 'Our Women' is repeated throughout the article. 
It is initially found in the sub-heading: 'Frightened women 
locked in village shop, Parish Council were told'; repeated 
through the main body of the article -I... frightened women 
were locked into a shop for safety', 'women got very alarmed', 
I ... the shopkeeper locked his shop with 
the women in it'; and 
in the later reference to different incidents -I... but it is 
pretty alarming if there are any women about' and 'I found 
another lurking in my mother's ground at dusk'. This form or 
structure which counterposes Male-Patient-Danger-outside with 
Female-Villager-Frightened-Inside can also be found in more 
contemporary accounts. 
Also of interest here is the way that 'knowing' is introduced 
and raised as an issue only to be disclaimed (Hewitt and Stokes 
1975): '1 didn't see it myself but several people have told me 
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about it, . The epistemic warrants for Village complaints indeed 
become increasingly thematised over time and held up to 
scrutiny in a way that will become clear. 
The Parish Council minutes on the other hand point to a growing 
dissatisfaction with the Hospital Is response as indicted by the 
summoning of the Medical Superintendent and the reference to 
the Member of Parliament. However, following the attendance of 
the Superintendent at the next meeting of the Council it 
appears that the situation calmed down again and no further 
reference is made at this time to the MP. 
Some two years later in July 1958 the medical Superintendent 
again attended the Parish Council meeting, along with 'a large 
number of the public', following disquiet expressed about the 
'conduct of patients in the village,. At the same time an 
oblique reference appeared in the minutes to a 'change of 
policy' by the Hospital. Unusually, the public were allowed to 
comment at the meeting and a letter of complaint was read from 
a resident of the Parish. It was later resolved that I ... a 
letter be addressed to Dr, Fitzgerald asking that a permanent 
patrol of the village be established on (sic) order that any 
patient on parole can be instructed to keep away from private 
property. ' 
The Superintendent however refused to oblige the Council and 
after a further exchange of letters made what appears to have 
been a diplomatic initiative in suggesting that I ... in order 
to establish better understanding and confidence', the Parish 
Council visit the Hospital, thus also grasping the 'home' 
advantage. That this initiative appears to have been 
temporarily successful is perhaps indicated by the absence of 
complaint in the minutes over the ensuing three years. 
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A Brief Socio-Economic Excursus 
The apparent emergence of 'Patients-as-Troublel within the 
Village from the beginning of the 1950's coincided with the 
well documented change in policy within psychiatric 
institutions in general at this time. An 'open-door' approach, 
and the recognition of the importance of 'ward atmosphere' 
advocated by the 1953 WHO report, was widely adopted throughout 
the 1950's (K. Jones 1988 p130), a policy which was confirmed 
and promoted by the legislative reform of the 1959 Mental 
Health Act (Rose 1986 p75). The latter was itself preceded by 
the Royal Commission on Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency 
(1954-57) which must have played a part in creating a climate 
of change but at the same time also reflected a growing 
disquiet concerning the extant practices and conditions of such 
institutions. Indeed as Goodwin (1990 p88) shows, new mental 
health legislation had been considered by the Ministry of 
Health in the late 1940's in order to make it even easier for 
more people to receive the benefits of psychiatric treatments, 
but foundered temporarily for want of an administrative 
solution to the problem of overcrowding in such hospitals, 
although the official explanation for shelving the proposed 
Bill in 1952 was 'insufficient parliamentary time'. 
official histories often explain these changes in terms of the 
discovery of the major tranquillizing effects of Chlorpromazine 
in 1953 (Kendell and Zealley 1983) and its introduction in 
Britain under the brand name of 'Largactill in 1954 (Scull 
1977), or else in terms of the critique of psychiatric 
institutionalization (see Pilgrim 1990). 
It certainly appears, as indicated above, that new 
administrative Policies were being introduced in psychiatric 
hospitals before the introduction of Chlorpromazine. And as 
,aa 
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Scull notes, an intellectual climate, critical of the effects 
of institutions, had existed for some time. Barton's work 
'Institutional Neurosis' published in 1959 primarily as a 
handbook for medical staff, draws upon work available much 
earlier on the effects of institutional regimes on individuals, 
such as Bettleheim and Sylvester's work in 194B on 
'psychological institutionalism' although the latter are 
concerned principally with the plight of children (quoted in 
Jones and Fowles 1984). And even as far back as 1871, Williams 
was complaining of the negative effects of such places. 
Maxwell Jones' work 'Social Psychiatry' concerning the 
'therapeutic community' was published in 1952 and stemmed from 
his involvement during the Second World War at an establishment 
for the treatment of war neuroses. Thus, according to Rose 
(1986 p74), an attack was mounted in the 1950's on psychiatric 
institutions under the banner of the therapeutic community". 
However Scull of course is intent on providing an alternative 
explanation which relies heavily upon a model of the fiscal 
crisis of the capitalist state which is said to explain the 
beginnings of the move towards community care (and for a 
critique of Scull see Matthews 1979). In his recent book, 
Goodwin (1990) provides a more sophisticated argument, drawing 
10 In a recent article Prior (1991a) has posed the related argument 
that the move in psychiatry towards community care can best be 
explained In terms of the development of behavioural and socially 
oriented Ideas and discourse within the Institutions of psychiatry 
themselves, especially nursing. Her argument Is Important for 
focusing on the way Internallst (Murphy 1988) dynamics and the 
development of Ideas influence practices, but uncoupled from its 
riders and disclaimers It seems to come close to yet another form 
of reductionism. Criticising economic and technological 
reductionIst explanations she ends up herself with a form of 
Idealism, failing to explain why Inormalisation' and behavioural 
procedures, which In her article bear the burden of explanation, 
were adopted by nursing staff in the first place and why social 
psychiatry Itself came Into being. 
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on work by Offe (e. g. 1984) and Habermas (e. g. 1976), in which 
the post-war development of community care policies in mental 
health can be seen to emerge as the outcome of a grappling by 
the state with a number of often contradictory problems and 
exigencies which include 'cost (efficiency), control 
(effectiveness) and legitimation (acceptability)"'. 
The precise historical course at Shenley, cannot be easily 
determined from the material available locally, but there is 
certainly a likelihood that the complaints documented in the 
Council minutes from 1952 onwards do relate directly to a 
previous loosening of institutional controls or more correctly 
to a shift in the form of institutional controlI2. And while the 
1952 tone of the Superintendent's orders to restrict patients' 
movements appears quite authoritarian, it did occur within a 
growing wider climate of change within and around psychiatric 
establishments which certainly pre-dated the discovery of the 
tranquillizing effects of chlorpromazine. 
In addition, as Goodwin (1990, p84) notes, during the post-war 
period a shortage existed in psychiatric nursing staff in the 
country as a whole and many of the hospitals were becoming both 
overcrowded and 'old fashioned, in that they had large wards 
and were isolated. Shenley in contrast had been built on a 
'villa' model which had been hailed at the time as progressive, 
but may nonetheless have shared the problem of staff shortage, 
and as the Nursing Times (1977) reports, while its patient 
population did not begin to decline until 1957, the 1953 total 
Elsewhere (Southgate 1982c) I have provided an overview of the 
work of Claus Offe In relation to the 'state debate'. 
12 For commentary on changing forms of social control, especially in relation to medicine see for example Ehrenrelch (1978), Lowman 
et al. (1987), Kovel (1981), Roman (1971) and Zola (1975). 
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of 2300 stood very close to its peak13. The relaxation of 
'parole, at Shenley prior to 1952 may therefore have been a 
result of a number of the above factors. 
The Problem Continues 
Over the following nine years from 1961 to 1970 a pattern 
begins to emerge in which an 'incident' is documented in the 
Parish Council minutes, contact is made with the hospital 
authorities, and matters improve until the next 'incident' is 
reported. Most of the entries are conciliatory in tone, with 
the occasional exception. In July 1963 for example there is 
talk of the 'half-hearted attitude of police and hospital 
authorities', while the reference in the December 1963 minutes 
bears recounting in full: 
A letter was received from the Hospital Management 
Committee to the effect that they were "doing all possible 
to keep incidents to a minimum". 
Mr Broadley said that events did not bear out the 
sentiments of the letter. He said there had been a spate 
of incidents recently culminating in a patient breaking 
into a shop at ie-se-pm 9-30 pm (added in ink) on Saturday 
7th December. Miss Boswell said that it had been her shop 
that had been broken into. The method showed that the man 
concerned is mentally unwell, which raised the question 
as to how he was allowed out so late, while in such a 
state. 
13 The villa system' Itself appears to have been developed In the 
early 1870's as one of two alternative forms of workhouse design 
along with the 'pavilion system'. It was also known as the 
'domestic system' because Its basic units were built more in the 
form of houses than large ward blocks (Williams 1981 p118). As 
Williams points out these new designs contrasted strongly with 
the Idea of the Panopticon (Ibld p144). Within the new institutions, 
divisions were maintained by open spaces, lawns and walkways, 
In contrast to the hub and spokes structure of the old workhouse 
design. It is certainly tempting to suggest that the domestic 
model, with many small units separated by physical space, may 
have required significantly more staff simply to monitor and 
police than a centralised model with larger wards. 
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There was very real concern in the village about the, 
seeming laxity, in allowing patients to wander, in and out 
at will. 
It was resolved the item "Shenley Hospital" appear on the 
agenda of the January meeting when the advisability of 
holding a public meeting would be considered. 
By the following meeting the situation was described as 
'greatly improved' after contact with the Chief Male Nurse14. 
The above account is notable for several reasons. The first is 
the continued (reported) cooperative tone of the Hospital 
authorities. The second is the dissatisfaction expressed with 
Hospital 'laxity' in continuing to allow patients unsupervised 
freedom of movement outside the Hospital grounds. Indeed there 
is a sense in many of these accounts in which the 'problem' 
itself appears to be less the Patients per se than the 
Hospital, rather in the manner of complaints about escaping 
industrial effluent, or stray dogs fouling the footpath and 
biting people, where the objection concerns less the effluent 
or the dogs, which after all might (possibly) be fine in the 
right place, but their controllers and keepers. 
But also of interest is the decidedly strange account of the 
break-in. What the entry of the text indicates is how the poor 
condition of the man's mental state (and possibly his identity 
as a patient) is warranted; by virtue of the method used to 
break into the shop. 
One could spend considerable time reviewing the possibilities 
here. What method of entry is it which can possibly indicate 
that the villain (or alleged 'patient' in this case), is 
14 Note also the shift here In reference to Nurse rather than 
Superintendent or Doctor. 
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'mentally unwell', which is not based upon a simple or 
complicated disrespect for property? 
But the principal point here is that grounds are offered at 
all, and that this is the only ground offered for imputing 
, mental disorder'. The disputable nature of this account is 
then echoed in the next paragraph where the hospital's 'laxity' 
is attenuated by the use of the adjective 'seeming'. The 
account, then, identifies itself as controversial. In the terms 
of Habermas (1979,1984) we might say that the truth claim 
raised in the warranting of the person as mentally unwell is 
then used as a platform from which a claim to normative 
rightness might be launched, thus: 'Because he was mentally 
unwel 1 he should not therefore have been allowed out so late I. 
Arguably then such normative arguments rest in this context 
upon more than any simple and enduring assumption of a shared 
reality concerning mental disorder, but upon its continual 
reaffirmation in relation to the status of a person as mentally 
unwell. In other words the reality of mental disorder and 
prescriptions concerning behaviour have to be continually 
reaffirmed and renegotiated. 
Some suggestion of the increasingly problematic nature of the 
relationship between Village and Hospital can be gauged from 
a lengthy article which appeared in 1968 headed 'The Village 
divided by love and prejudice, in a local paper and subtitled 
I ... the Hertfordshire village with the split personality, known 
to some as a picturesque beauty spot and to others as "the 
place where the nuts come from" I (Evening Echo 29th October 
1968). Of particular interest is the way the Parish Council 
reacted to this article which was said to have brought up 
events concerning the relations between the Village and Shenley 
hospital which had occurred two or three years before', 
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reinforcing the sense of the politically delicate and sensitive 
nature of this relationship: 
Council moved a motion which deplored the article which 
in reference to matters which had been settled some time 
ago threatened the good relations between the village and 
Shenley hospita: l. 
From the newspaper article it appears that these 'matters' 
which had been settled were related to an incident, not made 
explicit in earlier Council minutes, which had occurred on the 
local golf-course in which a woman was attacked, but in which 
the attacker turned out not 
, 
to have been a Shenley patient. The 
author of the article refers here to Village 'hysteria'. 
A major moment in the history of this relationship came two 
years later in 1970 following a reported attack on a local 
woman resident by a patient with a hammer an February 18th. The 
man also is said to have set fire to a garage. The following 
extract is taken from an interview with a couple who recalled 
the event: 
DS: You were saying about setting up the hot line? 
Tom: Yeah it came about, some unfortunate guy was admitted 
and um (2) and the laws are unless they're actually 
committed, they can please themselves whether they come 
or go and er, before they got down to any sort of 
treatment with the guy, held um, set off to go on the 
rampage in the, village, and er, it culminated in a fire 
in the er garage that I rented round the village at that 
time, you know. 
DS: A fire in the garage= 
Tom: =Yeah (laugh) held locked himself in and tried to set 
fire to it, oh my goodness. Only superficial damage but 
um. Then this, course held been, held broken in houses 
over here and held been in another house and threatened the woman before held decided to have a look further and 
er 
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Irene: He hit her didn't he, with a hammer 
Tom: 
[I 
believe that's 
right yeah. 
Irene: Hit Mrs *. 
DS: He hit her with a hammer? 
I: Yeah held got a hammer and he hit her, yeah. 
T: So he was obviously unstable because held only just 
been admitted, and, was out within hours, wasn't he, 
apparently he wasn't 
I: 
[That's 
right, yeah, same day. 
T: Yeah, so I think there was a bit of, laxness there 1cos 
I'm sure they could have coerced him, a little bit to have 
sort of stayed and see what it's about, rather than go 
rampaging but - Then then the villagers got rather incensed 
and there was a meeting, public meeting called up the 
village hall. And um, don't know how long ago it must 
have been well a good 20 years ago and er (4) it, it 
seemed wrong that it, ý it needed um the public to really take, some action becaýise it wasn't until we got together 
that the Council decided to, to come in at that stage. 
Anyway it culminated in getting a, a hot line. Well it's 
still in being now. (pi) 
According to newspapers of the time this was the second such 
incident to have occurred within a few months. In December 1969 
another man, resident at Shenley Hospital, was charged with 
, unlawfully and maliciously wounding, a woman in nearby 
Borehamwood. I 
The Parish Council minutes record here the first mention of the 
IShenley Action Committee', the group of villagers set up to 
press for 'action' following the above incident, indicating 
some dissatisfaction with the way the Parish Council were 
conducting affairs on their behalf. The furore was front page 
news in the local press. Under the headlines 'Village in fear 
calls for hospital alarm, the Post reported: 
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Nearly 100 villagers crowded into the village hall on 
Tuesday to a meeting called by a band of determined 
mothers who want the hospital authorities made more 
responsible for keeping dangerous patients under control. 
They were led by Dr L. Payne, a local scientist living in 
London Road. He chaired the meeting and gave an outline 
of the aims of the committee. 
The meeting was a highlight of a week of activity by women 
in Shenley who started their campaign by sending a 
petition to Health Minister Mr Richard Crossman. 
(Borehamwood, Elstree and Barnet Borough Post, 26th Feb 
1970) 
The petition which collected 246 signatures was said to have 
been started by nine women. One was quoted in the article: 
When I was young you didn't see patients in the village. 
We used to go for walks as children. Now you are 
frightened to let children go out. We never had the fear 
we have now. 
Commi ttee members demanded an alarm system. Dr Payne suggested 
that: 
A siren could be sounded as soon as the hospital discovers 
a patient is out, so that children can be put indoors and 
families preparedI5. 
The subsequent meeting between the Parish Council and the 
Hospital Management Committee included two representatives of 
the 'Action Committee'. The Parish Council also resolved to 
keep an 'Incident' record 'of all happenings in the Village 
15 In a letter published In the Post on 2nd April 1970, Driver 
Giddens, of Edgware LTE Garage replied: 'Residents require 
protection from mental patients. What ridiculous allegations. I 
have never known anything so hypo-critical In my life. If 
anybody wants protection It Is the patients themselves. It cannot 
be disputed, and lets be honest about It, that whenever a mental 
patient Is walking outside any of our hospitals, throughout this 
country, he or she Is leered at, scorned, ridiculed, call It what 
you like. And when they fight back it Is not because of their sick 
minds but their self-respect. ' 
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which were attributable to the inmates of Shenley Hospital, 
and that such record be checked with the Hospital records at 
each meeting between the council and the Management Committee. I 
This call for documented evidence constitutes an effort not 
only to determine the extent of the 'problem', but to do it in 
a rigorous, accountable and calculable fashion. In measuring 
the problem the Council and the Villagers assert their (, formal) 
rationality and their epistemological self-consciousness 
(Barham 1984 p63) while at the same time clearly outlining 
their interpretative schema, the boundaries or paradigm within 
which the 'problem' is to be measured as a 'problem' i. e. 
'Patients-as-a-Problem'16. 
In addition, the fact of the resolution documents the 
seriousness with which the Council were taking the matter, a 
seriousness also explicitly shared by the Hospital authorities. 
A further measure of the perceived legitimacy of Village 
protests by the Hospital can be read from the proposals which 
were subsequently pursued by the Hospital Management Committee 
as documented in the Council minutes: 
1. The Village Patrol to be more frequent 
2. The Patrol to be easily recognised by the wearing of 
lapel badges. 
3. A direct telephone line to the Hospital for immediate 
contact in case of emergency. 
4. The use of "walkie talkie" for the use of the 
Hospitals Village Patrol. (sic) 
16 Compare Law's (1986) argument that the securing of control by 
scientists over Ideas and practices rests on attempts to increase 
the mobility and durability of various (scientific) materials. By 
demanding writing (statistics), which Is more durable and mobile 
than talk, the Village Action Committee also gain power which may 
be seen at least in part as an outcome of the creation of the 
register. See also Sibeon (1991 p44-49) and D. E. Smith (1984). 
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Increased availability of transport. 
Later on that year the Hospital wrote to the Council giving the 
ex-directory telephone number, which came to be known as the 
'Hot-Line', 'to be used in emergency'. The Council then 
resolved to send a letter giving the telephone number to every 
house in the village. Almost paradoxically however, the 
instigation of this new system, this technology, eventually 
began to further disrupt the relationship between Hospital and 
Village either by directly constituting a channel around which 
previously extant but often latent conflicts were able to 
crystallize, or alternatively by the direct generation of new 
conflicts. The particular form of this disruption is traced in 
the following pages. 
The Hot-Line 
From 1970 to the late 1980's villagers continued to complain 
about the behaviour of people who were patients. However, 
during this period the nature of the interactions between 
Village and Hospital underwent a subtle (and sometimes not so 
subtle) twist. 
In the initial stage of Hot-Line use the Council minutes note 
the 'impressive' speed of response of the Hospital. One 
Councillor reported that from the time he put in the call to 
the time the patrol arrived was only four minutes. The Hot-Line 
seemed to signal the emergence of a new spirit of cooperation 
and understanding between Council and Hospital as the following 
minutes in April and December 1971 suggest: 
The chairman reported that there had been a very cordial 
meeting between the Council and the Hospital Management 
Committee, there had been no incidents in the village 
since the last meeting, and the hospital was congratulated 
on this. 
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and 
Meeting with SMHC (Shenley Hospital Management Committee) 
had been worthwhile and increased the understanding 
between the two bodies. The clerk read a draft letter 
which it was suggested should be sent to every household 
in the village, giving the special telephone number for 
use in emergencies, and asking for the cooperation of all 
in the village. 
However by September 1973 complaints were being voiced about 
the working of the emergency system and the 'marked coolness 
from officials regarding complaints'. The minute assigns 
potential responsibility for the deterioration in response time 
to the appointment of a new 'Head Male Nurse' who was perhaps 
'not as aware of the importance of these matters as was the 
case with Mr Vickers. It was resolved that an invitation be 
extended to Mr Manners to meet the Council. ' 
But Mr Manners only confirmed the Council Is view when he failed 
to reply to their letter of invitation, and then gave what for 
the Council was a cursory reply to their second letter. 
In November 1973 a letter appeared in the local press 
complaining about the inadequacy of the Hot-Line procedure, and 
by March of the following year a serious breakdown' was noted 
'in the service given by Shenley hospital with difficult 
patients I. A publican is reported to have used the Hot-line but 
'could not be put in touch with anyone who could deal with the 
matter, the result was that a very considerable time elapsed 
before help was obtained and the patients taken away', and in 
July the Council minutes note that one Villager, on using the 
Hot-Line, was told 'to contact the police and not to use the 
line. ' 
Reading the Parish Council minutes it becomes difficult not to 
draw the conclusion that the relationship between the Village 
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and the Hospital was beginning again to 'hot up' but this time 
in a manner which revolved around the 'Hot-Line' which had 
itself become a metaphor for, and an instrument of, both 
redemption and dispute. 
The meeting finally held between Mr Manners and the Parish 
Council was open to the public. Unusually the meeting is 
recorded very fully in the minutes and I have included a copy 
in Appendix C. This document is susceptible of an extensive 
analysis but for the sake of economy and for the purposes of 
the argument proposed here, I shall only dwell an some limited 
aspects. First, I suggest the document provides a flavour of 
the sense of both promise and of disappointment in relation to 
the Hot-Line itself. Examples are provided of the failure of 
the 'device' and a clear connection is made between speed of 
Hospital response and confidence of Villagers. A warning is 
given of the possibility of serious deterioration in the 
relations between Village and Hospital. The tone of the case 
for the prosecution is one of concern for the Village and its 
inhabitants. There is one point when the patients' welfare is 
also proposed to be of concern to the Village, but this is used 
as a disclaimer' which paves the way for further criticism and 
blame, thus: 'Cllr Broadley stressed the fact that in general 
there was a very real desire an the part of the Village to help 
in all practical ways the recovery of those patients who would 
benefit by mixing with the outside world, but it did seem that 
many who were allowed out were in no fit state to be at large, 
and they did nothing in helping relations between the Village 
and the Hospital., 
In a symmetrical move, the Nursing Officer defended the 
practices of both nursing staff and patients, the former on the 
grounds of fallibility and the fully occupied nature of their 
time, and the latter on the grounds that from the patients' 
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point of view, things (i. e. the Village and Villagers) could 
be as strange to patients as patients were to Villagers. Both 
lines of argument are prefaced with similar statements thus; 
I it should be understood that... I and I it should be appreciated 
that... 1, which technically, in speech act terms, appear to be 
hedged forms of regulatives (Habermas 1979,1984). In a less 
diluted form they would read as the requests/commands 'You must 
understand that... I and 'You must appreciate that... 1. Mr 
Manners we might say was diplomatically invoking his power to 
command (cf. Murphy 1988) in respect of how the Villagers ought 
to think and feel. 
The minutes report that Mr Manners then conjoined his defence 
with the Villagers' case in the following manner: 'He made no 
excuses, but assured those present that every consideration was 
given to most of the points raised at the meeting', which 
unfortunately for Mr Manners tends to undermine his case, 
obliquely attributing to it the status of 'excuse'. 
Local anxieties were further increased over the following few 
years by the proposal of plans to establish a new 'Maximum 
Security Unit' at Shenley Hospital. The Parish Council minutes 
indicate that discussions at the Council meetings drew large 
numbers of the public. The meeting in January 1977 which was 
attended by members of the Regional Health Committee in order 
to discuss the proposed unit, records: 
Earnie Broadley said that with five major mental hospitals 
in the area it had enough and to add a security unit would 
be to "overload the patience" of those who live in the 
Village. He went on to talk about how at the moment 
discipline, was a dirty word with those in charge. He said 
this was not a matter for the Council alone, and at the 
last Parish Meeting attende(d) by nearly 100 people it was 
the unanimous opinion of the meeting that every objection 
possible be made regarding the siting of the unit at 
Shenley. 
councillor Murray said he had knowledge of patients from 
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the hospital who were out late, and drinking heavily in 
local pubs, it seemed that the doctors were very slack on 
the security side. 
Such protests may have had some affect and no further moves 
were made at the time to site the Maximum Security Unit at 
Shenley. But in the same ye ar a further issue became prominent 
in the Council minutes for several months, that of 'Patients 
Votes'. This is quite an important issue which has bearing on 
the legal and moral status of people who are in-patientS17. At 
the same time however the Council was also concerned by a 
proposal to demolish an old and dilapidated farmhouse on the 
edge of the Village, which had previously been used as a hostel 
for patients, and build a number of flats which would be used 
to house people who were at the -time patients from Shenley and 
other hospitals. The Parish Council opposed this development 
principally on the grounds of 'encroachment of the green belt'. 
But it is of note that this constitutes one of the few 
occasions when people who were patients themselves contributed 
to the debate, albeit via a representative'. In 1978 a letter 
in support of the development was sent to the Praetorian 
Housing Association, parts of which were published in the local 
press, by the Chairman of Shenley Hospital's 'Patients' 
Representative Group' (PRG). At the same time a hand-painted 
sign appeared outside the old Farmhouse which read, in 
capitals, 'This site is required for Shenley Hospital patients 
so that flats can be built and we can be discharged from 
hospital and become independent'. In January 1978 the M25 
17 At the time, the Council was exercised by the notion that patients 
- at 
the hospital were going to be given the chance to vote in local 
elections. Following changes to the rules of electoral registration In the 1983 Representation of the People Act, Informal psychiatric 
patients were able to make a 'patient's declaration' specifying an 
address outside the hospital for voting purposes. This new 
provision specifically excluded Parish Council elections. 
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appeared in the Council minutes as a further cause for 
opposition. 
Meanwhile the Hot-Line continued to be a focus for concern, and 
by December 1977 the waiting time for a response from the 
Hospital is reported to have increased to one hour. 
The sense of a reality disjuncture makes an official appearance 
in the Parish Council minutes of November 1979, when a reply 
was received from the Hospital to a complaint from the Council 
concerning an alleged attack by a patient in the Village. The 
reply indicated that the matter was 'trivial', while a press 
report of the time quotes a Hospital spokesman as saying 'I 
think 'attack' would be a strong word to use in this case, but 
we are nevertheless treating the matter seriously' (Herts 
Advertiser, 23rd November 1979). The allegedly poor response 
to the 'Hot-Line' was taken up in the subsequent meeting held 
shortly after between Hospital and Council. At this meeting it 
was agreed that the Council should appoint a 'liaison-person', 
to whom all incidents in the village should be quickly 
reported. This was seen as a further possible means 'to be able 
to judge the real extent of incidents., 
What appears to be increasingly at issue here is the 
rationality of the Villagers in their judgements of the 
frequency and seriousness or otherwise of 'incidents' in the 
Village, that is, of the reality of trouble, itself. In a 
fashion which at once confirms the changing nature of the 
'problem' (i. e. as one increasingly concerning disputes over 
reality), demonstrates the competence of the Council's new 
system of reality testing, and attempts to shift responsibility 
for this 'new problem, to the press, the following item which 
appeared in the following month's Council minutes states: 
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Councillor Broadley said that he had had no incidents 
reported regarding Patients from Hospital, there had 
appeared in a local paper a suggestion that the Committee 
dealing with charges for school transport had said that 
there had been incidents between Patients and children in 
the area. This was incorrect, there had been incidents but 
no patients had been involved, he had written to the 
administrator making this point. 
Two months later at the Annual Parish Council meeting, 
representatives from the Hospital answered Villagers questions 
concerning Hospital practices. This extract is taken from a 
press report of the meeting and indicates a significant shift 
by the Hospital. 
One important query was whether villagers should contact 
the police and the hospital or just the hospital, in an 
emergency. They were told that it was best to ring both 
because the hospital staff may be called out to deal with 
a patient from another hospital and that could put them 
in a difficult position. (Herts Advertiser, 14th March 
1980). 
Protests concerning the uncaring 'attitude' of the Hospital 
staff and Hospital security arrangements continued to be made 
over the following years and the Hot-Line drew regular 
attention. However in April 1981 the Hospital administrator 
took the unusual step of complaining to the Council about the 
press report of the Annual Parish Council meeting the previous 
month, in which the Hospital had been criticized for taking too 
long to respond to Hot-Line calls. The Council replied to the 
effect that it served the Hospital right for not having a 
representative at the meeting. 
By 1983 the Hot-Line response time had allegedly increased to 
two hours. The Council's minute was surprisingly mild in tone, 
the clerk being instructed to obtain the comments of' the 
Hospital authorities in this matter. The Hospital also 
responded in a conciliatory manner by suggesting that 'perhaps 
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there had been some misunderstanding on both sides' regarding 
the use of the 'hot line I by a resident when reporting a recent 
incident. 
The peak of the disagreement between Hospital and Village 
concerning the 'reality' of certain states of affairs can 
perhaps be located in 1986 and is indicated in a minute of the 
Parish Council which in July documented the concern of the 
Chief Nursing Officer at Shenley Hospital over the abortive 
telephone calls from landlords of Village public houses in 
connection with the behaviour of 'alleged, hospital patients 
in the licensed premises. The press report, however, although 
short, was more explicit and rude. Under the headline 'Just who 
is mad? ' it stated: 
Nine times out of ten Shenley hospital staff are asked to 
retrieve a patient from the village they discover it is 
only a member of the public. That is the claim of Brent 
Health Authority and, at this week's meeting of Shenley 
Parish Council, Councillor Marion Martin announced that 
callers were being urged by the hospital to check that 
people they believed to be patients really were. Main 
targets of the campaign are to be the vi 1 lage Is publ icans. 
(Herts Advertiser, 18th July 1986). 
The headline captures the irony involved here, for what does 
indeed appear to be at issue (in a fashion which can be 
contrasted to the tone and content of the debate in earlier 
years) is the rationality or sanity of Villagers themselvesI8. 
We confront here the threat of a reversal of the fortunes and 
18 There Is a sense that the press might have waited a long time for 
this opportunity. Compare more recent newspaper articles which 
trade upon the notion that the villagers /village might be crazy: 
'Village barks at dirty dogs' (Herts Ad. 12/5/89); 'They are going 
animal quackers this week In Shenley' (IbId); 'Cage cracks up, 
(Herts Ad. 16/6/89). The attempted humour and Irony depends for Its effect upon the reader sharing a cultural understanding that 
'mad' constitutes a pejorative predicate and that madness Is 
newsworthy. 
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roles of the dramatis pez-sonae of the narrative of Village and 
Hospital. And not only is rationality in dispute, but there is 
a threat of a new evaluative and moral framework in which 
heroines, heroes and villains exchange parts. 
The Villagers however do not take this lying down. In an 
article published three months later in the local press the 
Parish Council is quoted as casting doubt upon the Hospital's 
very own knowledgeability: 
Alleged buck-passing between Shenley Hospital and the 
police over responsibility for wandering patients has 
pushed parish councillors into taking the matter to the 
top. 
Following recent incidents of hospital patients 
"misbehaving", Shenley residents say that a hot-line to 
the hospital is not working. 
So Shenley Parish Council has decided to go to the top and 
is contacting health minister Norman Fowler to establish 
exactly who is responsible for errant patients. 
The parish council was told that one patient had been 
knocking on doors recently equipped with a pair of shears. 
Worried residents had called up the hot-line but the 
hospital would not acknowledge the man as a patient and 
suggested the police should deal with the matter. 
The police then denied responsibility and told people to 
contact the hospital. 
The final straw came neither the police or hospital would 
act after reports that patient had been jumping into the 
path of female cyclists. 
This week parish councillor (sic) said: "These people are 
put in hospital for care and to be looked after. Somebody 
is responsible for these poor, sick people". 
And they wondered if hospital staff were aware of who was 
actually in their care. 
Anne Wilson, hospital general services manager, denied 
that all the incidents involved hospital patients. 
"Some of the difficulties in the village relate to people 
who are not necessarily from Shenley Hospital" she said. 
(Herts Advertiser, 17th October 1986) 
Again this article clearly indicates some of the issues at 
stake in the dispute. There now appears to be something more 
than an 'interpretive asymmetry' in Coulter's (1975) terms, in 
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which some objective state of affairs is acknowledged by agents 
but in which competing interpretations are proposed. It appears 
rather that a full blown reality disjuncture (Pollner 1974, 
1975) has surfaced in which the very existence of the proposed 
state of affairs is in dispute and which is reminiscent of 
similar debates often found within the walls of psychiatric 
institutions themselves19. For the Hospital, arguing one would 
think from a position of some considerable psychiatric 
authority in these matters, it appears that the people who are 
Shenley Hospital patients are not a problem in the Village, 
because those people notified to them to be causing problems 
are not patients, or not patients at Shenley Hospital. For the 
Villagers however, insistent upon their conviction that they 
can indeed 'tell the difference, at least as well as, if not 
better than, the alleged experts, the behaviour of 'patients, 
does constitute a concern. But overarching this concern with 
patients is the meta-problem of rationality, of the question 
concerning whose account of reality, is going to prevail. And 
in the last extract it can be seen that further resources are 
being mobilized in support: -the 'Villagers are 'going to the 
top,. 
But at the same time a further culprit can be identified in the 
above article. The Hot-Line has gone wrong, it is 'not 
working'; it has broken down. I find fascinating the way that 
the Hot-Line is so easily reifiable and referred to as if 'it' 
were indeed an independent something which had somehow 
'broken'; as if it were the wires which had snapped, or the 
electronic bits and pieces which had fizzled and died. 
In contrast to viewing the Hot-Line simply as a mechanical 
thing, I suggest rather that it may be understood more 
19 As MacIntyre (1977 p463) argues, the categories of psychiatry and 
of epistemology must be to some extent interdefinable. 
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appropriately on the one hand as a metaphor for the 
relationship, the link, between Village and Hospital; and on 
the other as embodying in its very make up and ends certain 
values, relationships, and social practiceS20. 
The social practices which are built into the Hot-Line can be 
viewed from several perspectives. On the one hand the Hot-Line 
can be said to embody a drive towards the establishment and 
maintenance of co-operation, co-ordination and mutual 
understanding, the kind of human relationship which is 
encapsulated in Habermasl(1979,1984) notion of communicative 
action and communicative rationality. This is its positive and 
emancipatory-side. However on the other hand the Hot-Line was 
set up in order that the action co-ordinated by it should be 
principally that of systematic control and exclusion. The 
communication in the end turns out not to be the encouragement 
of free and unconstrained debate, (for example about the 
ethical issues involved in certain situations) but rather a 
systematically distorted, or perhaps better, a systematically 
biased, communication oriented to systematic exclusion from the 
Village of Patients who are considered by Villagers to be a 
'problem' (cf. Habermas 1970b). Thus it is that the Hot-Line 
can be seen as embodying contradictory imperatives. 
And at the very least if we examine the Hot-Line we can see 
that as well as the human labour which has gone into the 
construction of its more mechanical parts, it, is human, in 
that in order for 'it, to 'work', 'it' must necessarily depend 
20 There Is a wide literature concerning science and technology as 
the preservation of concrete social practices, from the Marxian 
stream of Lukacs, Marcuse, Slater, Habermas, Horkheimer and 
Adorno, Navarro, Figlio and the Radical Science Journal Collective, 
to some of the recent perspectives In the sociology of scientific 
knowledge such as that of Latour and Woolgar (1979), and Woolgar 
(1991a). 
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upon at least two human beings being in communicative, 
discursive, touch with each other. In this sense the Hot-Line 
entails a working human relationship. 
Thus with the 'breakdown' of the Hot-Line is revealed the 
breakdown of communication, of the relationship, and the 
imputed 'breakdown' of its individual parts, the Village and 
the Hospital. Each accuses the other of not seeing, not 
knowing, not hearing and of being out of touch with reality. 
The epistemological crisis here turns out to be essentially one 
of human relationshipS21. 
In fact, in her reply quoted above (p250), Ann Wilson for the 
Hospital implicitly offers a mediative position, a new and 
, enlarged' narrative in MacIntyrels (1977) terms, which serves 
to play down some of the issues and still allows for the 
possibility of reconciliation. Her statement is ambiguous but 
can be taken to read that in fact perhaps the Villagers may be 
able to tell the dif f erence between people who are patients and 
people who are not, but may have an occasions unbeknowingly 
chosen to report people who are patients at another, a 
different, hospital. 
The records suggest that the Hot-Line expired temporarily. But 
consistent with its ambiguous state and contradictory function 
it was brought to life again the next year. Headed 'Hospital 
hot-line re-opens', the following article details the event: 
Growing concern over the behaviour of hospital patients 
in Shenley has prompted the re-opening of the emergency 
Hotline telephone scheme. 
21 Compare Mr Broadley's reported statement at the open meeting 
reproduced In Appendix C, p480: 'If requests for help were dealt 
with promptly It would go a long w(a)y to restore confidence, but 
when such requests were not answered for long periods 
confidence was broken. ' 
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Businesses in Shenley are to be given the phone number 
which they can call if they have a problem with one of the 
patients. 
Councillor Bill Hogan told parish councillors this week 
that the so-called Hotline was once again in full 
operation and that the hospital would attend any 
incidents. 
Problems with patients have recently become a matter of 
great concern in the village but there was doubt over who 
was actually responsible. The parish council called on 
Secretary of State Norman Fowler to clear up the matter 
and issue was taken up by Shenley's MP Cecil Parkinson. 
The special phone line should, however, only be use in 
connection with patients. (Herts Advertiser 13th February, 
1987) 
Here the reality disjuncture spreads as it were to the Hot-Line 
itself which now has achieved the doubtful ontological status 
of being a "... so-called Hotline ... 11. 
The Hot-Line as Social Closure 
As well as highlighting and accentuating the problematic nature 
of the relationship between Village and Hospital, being the 
vehicle for, and focus of, conflict, the use of such a Hot-Line 
has certain ethical and legal implications which have not so 
far been adequately explored here but which deserve comment. 
The first point is that it is in fact quite unlikely that 
nursing staff on Hot-Line duty would know or be familiar with 
all the patients in the Hospital or their legal status. Thus 
a Hot-Line call to remove a person from the Village may very 
well place the nurse in a difficult legal position. Clearly if 
the person is not a Shenley Hospital patient the nurse has no 
legal right to attempt to compel him or her to go to Shenley 
Hospital. But equally serious is the position of the nurse in 
relation to a person who is an informal patient at Shenley 
Hospital and who has gone to the Vi 1 lage. For again any attempt 
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to compel the person to return against their wishes would 
constitute an assault upon that person22. 
It may appear then that from a legal perspective the Hot-Line 
is disadvantageous to nursing staff and patients alike. If a 
person is residing in the Hospital informally then we might 
expect that he or she has (at least formally) as many freedoms 
and rights as a Villager23. The police however, as some of these 
extracts imply, upon hearing that the person is (putatively) 
a patient at the local psychiatric hospital, are usually only 
too keen for the Hospital to take responsibility for the 
offending body. Witness the following extract from a local 
paper in pre Hot-Line days where a local policeman was reported 
as saying: 
If they were ordinary members of the public, you could 
whip lem in. As it is, when you ring the hospital, they 
never come for them. Even if it gets to court the 
Magistrates seem to take a Utopian view of it. As soon as 
they hear someone's from the hospital, they say: "Oh I 
22 It might be objected here that even Informal patients may 
reasonably be expected by the villagers to abide by the rules of 
the hospital and to return to the hospital when requested to do 
so by staff. And similarly It might be argued that because mental 
hospitals exist then the public has a right to expect patients to 
reside In them. But neither argument ameliorates the vulnerable 
position of nursing staff who must be guided by the legal 
framework and constraints which offer some measure of protection 
to patients from abuse. The second argument underplays the 
controversial aspects of the Issue about where such people really 
should be. On the one hand the existence of large mental hospitals 
does tend to warp, as It were, the surrounding semantic space. 
On the other hand however their existence does not annul the 
potential or ongoing process of controversy about their very 
existence and the rights of their patients. 
23 Should he or she refuse to return to the hospital when requested, 
the hospital authorities have the power either to discharge the 
patient or to consider 'formal' admission. 
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don't think there's much we can do about it - send them 
back" . (Evening Echo 29/10/68)24 
The implication is that this organisational procedure which 
revolves around the Hot-Line constitutes a form of social 
closure and exclusion (Murphy 1988, Neuwirth 1969, Parkin 
1979), that is, a discrimination against people who are 
patients, although this is countered in some of the above texts 
by an appeal by Villagers to the welfare of patients. However 
these appeals themselves have rhetorical implications as I 
shall show in the fol, lowing chapter. 
A pre-eminent, important, and almost too obvious feature of the 
public discourse of trouble which I have begun to portray above 
is the way the world is divided up into two groups of people; 
patients and non-patients (cf. Goldie 1988). Patients in turn 
may be subdivided in a variety of ways which include here 
'ours' and 'someone elsels'. In the discourse described here 
patients are inevitably linked or tied to the Hospital 
conceptually, pragmatically and rhetorically, in a discourse 
and relationship in which the Hospital and Village are dominant 
and patients are overwhelmingly voiceless and silent. 
Conclusion 
In the above pages I have attempted to chart the historical 
development in the relationship between village and hospital. 
This relationship has been demonstrated to be political in that 
the dialogue, debate, or discourse concerning the relationship 
between vi 1 lage and hospital, local practices and patients, has 
revolved around the particular interests of the two principal 
24 See Major (1991) for the recent view of a J. P. who Is also the 
VIce-President of the National Schizophrenia Fellowship. 
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parties, and has excluded to large extent the voice of patients 
themselves. From the historical perspective presented here 
which draws largely upon publicly available material, it 
appears that villagers from time to time have attempted to 
close off opportunities to people who are and were patientS25. 
I' have argued that in the historically changing process of 
negotiation a principal feature of the debate has become the 
issue of rationality itself, not only of the people who were 
patients, but also ironically of the two principal parties in 
the discourse, and I have suggested that the reality 
disjuncture which emerged was connected at least in part to the 
introduction of a specific technology introduced to alleviate 
problems and tensions between village and hospital. 
The dialogue between Village and Hospital which I have depicted 
above may be seen to mirror some of the processes which go on 
daily and contemporaneously between families and psychiatrists. 
In this scenario, where the psychiatrist is called in to sort 
out a problem initially felt to be 'psychiatric' in some sense 
by the family members (Mechanic 1962), the process of 
negotiation of the'nature of the problem may often occur, at 
least in part, without the putative patient being present at 
all, occupying a space of an excluded middle, as in: 'Come into 
the next room doctor so he can't hear us and I can tell you 
what he's been doing. ' 
In the next part of the thesis I shall consider in more detail 
the way that villagers' talk about patients draws upon a range 
of interpretative repertoires in the rhetorical management of 
dilemma. 
25 And of course the practices of such hospitals are also often discriminatory. As Page (1974 p16) puts It: I ... there Is usually a rather clear physical and attitudinal separation between staff and 
patient and It Is not difficult to determine which group has the higher status. ' Edelman (1974) has provided an astute view of the 
political language of the helping professions, and see also Brandon (1987). 
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This chapter provides an overview of the aims, methods and 
theoretical background of the particular form of discourse 
analysis drawn upon in the analysis of interview transcripts 
in chapter-14-below. 
Background 
The model of discourse analysis outlined here has drawn impetus 
from a number of theoretical traditions which include 
ethnomethodology, speech act theory, the philosophy of science, 
the sociology of scientific knowledge, semiotics and rhetoric 
as well as the work of the later Wittgenstein, and is organised 
to contrast with traditional perspectives in social science 
concerned for example with attitude studies (see Potter and 
Wetherell 1987). A core position, now a commonplace, is that 
language has more than a cognitive function, serving to do more 
than simply represent things in the world'. This model is 
presented not as a method as such but rather as an orientation 
to the place of discourse in social life (ibid p175). Indeed 
from this perspective, one analytic effort is to consider how 
But the metaphor of language as tool has been challenged by 
Gadamer (1976, p62) who argues that language cannot be picked 
up and put down again like a tool, but rather is a mode of being 
(cf. Stewart 1986). 
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'things in the world' are lent independent thingness by virtue 
of the language used to describe, debate and discuss them (cf. 
Smith 1978, Woolgar 1988a). In his 1987 paper, for instance, 
Potter provides a clear statement of the influence upon his 
work of literary theory, in particular that of Roland Barthes 
(and cf. Potter, Stringer and Wetherell 1984). In describing 
Barthes position Potter suggests: 
... instead of treating "realism" as a product of acute and literal description, he treats it as a linguistic effect. 
The traditional question of how accurately a text 
describes is therefore replaced by a prior analytic 
question which asks how the organisation of discourse 
within a text achieves the effect of merely describing. 
(1987 p114)' 
As Potter also points out there is a strong parallel here 
between this poststructuralist move from resource to topic in 
relation to the text, and ethnomethodology, a similarity noted 
earlier by Lemert (1979). From the perspective of Michael 
Billig, and notwithstanding Barthes announcement of the 'death 
of rhetoric' (quoted in Billig 1991 pp2,196), we might say 
that what we are engaged in here is rhetorical analysis, to be 
understood as, the analysis of, and the joining with, argument. 
It may be possible to identify continuities between the form 
of discourse analysis presented here and that of Foucault, for 
example the shared view of discourse as a social practice. 
Lemert (1979) for example has drawn parallels between 
ethnomethodology, which has informed discourse analysis, and 
the work of Foucault, Derrida and Levi-Strauss. But at the same 
time there are arguably substantial differences. Foucault's 
notion of discourse is wider and deeper in that he uses 
discourse to refer to both language and other social practices 
(Kramarae et al 1984 p12, Anderson et al 1986 pll4, ). As 
Woolgar (1986 p312) puts it 'Foucault's use of discourse 
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denotes a whole concatenation of activities, events, 
circumstances and objects which together make up a particular 
world-view' . By contrast, Woolgar (ibid p312) observes that 
'Anglo-Saxon empiricism uses 'discourse' as a label for a 
narrow set of empirically observable linguistic activities', 
a position accorded to the work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) 
which is wedded, Woolgar argues, to a realist epistemology. 
Thus Anglo-Saxon empiricism is said to hold to the notion that: 
, objects exist independent of the observer, who strives to 
maximise the validity of observation by minimising his distance 
from the object' (Woolgar 1986 p310). 
The issue of who is and who is not a 'realist' features 
substantially in many of the writings of Potter, Wetherell and 
Woolgar (see especially Potter and Wetherell 1987, Woolgar 
1988a), and is often cast as part of the debate concerning 
social scientific methodology, reflexivity and relativism. 
While Potter and Wetherell (1987) move towards Woolgar's 
constitutive perspective, which holds that reality is 
constituted in and through discourse (Woolgar 1986 p312), they 
do not extend their analysis to the world of objects as Woolgar 
and Foucault do, thus: I ... entities such as objects, machines 
and circumstances can all be treated as texts in that they too 
manifest a-discourse' (Woolgar 1986 p312, and cf. Woolgar 
1991a)2. 
In addition Foucault's excision of the subjeCt3 arguably runs 
2 There may be at least two ways to understand Woolgar's claim: 1) 
that every thing, Is embedded In a matrix of meaning, and 2) to 
view machines for example as M they were texts may be a useful 
analytic or methodological move (cf. Woolgar 1991a). 
See e. g. Foucault's (1980 p117) discussion of genealogy: 'One has 
to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject 
itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account 
for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. ' 
However, Dews (1989) points out that In his late work Foucault 
breaks with his earlier position by Introducing a notion of the 
freedom of self-creation, of autonomous subjects. 
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counter to the social-psychological theory of Potter et al and 
Billig which provides room for an active subject in the process 
of argumentation4. 
The argument that discourse analysis overcomes some of the 
problems of warranting ethnographic interpretations by 
presenting the 'actual data' for inspection, while apparently 
powerful, fails to sufficiently acknowledge that in fact both 
discourse analysis and ethnography are hermeneutic endeavours 
(cf. Atkinson 1988). In chapter 11 below I attempt to tackle 
some of the lacunae of the discourse analytic perspective. 
Nevertheless I also argue that the detailed analysis of texts 
can offer something important and interesting to an 
ethnographic study. At the very least, and regardless of the 
slippery philosophical path here, it is possible and legitimate 
to read and present research material in a number of different 
ways as Richardson (1990 p49, and see Atkinson 1985,1990 p168, 
and Silverman 1985) observes. And so in my analysis of 
interview transcripts and newspaper articles this means that 
while for much of the time I obey the discourse analytic rule 
of staying with the text, on occasion I disengage from this 
mode to enter a discussion about the implications of the 
analysis for the real world, in a manner informed by the 
universal pragmatics of Habermas. 
The Focus of Discourse Analysis 
A principal point of this model of discourse analysis can 
perhaps initially be demonstrated by an example from some 
4 However, at least methodologically, Potter and Wetherell are lanti- 
realist', that Is, they do not take language as a pointer to prior 
events, objects, beliefs, cognitive processes, states of affairs, etc 
(e. g. 1987 p35,157,160), and do not wish to go 'beyond the text' 
(p49,160), although language 'function, Is regularly identified In 
their work with 'purpose' (e. g. p33) and goals (e. g. p137). At the 
same time they say they wish to resist an understanding of any 
particular language usage as necessarily Intentional (p34). 
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preliminary analysis of research material. Compare the 
following interview --extracts. -In example 1 the speaker is 
talking about some of her responses to, beliefs about, and 
experiences of, people who are patients at the psychiatric 
hospital. On the whole this talk is unambiguously negative in 
its evaluation, explanation and generalised description of 
events. People who are patients are unpredictable and can be 
violent. The speaker suggests that she has become cautious 
because of this unpredictability and violent behaviour which 
is presented as a reason for trying to avoid 'them'. 
Examp 1e1 
You try to keep away from them because you don't actually 
know how they're going to respond to anything you may say 
or do to them. 
I think they are unpredictable in their actions and as 
say you do get cautious of them. 
.. there have been several incidents in the road when you have had a patient who has sort of snapped and they have 
got very violent and vicious and we've had to call in the, 
you know, hospital people and the police. 
In example 2 below the picture is quite different. Here the 
speaker proposes a positively evaluated view. In this example 
patients are friendly, sensible and not troublesome. There is 
no sense of danger or unpredictability about the patients who 
'wander' around the village, and indeed there appears to be 
some willingness to begin to get to know 'them' albeit in a 
superficial manner. This speaker's use of an extreme case 
formulation (Pomerantz 1986), 'They're all very friendly 
people', seems calculated to forcefully rebut any suggestion 
to the contrary. As such it contrasts quite strongly with 
example 1. It is possible to imagine speaker 2 engaging in an 
argument or debate with speaker 1 on the issues involved. 
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Example 2 
They're not as people imagine, psychopaths. They're all 
very friendly people. 
There are several patients who come in regularly and you 
start to recognise them but they haven't done anything 
that would worry me at all. They seem very sensible in 
their attitudes and their manner. 
I mean the ones that are wandering around the village 
aren't the ones who are going to cause a lot of trouble 
really. 
Examples 1 and 2 above appear then to contrast sharply with 
each other. But in fact5 both derive from the same interview 
with the same person. How then are we to characterise this 
person? As tolerant and accepting, or as avoiding and 
rejecting? Do we slot her into a don't know' category, or 
dismiss one version as mistaken or invalid in some sense? If 
so, what kind of methodological or epistemic warrant can 
validly be used to achieve this? 
This apparent discrepancy highlights one of the main points of 
discourse analysis which is an acknowledgement of the 
variability of people's talk according to its functional and 
argumentative context. Variability then constitutes a principal 
analytic resource for understanding the functional orientation 
of discourse (Wetherell and Potter 1988 p171). The suggestion 
here is that previous studies which are attitude or vignette- 
based may not be able to capture the context-related complexity 
of how people think, talk and otherwise behave in relation to 
people who are or have been patients. In the terms of Michael 
Billig (1987,1989,1991) it is possible to see talk and 
thinking processes as dialogically, argumentatively or 
rhetorically organised, so that even people whom we see as 
5 This form of presentation Is used by Wetherell and Potter (1988). 
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holding strong views may modify, their views in some manner 
according to the place or context of their expression, and in 
relation to their opponent's argumentative stance. Indeed for 
Billig and others (e. g. Schiffrin 1984, Knoblauch 1991) it is 
disagreement rather than agreement which is often a preferred 
activity in discourse (cf. Jackson and Jacobs 1981). Where 
Potter and Wetherell speak of 'variability' and 'repertoires', 
Billig writes of 'dilemmas', thus 'The dilemmatic nature of 
ordinary thought might be said to reveal that people possess 
contrary repertoires - for talking about their social lives 
(Potter and Wetherell, 1987). 1 (Billig et al 1988, p143). 
This view of language use and its related notion of functional, 
argumentative and context variability has considerable 
implications for the way interviews are or should be conducted. 
For rather than trying to pin our respondents down to one 
consistent response or belief expression, we should be 
attempting to generate the conditions under which the kind of 
variability which it is possible for the person to exhibit is 
allowed to emerge. This is the approach advocated by Gilbert 
and Mulkay (1983,1984), Potter and Mulkay (1985) and Potter 
and Wetherell (1987). And consistent with his rhetorically 
informed position, Michael Billig (1987) suggests that 
interviews should be carried out argumentative ly. That is, once 
we see 'views' as rhetorically and dialogically organised then 
it is beholden upon us, if we want to witness the range of 
views, to encourage the argumentative context out of which they 
can emerge. Potter and Mulkay (1985 p269) for example suggest 
'Once the analyst has come to use the interview as a way of 
exploring participants' variable interpretative practices, 
there is every reason for her to engage actively in the 
interview so as to extend the range of interpretative work 
carried out there. ' From this perspective, interviews which 
contain an internally consistent set of responses are seen as 
relatively uninformative. 
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This position also has the effect of making quite clear what 
is now a commonplace, that all interviews are inherently joint 
creations (see Mishler 1986 for a good account of interviewing 
as dialogic construction). once seriously acknowledged this 
also has implications for the presentation of research 
material, which as far as possible should show the part played 
by the interviewer. 
In addition to the functional variability of accounts and an 
emphasis upon the constructive use of language, Potter and 
Wetherell follow Gilbert and Mulkay in adopting the analytic 
tool of the 'interpretative repertoire'. The building blocks 
of accounts, ýrepertoires may be defined as registers of terms, 
descriptions and commonplaces drawn upon to characterize and 
evaluate actions, events and other phenomena. They often 
utilize distinct grammatical structures and styles, and may 
often be signalled by certain rhetorical tropes (Potter and 
Reicher 1987, Potter and Wetherell 1987,1990, Wetherell and 
Potter 1988, Yearley 1985)6. An end point of discourse analysis 
can be seen as the identification of such repertoires together 
with their management devices, and an examination of the 
discursive functions which the differential use of repertoires 
serves to perform. The overriding concern here is often to do 
with how respondents I practical reasoning may serve to maintain 
asymmetrical power relations within society (Wetherell and 
Potter 1988 p173), and defend existing social institutions 
against criticism (Wetherell and Potter 1989 p218). The view 
provided here is not unduly voluntaristic, for as well as being 
used by actors, discourse is seen as constraining and enabling 
6 This Is quite a wide -definition of interpretative repertoire which Is not entirely dissimilar to the notion of discourse register as 
used by Fraser (1988). Compare also discourse theme (Agar and 
Hobbs 1982, Agar 1979), and dilemmatic theme (Billig et al 1988). 
Brewer's (1990) use of discourse vocabulary' is also similar to 
Interpretative repertoire. 
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action. Indeed the relationship between actor and repertoire 
is quite close to that of action and structure in Giddens, 
(e. g. 1984) sense, where structures, i. e. rules and resources, 
are seen as instantiated in action. As Potter, Wetherell, Gill 
and Edwards (1990 p213) put it 'Put simply, discourse analysis 
studies how people use discourse and how discourse uses 
people'. 
Nevertheless one criticism which might be levelled at the 
approach presented here from the view of social and political 
theory concerns the apparent lack of any analysis of power, 
ideology, and social structure. The work of Billig et al 
(1988), which is concerned to detail the way that 'the 
dilemmatic ideology of the Enlightenment' still influences 
people's discourses and lives, goes some way towards remedying 
this, although the meaning of ideology is not addressed from 
the position of the critique of political economy. 
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In the preceding chapter I presented a brief 'official' version 
of discourse analysis; what it is and what the analyst does. 
In this chapter I want to look in a little more detail at the 
specifications of a discourse analysis as outlined above, and 
in particular the three central features with which analysis 
is concerned: 'variability', 'interpretative repertoires', and 
, function' The following comments have derived from my efforts 
to do discourse analysis and so the clarification of these 
issues has constituted a practical problem which I have had to 
tackle. The following may be termed an immanent critique of 
discourse analysis, in the spirit of a constructive and 
reflexive criticism (Atkinson 1990, Steier 1991, Woolgar 1988b, 
Thompson 1990). There are, I suggest, a number of lacunae in 
the work of Potter, Wetherell (and Reicher), which I attempt 
to clarify here, with the aim of reformulating the discourse 
analytic project. 
Variability 
The suggestion here is that researchers should be alive to 
differences and dissonances (cf. Ward and Werner 1984) in their 
research material. For Potter and Wetherell such variability 
is, it seems, a self-evident affair. As in my own example 
provided above, 'variability, is offered up to the reader as 
in need of no further support beyond that of the evidence 
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provided in the text itself. Further, the suggestion is made 
that variability indicates that different things are being done 
in different contexts. 
In their 1988 paper Wetherell and Potter suggest: 
... our point is that variation 
has a crucial analytic 
role. As variation is a consequence of function it can be 
used as an analytic clue to what function is being 
performed in a particular stretch of discourse. That is, 
by identifying variation, which is a comparatively 
straightforward analytic task, we can work towards an 
understanding of function. We can predict that certain 
kinds of function will lead to certain kinds of variation 
and we can look for those variations ... (p171) 
And in their 1987 work the authors clearly see the 
identification of variability as a first phase analytic task, 
and the identification of function coming later on (p 168). It 
appears that although the authors see variation (variability) 
as pragmatically linked to function, for the purposes of 
analysis variation is lent a certain analytic privilege in that 
it is to be identified prior to function. Again, for the 
purposes of doing analysis there are I think two issues here. 
The first concerns the general problem of determining meaning. 
The second concerns the analyst's differentiation between 
different types of difference. 
The authors seem to propose here that variation or difference 
is readily identifiable 'in itself' and analytically separate 
from its functional correlate. They therefore play down the way 
difference comes into analytic being by virtue of the analyst's 
selection and argument. This may be surprising in view of their 
antipathy to 'realism,., their social constructionist 
orientationj and their criticism of the way others 
illegitimately select or ignore 'data'. 
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While 'good' and 'bad', for example, may be easily read as 
lexical items with opposing meanings (although a certain usage 
may yet bring their meanings into line), it is less clear where 
the analyst stands in relation to more complex 'distinctions' 
such as 'good' and 'not bad' in terms of a) whether this is an 
example of variation, and b) if it is, whether it is a 
significant variation. of course to give them the benefit of 
the doubt the authors may simply assume that everyone 
understands that there is no available algorithm for the 
identification of meaning and difference. 
Clearly the analyst plays a central role here. And in their 
1987 work Potter and Wetherell do suggest that the analyst 
should be constantly asking 'why am I reading this passage in 
this way? What features produce this reading? ' (p 168). But 
pace Potter et al, a central point is that while variability 
might signifyý function, a preliminary anticipation, 
determination or reading of a specific function by the analyst 
may be involved as a prior or simultaneous step in determining 
and identifying variability and difference. 
on the other hand it is no doubt prudent to resist any 
suggestion that meaning might be reducible to function because 
such a reduction would render any search for discrete semantic 
variability, redundant. Yet such resistance also has a logical 
correlate and indeed it is clear that figurative language 
itself depends upon a distinction between literal and 
metaphorical meaning, as Culler (1981 p4l) for example points 
out'. 
In other words the notion of 'literal meaning, Is something we 
Implicitly rely upon In our everyday use of language, even though 
the meaning of each word can vary according to Its use. And see 
Searle (1979) who argues against the Idea of literal meaning as 
Implying a zero or null context; also Richards (1936/1971). 
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The issue here is an old one concerning the indeterminacy or 
otherwise of meaning. There appears to be a dichotomy between 
a semantics which promotes literal and independent meaning, and 
a pragmatics which emphasises its contextual dependency. 
Although separate, each however can be seen to depend upon and 
point towards the other, and it is arguably out of this 
process, this dialectical movement, that understanding comes 
(if it does). 
If we allow for--a-dialogic--(Gadamer) or argumentative (Billig 
1991 p31-56) theory of meaning, then the analytic task of 
discourse analysis is perhaps more accurately described as a 
dialectical or hermeneutic, rather than linear, process. The 
authors come close to this view when they note that 'We can 
predict that certain kinds of function will lead to certain 
kinds of variation and we can look for those variations ... I 
(Wetherell and Potter 1988 p171), although the emphasis still 
remains in their work upon identifying difference in the text 
before hypothesising function, in the practical business of 
analysis. Arguably then their linear analytic movement captures 
only one part of a larger process in which the analytic 
priority they give to variability collapses. 
The problem of understanding the meaning of abstracted parts 
of discourse may be less of an issue in face to face 
interaction in which meaning, while still dialogic and 
discovered anew, in the terms of Gadamer, may yet be hammered 
out to some mutual agreement and understanding. Schegloff 
(1984) has discussed this issue of meaning in terms of the 
loverhearer's problem' and ambiguity: 
It is because actual participants in actual conversations 
do not encounter utterances as isolated sentences, and 
because they do not encounter them in a range of 
scenarios, but in actual detailed single scenarios 
embedded in fine grained context,... that most 
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theoretically and heuristically depictable ambiguities do 
not ever arise. (p5l) 
Although a central theme of discourse analysis is that 
interpretations of differences and functions can be displayed 
in the final text so that readers can decide for themselves 
upon their validity (Potter 1988), the analyst's task is 
different to that of the 'final' reader, for as well as 
identifying variability, he or she must, as I have noted, also 
decide which textual differences make a difference - which to 
leave out and which to include in the final document. If the 
analyst's selection is likely to be linked to his or her 
theoretical and other interests, in other words with what the 
analyst-reader brings to the text, as for example hermeneutic 
, reception theory' in literary criticism suggests (Eagleton 
1983 p74-90, Polkinghorne 1988 p96-99), then some form of 
analyst's (reflexive) autobiography should perhaps also be 
included in the text (cf. Sdderqvist 1991)2. 
Interpretative Repertoires: Warrants 
once we have Justified 'seeing' variability, then it seems 
reasonable enough to attempt to impute pattern to it. In 
relation to ethnography for instance, Ward and Werner (1984) 
talk of the identification of difference and dissonance as 
opening I epistemological windows I leading to a more fundamental 
level of analysis in which discrepancies become resolved. 
It is arguably the case that the imputation of pattern via the 
identification of repertoires shares the problems identified 
in 'Variability' above, but this time in terms of seeing or 
warranting pattern at a meta-level, instead of imputing 
variability at the first level. 
21 have attempted In Part One to give a brief account of my own 
interests and background. 
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How is it then that the textual material can be warrantably 
differentiated into discrete repertoires? For example at 
precisely what point does one cut into the text with the 
analytic scalpel? How often does a pattern of words, tropes, 
etc have to be seen in use in order for it to be adjudged a 
repertoire? Can one continue to break down a repertoire into 
sub-repertoires and at what point should one stop? These kinds 
of questions must be addressed in the process of identification 
of variability, repertoire and function. 
Because at the time of writing there is no detailed and lengthy 
elaboration of a research project available which shows how 
these questions are answered, my discussions below must have 
recourse to arguments presented in short paperS3. 
In their 1988 paper Wetherell and Potter offer three prime 
warrants for the definitions of the examples of repertoires 
furnished in their text (p178): 
What grounds have we for defining three different 
interpretative repertoires (here)? In this analysis we 
used three central kinds of evidence for this. Firstly, 
as we will show, there are inconsistencies - noticeable 
to both analysts and participants - between the different 
forms of account. Secondly, these forms of account are 
generally separated into different passages of talk so 
that inconsistencies do not become a problem for 
participants to deal with. Thirdly, on these occasions 
when the different repertoires are deployed together, 
participants display in their talk an orientation to the 
potential inconsistencies, or the variation is organised 
for different functions - one repertoire presented for 
disclaiming, for example. 
The warrants presented here can be read as ex post facto 
supports. First they suggest there are inconsistencies 
3 Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) study of scientists' Interpretative 
repertoires also fails to address these issues fully. 
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(variability) between the different forms of account which are 
noticeable to both analysts and participants. However they fail 
to note the extent to which this occurred, or what their 
position might be if this does not occur. That is, if the 
inconsistencies are only noticed by the researcher, then to 
what extent should they still count as valid pointers to 
repertoires? 
Secondly, they suggest that different forms of account (i. e. 
repertoires) 'are generally separated into different passages 
of talk so that inconsistencies do not become a problem for 
participants to deal with. I But uncharitably one might say that 
if inconsistencies are not a problem for respondents to deal 
with because they are kept separate, then how Is it that we can 
say respondents 'notice' inconsistencies? If 'notice' means the 
use of a meta-comment then this would only serve to draw 
attentioý, to an inconsistency as a problem. The analysts' 
ability to locate competing accounts in different parts of the 
text does not in itself mean that such variability has been 
noticed by respondents. 
Finally Wetherell and Potter tell us that when 'different 
repertoires are deployed together, participants display in 
their talk an orientation to the potential inconsistencies, or 
the variation is organised for different functions - one 
repertoire presented for disclaiming, for example' (ibid). This 
warrant, however, like the two above, presupposes the prior 
identification of repertoires. However it is possible to read 
it in two ways. First, that disclaimers (and other reflexive 
displays) can be used in a deductive fashion as a test of the 
validity of previously identified repertoires. In other words, 
that once identified, the validity of repertoires may be judged 
by the way they are 'managed' . Or second, that repertoires may 
be identified via, amongst other things, the prior 
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identification of the rhetorical trope, prolepsis, which is 
what the authors suggest elsewhere (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 
Wetherell and Potter 1988 p172). However if the latter is the 
case then it may seem unreasonable to use the same prolepsis 
as a test for validity. In other words there is a potential 
contradiction between these two readings, which both appear to 
be advocated by the authors (but which are kept separate in 
different parts of their texts! ). 
These proposed warrants only rather weakly answer the question 
of how it is that one set of 'terms, descriptions and 
commonplaces' may be initially preferred by the analyst to 
another, in order to resolve the 'problem' of variability. As 
I suggest below I think this is inevitably a complex 
hermeneutic process involving function, repertoire and 
variability. 
And indeed Patter and Wetherell do talk about the long and 
complicated procedure of following hunches and testing out 
ideas. For example in their 1987 work, while they begin by 
arguing that coding, which functions to 'squeeze an unwieldy 
body of discourse into manageable chunks' (pl67), is 'quite 
distinct from doing analysis itself', a few lines later they 
acknowledge that on occasion the process may be 'a cyclical 
one, moving between analysis and coding' (ibid). 
Interpretative Repertoires: Two Approaches 
The analysis of problems concerning interpretative repertoires 
may be extended by the comparison of two papers. In Potter and 
Reicher (1987) and Wetherell and Potter (1988) we find what 
appear to be arguably- two different approaches to the 
definition and naming of interpretative repertoires. 
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In the 1987 paper Potter and Reicher set out to examine the 
range, features (p27), facets (p27) and themes (p27) of what 
is called the 'community, repertoire, in the context of the 
aftermath of the 'St Paul's riot', with a particular focus upon 
the way conflict is represented in talk and text. This 
repertoire is given its name by a process of analytic fiat 
which appears to have taken place before the analysis. In this 
case 'The entire body of transcript and copies of newspaper 
articles were read and all instances of the terms community, 
communities and communal were noted' (p27). In other words the 
authors set out to provide empirical support for their idea 
that there is such a thing as a 'community repertoire' 
organised around the lexical items 'community, communities and 
communal' which is used differentially in different 
argumentative contexts. Note here that there is said to be only 
one repertoire defined as a range of terms, tropes, etc, from 
which people 'selectively deploy' (p38) parts, thus: 
Overall, then, two opposing ways of representing and 
evaluating the role of the police and the nature of 
conflict have been described. In each case, the same 
linguistic repertoire is drawn upon - that of community. 
But the repertoire is deployed in such a manner that the 
evaluative implications are markedly different. That is, 
different selections are made from the various lexical 
items and tropes in the repertoire to formulate actions 
and events in contrasting ways. It is important to 
emphasise again that the repertoire is a set of available 
resources - we are not suggesting that the entire 
repertoire will be somehow present in every use of 
'community'. (p37) 
In this analysis the notion of 'communityl is demonstrated to 
be generally positively evaluated - as demonstrated by a list 
of sample predicates - but its differential thematic and 
grammatical usage is shown to have variable consequences. 
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In the 1988 paper on the other hand, the identification and 
labelling of the repertoires, also concerned with racial 
discrimination but in the context of New Zealand culture, is 
portrayed as taking place after or during the analysis. Here 
coding does not alight simply upon references to 'Maori', in 
the pursuit of the range of the 'Maori repertoire but instead 
upon discourse topics, thus: 
The first goal in a study of this kind is to perform some 
preliminary coding and thus sift out a manageable subset 
of data from hundreds of pages of transcript. We selected 
out from the interviews all passages of talk relating to 
our topic of models of 'race' relations. This included all 
material relating to the respective places of Maori and 
European culture in New Zealand - issues such as 
integration versus separate development or assimilation, 
the teaching of Maori language, reactions to attempts at 
a renaissance in Maori culture and so on. (p177) 
The analysis in this short paper yields an identification of 
three 'dominant repertoires', which the authors, following 
their analysis, labelled 'culture fostering', 'pragmatic 
realism' and 'togetherness'. 
Now it is arguably the case that although the repertoires 
identified above in the 1987 and 1988 papers were arrived at 
in a different manner via different coding methods and with 
arguably different labelling techniques, they do in fact share 
something in common. This commonality is given by the 
definition of the repertoire as a limited number of lexical 
items I which make up a set. The items in the set of each 
repertoire can be seen to have a family resemblance (Bloor 
1983, Sacks 1974) according to their conventional social use. 
Thus, in relation to the 'community' repertoire, as noted 
above, community is defined and used in different ways by 
different people but is given, in its use, an overwhelmingly 
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positive evaluation. The predicates 'friendly', 'warm', 
'happy', 'harmonious', are all seen as being part of the same 
family of 'positive connotation'. 'Community' is by all 
accounts a good thing. 'Culture fostering' for example, in the 
later paper, while having different 'facets', has a consistent 
theme of 'advocating multicultural ist social policy and the 
importance of Maori culture for New Zealand society' (1988 
p178). In other words there is an overarching sense of 
coherence to an interpretative repertoire as described above. 
But where then we may ask, is variability in the 'community' 
study? 
In the 'community' study, variability is located in the way 
'community, is related to different 'facets' and 'themes' (p27- 
28), such as the theme of the temporal existence of community. 
Varying the temporal accent then changes the impact of the use 
of the community repertoire. In addition, variability is 
located in differences in syntax as for example in their 
identification of the putative nominalization 'community 
relations' (p32), whereby a description of action is turned 
into noun form thereby obscuring agency (see also Wetherell and 
Potter 1989 as well as Kress and Hodge 1979, Seidel 1985, 
Thompson 1984, Fairclough 1989). 
In the 1988 paper on the other hand variability is depicted as 
occurring in, is located in, the usage of different repertoires 
themselves, and their Juxtapositions and combinations. Indeed 
in this later paper the repertoires are conceived of as 
'constituted out of a restricted range of terms used in 
specific stylistic and grammatical fashion'. on this definition 
the use of a nominalization around the word community, such as 
'community relations' in the 19B7 work (p32), should have 
constituted a separate repertoire. 
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This brief examination of coding, analysis and naming of 
repertoires suggests that methodologically this process is, to 
a degree at least, an open one, and one that is perhaps still 
in the process of being clearly articulated. Probably the most 
extensive account of the method of analysis is to be found in 
Potter and Wetherell (1987). Here coding is depicted as being 
'quite distinct from' the analysis itself. The point of coding 
as in the 1988 paper is to 'squeeze an unwieldy body of 
discourse into manageable chunks' (1987 p167). However while 
the authors suggest that on occasions coding might be 
straightforward, as in the Potter and Reicher study, they do 
allow that at other times 'the phenomenon of interest may not 
become clear until some analysis has taken place and a number 
of attempts at theoretical interpretation of the data. In these 
cases, as noted above, the process will be a cyclical one of 
moving between analysis and coding' and the authors give the 
New Zealand study as such an example (p167). 
In relation to my own study, the anticipation of potential 
repertoires has derived from a number of different stages in 
the research. It must be remembered that a participant- 
observation study took place over a long period of time; that 
I had interviewed respondents and corrected transcripts and so 
on. Ideas were being formulated at quite an early stage and 
have been honed down or elaborated over time, and in the 
preparation of discussion papers and presentations. However in 
apparent contrast to the account of the 'community repertoire' 
by Potter and Reicher, the full range of potential repertoires 
was not readily apparent to me before beginning the research 
project. 
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Interpretative Repertoires: Status 
A further potential problem with interpretative repertoires 
concerns the relationship between their analytic and 
ontological status. According to Potter and Wetherell (1987) 
the interpretative repertoire is seen as an analytic tool, a 
'summary unit' (Wetherell and Potter 1988 p172) which is useful 
principally in lending form to, or conceptually organising, the 
apparent variability of accounts. This analytic device then in 
turn facilitates the hypothesising of different discursive 
functions. So far so good. This elucidation of function 'is one 
of the endpoints of discourse analysis' (ibid pl. 70). 
Yet at the same time interpretative repertoires are 
characterised as having some kind of real existence which 
appears to be independent of their analytic function. In other 
words Potter and Wetherell portray interpretative repertoires 
as having quasi-independence, as being existentially available 
in some fashion for people to draw upon. Witness their use of 
the metaphor of 'building blocks' in describing repertoires 
(Wetherell and Potter 1988 p172). 
In their 1987 paper Potter and Reicher talk of the (community) 
repertoire as a 'pre-existing interpretative resource', and 
'The concept of repertoire is an initial attempt at 
characterising certain pre-existing arganisations of discourse I 
(p3B). It appears to be in this sense that a further end-point 
of the analysis is justified: the identification of the range 
of interpretative repertoires available for use. The problem 
then is that if such repertoires constitute an analytic tool 
on the way to the explication and elucidation of discourse 
function, it may be difficult to see how they can also 
constitute an end-product, a result, of the analysis. 
oTheoretical and Practical Problems 280 
This has implications for the organisation of this research 
document as well as the internal coherence of the methodology, 
for if repertoires are an end-product then they might best be 
positioned at the end of the research text, in the way that 
results might come after analysis. However if they constitute 
an analytic tool, then one would expect interpretative 
repertoires to appear towards the middle but before the 
explication of function. 
This problem may be tackled in a similar manner to that of 
'variability' discussed above. As noted above it is clearly 
possible to 'find' all kinds of sets or registers of terms, 
descriptions and commonplaces, according to the researcher's 
interests at the time. The text can inevitably be parcelled up 
in a host of ways4- Now it seems quite likely that while the 
identification of function may be based on the researcher's use 
of the analytic tool of interpretative repertoire, the 
identification of the latter may depend in turn upon some prior 
or simultaneous understanding of the functioning of particular 
parts of the text. As Culler (1985 p293) comments in his 
critique of Habermas, 'to understand sentences is to understand 
how they might function in purposive activity'. 
And it is in this way that the above 'problem, might be solved, 
for methodologically it is arguably the case that the 
, identification' in the text of variability, repertoires and 
functions all proceed apace in a way in which all are mutually 
informing. Where the analyst may be struck for example on one 
occasion by a contrast or seeming contradiction, out of which 
one may designate repertoires and functions, another tract of 
text may promote the initial sense that something of interest 
is being done discursively (i. e. that the text is functioning 
Yet, following Eco (1992) for example, one may argue that there 
are 11mits to the Interpretation of texts. 
wTheoretical and Practical Problems 281 
in an interesting fashion), which may in turn lead to the 
elaboration of repertoires, and so forth (cf. Potter and 
Wetherell 1987 p167). 
Methodologically therefore the process of discourse analysis 
can best be seen as an hermeneutic process, as I have argued 
above. Existentially, the repertoires may be seen as 
instantiated in discourse, so that their 'existence' is 
'virtual, and not independent of the practices which draw upon 
them. This is of course similar to Giddens (e. g. 1984) notion 
of Istructuration'. 
To repeat the main point here, at the end of the day the 
endpoint of discourse analysis becomes the elaboration of both 
repertoire and function, with variability' taking a backseat 
as an analytic conceptual tool. Interpretative repertoires are 
then both an end-point of analysis as well as an analytic tool. 
However, alternative analytic schemes are not excluded as 
Potter points out. For example one may be more interested in 
exploring the kinds and range of discursive methods used to 
generate a factual account (cf. D. E. Smith 1978, Potter, 
Wetherell, Gill and Edwards 1990), rather than specifying 
repertoires. 
Function 
I have already touched above upon some of the problems with the 
authors' use of 'function', but a central issue remains; their 
general lack of clarity concerning the kinds of function that 
might be referred to. 
Clearly there are many ways of using the term function'. How 
it is defined, as Mishler (1986 p108) argues, may reflect 
assumptions about relations between language and meaning. 
uTheoretical and Practical Problems 282 
Within the domain of linguistic theory, function' has a long 
history,. as Halliday (1978 /1979 p47) points out. Writing from 
a position of interest in the social use of language, Halliday 
proposes a model of three major generalised functions5, and the 
meaning of language is defined in terms of function. At the 
same time Halliday makes a distinction between function and 
use, with the latter understood in an informal multiplicitous 
everyday manner, and the former in terms of a discrete and well 
defined system (1978 p46,187 and cf. Georges 1969 p319,327). 
In other words we can regard 'function' in terms of local, 
variable and multiple use, or attempt a kind of meta-functional 
classification. 
In his model of communication, Jacobson (1960) described six 
functions that messages can perform: the referential, the 
emotive, the conative (to move to action), the phatic (to 
express sociability), the metalingual, and the poetic (the 
message as center of attention). For Jacobson the meaning of 
a transaction between sender and receiver resides in the total 
act of communication and not solely in the message itself 
(Polkinghorne 1988 p34). 
And from speech act theory it is possible to see language 
functioning in terms of constatives, regulatives, expressives 
and so on (Austin 1962/1989, Searle 1975a), while in 
Habermas'(1979) universal pragmatic terms, functions can in a 
very general sense be said to relate to three different worlds 
in the raising of validity claims of normative rightness, 
sincerity and truth. In his Theory of Communicative Action, 
5 The Ideational (comprising the experiential and logical), the 
Interpersonal (language as action), and the textual (language as 
a texture, In relation to the environment) (1978/9 p187). According 
to Mishler (1986 p77) the latter function refers to 'how parts of 
the text are Internally connected through various syntactic and 
semantic devices., 
oTheoretical and Practical Problems 283 
Habermas refers to the three general functions of language in 
terms of mutual understanding, social integration and the 
coordination of action, and socialization (1987a p137), which 
coincide with his understanding of the structures of the 
lifeworld6. 
In their 1988 paper, Wetherell and Potter appear to use the 
lexical items function', 'use', 'effect', 'purpose, and 
'consequence' interchangeably, thus: 
Talk ... can be analysed in terms of discursive 
functions 
and effects ... (p170) 
Essentially, discourse analysis involves developing 
hypotheses about the purposes and consequences of -language 
(p170) 
(In discourse analysis) the search for regular pattern 
(gives) way to the formation of hypotheses about that 
pattern of repertoire use (p177-8) 
In effect however they appear to looking for functions which 
'go beyond' (p170) the meaning immediately given by the text, 
thus: 
As we have seen, discourse does not usually come ready 
labelled with the functions neatly displayed on show, so 
that one kind of form is always an accusation, or always 
marks out a rationalisation, or always suggests 
consequences which we could describe as ideological in 
their effect. 
Notwithstanding the important point that all discourse, spoken 
or textual, cannot fail, as Ricoeu3ý (1981 p201) says, to be 
about something (apart from the few sophisticated texts 'where 
the play of signifiers breaks away from the signified' ibid), 
6 For commentary upon the relation between the structures of the 
lifeworld and Habermas, three world concepts, see p138 above, 
note 6. 
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it seems fairly clear here that in spite of their bid to stay 
with the words on the page, Wetherell and Potter also enjoin 
us to deviate from this path in the definition of function. 
In their 1988 analysis of putative functions of the repertoires 
outlined above, Wetherell and Potter are clearly inclined 
towards a speculative assessment of the implications of 
differential repertoire use for the maintenance of relations 
of domination, that is, the structured relational inequalities 
of power between Maori and European people. I suggest that as 
it stands this approach is incomplete. The reason is that in 
order to present the repertoire use in this fashion the authors 
must make use of a prior (or simultaneous) understanding of the 
particular relations of power at issue. In other words because 
they already know that discrimination occurs, they can 
therefore hypothesise about function in the way they do. 
Alternatively, in the absence of a prior understanding the 
authors might be said to be building an argument de novo, but 
this may lack persuasion. 
As I have shown, the authors do note that the kind of functions 
they are interested in do not come complete with labels 
identifying them as such (1988 p170). Discrimination/domination 
in the form of perlocutionary action, or concealed strategic 
action in Habermas' (1979,1984) terms, cannot easily be read 
off from the text in any simple fashion. And even for open 
strategic action (eg 'A woman's place is at the sink'; or in 
the context of this project 'A patient's place is in the 
hospital') to be understood as discriminatory, one already has 
to have some awareness of discrimination/domination as an 
issue; there must arguably already be at least the possibility 
of a meta-discourse concerning domination. And of course in 
addition the identification of discourse function in no way 
explains why kinds of talk occur in the way they do. 
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This absence of any critical socio-historical analysis of 
structures of domination in their work (although to be sure 
there is scarce room for this in short papers) therefore 
arguably detracts from their analyses by leaving their 
interpretations of function ungrounded (cf. Thompson 1984, 
1987,1990). 
In this research project I have attempted to integrate a 
discourse analytic perspective with an historical analysis and 
a participant-observation study which is framed by the 
theoretical orientation of time-geography7. In the analysis of 
discourse I have used the term 'function' in a similar wide- 
ranging way to that of Potter and Wetherell, but have also 
drawn upon the work of Habermas (1979,1984) and Billig et al 
(1988) in attempting to understand the social meaning of the 
use (function) of interpretative repertoires. By locating the 
analysis of function within a formal pragmatic framework I have 
configured talk as thematising validity claims' which could 
be argued out further in a 'discourse' or 'critique' in which 
reasons are offered and evaluated (Habermas 1984 p42. See also 
ch 5 above). 
Conclusion 
In, the above pages I have addressed some practical problems 
with this particular version of discourse analysis. I have 
portrayed it, much like my earlier view of ethnography, as an 
ongoing (critical) hermeneutic process8. In this manner, 
7 Elsewhere '(Southgate 1992b) I have addressed the 
relationship between village and hospital, and attempted to 
reframe the dilemmas of villagers, In terms of Habermas' analysis 
of lffeworld and system. 
This Is 'hermeneutic' In a double sense; first It refers to the 
, circular' process in which repertoires etc may be Identified from 
the text, and second, It refers to the way that the text itself is 
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ethnography and discourse analysis can be brought into 
methodological line (cf. the view of ethnography of Ward and 
Warner 1984), rather than being portrayed as competing research 
orientations as in Potter and Wetherell (1987). 
However the critic may well ask about the point or coherence 
of portraying discourse analysis as a separate method from 
ethnography if the two are really, similar. The answer is that 
discourse analysis does have something extra to offer if not 
always for the reasons provided by Potter and Wetherell. While 
both may be hermeneutic endeavours, the close analysis of 
interview (and other) transcripts allows more readily for the 
illumination of the argumentative nature of the provision of 
facts, opinions, feelings etc; emphasises the way that language 
has more than a referential function; may enable a greater 
reflexivity in that a part of the researcher's work can be 
openly displayed to the reader; and provides for a preliminary 
specification of often subtle aspects of discourse which may 
be tentatively configured as discriminatory. 
On the other hand the theoretical presentation of ethnography 
may easily be divorced from its textual presentation, so that 
what is given as theoretically interpretative or dialogic may 
turn in the text into a realist tale. This can then be 
counterposed to the more explicitly rhetorical analysis of 
an outcome of a joint effort involving researcher and interviewee. 
I have left to one side for the moment the way other factors 
Impinge upon the text and Its Interpretation. In addition one 
question which may be raised concerns the status of repertoires 
as 'artifacts, or 'analysts' constructs'. I have discussed this 
above to some extent. But my general position, which I have 
explicitly articulated In Part One, is that we have no unmediated 
access to reality (pace conversation analysts, and cf. Atkinson 
1987 p460), and that the objects sociologists present to their 
readers are always In some way jointly constructed. This does not 
mean however that we should not be oriented to the 'truth', and 
the discourse-analytIc perspective has the advantage that Its 
workings can be Inspected by the reader. 
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discourse which illuminates the ways that this resultant 
reality comes into argumentative being, so that the two textual 
orientations may be seen in counterpoint to compliment each 
other (see ch 6 above especially p130 ff). 
This leaves me with the issue of how the process of discourse 
analysis, which has involved the reading and re-reading of 
texts and the refining of ideas over a long period of time, 
might be telescoped into comparatively few pages in this text. 
To this end I have adopted two methods. In chapter 14 below I 
intrjoduce the range of repertoires which I argue is 
'discoverable' in the text. I then work through the processes 
of discovery in order to show how my preliminary ideas about 
repertoires and function were amended and refined, and the 
anomalies and interpretative difficulties encountered along the 
way (cf. Bloor 1978). 
In relation to what Bloor (1978 p547) has called 'the hoary old 
problem of drawing the correct inference from all the competing 
inferences that could be drawn from one's data', I have 
suggested that the discourse analytic method advocates the 
presentation of detailed transcripts to the reader in a way 
which may not always be done in for example an'ethnographic or 
participant-observation study9. This does not however solve the 
problem of the possible accusation of Iverificationism'. 
Unfortunately it appears that the only way around this is 
either to become an explicit f alsif icationist or to present all 
the material for inspection by the reader. Neither is a viable 
option here. 
Although It may be said that the detail provided here is not as 
fine as that found In 'conversation analysis, transcriptions; nor 
is this kind of detail necessarily excluded from ethnographic 
studies. 
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Yet the hypothetico-deductive approach is clearly not without 
its own problems. In this respect it may be worth quoting 
Peirce: I ... All the ideas of science come to it by the way of 
abduction. Abduction consists in studying facts and devising 
a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that if we 
are ever to understand things at all, it must be this way. I 
(quoted in Hanson 1958 p85)10. And in Hanson's words: 'The H-D 
account tells us what happens after the physicist has caught 
his hypothesis; but it might be argued that the ingenuity, 
tenacity, imagination and conceptual boldness which has marked 
physics since Galileo shows itself more clearly in hypothesis- 
catching than in the deductive elaboration of caught 
hypotheses' (1958 p72). 
10 1 might like to amend this in the following manner: 'Abduction 
consists in studying Implicitly theorized facts and devising an 
explicit (and perhaps different) theory to explain them. ' In a 
recent book Thomas Joel Scheff (1990 e. g. p3l) commends Peirce's 
concept of abduction as an analytic method for understanding 
meanings in context. 
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The present chapter sets out to describe and develop the themes 
'prolepsis' and 'dilemma', in anticipation of their central 
analytic importance in chapter 14 below. 
Prolepsis 
The analysis of variability, function, and interpretative 
repertoires may be aided by the results of previous work which 
has shown how particular rhetorical tropes or schemes may be 
implicated in their constitution and management. A number of 
studies of racial discrimination have for instance shown how 
such figures of speech are used to mitigate potential 
accusations of racism (van Dijk 1984, Cochrane and Billig 1984, 
Billig et al 1988, Potter and Wetherell 1987, Wetherell and 
Potter 1988,1989). One central device is known within the 
tradition of rhetoric as 'procatalepsis" (Nash 1989 p180), or 
in shortened form 'prolepsis'; the anticipation of objection, 
complaint or accusation, which has come to be known in social 
science as a 'disclaimer' (Hewitt and Stokes 1975, Billig 
1987). 
Etymology: pro, Gk, before In time or position, katalepsis, Gk, a 
seizing, from kata, down, and lambanein, to take or grasp. Thus: 
, to seize before,. Interestingly 'Catatonial Is a (now rarely used) 
term in psychiatry to describe the rigid posturing of patients, 
and 'Catalepsy, Is a term used In neuropharmacology to refer to 
rigidity in rats. 'Prolepsis' has a similar derivation: Pro + 
lambanein. 
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There are many ways to do a proleptic manoeuvre. A principal 
feature of a prolepsis is the combination of a position on a 
topic (e. g. "I'm not against the patients") with a reflexively 
linked comment ("but I don't think they should be allowed out 
at night"). The two parts to the manoeuvre react upon each 
other, and the speaker can be seen to be commenting upon his 
or her own comments. This reflexivity may be implicit as in the 
example above, or explicitly and immediately meta-discursive 
as in "I don't like to say this, but... " (Schiffrin 1980). Very 
often the link is made by the use of a strategically placed 
'but', although (! ) this is not always the case. 
The scheme of Hewitt and Stokes has been expanded by McLaughlin 
(1984), following Mura (1983) and Brown and Levinson 
(1978/1990), to specifically include anticipation of complaints 
over potential alleged infringements of Grice's Cooperative 
Principle2. For example the reflexive comments ... to tell the 
truth... 11 , and 11 ... that's just a guess ... which modify 
another discursive item, tell others that in spite of any 
appearances to the contrary, the speaker is actually orienting 
to the maxim of quality; is concerned, that is, with being 
truthful. McLaughlin terms these IlicensesI3. 
McLaughlin has coined the term 'Preventatives, to incorporate 
both disclaimers and licenses as outlined above. Thus 
'Preventatives ... are disclaimers and licenses aimed at 
protecting the author of a potentially troublesome speech act 
from negative characterization of him as an unthinking, 
2 'Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged. ' 
3 Compare Habermas on avowals', the paradigmatic speech act form 
of the validity claim of sincerity as in "I must confess to YOU that ... 11 (1979 p57-8). 
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irrational, or irresponsible member of society and/or as an 
incompetent communicator who either doesn't know the rules or 
doesn't care about them' (1984 p207). While preventatives may 
then be seen as devices of impression management (e. g. Goffman 
1959) it is clear that they also suggest other functions of 
language as I argue below. In contrast to McLaughlin I shall 
continue using the word prolepsis to cover all preventatives 
for the reason that the concept 'preventatives' unduly limits 
the pragmatic and rhetorical implications of such manoeuvres. 
Pace McLaughlin I suggest that the use of a proleptic manoeuvre 
serves to implicate several potential discourse functions. For 
it is not simply that the 'rules, remain as an unproblematic 
backdrop against which the actor must adjust his or her 
discursive garb, as McLaughlin's dramaturgical definition 
implies, but that the backdrop itself may also be spotlighted 
in the process as something potentially in need of repair. 
This matter may be addressed from the perspective of Habermas, 
theory of communicative action and universal pragmatics. 
Habermas has extended the concepts of rationality and social 
action beyond the dramaturgical. Following Habermas (1979, 
1984) we can say that in every instance of communication a 
number of universal validity claims (reciprocal demands) come 
into play, although often only one is thematic. Language is 
seen here as the medium which interrelates three 'worlds' : the 
'objective' world of existing states of affairs and facts, the 
world of normatively regulated social relations, and the inner 
, subjective, world of the speaker's intentional experiences 
(Roderick 1986 p96 and see chapter 5 above). For Habermas, in 
the process of reaching understanding and coordinating action 
via communication, we cannot avoid raising the validity claims 
of comprehensibility, truth,, normative rightness and sincerity 
(Habermas 1979 p2). 
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From this view, therefore, dramaturgy is seen as a limited 
account of social action. While a proleptic manoeuvre can be 
seen to have impression management effects, it may also serve 
for example to throw light upon, to comment upon, the world of 
social relations, of normative rightness. Indeed we can say 
that a prolepsis may act as a spotlight which highlights or 
points to particular validity claims concerning several worlds 
which are problematic and indicating controversy, ambivalence 
and dilemma (Billig et al 1988, Schiffrin 1980). 
In everyday life when a problem in communication arises, then 
any or all of these claims may be thematised, that is, action 
may switch to argumentative speech and the discursive 
examination of problematic validity claims (Habermas 1979 p4, 
1984 p424). In terms of normative rightness, validity claims 
maybe thematised at two levels: a) the justification of action 
by reference to established norms and b) the thematisation of 
the background consensus itself. What the proleptic manoeuvre 
can be said to achieve is to point the way to those claims 
which are arguably shaky and problematic. It points to a 
potential problem in the background consensus. 
However Habermas further points out that while talk oriented 
to communication raises the whole range of validity claims, 
only the claims to truth and normative rightness may be 
discursively redeemed. That is, the dramaturgic aspect of 
sincerity may only be redeemed in action. I am judged to be 
His 1979 account of the thematisation of problematic validity claims 
as 'discourse' gave way in his 1984 (p42) work to reference to 
'discourse' and 'critique': The latter Is to be used I ... when 
arguments are employed In situations In which participants need 
not presuppose that the conditions for speech free of external 
and Internal constraints are fulfilled. ' 'Discourse' Is to be used 
when participants can suppose (via the conceptual force of the 
meaning of the problematic validity claim) that a rationally 
motivated agreement could be achieved In principle. 
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sincere by my actions, but judgements of truth or normative 
rightness spring from justifications and warrants in discourse. 
Thus the proleptic manoeuvre may act both to uphold and 
challenge claims to normative rightness (and truth) as in the 
following extract taken from van Dijk (1984 p65, and quoted in 
Billig et al 1988 p108) in his research into racial discourse: 
I have nothing against foreigners. 
But their attitude, their aggression is scaring. 
We are no longer free here. You have to be careful. 
The two parts can be said to co-exist in uneasy tension, while 
the whole acts to both uphold anti-racist normative rightness 
and at the same time to undermine and challenge it. A prolepsis 
then, at one and the same time, both anticipates and attempts 
to block criticism and the thematisation of validity claims 
while also inviting precisely such thematisation. 
Billig et al (1988) have characterised this kind of talk as 
dilemmatic (see below). The authors criticize van Dijk (1984) 
for portraying such talk as a conflict between the 
interviewee's real attitude and their desire to create a 
favourable impression upon the interviewer (plOB). By contrast 
Billig et al argue: 
one must ask why respondents assumed that the utterance 
, of racist comments would make such a 
bad impression. 
Evidence suggests that the respondents were not paying 
lip-seryice to norms of politeness, which were foreign to 
themselves but which they knew the interviewer held. 
Instead, these were norms which they themselves shared. 
(P109) 
In other words the real meaning of a prolepsis is said to lie 
less with 'I don't want you to think I'm prejudiced because I 
don't want you to think badly of me, than with 'I don't want 
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you to think I'm prejudiced because I think it's wrong to be 
prejudiced'. For Billig et al, the prolepsis signals dilemmatic 
thought, a kind of dual or rhetorical consciousness. We may ask 
however what kind of evidence supports this assertion. Billig 
et al, for example, argue that studies which catch respondents 
talking relaxedly amongst themselves suggest that this 
ambivalence or two-handedness5 is still present (ibid p109). 
Nevertheless we cannot easily dismiss out of hand the notion 
that people do try to impress others, and say what they think 
others want them to say; and that in the everyday world people 
do continually try to persuade others to say what they want 
them to say. My argument here is that the kind of extension of 
the action framework proposed by Habermas allows us more easily 
to see that in spite of a person's intentions, their talk has 
normative as well as truth-related and dramaturgic implications 
and that all may be highlighted by the proleptic manoeuvre. In 
this sense the framework provided by Habermas lends some 
theoretical support to the position of Billig et al. It may 
then be possible to imagine, in a situation in which there is 
sufficient freedom for relatively unrestrained discourse, the 
normative and truth components being further thematised and 
debated. 
on the one hand then the use of prolepsis itself constitutes 
, reasonable prejudice' in the terms of Billig et a16. We see 
5 We could perhaps say that Billig emphasises the 'two-handed', 
rather than the 'two-faced', nature of argument. 
6 Scambler (1989 p56) also speaks of 'reasonable' discrimination In 
relation to people with epilepsy; for example bans on driving 
trains, etc. This Is rather different to Billig's notion of 
'reasonable prejudice' In which the outcome Is more a disguised 
prejudice, dressed In 'reasonable' terms, and thereby, for Billig, 
signalling dilemmatic thought. Much of Billig's work is to do with 
race, and the Issues concerning discrimination are perhaps 
clearer or more fully debated there than In relation to people who 
are psychiatric patients. Wall (1986 p1262) has referred to this 
form of talk In relation to people with learning disabilities as a 
'proxy for prejudice'. 
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how discourse may deplore, deny and at the same time protect 
prejudice. And in order to be reasonable, arguments have to be 
built and reasons proffered (and see Southgate 1992c). In this 
process 'reasonable prejudice, requires its unreasonably 
prejudiced and irrational Other (Billig et al 1988 p114-5, and 
see ch 14.8 below). 
On the other hand, the use of prolepsis constitutes a moment 
in the pointing towards, the instantiation of, a window of 
opportunity by way of which debate can be further conducted, 
a debate about whethez- certain prejudice is in fact 
'reasonable'. In other words the prolepsis signals dilemmatic 
thought, although the opposing themes which go to constitute 
the dilemma may not be equally balanced (ibid p144). 
Thus these issues could in principle have been further pursued 
by those involved in the performative attitude within the 
interview world thereby 'deepening and radicalizing' (Habermas 
1984 p130) the communicative context in a manner which is open 
to all social-scientific' laypeople7. 
At the same time, the degree to which we regard such a debate 
and agreement as rational will depend upon our understanding 
7 There are limits to the extent to which Issues can be pushed 
within Interviews. We might say that the Interactional fabric of 
the Interview world may not be strong enough to contain the 
degree of pressure needed to substantially Iradicalizel Its 
communicative context. Thus the opportunities for the kind of 
critical approach organised around the thematisation of validity 
claims in situ, provided for by Habermas, formal pragmatics, and 
oriented to the counterfactual reconstruction of generalizable 
interests, are also limited In the practice of Interviews. But we 
can still of course engage with, and Interrogate as It were, 
Interview transcripts, which Is what I attempt to do In this 
chapter, thereby Identifying retrospectively some of the validity 
claims which appear problematic for respondents (and myself), 
and thereby further raising Issues concerning discrimination and discourse, In a manner still oriented to Habermas' model (cf. 
Habermas 1976 p113). 
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of the structures of power within which participants will be 
located. In this manner Habermas, analysis of the relationship 
between system and lifeworld precisely addresses the socio- 
historical possibilities of rational agreement. 
Dilemmas and Ideology 
In their 1988 work, Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton 
and Radley have shown how it might be possible to configure the 
social meaning of interpretative repertoires in terms of their 
instantiation of competing 'ideological' themes and dilemmas. 
In this section I want to pursue the notion of ideological 
dilemma and consider its relevance for the present project and 
the social significance of interpretative repertoires. 
From their concern with what they call 'liberal' or 
'Enlightenment' ideology, the above authors locate the 
dilemmatic nature of this ideology in its reproduction 'as an 
incomplete set of contrary themes, which continually give rise 
to discussion, argumentation and debate' (p6). The 
philosophical concepts of liberalism are said to appear in 
everyday contemporary discourse, often with complex and 
contrary meanings (p4). Fundamentally, 'dilemma' and 
'dilemmatic', which are used variously as predicates with 
'common sense', 'situations', 'thinking', social beliefs', 
'concepts', entail contrary themes, although one theme may be 
dominant in particular discourses (p144). These themes are 
often posed as ostensible opposites such as 'freedom V. 
constraint', 'internal constraint v. external constraint' and 
so forth. Such themes may, they suggest, be uncovered by the 
analysis of implicit meanings via a hermeneutic process: 
'Discourse which seems to be arguing for one point may contain 
implicit meanings which could be made explicit to argue for the 
counter-point' (p23). 
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Thus for Billig et al 'The dilemmatic nature of ordinary 
thought might be said to reveal that people possess contrary 
linguistic repertoires for talking about their social lives 
(Potter and Wetherell 1987)1 (1988 p143). There is still the 
problem however of what precisely constitutes contrasting 
themes8. 'Contrast' can mean many things. The authors suggest 
that the presence of contrary themes in discussions is revealed 
by the use of qualifications, so that 'The unqualified 
expression of one theme seems to call forth a counter- 
qualification in the name of the opposing theme' (p144). 
To be sure the dilemmas posed here are complex. As Billig 
argues, if poles of each dilemma are equated with particular 
ideological positions, for example if the pole social order, 
control, authority and tradition are taken as central planks 
of conservative thought as for example in the work of Edmund 
Burke, they nonetheless arguably contain within themselves the 
seeds of their opposite. This dialectic can be presented in 
several ways. For example, from the position of the lived 
functional demands of liberal capitalism, order, security and 
discipline, while necessary elements in the maintenance of 
class society, may also act as constraints upon accumulation. 
As Stephen Spitzer (1987 p4e) has observed: 
And if capitalism requires uncertainty for its development 
as a system, but individual actors and organizations need 
to reduce uncertainty to operate and profit, then security 
clearly stands in a complex and contradictory relationship 
to capitalist vitality and growth. 
or from a more abstract viewpoint, 'society,, while not merely 
a sum of its parts, would simply not exist without its 
individual elements; while the individual in turn needs society 
8 Compare this with the problem of Identifying variability and 
Interpretative repertoires discussed above. 
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and the social structures which constrain but also enable him 
or her to act. 
The notion that ideologies are by no means univocal or 
consistent but contain, sometimes implicitly, opposing themes 
concerning for example issues of freedom and constraint, 
individual and society is not therefore exactly novel. Marxian 
theory is predicated upon real and lived contradictions wherein 
ideology is anchored. However the benefit of the account by 
Billig et al is their explicit attempt to link action and 
society, as the following gloss suggests: 
In contrast to the cognitive psychologists, we stress the 
Ideological nature of thought; in contrasts to theorists 
of ideology, we stress the thoughtful nature of ideology 
(1988 p2) 
And so in common with a number of other recent works (e. g. 
Donald and Hall 1986, Eagleton 1991, Thompson 1984,1987,1990 
p8) ideology is seen here as a matter of discourse rather than 
language. To paraphrase Eagleton (1991 p9), ideology is less 
a matter of inherent linguistic properties, than a question of 
I who is saying what to whom and for what purposes I. As he puts 
it: 
Ideology is a realm of contestation and negotiation, in 
which there is a constant busy traffic: meanings and 
values are stolen, transformed, appropriated across the 
frontiers of different classes and groups, surrendered, 
repossessed, reinflected. (1991 p101) 
Stuart Hall (in Donald and Hall 1986) has argued for example 
that 'liberalism' itself has contained radically opposed 
strands such that Paine Is radical ism and Burke Is traditional ism 
were both premised upon the liberal principles of political 
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economy (p57), while the recurring contradiction9 in liberal 
thought between liberty (freedom) and equality persists today 
(p4l). 
These authors also prefigure Billig et al in the way they 
discuss the process of thinking, so that like Billig et al, 
Donald and Hall argue that these political concepts and 
languages tend to flow through and structure our thought: 
We swing, in our actual thought, from 'liberal' to 
'conservative' to 'collectivist' arguments as we move, 
episodically, from one area of thought or practice to 
another. We get a kick out of our ancient and revered 
institutions, believe fervently that every person must be 
free to maximise his or her self-interest, and see 
ourselves as responsible and 'caring' members of society - 
without experiencing much more than a tiny, involuntary 
hesitation as we shift gears through these conservative, 
liberal and social-welfarist discourses which consistently 
'map out' political thought in British society. (1986 
pxii) 
The point to be made here is that while the dilemmas which 
villagers face in respect of people who are patients can be 
configured as local and discrete, they may nonetheless and at 
the same time also be patterned by wider social discourses. 
The interpretative repertoires which are displayed here 
arguably share in and recreate wider ideological dilemmas in 
Billig's terms. However it is one thing to portray talk as 
dilemmatic and another to read into this a fractured ideology, 
and there are passages in their book which methodologically 
seem very naive (e. g. Billig et al 1988 p3-4). 
A further problem here lies in the way that the very dilemmatic 
nature of ideology takes on a neutral quality such that 
An alternative view might recast 'contradiction' as a 'plurality' of Ideals. 
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domination often appears to take a back seat as Spears (1989 
p284) suggests. While the claim concerning the universal status 
of argumentation is well founded, Spears notes that: 
... people's capacity to generate such dilemmas may also be related to the time and scope for such deliberation 
that their place in the order of things af fords ... In these terms it could be argued that it is precisely when the 
contradictions relating to unequal power relations are not 
articulated in 'ideological dilemmas' of people's everyday 
thinking, that 'ideology' in its critical sense is most 
evident. (p284 emphasis added) 
This leads back to the old issue of reflexivity and the kind 
of question which asks how a theory of ideology may avoid the 
type of accusations which its own analysis raises. In this case 
perhaps we could say that -the dilemma the authors face is 
between a sanitised view of ideology, or ideology as 
domination; or, to the extent that their own thought is also 
necessarily ideologically dilemmatic, whether it can remain 
coherent. The issue of the extent to which such a theory might 
be able to 'ground' itself could I suggest be tackled via the 
work of Habermas'O. 
Another way of understanding some of these issues is to ask 
whether the 'dilemmatic' nature of people's responses to 
patients (and elsewhere for example to matters of race and 
gender) constitutes their real, position, or whether this 
dilemmatic mode itself constitutes a verbal smoke screen behind 
which people shelter other views, or a screen by which social 
science itself once more hides the 'real I issues. However, the 
point about a prolepsis is that while it no doubt shelters, it 
identifies itself as doing such sheltering. People may adopt 
10 There Is lacking here a sense In which ideology, as something 
people do, as grounded In the practices of ordinary people, 
connects up to the present day social structures, mechanisms and dynamics of our society. See note 7, p285 above. 
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this device strategically but at their own risk. Prolepsis 
points to problems. 
In the following pages I refer to the dilemmatic quality of 
villagers' talk about people who are patients, a quality which 
I suggest is signalled by the rhetorical structures of their 
responses. It may also be the case that villagers' talk 
displays the same kinds of dilemmas which can be read into 
bourgeois--philosophies and I shall briefly consider this 
further below, although the 'ideological' nature of everyday 
dilemmas is not pursued here as a central theme. 
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Numbers 
A total of 37 interviews were conducted with people who lived 
in Shenley village (32) and others (5) who had an interest in 
the village, such as the doctors of the local G. P. practice, 
present and former hospital staff and the manager of the 
Praetorian Housing Association. Most interviews took place 
during the years 1989 and 1990. 
Of the 32 interviews with villagers, 27 were tape-recorded'. 
These recordings lasted up to VI hours in length. One person 
was interviewed and recorded on two occasions, the first on his 
own and the second together with a friend. On another occasion 
I realised over half way through the interview that the tape 
recorder had not been running. 
one tape-recorded village resident was also employed at the 
time at the hospital. Five tape-recorded residents had 
previously worked at the hospital in capacities which included 
domestic (2), clerical, shop assistant, medical secretary and 
gardener (one person had held two different jobs). One tape- 
recorded resident had worked as a nurse in nearby Harperbury 
Hospital. Two other tape-recorded village residents were 
actively involved with the Shenley Hospital League of Friends. 
From the perspective of Wetherell and Potter (e. g. 1988 p173) this 
constitutes a substantial sample. 
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A number of the recorded interviews with villagers (8) involved 
more than one interviewee, so that the total number of 
villagers involved in the recorded interviews was 34, bringing 
the total number of villagers interviewed to 39. 
Excluding interviews with people who were Shenley Hospital 
patients or former patientS2, altogether 30 interviews were 
tape-recorded (27 villagers, 3 others). These recordings were 
completely transcribed. Constraints of time allowed 20 of these 
transcriptions to be corrected - and analysed in detail. The 
remainder were then partially corrected and analysed according 
to a refined analytic focus. Of the 34 tape-recorded village 
residents, 14 were male and 21 female. The large majority were 
over 42 years of age (0-21: 4,22-31: 1,32-41: 3,42-51: 8,52- 
21 also conducted interviews with 27 people (17 men and 10 women) 
who were patients or former patients. The former patients' 
Interviewed (9) lived In the Praetorian Housing Association houses 
on the edge of the village. Of this latter group, most had been 
patients in Shenley Hospital, with one exception. These people 
were Interviewed either on their hospital ward, or at their house. 
On one occasion I Interviewed a group of three men together, and 
on another I interviewed two women together. The remainder of 
the Interviews were conducted with Individuals. Thus 24 
interviews were conducted. On the majority of occasions (17) 1 
tape-recorded the Interview. For the rest I made detailed notes 
wherever possible. One person refused to speak to me at all after 
I had begun the Interview and he Is not included in the figures. 
The age distribution was as follows: 32-41: 3,42-51: 6,52-61: 8,62- 
71: 8,72+: 2. These patients were Identified for me by hospital staff 
and villagers as being people who were known to go Into the 
village and make use of some of Its facilities. In. order to interview 
patients on the hospital ward I had to secure Parkside Health 
Authority Ethics Committee approval. I also agreed to use a 
consent form. This was a useful exercise on at least one occasion 
when someone whom I had finally persuaded to talk to me was able 
to use his reluctance to sign the consent form to avoid being 
interviewed. See Appendix D for patients, voices. 
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61: 5,62-71: 8,72+: 5)3. 
The detailed transcription of tape-recordings is a formidable 
affair which is extremely time consuming. Following 
transcription, the texts needed to be corrected and I also 
included in the first 20 texts the fine detail of hesitations, 
overlaps, etc which had not initially been incorporated4. 
Codinq and Topics 
I have already argued that coding has constituted a process in 
which themes have become progressively modified and refined by 
way of a continual shuffle between coding and analysis, a 
continual process of testing and 'theoretical' elaboration in 
which the definition of repertoires and their functions has 
3 These details are Included only for the Information of readers. It 
Is not my aim In the following pages to compare the responses of 
men with those of women, young with old etc, nor to suggest that 
one 'group' or person Is more tolerant or Intolerant than another. 
Indeed my argument Is that It Is often difficult to characterise 
Individual respondents as unambiguously or explicitly prejudiced 
from their talk, which within the Interview world displays 
variability, ambivalence and dilemma. Rather than attributing 
prejudice to Individuals I have attempted to highlight some 
dilemmas which villagers appear to share, together with the 
functions of particular kinds of talk. However at times of course 
we may wish to explicitly characterise, individuals as holding 
strong views (cf. Billig 1989) or as being prejudiced. In which 
case we also build arguments based upon a range of reasons and 
evidence, both discursive and extra-dis cursive, and on occasions 
I have referred to certain patterns of talk as prejudiced. 
4 Transcription conventions In relation to tape-recorded Interviews 
are to be found In Appendix A. Unfortunately first transcriptions 
were made using a type-writer rather than a word-processor, and 
I later decided to use a scanner to Import the material Into my 
computer using the Omnipage programme. This process was 
further complicated by the fact that the Hatfield Polytechnic 
scanner was linked up to a Macintosh system, which was Incompatible with my own, thus requiring further translation of 
computerised data. 
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been open to revision. In terms of the philosophy of science 
this has perhaps as much or more in common with Kuhnian 
hermeneutics, Peirce's 'abduction', or Hanson's (1958) 
elaboration of Iretroduction' as it has Popper's deduction and 
falsificationism (and see Bulmer 1979 for a discussion), while 
within sociology in this sense its procedures are congruent 
with those of participant observation and also have some loose 
affinity with 'analytic induction' (see Hammersley 1989, 
Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, Bloor 1978), and stand close to 
the 'constant comparative method' of Strauss (1987). 
All interview transcripts were read and in the first 20 
interviews all references to 'patients', 'mental disorder' and 
their synonyms (e. g. 'them'; 'mental il1ness') were coded. In 
addition the texts were extensively marked according to a large 
range of other categories of interest which included 
'metaphor', 'history', 'blame', 'argument', 'contradiction', 
amongst others. Following an initial and preliminary analysis 
of these interviews, the coding focus in the rest of the 
interviews was narrowed to include, in particular, 'stories' 
told in relation to patientS5; text relating to stigma and 
discrimination in general terms; and potentially controversial 
topic areas. 
Topics and related discourse have included a) the hypothesised 
siting of a psychiatric hostel next door to the interviewee, 
b) the closure of psychiatric hospitals in general and Shenley 
Hospital in particular, c) the 'topic of patients' freedom 
within the village, and d) the question of whether patients can 
5 One possibility I have not pursued Is the separate analysis of 
respondents' stories about patients. However a particular story 
provides a focus for my paper presented at the BSA Annual 
Conference (Southgate 1991). 
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or should be able, and be allowed, to join in local activities 
such as clubs and societies. These questions were included in 
the interview schedule in order to attempt to stimulate debate 
but also in part because of their intrinsic interest. I wanted 
to see how people would respond, whether they would adopt rigid 
and defensive positions or whether respondents' talk would 
illustrate more than stereotypical responses. 
These are not, however, the only topics to generate debate. 
Indeed in the interview setting and guided by a loosely 
structured interview schedule, it became virtýially impossible 
to suppress discussion and argument. Sometimes the debate was 
carried out between the parties present on those occasions when 
there was more than one interviewee. And on other occasions it 
became clear that a single interviewee was engaged in the 
expression of what appeared to be an internal debate. At other 
times the discussion took place principally between the 
interviewer and the subject. The topics of debate in fact 
varied widely. 
Nevertheless the particular topics upon which I attempted to 
focus do smack of contention and again my understanding or 
presupposition of this fact is symptomatic of the way that 
social research relies upon often unarticulated and taken for 
granted assumptions (Garfinkel 1967, Warnke 1987 p77). And in 
this way social research can be seen to constitute the outcome 
of an interrogation of both the culturally located author and 
his subjects, by the author, in conjunction with his or her 
subjects (Hammersley 1990 p9). 
In the following pages I have tended to draw upon interviews 
with couples because this has often better exemplified the 
argumentative flow. 
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Respondents 
The proper names of interviewees have been changed to maintain 
anonymity. In addition I have made minor adjustments to 
occupational details and ages where it seemed that explicit and 
precise description would render identities transparent. Where 
respondents have been residents in the village I have indicated 
the length of such residence. 
However where names have appeared in publicly available 
documents such as newspaper articles or Parish Council minutes, 
I have not changed them6. 
S 
6 To my deep regret two villagers died following my interviews with 
them (not, I hope, a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc). Another 
person whom I had Interviewed and who In various ways had been 
very helpful to me In my research endeavours suffered a bereavement and shortly afterwards left the village. Yet another Interviewee, a former patient, was knocked down by a car and killed. 
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1: Interpretative_Repertoires: A Preview 
In this chapter I show how I came to identify a range of 
interpretative repertoires which refer to the relationship 
between residents of the villager and people who are patients 
and former patients, and I hypothesise about the functions the 
use of such repertoires perform. In addition I consider the 
discursive means whereby villagers account for 'telling the 
difference' between patients and others, and also provide an 
analysis of what I have called 'Balancing Devices', by means 
of which villagers shrink the discursive distance between 
themselves and patients. 
The two central repertoires recounted here have been named 'Own 
Interests' and 'Humanist Concern' .I suggest that these may 
each be regarded as possessing two parts which I later 
elaboratel. The other repertoires which I have identified have 
been named 'Relative Balance' and 'Local Identity' . As analytic 
tools the configuration of such repertoires enables us to lend 
some structure to the analysis of function within interview 
talk. As 'virtual I entities they may be read as resources which 
villagers draw upon in arguing a case within the interview 
world. But at the same time they rely for their I survival I upon 
being used. 
In the process I occasionally talk of 'themes' when referring to repertoires and their parts. 
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The number of repertoires identified here was not pre-ordained. 
It may have been possible to have written of just one 
'Patients' repertoire with many parts, but in its generality 
something would have been lost. And unlike the 'Community' 
repertoire of Potter and Reicher discussed above, the meanings 
which attach to 'Patients' within interview transcripts are 
variable as I shall show. 
It may be possible to further break down the repertoires 
depicted here into more parts. The reader may well read other 
patterns into the textS2. Yet arguably there is a limit to the 
kinds of repertoires which would be acceptably identified in 
this context (a thesis) and within the framework of this kind 
of discourse analysis. For example, to identify a repertoire 
as consisting of the sequence land the', simply because this 
sequence reappears regularly in the texts, would not be an 
acceptable version of a repertoire relating to patients and 
villagers. But at the same time 'acceptability' is itself 
something which has to be located within the traditions of 
social science, and for which I must also attempt to provide 
locally occasioned warrants. 
The first three repertoires identified in the following pages, 
'Own Interests', 'Humanist Concern,, and 'Relative Balance, 
refer, as I have suggested, to the relationship between 
villagers and patients but also contain, as it were, a sense 
of what patients are like as patients. 'Local Identity' also 
implicates the relationship between village and patients but 
arguably in a more complex manner. In the section below 
entitled 'Other Times, Other Places, Other Persons' I argue 
that the notion of a local village identity may be taken as a 
resource but at the same time rhetorically managed by the 
delimitation of boundaries with others, includin_q patients. 
2 See the arguments In chapter 11 above. 
mArguing About Madness 310 
In the following section I show how a sense of the two central 
repertoires may be initially gained via the analysis of 
proleptic manoeuvres in 'on record' public talk. 
t 
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2. Competing Accounts 
The two major repertoires can be approached via an old extract 
from Parish Council minuteS3: 
'(Councillor Broadley) instanced a case at the King 
William IV public House (sic), and cases of intimidation 
by patients to housewives, and cases of indecent behaviour 
in the Village and its surrounds. He thought that not 
enough attention was being given to the very real concern 
of the Villagers when faced with these problems. 
Councillor Broadley stressed the fact that in general 
there was a very real desire on the part of the Village 
to help in all practical ways the recovery of those 
patients who would benef it by mixing with the outside 
world, but it did seem that many who were allowed out were 
in no f it state to be at large, and they did nothing in 
helping relations between the Village and the Hospital. 
Shenley had had the Hospital in its midst for so long that 
it was accepted as part of Village Life, but there were 
limits and if they were exceede(d) there could well be a 
serious deterioration in those relations which would not 
be for the good of the Hospital or the Vi 1 lage. I (Minutes 
of Shenley Parish Council Open Meeting, 9/4/1974) 
The message in the above extract is clear. In the text the 
speaker, a villager, portrays the behaviour of some patients 
as posing a threat. Talk of 'indecent behaviour' and 
'intimidation', coupled with later references to customers in 
the pub being 'seriously upset', and 'the possibility of 
children being frightened or interfered with', all point to a 
serious worry or concern which is primarily to do in this 
extract with the protection of bodily integrity, and the 
defence of physical and social space (cf. Lyman and Scott 1967, 
Goffman 1961/1968,1971, Sommer 1969, South 1987). The sense 
here is more than one of patients simply being a 'nuisance', 
3 The whole of this official minute is reproduced In Appendix C. 
This extract has been corrected for spelling mistakes. 
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or of villagers being 'fed up' with their behaviour. Rather 
the dominating linguistic repertoire has a more ominous ring 
which can be characterised as one of danger, threat and fear. 
As I have already shown in chapter 9, the precise reality of 
local life, which can include the level of danger involved in 
living near a psychiatric hospital, is one which is open to 
dispute and negotiation. And the organisation of the above text 
must be seen in the context of the part. it was designed to play 
at the time in the open meeting with the hospital authorities, 
and the villagers' desire to present their point of view with 
maximum effect. The point however is that the kind of account 
offered here, in relation to the behaviour of patients and the 
feelings of villagers, is acceptable as an account in this 
instance, even though elsewhere villagers' efforts at 
accurately identifying patients is held in doubt, and their 
rationality impugned in the process. To paraphrase Collins 
(1983, p72) this understanding allows the researcher to 
identify the kind of account which counts as an adequate 
account4. 
The dominant linguistic theme in this extract can therefore be 
seen to combine a presentation of 'many' patients as 
threatening and dangerous5, together with villagers' concern 
for their own safety and protection. I have configured this 
pattern as the repertoire 'Own Interests'. 
But at the same time as invoking this major repertoire, the 
extract above draws upon another important theme. Both are 
Or by corollary, the kind of context which would be needed to 
allow a particular account to be taken as acceptable. 
5 For discussions of the dangerousness of patients and their 
, fitness' to be allowed out of the hospital see chs 4 and 9. These 
are clearly contestable Issues. 
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articulated in the context of a variation upon the rhetorical 
figure 'prolepsis'. Two sentences in the extract demonstrate 
the same construction; first, the positive message, then the 
warning, revolving around the word 'but'. As I have shown in 
chapter 12 above this is a way of forestalling anticipated 
criticism and can be seen to juxtapose competing discursive 
themes which run through much of the talk about patients in the 
village context, by using one moderate or positive theme to 
pave the way for a criticism or some form of potential social 
I of f ence I (cf . Brown and Levinson 1978/1990, Bi 11 ig et al 1988, 
van Dijk 1984). 
A second major theme, derived from merging the first parts of 
each proleptically organised sentence above, contains 'very 
real desire ... to help', and the hospital as an 'accepted part 
of village life' . It is a positive 'caring, theme which locates 
the Village and Villagers within a tradition of humanism6 (see 
e. g. Soper 1986). 1 have therefore called this the repertoire 
of 'Humanist Concern', which also has two parts, as I shall 
later show. 
In building his argument, grounds or reasons are provided by 
the speaker to support his conclusion: I ... but it did seem that 
many who were allowed out were in no fit state to be at large I. 
The minutes then proceed to document examples of this absence 
of fit state'. The theme here, which clearly coincides with 
6 In these allegedly 'postmodern, days this term Is often viewed 
with suspicion, see Foucault (1961/1971,1975/1979), Connolly (1987 
p104). For a discussion and Foucauldian critique of 'the 
paradoxical nature of humanist caring' In relation to social work, 
see Rojek, Peacock and Collins (1988): 'In determining the needs 
and rights of citizens, humanists are said to install new and 
extended patterns of surveillance and control which unavoidably limit the freedom of the Individual., (ibid p115) 
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the theme of 'Own Interests', has two aspects, one related to 
'fitness' and the other to 'place'. 
There are several ways of interpreting this. First, that some 
patients should not be let out because they are not fit to be 
out (because they cause trouble, or constitute a problem); or 
alternatively, that some patients should not be allowed out 
because they are not well enough to be out. While the first 
version coincides with the Own Interests repertoire (as in 
, they should not be let out because they are a danger to 
others'), the second could be seen as part of the repertoire 
of Humanist Concern (as in 'they should not be let out because 
they need the proper care and help'). This latter aspect is 
common and has already been seen in use in chapter 9. For 
example in the following extract already quoted an p250 above: 
This week parish councillor (sic) said: "These people are 
put in hospital for care and to be looked after. Somebody 
is responsible for these poor, sick people. " (17/10/1986 
Herts Ad. ) 
This passage which bespeaks concern, worry and disquiet, hardly 
needs elaboration. This theme can also be illustrated by 
additional extracts from local newspapers reporting the 
comments of ýParish Councillors, over a number of years, as 
follows: 
Parish Councillor William Hogan said at one incident he 
attended when an elderly woman patient was taken from the 
village pond it was a full ten minutes before a hospital 
representative arrived. "People were very concerned about 
the attitude of the hospital because the officer did not 
go in the ambulance with the patient", he said. ' (20/3/1981 
Herts Ad. ) 
and: 
Councillor Marion Martin told members she had received 
many comments from members of the public concerned at the 
unsuitable dress of many patients. 
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She said patients, some of whom were elderly, could be 
seen wearing only thin cotton smocks and slippers on the 
coldest of days (20/1/1984 Herts Ad. ) 
II By contrast the repertoire of own Interests' focuses upon the 
position of villagers, and examples of their concern about the 
protection of their space, property, and selves can be found 
sprinkled throughout chapter 9 above. Sometimes the concern is 
stated explicitly as in the following further extract7: 
(Councillor Ernie Broadley said) "The hospital ought to 
look after the interests of villagers by taking more care 
over which patients it allows out of its grounds. " 
(23/11/1979 Herts Ad. ) 
Similar repertoires are used by hospital staff in their defense 
but with a different weighting. For example in Appendix C the 
hospital representative also refers to the welfare of patients 
and in addition defends the interests of the hospital staff. 
In the following extract for example the then hospital 
Administrator stated: 
... "It would be inhuman to confine a person in a ward for 24 hours a day. " (20/3/81 Herts Ad. ) 
In the following pages I intend to trace the way that the two 
central repertoires glossed here, which I have named 'Own 
Interests' and 'Humanist Concerno Jostle continually, as it 
were, for place within the texts of interview transcripts. 
However, within the interview world their argumentative 
expression often appears more sophisticated and complex, and 
the clear themes, especially those of danger and threat, often 
give way to milder forms. Thus I show below how the repertoire 
7 Interestingly the word 'care' Is also used here but In terms of an 
Imperative about the kind of action the hospital should take which 
would demonstrate that It cared about villagers. 
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'Own Interests' possesses a strong and a weak form in interview 
transcripts8. 
Although these repertoires are not logically contradictory, 
nevertheless their use has a certain dilemmatic quality, and 
arguably illustrates a central dilemma for local people which 
is occasionally commented upon explicitly. This dilemma can be 
caught in the first extract above, and is evident in interview 
transcripts in the way that one repertoire can be seen to give 
way to the other within the argumentative context (cf. Potter 
and Wetherell 1987, Billig et al 1988). It is possible to 
tentatively reformulate this dilemma in different terms. Both 
repertoires have an interest in control but from different 
perspectives; one emphasising the social good in terms of the 
importanceýof-constraint and discipline, defence of property 
and order; the other the welfare of individual and 
'generalised' patients. Social defence is pitted against the 
benefits to patients of having the freedom of the village. 
Individual and society become, to an extent, counterposed. This 
polarity becomes clearer with the elaboration of these 
repertoires and the introduction of others. 
It is already clear from chapter 9 that talking about patients 
in the context of public debate and complaint often involves 
the attribution of blame and responsibility, with the hospital 
and its staff as the frequent focus. This also occurs in 
interview texts. However, as I have indicated, the latter 
8 Note that I am not yet arguing that one context allows the more 
'accurate' expression of the 'real' opinions, feelings or beliefs of 
villagers. Although we may wish at other times to attribute 
accuracy to accounts of others, (or our own) feelings and 
thoughts, this again would Itself take place within an 
argumentative context of a different kind. Here I am arguing only 
that people's accounts (about patients) vary according to the 
argumentative context. 
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display talk which is often much more subtle and varied and 
often implicates third parties other than the hospital as 
shall show. 
In chapter 9 villagers were portrayed as actively participating 
and intervening in the real world. Those villagers quoted by 
the press and in the Parish Council minutes were clearly 
interested we might say in directly altering their world in 
some way. Regardless of the justifications for their arguments 
and complaints, we may feel confident in suggesting that a 
large turnout at a public meeting is indicative of controversy, 
dispute and complaint, with feelings often running high. This 
was largely in contrast to recorded interviews, where 
respondents were sometimes reluctant and perhaps not 
necessarily motivated to expound in a mode of high dudgeon, and 
indeed sometimes implied that they did not want to I stir things 
up again' at least on this occasion9. 
Public statements and meetings have, we might say, constituted 
occasions at which explicit boundary work' (cf. Woolgar and 
Pawluch 1985) can be clearly witnessed. At these times of 
complaint the argumentative (rhetorical) delineation of 
boundaries and categories (e. g. 'village', 'villagers', 
'patients', 'hospital, ) may be especially transparent. This 
worký is also instanced within the interview world but again 
often in a more subtle and complex manner as I show below. 
This may go some way to explaining some of the differences in 
the exhibition and use of repertoires in the interview world. 
Basicallyý we may hypothesise that the interest matrix of 
villagers differed on these _different occasions. This argument 
It should be born in mind that during the period In which most 
interviews were conducted, in the years 1989 and 1990, the village 
was facing the projected closure of the hospital. 
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is consistent with the premises of discourse analysis which 
maintain that the language used will differ according to the 
argumentative context'O. 
While blame may be one specific function of villagers' 
discourse (on conversation analytic perspectives of accusation 
and blaming, see e. g. Drew 1978,1988, Watson 1978, Pomerantz 
1978, Molotch and Boden 1985), this chapter continues the 
argument that in the process of discussion and debate the 
villagers are actively (re) constructing their own identities 
as reasonable, rational and sane people (Garfinkel 1967, 
Shotter and Gergen 1989, Goffman 1959), together with the 
identities of patients as patients; and that they are 
simultaneously recreating culturally furnished norms together 
with the truth or facts of the matter (Baxter 1987, Habermas 
1979,1984, Potter 1987., D. E. Smith 1978). 
In terms of its overall structure, this part of the thesis may 
be read as displaying two positions. Its main thrust is to 
provide an elaboration of, and give substance to, the 
discursive, interpretative repertoires of madness - that is, 
those culturally furnished resources which people draw upon in 
talking about mental disorder, madness, mental illness, and 
above all 'Patients'. It aims, in other words, to illustrate 
repertoire content. 
However, in addition, it also focuses upon some of the 
rhetorical moves implicated in talk about patients, and 
provides space for the analysis of the interpersonal and 
communicative effects and functions of repertoire use. In this 
10 The functional variability of repertoires often seems more evident 
in public documents whereas on occasions within the Interview 
world It has not been possible to discern precisely what function 
a particular repertoire might be performing. 
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sense then it attempts overall to link content with form, or 
to explore the relationship between interpretative resources 
and situated talk (Edwards 1991 p517). 
In the following pages the examples used are derived primarily 
from interview transcripts although newspaper excerpts are used 
on two occasions in order to reinforce a particular point. 
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3: Strange Alliances; Danger, Nuisance and Concern 
As I have presented it so far the repertoire of 'Own Interests, 
organises the idea of villagers' defence of their village realm 
against perceived threat, understood in a strong sense to imply 
danger and violence. It is clear however that although danger 
and violence reappear throughout the interviews, there is also 
a competing theme of 'nuisance', a word used in relation to 
patients on numerous occasions. Here, villagers are still 
concerned about their own interests, but the concern and the 
interests are to do more with defending their physical, social 
and property space and labour time, as for example in the 
anticipation of requests to 'look after' patients. 
The following extracts are taken from one interview with two 
respondents, Nancy and Ralph. Ralph, a retired craftsman, has 
lived in the-village since childhood, and his friend Nancy, a 
'housewife' in her 501s, has been resident there for 15 years. 
The extracts have been chosen to illustrate first the way that 
the themes of danger and nuisance, as well as concern for 
patients' welfare, are often intertwined in talk; second, how 
temporality is used to discursive effect; and third, how 
Ralph's acknowledgement of dilemma concerning a controversial 
issue gives way to a different position in a different 
argumentative context. - 
My question concerned whether patients should be allowed out 
of the hospital in order to go into the village. Ralph's answer 
at first seems certain but he goes on to modify it by way of 
an interesting prolepsis-like manoeuvre with a particular kind 
of content, which I refer to as a 'balancing device' (see 
section 10 below): 
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Ralph: At one time when it was, when it was first there 
you'd get about four nurses, coming up the road with about 
a dozen or dozen and a half patients and they were allowed 
in the shop two at a time and the nurses were there and 
then they walked back again. But now they walk all over 
the place. 
DS: They're allowed out all over, anywhere? 
R: All over the place 
Nancy: There's no gates, no gates. 
DS: What do you think about that? 
R: Well, to my mind I think it's all wrong but er, I, I'm 
not a medical, man. I know psychiatric people down there, 
I think they're as mad as the patients, quite a few of 
them. 
DS: What, staff you mean? 
R: Yeah. Well the patients, some of the patients are a 
damn sight, saner, than what they are I think. But they 
say no you can't keep em closed in. Well (2) they've got 
af ew, yards of open space there that they walk around in 
without coming into the village and I, well a, a mate of 
mine saved one woman from throwing herself in the pond, 
it took us a hell of a while. All these sorts of things 
happened. And they walk in front of cars and get knocked 
over and killed. 
N: Several isn't there 
R: Been several accidents happen like that. Well, it's 
their life I know it's their life, but er, it's the p-poor 
old motorist really I mean (2) (p7) 
In the above extract Ralph appears to be saying that patients 
should not be allowed out because they are a danger to 
themselves - talk which can be read as displaying an instance 
of the repertoire of Humanist Concern. 
At the same time the reference to 'the p-poor old motorist, 
(who may not just be a villager) and I ... it took us a hell of 
a while', suggests that he is also referencing here the own 
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Interests repertoire. However the threat to villagers is not 
to do with patients being violent towards villagers, but is 
related rather to upset and the extraction of labour time. 
Intriguingly, one of the few putative references in the 
interview transcripts to 'Patients Rights', as in 'Well, it's 
their life I know it's their life, but... I is used to raise the 
idea, immediately disclaimed, that they have a right to die in 
that manner. To be sure an alternative reading of this sentence 
can be made but it would be distinctly less charitable, as in 
'Well it's only their life I know but... I i. e. 'they don't 
matter, but what about the motorist'. 
A little later in the interview Ralph provides another example 
in the form of a story". As part of his construction of 
'patients as nuisance' this particular patient is portrayed as 
deviously attempting to exploit Ralph, and later flaunting this 
intent. However the coda to the story contains a brief 
prolepsis which points to the dilemmatic nature of the topic 
and of 'nuisance' itself: 
Ralph: ... there's one chappie, I ain't seen him for ages but held 'Have you got a shilling, for a cup of tea? ' 10h 
get back down the bloody hospital. Get one for nothing 
there. I And I walked in the toilet, public toilet one 
dinner time on me way down the village and there he was, 
sitting in the bloody, on the floor of the toilet, trying 
to scrounge, money. And I was just walking in the [King 
Harry] one day and he stopped me, I said 'I've told you 
time and time again, get back down the road, you'll get 
a cup of tea for nothing. ' He followed me in the pub, 
fetched out af iver and and said to old C live, the barman, 
he said I Got change f or a packet of f ags? 1 (2) And I said 
'You scrounging', I said, 'get out of it', I said, 'You 
stopped me outside (laugh) wanting a bob for tea. ' It's 
I have not attempted an exhaustive analysis of this story here. 
Elsewhere (Southgate 1991) 1 have provided a framework for the 
analysis of respondents' stories drawing In particular upon the 
work of Polanyl (1979,1981,1985) and Linde (1986). 
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something and nothing really but it, it does aggravate 
you, you know... (pq) 
The dilemma here relates in part to whether patients should be 
allowed out into the village, but also to the issue of how 
villagers should react to patients who are allowed oUt12. 
Another way of putting the point is to say that in these 
extracts Ralph expresses disapproval but in a manner which 
displays the dilemmatic nature of the subject. 
In the following passages Ralph, Nancy and myself pursue the 
issue of whether patients should be allowed out. These are 
notable for the way the themes of danger and nuisance, past and 
present, are intermingled in such a way that it becomes 
virtually impossible to disentangle the facts of the matter. 
Ralph: Oh used to be gates, yeah. And there used to be 
gates down Radlett Road and they, and a chap called King 
used to live in that lodge. And he was responsible for 
shutting them and undoing the gates, in the morning and 
night. 
DS: So the railings and the gates would have kept a lot 
of the patients in? 
(jumble of talk) 
R: I say, at one time you never saw patients walking 
about, but now of course they they go in the pubs and er, 
in the shops and they create a nuisance sometimes [to) 
themselves. And er some of them are quite light fingered 
(2) And well, although the general public don't say much 
they're not very happy, are they really. 
Nancy: No. * I'm glad my children when we moved here, that 
they were (2) 8,8 and 10 weren't they. I'm glad they were 
that age. I didn't like them you know, there was quite a 
22 This may be read In at least two ways; as a dilemma about how 
one should respond to a patient qua patient, who is being a 
nuisance; and second, as a dilemma about whether one should 
consider this behaviour of sufficient 'nuisance' to become 
, aggravated' about In the first place. 
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few patients then. Going back 15 years there was quite a 
few. You couldn't, you had to know them, to know what they 
were going to do. One or two were a bit= 
R: =There was lots of things really. People wouldn't take 
any notice much of it today, but going back, there was two 
old ladies there, they must have been there years and 
they'd just stand on the pavement open their legs and pee 
(2) And even now the men do that. Some of the men do it. 
* Pass water on the pavement. Don't matter who's about.. 
(p8) 
In this section the past is presented as both bad and good, 
while the public is depicted as both unhappy with patients, 
behaviour ('. ý.. the general public don't say much but they're 
not very happy,.., ) and also unconcerned or dismissive of it 
(, People wouldn't take any notice much of it today... 1). 
While Ralph plays down danger and focuses upon nuisance,. 
Nancy's talk is perhaps most readily understandable if the 
reader adopts the culturally available frame of 'patients as 
danger'13. Here patient identity as 'psychiatric patient' is 
already given, so the question becomes 'what is it in the text 
which allows us to read 'danger' in the absence of explicit 
reference? ' I suggest the key lies in the reference to dislike, 
together with the line 'you couldn't, you had to know them, to 
know what they were going to do', which suggests a certain 
unpredictability, conjoined with reference to children. Danger 
and threat are located by Nancy in the past, when I ... there was 
quite a few patients... '. 
However some time later on in, the same interview a significant 
change of tone can be detected in the context of týhe topic of 
the proposed closure of the hospital: 
13 Compare D. E. Smith (1978 p23); 'the structure of the conceptual 
scheme 'mental Illness' which the reader uses in recognising 
, mental Illness' Is Isomorphic with that organising the text', and 
also D. E. Smith (1984). 
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DS: So you'd prefer the hospital to stay, would you? If 
you had a choice? 
Ralph: Yes it wouldn't worry me in the least, wouldn't 
worry me in the least. 
DS: That's in spite of the patients or? = 
R: =Well, you see (1.5) you learn to live with these 
things. 
Nancy: They've got to go somewhere haven't they? Otherwise 
they'd be on the road. 
R: And I think the type of patients you've got in there 
now (2) are pretty harmless really (2) At, I mean, at one 
time they were compulsory patients I should imagine, I 
don't know. But now it's all voluntary patients. That's 
why they're allowed to walk about I suppose. But er (2) 
I don't think, I'd sooner it was a hospital than (2) the 
houses. The amount of money that's been spent on that 
road. It's um, a sheer waste of money. 
DS: I suppose it will make a difference, quite a big 
difference to the village? 
N: Well you see that will near enough join it to Radlett, 
you see. We're nearly joined up with Borehamwood now. So 
a village= 
R: =I mean you're, you're, you're only about 300 yards 
without a house between here and Borehamwood. And er, when 
Elstree Rural Council decided, won the honour of becoming 
a Borough it was the worst thing that ever happened, 
'cause Elstree Rural Council was a, good Council. (p2l) 
In contrast to the previous section there is no reference here 
to patients as 'nuisance', and in proposing 'otherwise they'd 
be an the road', a charitable reading of Nancy's assertion 
suggests a-Humanistic Concern for patients' welfare. Ralph too, 
in fending off my reminder of previous talk about patients 
being a nuisance, tells us that I ... you learn to live with 
these things', thereby invoking a temporal continuum or 
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process, a projected history within which villagers have become 
more or less tolerant and accepting"'. 
Ralph goes on to describe patients as 'harmless', which, while 
not incompatible with 'nuisance,, plays down what has 
previously been defined as a potential problem. 
In what amounts to a defence of the patients in support of his 
own cause, it would-be simple to argue here that Ralph, in 
order to mount such a defence, is forced to play down the idea 
of patients as danger and as nuisance. This is not correct 
however for there would be nothing to stop Ralph in theory from 
arguing that the hospital should stay In spite of the danger 
and-nuisance of patients; that the housing development might 
prove more of a danger and a nuisance in terms for example of 
increased traffic flow. There is therefore nothing necessary 
about Ralph's argument. Rather, it constitutes one available 
option open to him. 
One way- of reading this section is in terms of patients 
constituting a danger in the past but no longer in the present, 
as previously suggested by Nancy. This reading relies upon 
understanding 'compulsory' as relating in some way to 'harmful I 
(the opposite of harmless). Ralph can be seen as trying to 
provide grounds for his position, that patients are now harmless 
i. e. the reason they are allowed out now is because they are 
not 'compulsory', hence not dangerous. 
Ralph's'assertion that the fact that patients are allowed out 
is evidence for their harmlessness, appears to clash with or 
contradict Nancy's earlier suggestion of implied danger which 
is linked to 'quite a few, patients being around 15 years ago. 
14 Compare the discussion In section 8 below. 
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It is interesting to see here how temporality is used across 
the range of extracts and with different effects. Ralph and 
Nancy use time to locate danger elsewhen. Time here is 
comprised of discrete packages. There is now and there is (in 
the present) then, which serves as a contrast structure within 
which one can make a particular point. At the same time, Ralph 
implicates a continuum notion of time to argue that 'you' and 
by' extension other villagers, 'learn to live with these 
things', thereby rendering villagers as presently tolerant. In 
terms of the way its constitutional makeup is discursively 
varied, time can perhaps be seen as relative. 
In this final extract it is possible to see how Ralph 
constructs his position by (a) converting the nuisance and 
danger of patients into harmlessness (b) locating danger in the 
past and (c) recreating villagers as tolerant, with assistance 
from Nancy who (d) expresses concern for patients' welfare. The 
outcome of this is the co-optation of now harmless and 
vulnerable patients to the cause. Patients become allies in the 
voiced opposition to the housing development and the local 
Borough becomes the other 'Other' upon which complaint is 
focused. 
The above sequence of extracts illustrates, I suggest, a number 
of points. First, that 'nuisance, competes with 'danger' as a 
central theme of the interpretative repertoire own Interests. 
'Nuisance' reappears throughout the interview transcripts and 
is evidenced in many of the extracts which appear in later 
pages. I have chosen to include it in the Own Interests 
repertoire instead of creating a separate category because it 
shares the central tenet of the Own Interests repertoire, i. e. 
defence by villagers. I shall refer to this aspect of the 
repertoire as Own Interests (Nuisance) or Own Interests (Minor) 
or simply 'Nuisance', but point out that it is intended to 
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illustrate a particular meaning of the relationship between 
villagers and people who are patients. 
Secondly, the above analysis shows that such repertoires are 
drawn upon in different ways in different argumentative 
contexts and with varying discursive results; and thirdly, that 
the intertwining of alternative repertoires possesses a 
dilemmatic quality which finds expression in a sense of 
uncertainty in relation to contentious topics, and which 
arguably possesses an ideological correlate in so far as their 
themes embody an opposition between social order, constraint 
and control, and individual freedom and expression. 
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4: The Rustle of Danger 
In the previous section I showed how Ralph proceeded to 
discursively neutralize patients-as-danger with the effect that 
patients were co-opted to his cause. Danger became converted 
into harmlessness and villagers' fear into concern and 
tolerance. 
Danger and threat have indeed proved to be continual themes 
throughout the inierviews. One moment they rustle in the 
background, lurking, half articulated and hinted. The next they 
rise to the surface of talk and display themselves, so to 
speak, to use a structuralist metaphor. And indeed it is 
possible to see how the psychiatric hospital itself helps to 
perpetuate this undercurrent. 
In this section I will show how danger, threat and violence can 
be conjured into being out of nuisance and even out of reason 
and reasonableness itself, often with the discursive assistance 
of Humanist Concern. 
From Reason to Danger: The Paradox of Normality 
The following extract is taken from an interview with Andy, a 
40 year old man who had a managerial position in a local 
company who had lived in the village for most of his adult 
life. 
DS: Suppose somebody said, one of the patients came to you 
and said - I'm interested in being on the committee of the 
Village Society. What would happen? 
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His response was long and complex and I have included only the 
latter part of it below: 
Andy: But um, no, I think most people are tolerant. Yes, 
what if someone came up and asked me? 
DS: Would you consider it? 
Andy: If they seemed reasonable and they had a reasonable 
point of view, of course you would, because you can't see 
any reason against it. It would only make you wonder what 
on earth they were doing in a mental hospital, you see 
(Andy's laughter). I don't know, they, they could be a 
psychopath (Andy's laughter). But, no I think the worst 
people are locked up. I think mainly the people out there 
are just just genuinely harmlessly mad. You know, for 
various reasons. (gap) Normal people just had their lives 
ruined. ** (p17) 
Andy's laughter in this passage coincides with a temporary 
change of frame (cf. Schiffrin 198415), from stated acceptance 
to doubt and back again. 
It may be possible to view this laughter as exhibiting a kind 
of 'troubles-resistance' in Jefferson's (1984) terms, whereby 
in the course of telling about a trouble the speaker 
demonstrates that he or she is coping with the trouble. And to 
the extent that my question itself constitutes 'trouble, for 
Andy, this may be the case. 
Andy had been floundering somewhat in answering the question. 
His immediate reaction was 'Ah, I don't know. I've no idea, it 
depends who it was. ' He eventually proceeds to work his way 
reflectively through stages of argument pausing for a moment 
with an answer which twice articulates the lexical item 
, reasonable, and once that of reason,: 
is Drawing upon Goffman (1974/1986), Schiffrin refers to 'frames' 
through which levels of seriousness In conversation are 
negotiated. Thus speakers as said to 'break frame' from serious 
argument, to Jointly gloss disagreement as non-serious. 
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If they seemed reasonable and they had a reasonable point 
of view, of course you would, because you can't see any 
reason against it. 
Andy tells us that no reason can be found to oppose the 
reasonable. But then immediately Andy 'sees' a reason against 
it. And this reason is the very reasonableness of the person 
him(her)self. From the perspective of the semantic and symbolic 
sway of the mental hospital, a socially shared affair, there 
is no demeanour, no behaviour, no reasonableness, according to 
Andy's argument, which cannot itself be taken as evidence of 
mental disorder; while the very absence of problematic 
behaviour constitutes the most extreme evidence of one extreme 
case of such disorder. The very fact that someone is a patient 
in a mental hospital, in Andy's talk, is sufficient to imply 
threat and danger irrespective of the person's behaviour; and 
the more 'reasonable' the person is, the more he constitutes 
a potential threat. 
There is indeed a certain paradoxical logic here which Andy 
reflects, for surely, the reader might object, a person who is 
a patient in a psychiatric hospital ought to appear odd and so 
forth, and not completely reasonable. And yet clearly it is 
possible to imagine such circumstances; for example where 
someone has 'recovered' in hospital, appears 'normal', and is 
seeking some social stimulation while awaiting rehousing. 
Andy's articulation of the problem may be fleshed out via 
Foucault's (1978/1988) analysis of the way the medico-judicial 
category of the 'dangerous individual' came into being via the 
notion of early 19th century category of homicidal monomania; 
the zero-degree of insanity' (p130), the psychiatric entity 
of a crime which is insanity, a crime which is nothing but 
insanity, an insanity which is nothing but crime' (p132). 
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Foucault argues that 'the great unmotivated crimes' posed a 
problem for the judiciary from the very fact that reason', 
, motive', could not be established: 'Now that the reason for 
the crime had become the reason for the punishment, how could 
one punish if the crime was without reason? ' (p138). In the 
following process, he argues, modern law has come to allow for 
society's right over the individual because of what the 
individual is, not what he or she does. The establishment of 
motive therefore becomes pre-eminent, and psychiatry becomes 
the specialist in motivation (pl3B). 
In this analysis of the psychiatrisation of crime within a 
framework of the management of threat (danger) to the social 
body and public hygiene, Foucault details how the concept of 
, dangerous individual' was enlarged by penal law from the 
'monomaniac' to everyday figures by way of a perpetual 
interaction between the judiciary and medico-psycho logical 
knowledge, out of which a set of objects and concepts was born 
(p149): 'Nineteenth-century psychiatry was a medical science 
as much for the societal body as for the individual soul' 
(p134). 
This figure of homicidal monomania can therefore be seen to 
have played a part in the elaboration of psychiatry's 
functions; the control of the dangers hidden in human 
behaviour, and so the functioning of modern psychiatry is 
linked to this kinship between madness and death (p135). 
There is a picture here of the way that danger and madness have 
been historically elaborated, with the assistance of homicidal 
monomania, a category which, although now discarded by 
psychiatry, nevertheless still holds some symbolic sway. This 
figure suggests that at the ultimate boundaries of insanity lie 
violence and crime, a violence all the more dreadful because 
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it gives no hint, no sign, until it explodes into being. This 
is insanity in its most harmful form; a maximum of consequences 
and a minimum of warning, as Foucault puts it (pl35)16. 
What can be seen in the brief excerpt from the interview with 
Andy, I argue, is the way that danger emerges from discourse, 
framed in laughter and joke, only to sink back again in the 
further light of reason. The traces of danger and threat 
nevertheless remain. In terms of the effect of this discourse 
or its function, it can be seen that while rational 
consideration suggests that at least some patients should be 
allowed into local organisations, it is still possible to find 
a trace or a hint of danger and threat even in those most 
reasonable of requests, a trace which could be used to 
rationalise decisions to discourage patients from applying to 
join local societies. 
Andy's laughter in the above extract can also be said perhaps 
to comment upon or capture this particular sense of paradox 
involved in arguing about madness, a paradox also noted by 
other villagers. Put another way, it can be said to offer the 
opportunity for a laugh or a joke. For example in my lively 
discussion with Anne and Arthur a couple in their mid 50's who 
had lived in Shenley village for 20 years, I asked: 
DS: What would have happened if someone you knew was a 
patient had come along and said they wanted to join the 
W. I? 
16 Ramon (1986) has argued that the category of psychopathy was 
, rediscovered, In Britain during the Second World War, and 
functioned after the war to explain residual anti-social behaviour 
In the context of new welfare state stereotypes of the poor, the 
criminal or the Ill. And see Blackburn (1988) for an examination 
of practices of classification of psychopathic personality within 
the professions of psychiatry. 
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Anne: If they had enough, if they had enough sense to come 
and say they wanted to join and er= 
Arthur: =They wouldn't be in Shenley Hospital (their 
laughter) 
Anne: No, erm. Then, good luck to them. I mean as long as 
they weren't disruptive I suppose. (p16) 
From Nuisance to Violence 
The following extracts illustrate further the discursively 
contingent nature of danger, violence and threat, and the way 
that their factual status is constructed in discourse. The 
extracts are taken from an article in the Herts Advertiser, 
which is reproduced in full in Appendix B. Although a complete 
analysis needs to locate the extracts in their relation to the 
whole, it is arguably the case that these parts are of 
intrinsic merit. 
Talking about a young hospital patient' who had sat in the car 
of some friends, Mrs Gee said: 
"If he had sat in a less patient person's car or if he had 
confronted someone violent, this could have been a very 
serious problem indeed",.. 
and 
"This latest event was potentially a nasty situation. It 
is something that could happen in the village but we felt 
that if someone had lost their temper they could have hurt 
the patient", added Mrs Gee. (Herts Advertiser 4/9/1987) 
The police eventually came to help after a 999 call was made. 
The contingent nature of violence and danger arises in the 
sense that violence is discursively conjured out of thin air, 
when little or no warrant exists for it in terms of the 
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recounted actions of the patient himself. What might otherwise 
have been taken as an instance of nuisance' becomes 
transformed into something more serious. Nobody in this 
account, nor in the complete account, was violent (although the 
identified patient did allegedly swallow a cigarette butt). 
Violence, rather, somehow appears as if from nowhere and 
becomes attributable in a very speculative fashion to 
hypothetical and general ised I others' . No-one acknowledges that 
they were violent or even feeling vaguely violent. And yet 
violence has been raised as a truth claim in Habermas, terms. 
My initial response to this extract was to see it as an 
effective way of objecting to the behaviour of patients, any 
behaviour within limits, that people found objectionable. All 
one has to do is say 'other people are less patient and may 
become violent' . In argument one can of course dispute this and 
say 'well then that's their responsibility, not the patient's, . 
And indeed this kind of argument can often be found within the 
auspices of psychiatric practice itself when interested parties 
may demand the removal of the (putative) patient because they 
feel that the patient is at risk of violence from others, 
including relatives. This comprises a reversal of the 
discursive use of danger and threat as described above, but it 
invokes danger, threat and violence none the less. 
At a theoretical level the above passage may be seen to relate 
to the practical dilemma which centres upon freewill and 
determinism. In his 1974 discussion, Strawson contrasts two 
opposed but not exclusive reactive attitudes of everyday life, 
the 'participant' reactive attitude and the 'objective' 
reactive attitude (p9-10). While the former is concerned with 
the expression of a range of reactive feelings and attitudes 
which belong to involvement or participation with others in 
inter-personal human relationships -feelings and attitudes such 
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as anger, resentment, gratitude or forgiveness, the latter 
involves seeing the other as something to be taken perhaps 
precautionary account of; as an object to be treated, trained, 
managed, handled or cured17. 
His central argument concerns the importance that people attach 
to the intentions of other human beings, and the great extent 
to which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or 
involve our beliefs about these intentions (p5). The argument 
is that if we experience or understand another's harmful act 
towards us as being intentional then we will respond 
differently to a situation in which we believe the other was 
in some sense Idetermined, 18. 
Strawson distinguishes between two groups here. The first 
concerns situations in which the agent is granted autonomy but 
in which the action was 'determined', for example in which he 
or she had no choice, couldn't help it, was pushed, made a 
mistake, did it by accident and so forth. The second group 
concerns not the action but the actor, and Strawson again 
separates out two sub-groups. In the first we may be able to 
17 In so far as this articulates with Issues surrounding social action 
and rationality then It has links with a whole range of sociological 
theory. Compare for example the distinction In Habermas between 
communicative and instrumental/strategic action, the associated 
work on the attitude of natural science and the discourses of 
medicine by e. g. Mishler (1984), Scambler (1987). 
18 Another way of addressing this Is to say that we can dismiss 
threats to our self and our world-view, mend the fences which 
delineate our notions of the moral order, and the order Itself, by 
strategically attributing madness to the other. As Wagner (1980) 
shows, once people are regarded as mad then this may allow for 
continued co-presence ' 
without the consequences of engaged 
Interaction. Like the marriage where partners accuse each other 
of being mad, this may allow the couple to remain together 
(unhealthily we might say), to occupy the same space, without 
having to engage with each other. 
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ascribe a temporary state in which the person's identity is 
not permanently spoiled (Goffman 1963/1968), as in: 'He's been 
under great strain recently' and 'He wasn't himself'. 
In the second subgroup the actor is presented as 
psychologically abnormal or as morally undeveloped: 'the agent 
was himself, but he is warped or deranged, neurotic or just a 
child' (p8). His argument is that when we see someone in this 
latter light 'all our reactive attitudes tend to be profoundly 
modified' (p8) and shift from the participant to the objective 
reactive stance. 
Emerging from the discourse analytic frame for a moment, it is 
possible to understand that the people involved in this example 
may have felt angry that their property had been invaded, (from 
the suggestion that I others I could become violent), but because 
the man had been identified by them as a patient from the local 
psychiatric hospital, as someone therefore who simply 'couldn't 
help it', they may also have felt constrained in terms of the 
socially acceptable alternatives for action open to them. The 
people arguably faced a dilemma about how to act. 
To acknowledge one's own anger towards someone who is a patient 
constitutes a problem in two ways. On the one hand one may be 
seen to be in violation of a putative normative code to the 
effect that one ought not to be angry, resentful and so on 
towards people who simply and genuinely 'can't help it'. On the 
other hand, in the case where someone is openly angry or 
expresses resentment towards a patient, the implication could 
be that the patient is accountable for his or her actions, or 
that the angry person is not him or herself being fully 
rational. In either case the actor who expresses anger or 
resentment in such circumstances is in a potentially difficult 
position which may invoke criticism from 'normal' peers and 
contemporaries. 
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Of course, that a participatory reactive stance could still be 
retained, and often is retained, can be seen from the way 
people often react in relation to objects in the world, for 
example a Cleesian whipping of the car which refuses, to 
start. In such a case we may anthropomorphically attribute 
agency and freewill to some thing which in calmer or less 
poetic moments we may view as inert (cf. Woolgar 1991). Clearly 
then it is still possible to attribute freewill to people who 
in other contexts we may see as not responsible for their 
actions. But there may be costs in so doing, for example the 
image Cleese casts as Basil Fawlty of being very close to the 
edge of sanity. 
In everyday life this issue is a practical, contingent, 
difficult and complex one. There are occasions when it is both 
morally and technically right to attribute responsibility to 
someone who is a patient in a psychiatric hospital, depending 
upon a variety of factors which include the nature of the 
offence and the degree of mental disorder. Psychiatric nurses 
for example regularly and inevitably rely in a practical way 
upon being able to make this distinction (cf. Bott 1976, 
Erikson 1957). 
At the same time however it may be that the dilemma described 
here about whether or not to attribute agency to another is not 
necessarily ahistorical as Yearley (1985) appears to suggest 
in his discussion of Strawson's work. At least in terms of 
content it can be seen to relate to particular times and kinds 
of property and power relations (and see chapter 8 p199)19. 
19 In other words the attributions of responsibility and Insanity are 
themselves conditional upon historically and geographically 
specific social relations. 
mArgulng About Madness 339 
But from a discourse analytic perspective it is neither 
necessary nor warrantable to impute motive and sentiment. 
Rather the aim is to stay with the text itself as far as 
possible. Indeed, as noted, the speaker does not acknowledge 
that anyone felt violent. And from this position two dominant 
themes emerge: the hypothesised threat of violence by a 
villager or other non-patient, and concern about the welfare 
of the patient. The provoking action is nothing more nor less 
than 'sitting in (someone elsels) car, 20. The text suggests 
that patients may be at risk from certain impatient or violent 
people. Who are these people? We are not told. In what way is 
violence raised as an issue? 
The extracts arguably work in three main ways: First, a 
contrast structure is set up between concern and violence. This 
becomes particulary clear in the full text which begins with 
several statements of concern about patients I safety. This very 
concern then appears to Justify or provide for the raising of 
the theme of violence, as one more thing about which there 
should be 'serious' concern in the first place2l. Second, a 
further contrast structure is created between those tolerant, 
patient and understanding people involved i. e. the speaker and 
friends, and intolerant, impatient and violent I others I. Third, 
the event is temporally located as the 'latest' in an 
undisclosed number of prior events, stretching into the past 
20 one the one hand this Is an innocuous enough and everyday 
affair. On the other the uninvited nature of the sitting renders 
it unusual. 
21 It should be noted that there Is nothing necessary In the 
relationship between violence and concern. Many people enjoy 
violence in one form or another, and many (without necessarily 
being classifiable as 'psychopathic'), may also demonstrate little 
concern for its consequences for others or themselves. 
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and projected into the future as 1warning122. In this way, what 
would otherwise have been a legitimate complaint about 
'nuisance' is converted discursively into the more serious 
issue of violence and danger23. 
In terms of putative function the article extracts quoted above 
arguably act as a warning to patients, villagers and the 
hospital authorities, that something nasty could happen unless 
something is done. There is also a possible and implicit 
interpretative line. that patients may be responsible for 
others, losing control. That is, others who are I less patient' 
may simply be pushed over the edge into anger and violence by 
the behaviour of the patient him or herself (even though the 
patient 'can't help' his or her behaviour)24. Of course if the 
text allows this reading then it also allows for the 
possibility of villagers and others, by implication, becoming 
patient-like, i. e. by losing control of their actions. 
The use of the repertoire of Humanistic Concern together with 
the contrast structure between speaker, friends and violent 
others, functions to present the speaker and her friends as 
caring people. These villagers are discursively recreated as 
interested, concerned, patient and tolerant in contrast to 
violent, impatient, others. And obviously the complaint or 
warning of genuinely concerned people should be heeded. 
22 Reference to time Is also found in another part of the article In 
terms of the duration of the event Itself, 45 minutes, which can 
be seen to support the contention that this was a serious, because 
lengthy, Incident. 
23 In the article this theme Is In turn played down by both the 
Parish Council members and the Hospital Administrator. 
24 or, perhaps better, villagers may be pushed over the line by the 
coincidence of patient behaviour and lack of assistance from the 
hospital. 
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Yet there is more involved here than impression management 
(corporate or otherwise), warning and complaint. And it also 
involves more than the discursive production of the facts of 
the matter. For what we have here in the article, in the twin 
themes of violence and concern, in the intertwining of the 
repertoires of Own Interest and Humanist Concern, lies arguably 
a dilemma about how to act. In formal pragmatic terms we might 
say that the validity claims to normative rightness which are 
raised here are problematic. The article contains as it were 
a moral debate or 'moral work' (Jayyusi 1984) about correct 
behaviour, in terms of property rights and reactive positions 
to disabled others. The Violence which is raised, with the help 
of Concern, although purveyed as morally wrong, is presented 
as understandable, and thereby almost allowable25. 
Supreme Acceptance 
I have suggested that danger is a continual theme in the 
interview transcripts and have shown above how it can appear 
suddenly as if from nowhere, thereby assuming a predictably 
unpredictable status, and 'polluting' the majority of texts 
(transcripts). There are no texts which do not at some point 
refer to danger or threat. 
25 However In so far as the claims of psychologistic science are 
granted legitimacy here, then a further validity claim concerning 
truth is Implicitly raised In relation to the technically correct way 
of responding In such a situation. There Is a potential here for 
the Ideology of science to undermine or at least complicate the 
moral problematic In the way for example in which Habermas (1971) 
spoke of the 'technocratic consciousness, closing off moral- 
practical discursive spaces. In his later work Habermas (1987a) 
talks of the 'fragmentation of consciousness', rather than 
Ideology, In which the development and retention of knowledge in 
expert cultures may prevent the mobilization of resistance to life- 
world colonization. And compare e. g. Mishler (1984) on the 
dichotomy In medicine between humanness and efficacy (p191), 
and his 'voices of the life world' and the technical-scientific 
assumptions of medicine. 
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Mary, aged 89 years, who had lived in the village for most of 
her life, had been intent upon avoiding casting any aspersion 
upon anyone, patients and hospital included, and in this 
respect was unusual. Witness for instance the way she talks 
about patients she has known using an extreme case formulation: 
DS: I was just wondering how you knew who the patients 
were? 
Mary: Well they used to come in for a few buns, stale buns 
and that sort of thing and you got to know them and. There 
was one old chap, he used to bring me, when they used to 
throw the hydrangeas out in pots, held bring me some of 
those to put in me garden, you know. Because I let him 
have a few, * day-before buns and that sort of thing. 
DS: I mean I wondered if you've, ever mistaken somebody 
for a patient in the hospital who later turned out, not 
to be. Has it ever been difficult to know? 
M: No I don't think so, no, no I don't think I did (2) No, 
I don't think so. They were all quite nice. They got to 
know me more in the shop you see. (p4) 
Mary maintained her position of acceptance and harmony for most 
of the interview, yet on one or two occasions the hint of 
possible threat appeared: 
DS: ... What would you think if um, if you got a letter from the Council saying that they'd bought up this bit of 
land next door and they were going to build a hostel on 
it for people who used to be patients at Shenley? 
Mary: Well, I'd have to put up with it wouldn't I (laugh). 
Can't help these things, they come, don't they. 
DS: Would you object to it? 
M: Well I'm not much of a one for voicing my opinion at 
all. (Laugh). I'm very easy to get on with (laugh). So 
long as they don't interfere with me I don't mind (laugh). 
(p7) 
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And in the following excerpt I had been asking Mary how she 
thought others would hypothetically respond to her if she had 
a nervous breakdown': 
DS: ... Would it alter the way that they reacted to you d'you think? Would it change anything? 
Mary: I don't think so. Well it all depends how it 
affected, me, wouldn't it be. If I was aggressive, they'd 
want to get rid of me quick wouldn't they? Cos I mean you 
can't help how the mind goes, can you? (p15) 
I have been arguing above that danger, threat and violence are 
everpresent, if sometimes implicit, themes in interview 
transcripts (and including one newspaper article), themes which 
may be brought into being with the assistance of the repertoire 
of Humanist Concern. I shall continue by considering those 
occasions in which these themes occur in a more explicit 
manner. 
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5: The Odd One: The Display of Danger 
I have been arguing above that danger, threat and violence are 
continuing and ubiquitous themes which are present in the 
majority of interview transcripts, often entwined with Humanist 
Concern. I have also'suggested that on many occasions the main 
interest of villagers is less to do with their physical safety 
than with 'nuisance'. I have shown above how threat and 
violence may be discursively referenced even in what might 
otherwise be taken to be unthreatening situations, or 
situations of 'nuisance', and in a reverse fashion, how in the 
process of argumentation and in conjunction with the expression 
of concern, danger can be , 
suppressed and converted to 
harmlessness (in Strange Alliances p320 above). 
Danger and violence can of course also surface in a relatively 
explicit manner and yet the way in which this is done continues 
to be of considerable analytic interest. In the following 
example I had just asked Kev, a 23 year old man who had lived 
in the village for just over 3 years and who worked in a 
Shenley pub, how he would feel about a hostel being built next 
door: 
Kev: Oh (3) As I say if it's somewhere like Shenleybury 
where they can look after themselves and if you like 
aren't violent or whatever, I don't think, I wouldn't 
complain or anything. If it was right next door I suppose, 
and you've got say people from the flats who started to, 
I don't know, get petitions going up or something like 
that, I mean, you might get people doing that sort of 
thing. But I mean I'd never do anything like that. (p14) 
In this account, violence is raised as a central theme. Kev is 
saying that he would not complain as long as the former 
patients were not violent (in which case we may assume that he 
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might complain). But his expressed tolerance is buttressed by 
his assertion that 'others' might well complain even about non 
-violent former patients. In relation to 'others' the precise 
truth of this matter is not at issue here - and indeed we none 
of us could say for sure whether the residents in the flat 
really would complain. Rather, what is important is the way Kev 
argues his point and makes claims for himself by invoking 
, others' who are depicted as morally suspect. In the terms of 
Habermas, the central validity claims raised here are sincerity 
and normative rightness. 
In addition however another mention is made of patients which 
does not immediately fit either the Humanistic Concern or the 
own Interests repertoire. This is Kev's reference to the 
possibility of patients being not-violent and being able to 
look after themselves. In many interviews this often reads as 
a hypothetical concession to the argument, based around the 
form 'if ... then', often acting as a disclaimer. And yet it 
still raises the possibility, the theme, of former patients 
acting autonomously. I shall have more to say on this point 
later in the chapter, but for the moment wish to stay with the 
theme of violence, threat and danger. 
The following excerpt comes from an interview with Penny, aged 
36, who was born in the village, and worked in the store. Her 
objection is related directly to fear but in a less unambiguous 
fashion: 
DS: Patients wander round the village don't they, and er, 
unaccompanied. Do you think, that's OK? 
Penny: No, not all [the time] . Um (2) Not at night. I don't think they should be roaming round. I think they 
should have gates, on there and they should keep them. I 
mean they've got some nice grounds in there, you know, and 
they could keep a check on whether they were coming home. 
When you think some of these patients that they find dead 
and that, they've been gone for sort of four or five days 
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and no-one knows about it. You know, if they locked, I 
think they should have a bit more security, like checking 
the wards, making sure they're all in, and locking the 
gates. 
DS: Why at nights especially? 
P: Yeah I think they could frighten people, you know, 
frighten like the young girls, getting off the bus and 
that at night. And, for their safety, you know. And like 
they could, the way they could sort of cause accidents, 
I mean you'd never know, a couple of people have sort of 
said when Joyce died, someone was saying about he was 
driving along and he could see that this patient was going 
to step out in front of him, and he said he slammed his 
feet on the brakes and stopped just in time, you know. Um, 
so for their safety as much as anything really. (p13) 
Penny swings here between the expression of Concern for the 
welfare of patients and the expression of anxiety and 
apprehension. In this extract the frontier which Penny is 
defending extends through time to include in particular the 
night (see especially Melbin 1978, and also Lyman and Scott 
1967), an anxiety which can also be found in other 
transcriptS26. The conjunction of fright, young girls getting 
off the bus, night-time, and psychiatric patients, coupled with 
references elsewhere to death, acts as a powerful focus which 
may suffice to key the listener/reader into images of the 
(male) Boston Strangler or the (male) Ripper. And yet this is 
prefaced and followed by concern for the safety of patients. 
This extract therefore conjoins the interpretative repertoires 
,. -of 
Humanist Concern with Own Interests in a powerful argument 
to the effect that patients should not be allowed out, 
especially at night. 
26 Consider Irene: 'Don't like It when it's night time, If It's dark. I 
think there should be some way of them being in when It's dark. 
I do really. Day time It doesn't bother me. ' (Irene and Tom pl), 
and Val: 'But I've noticed the elderly people who I've dealt with 
are suspicious of the patients. We've got to know some of the 
older ones but you can sense the nervousness now regarding 
them going out of a night ... ' (Val p 1) 
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Finally I want to consider another response to the question of 
patients' freedom which displays violence and danger in a 
different but no less interesting form. Brenda, aged 38, had 
been living in the village for 15 years and at the time of 
interview also worked in the village store. 
DS: They're free to wander around and er, do you think 
that's alright? Are you happy about it? 
Brenda: Yes, it du, yes it du, doesn't bother me. Well, 
there's only one particular patient and that was um, a 
young man (2), he must have been 18,1 don't know. He was 
(2) He never actually done anything but, you, you felt as 
though you really had to be (2) you know cautious. 
DS: You had to be careful? 
B: Very careful. 
DS: Because, what, what would have happened? 
B: I don't know, it's just stories you hear about him, you 
know, that he's violent and er. If you upset him he can 
just, flip. 
DS: Right, so, so you felt a bit apprehensive ** 
B: Yeah. Just that one. 
DS: Um, and that would have been because, d1you think it 
was because of the stories you were told about him? Or do 
you think it would've been, also about something about him 
himself? 
B: There was something about him as well. It's just the 
way he walks, and stands, and looks (3) That's the only 
er. I've never had any experience of him. 
DS: So he's never actually done anything? 
B: No, no, but I've heard people, I mean especially in the 
pubs, that he's wiped the counters clean of glasses when 
he's (3) you know, gone into a rage (laugh). 
DS: I see, yeah, yeah. Does he still come into the um, 
I store? 
B: I haven't seen him for a while. No, but apparently 
they have to keep him under control. 
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D: I see. He's a young chap? 
B: Very young chap, yeah (5 secs) 
DS: So he's the (2) he's the main one then that you've 
you've had anxieties about. 
B: Yeah. Just that one. 
DS: In, in all those years, just that one? I mean that's 
interesting isn't it? 
B: Yeah, mm. (3) Yeah, I mean, none of the (2) No I can't 
say really, really. I can handle most of them that come 
in the shop. (p7) 
There are two central points to note about this passage. The 
first is that Brenda has not herself witnessed the man's 
violent behaviour but warrants her belief initially by 
reference to stories that she has heard, going on to use my 
prompt to invoke the notion that there is also something about 
the man himself which is disquieting. The initial warrant is 
quite legitimate and comprises an account of a discursive form 
of knowledge, of 'coming to know,. Brenda knows the man is 
violent because she has heard stories about him. This is in 
itself unremarkable. 
My defence of the man is met by Brenda by a reiteration of her 
point and a brief pr6cis of the stories. Brenda is unwavering 
about her conviction. 
Secondly, what I obviously saw at the time as being of major 
interest was how Brenda could apparently only quote, or only 
wished to quote, one instance of concern over all the years she 
had been in the village. The interview was a difficult one. 
Brenda was hesitant. Perhaps she had been holding back or felt 
too anxious about the interview to say more? But a further 
reading provides a possible explanation. 
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By redirecting our focus upon the potential functions of the 
discourse it becomes possible to see something of interest. For 
although propagated by myself, the seeds of the argument and 
prime function already lie in Brenda's first paragraph. 
Brenda: Yes, it du, yes it du, doesn't bother me. Well, 
there's only one particular patient and that was um, a 
young man (2), he must have been 18,1 don't know. He was 
(2) He never actually done anything but, you, you felt as 
though you really had to be (2) you know cautious. 
Brenda has said it does not bother her whether patients wander 
around the village. This is a brief statement of generality in 
which patients constitute an undifferentiated mass. She is, she 
says, only concerned about a particular case. And it is this 
particular case which is sufficient to cast doubt upon the 
correctness, rightness or sensibleness of the general - that 
patients should have freedom to enter the village. The seeds 
of doubt are sown here. That the majority of patients may in 
fact wander meekly around the village no longer matters; the 
one counter-example challenges the tenor of the text, 
undermines the general and promotes the particular. The 
, doesn't bother me' becomes subordinated to the emphasis upon, 
and worry about, the particular case. And again moving frame 
away from the text alone, it seems that the history of the 
relationship between village and hospital is, at least in part, 
one of a kind of lurching from crisis to crisis of imputed 
danger or nuisance; of the occasional particular within the 
general. 
It is possible therefore to see how violence, threat and danger 
may contaminate a text. In this form of accounting, which 
displays a kind of crude falsificationism, just one instance 
suffices to falsify, or at least cast strong doubt upon, the 
hypothesis. And it may be that the form of the account is 
congruent with its content. For where violence is concerned it 
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arguably only takes one episode or instance to shake confidence 
and undermine trust27. If the content in the above passage were 
reversed, for example, so that the mass of patients were seen 
as violent and the odd one was portrayed as harmless, the 
effect might be different. 
This passage again illustrates the omnipresence of anxiety 
about violence, such that even when presented as exceptional 
it comes to dominate the text. This can also be seen in the 
following passage where Irene, in response to my question about 
a hostel next door draws upon an incident which had been 
recounted by herself and her husband earlier in the interview 
(and presented in chapter 9 above, p238-9), but which actually 
occurred almost 20 years previously. This one incident has cast 
a long shadow: 
Irene: But if it were for bad cases I would say, well, I 
wouldn't be very happy. I mean if it's someone that was 
gonna break out and, club you one with a hammer or break 
In the house. (p15) 
27 Although this may not be the case In cultures where physical 
and 'unpredictable, violence is not only expected but valued. 
Consider, for example, the account of 'Going mental with the hard 
core', In Hobbs and Robins' (1991) discussion of football violence. 
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6: Discursive Dependence and Relative Balance 
In the previous pages I have shown how danger, threat, violence 
and nuisance are recurring themes, often linked to the 
expression of concern for patients. I have summarised these 
linguistic sets as the interpretative repertoires of Own 
Interests (Major and Minor) and Humanistic Concern, and have 
configured these two major repertoires in terms of the 
expression of dilemma. I have also noted how there is 
occasional reference to patients as autonomous beings and I 
shall further track this motif in this section. 
The title of this section 'Discursive Dependence' derives from 
the way the phrase 'It depends, is used in villagers, talk 
about patients in the context of potential controversy. It is, 
to be sure, a common enough phrase which is used not just by 
villagers, but which has applicability in every walk of life. 
Yet the very commonality of terms or phrases can sometimes 
conceal their intrinsic interest and their functions. 
And it is arguably an analysis of the common sense, practical, 
everyday phrases, terms or maxims that can point us towards the 
, ideological nature of thought' (Billig et al 1988 p2, Donald 
and Hall 1986, Fairclough 1989, Thompson 1984, et al) as well 
as the dilemmatic nature of ideology which can be seen to 
contain contrary themes (Hall 1986, Billig et al 1988, and see 
chapter 12 above)28. 
28 There is an extensive literature on Ideology, Its link with common 
sense, and the issue of the way Ideology embodies contrasting 
themes which Is too large to reference here. 
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In the process of analysing transcripts I was struck by the 
frequent use by respondents of I It depends I and variations such 
as 'Depends', 'Depending on', 'It would depend' and so forth. 
This may be seen as a cousin of the discursive strategy 'on the 
one hand ... on the other hand' which Billig et al 
(1988), 
drawing upon van Dijk (1984)29, have linked to prolepsis and 
dilemmatic thought. These authors suggest that if someone uses 
the terminology 'On the one hand ... on the other', in a 
particular context, we may expect to hear a dilemma in the form 
of two competing themes. At the same time these themes may 
often not balance out (Billig et al 1988 p109); that is, in its 
proleptic mode the two handedness may serve the purposes of one 
hand, as in 'On the one hand we I ve nothing against them but on 
the other hand they take our jobs' in which a critical comment 
is facilitated (and see chapter 12 above). 
If someone begins their statement with 'It depends', we may 
immediately look forward to the possibility of hearing at least 
two positionS30. On occasions the I It depends I is implicit while 
the statements follow a similar form, usually revolving around 
, but' , and often couched in 
the form I if. Ahen, but, if.. then' . 
Essentially 'It depends' signals the undecided or pending 
(hanging, from Lat: pendere), nature of a situation, 
phenomenon, course of action etc. The decision is suspended to 
be finalised in the future. It may be finely balanced or not 
but it' remains to be seen. This is probably the semantic core 
of I It depends I. Something, we may say, I hangs in the balance I. 
'It depends' then connotes both 'waiting' and 'weighting'. In 
29 There Is also a passing reference In van Dijk (1984 p48) to 'It 
depends'. 
30 Of course 'It depends' may be used to imply more than two 
alternativesi and may even suggest the rejection of any fixed 
meaning or truth; an overarching uncertainty. 
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this sense we can see doubt and equivocality which takes the 
place of a 'yes' or 'no' answer3l. 
In the abstracts below, 'It depends, is used primarily and 
explicitly to refer to 'types' of patient. The evaluation or 
judgment depends upon the type of patient who would for example 
be placed next door in the mental health facility. This seems 
fairly clear. Yet the passages often also possess a dilemmatic 
quality such that the respondent appears to find it difficult 
to know how to respond to the question, as in Irene below 
(p354): 'Well I don't know... I. In addition such passages 
often possess a proleptic form such that one part can be said 
to dominate another. In this sense 'It depends' may indicate 
uncertainty and possible dilemma. 
At the same time, like 'On the one hand ... on the other, J, or 
'Don't think badly of me, but... 1, 'It depends, also suggests 
a balanced thoughtful view, a rational and reflective form of 
discourse32. In a later section I provide an account of a number 
of different kinds of 'balancing devices' which achieve various 
balancing effects. For the moment I am interested primarily in 
the content of the competing repertoires which 'It depends' 
signals. 
In the context then of a potential controversy, 'It depends' 
both reinforces the topic as one of controversy while providing 
for the resolution of uncertainty. It acts to show how the 
problem or uncertainty is 'worked out, in practice. 
31 In an earlier draft I provided a more extensive analysis of 'It 
depends' but to reproduce it here would be to overburden the 
text. 
32 As noted earlier, Billig et al (1988 ch 7) have coined the term 
, reasonable prejudice' to describe the style by which prejudice 
Is at once denied, deplored and protected. 
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The abstracts which display talk in this way are numerous but 
a few examples must suffice. These examples illustrate the way 
'It depends' reflects reluctance, controversy and possibly 
dilemma; is linked to talk about 'types' of patient; and 
implicates a variety of repertoires. In particular the 
following examples have been chosen to illustrate further the 
range of interpretative repertoires involved. In the language 
of discourse analysis we can say that 'It depends' is a figure 
of speech which signals the utilisation of competing 
interpretative repertoires within an argumentative context. 
Irene is a 68 year 
village for over 3 
husband, Tom, also 
assistant in several 
about how they would 
replied: 
old retired woman who has lived in the 
0 years. She was interviewed with her 
retired. Irene had worked as a sales 
village shops. In response to my question 
feel if a hostel were built next door, she 
Irene: Well, I don't know (2) Um (2) 1 don't think. It 
depends on what type of person they would put into it. 
(DS: Yeah) For instance if it were just the normal 
depressions, nervous break-downs, things like that, I 
think probably you'd accept it. But if it were for bad 
cases I would say, well, ,I 
wouldn't be very happy. I mean 
if it's someone that was gonna break out and, club you one 
with a hammer or break in the house. (pl4) 
The form here is clear. Two positions are linked by a but' . 
And these positions are illuminating because they refer 
explicitly to two -'types' of patient, a common differentiation 
which I shall explore in more depth later. Here the 'normal' 
(normal depressions,, nervous breakdowns) is contrasted with 
, bad cases' (cf. Goffman 'Normal Deviants' 1957/1967). The 
latter position which Irene says she would not be happy with, 
is clearly an example of the r* epertoire own Interests' 
(Major). But what of the first part? It is unclear here exactly 
which repertoire this relates to. 
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The second example is taken from the interview with Penny: 
DS: Imagine that erm you got a letter from the Council 
saying that um they planned to build a, a mental health 
hostel next door to you, what would you think about it? 
Gonna house about a dozen, dozen former patients? 
Penny: We've talked about this before actually. (DS: 
Probably I might have asked) No not, not with you. It's 
a friend, friend of my sister's. It's, it's actually 
happened to her, right next door to her house you know, 
and she's sort of unsure, um, how she feels. It depends 
what sort of patient you're going to get in there, do you 
know what I mean. I mean I wouldn't want, people peeping 
over the, you know some of them peep over the fence and, 
I think that would be, I don't think the kids would like 
it. 
DS: So it would depend on the type of patients that they 
had (4) So you could imagine, that it might be alright, 
if they were all "? 
Penny: If they were all. Yeah, if they were like that, I 
mean I don't see anything, anything wrong in it really. 
If they all know how to, to cope and to look after 
themself and they're not ones who are going to sort of go 
mad and start putting bricks through your, your windows 
and that. (pl3) 
Again the argument contrasts I sort (s) I of patient. Both aspects 
of the Own Interest repertoire can be seen in Penny's reference 
to nuisance (people peering over the fence) and violence 
(putting bricks through your windows). But in addition we can 
see a reference to a different 'type' of patient corresponding 
perhaps to Irene IsI normal I patients. These are people who know 
how to cope and look after themselves and who at the same time 
are neither a nuisance nor violent. To extrapolate beyond the 
interview text it may be that these 'types' constitute 'types' 
in a Schutzian sense of the typifications which structure 
everyday action in the village life-world. 
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In a different part of the interview Penny and I had been 
talking about whether patients should be allowed into village 
pubs: 
Penny: Well I know it sounds horrible but they smell a 
bit. You know you get the ones that smell in there and 
they start coughing and choking with their cigarettes. You 
know, I mean, some of them they're alright but I can 
remember going in myself and thinking, you know, they 
shouldn't be allowed in here. You know, you go out for an 
evening you don't really want to sit and listen to that. 
As I say, some of them, again it depends what they're 
like. (p20) 
In this context 'it depends', which again implicates the 
possibility of different 'types, of patients, is dominated by 
the preceding negative evaluation in which patients constitute 
a nuisance, and appears to be an afterthought, but one which 
allows for the potential redemption of patients. 
References to such people, hypothesised patients or former 
patients who have some abi 1 ity to manage their own af f airs, can 
be found in various parts of the transcripts. The following two 
extracts have the same form as those above but the 'It depends' 
is, I suggest, implicit. I have drawn upon these to illustrate 
my reasoning concerning the development of another repertoire. 
The following extract is taken from an interview with Anthea, 
a 68 year old retired woman who has lived in the village all 
her life. I had just asked her how she would feel about a 
hostel being built next door: 
Anthea: I don't think I'd like it (2) Well, I wouldn't 
want anybody to build anythin_q anywhere near me (laugh). 
DS: * If it's possible to separate the two, the building 
and the um, the issue about having, people who were 
patients [here]? (2) 
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A: Well, I, I think you'd have to um (2) give them a 
chance, wouldn't you. But I mean, if they weren't able to 
cope and the place was dirty and it was out of hand, 
that's what I would be apprehensive about. But I mean if 
they could if they could look after themselves and keep 
the house and themselves clean um providing they're 
alright, I don't think, I don't think there's any 
difference. (pl6) 
Again it is possible to see the backwards and forwards 
argument, this time revolving around two 'buts', and suggesting 
both an ability and inability to cope as well as an implicit 
, nuisance'. 
In the next extract the coping patient is contrasted with 
explicit concern about other patients who are unlikely to be 
able to cope, and is taken from an interview with Karen, aged 
28, and employed as a P. A. in a local business, a relative 
newcomer, having been resident in the village for only 2 years. 
The extract takes the same form but instead of 'it depends', 
is headed with: I ... I think there are two things'. Lines have 
been numbered to assist analysis. 
DS: Closing down the big institutions. Do you have any 
thoughts on that? 
3 Karen: Um (1), 1 think there are two things. Um some 
people I think will probably benefit from it say perhaps 
the younger ones, the ones who are (2) are just a bit 
confused, you know, there's nothing, dangerous about them 
or anything. Um, where my parents live just up the road 
8 there's a large house been converted into little flatlets 
9 and little bedsits, um where half a dozen of these people 
live. You know, it doesn't make any difference. That's 
fine. I mean they're there in the community and I know one 
of them gets on the bus and goes off to * That's fine, 
they're obviously leading more of a life than cooped up 
14 in a big hospital. But, when you get the elderly patients 
that've been there all their lives, which, you know, from 
the few that I've seen I, I tend to think [as] that what 
they are. You don't see many young patients or I don't, 
you know I dont, I don't, I'M not involved in the hospital 
so I don't really know what's *. The people that I've seen 
wandering about all seem to be quite elderly, and I would 
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have thought um that if they've been in there all their 
lives it's home to them, and to suddenly say Oh we've got 
this brilliant new idea, you're going off somewhere else, 
I should think it would frighten and confuse them even 
more, personally. I mean I'm not a professional, I don't 
know. I presume the psychiatrists know what they're, you 
know, rknow what they're doing, or maybe they don't I dont 
know I 
29 DS: LKnow what they're doing, or maybe they don't 
YC: But it just seems logical to me that if somebody thinks 
of a place as home and they're used to it, they know every 
inch of it, go to the village and they've got a routine. 
Suddenly pack them up and ship them off somewhere else 
34 when they are so confused, * (p14) 
The f irst point to note about this extract is that on the 
surface we might say that it has a liberating aspect in that 
lines 3-14 appear to acknowledge that many patients have a 
potential for autonomy, for self-determination, and should be 
allowed out of hospital. In its second part (lines 14-34) it 
recognises that other patients are vulnerable and should be 
allowed to stay in hospital. The tone of the extract is one of 
'concern' by the speaker for patients' welfare, and criticism 
of the hospital authorities. 
In terms of its rhetorical structure the extract can be divided 
into two parts, joined together with a 'but' in line 14. In the 
first part Karen tells us that the 'younger' patients who are 
'no danger' may be allowed out. The 'older' patients referred 
to in the second part are ascribed feelings of fright and 
confusion at the prospect of being moved somewhere else. The 
sequential order of the two parts is important and 
asymmetrical. If they were to be reversed then the emphasis of 
the passage would change. The first part can be read as having 
the function of 'feeding into' the second, of setting it up as 
it were. In this sense it is not independent of part two. In 
its rhetorical form it is close to a disclaimer or prolepsis. 
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In addition the grammar used in part one is arguably 
patronising. The use of diminutives in lines 8 and 9 portray 
a sense of these people as children. The syntax transforms and 
transfixes any other potentially radical meaning; the patients 
being discharged have shrunk descriptively and morally to the 
size of children and hence still need attention, albeit not in 
hospital. 
We might also add that the division in the above text between 
young and old people acts as a supposedly self-evident 
explanatory and supporting mechanism. But again, although we 
might think that older people might not want to move home, this 
may in fact not be the case at all. The feelings attributed to 
patients are presented as causally independent of the patients, 
stimulated by the environment, feelings over which patients 
have little control. There is no suggestion that patients might 
actually want to move out, or that they could be consulted 
about moving. In this sense, in which patients are not granted 
a capacity for choice, the message dominating the account is 
that patients should be looked after. 
Finally there is mention in the account of younger patients who 
are not dangerous, in a way that suggests that somewhere else 
'other' patients may be dangerous. The text does not tell us 
where these others are. The reference to danger is an aspect 
of the 'Own Interests' repertoire previously identified. 
I want to suggest that the extracts presented in this section 
point towards the delineation of a further repertoire which 
incorporates references to patients' (sometimes limited) 
autonomy. This fails to fit easily into the other repertoires 
already identified. It is not readily congruent with villagers' 
expressed concern for their own interests which is linked to 
patients as either dangerous, threatening, violent or a 
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nuisance. Neither does it fit easily with the repertoire of 
Humanist Conqern, with its stress upon caring villagers and 
sick or ill patients who need to be helped, looked after and 
cared for, especially in hospital (although it could be made 
to fit these). 
I have therefore named this the repertoire of Relative Balance 
and I have shown above how it may be modified by particular 
grammar, and used in conjunction with, as a quasi-disclaimer, 
other repertoires with various ef f ects (and cf . Kev in I The Odd 
One' P344 ff). 
The naming of this repertoire in fact went through several 
stages, beginning first with 'Coping Patients' and moving to 
'Quasi-Autonomy'. I felt however that these names did not 
really capture the relationship between villagers and patients. 
The name Relative Balance incorporates a number of references: 
a) Like the preceding names it suggests that there are for 
villagers different types of patients, and that some may be 
more balanced or stable than others, as Mike, aged 16 and born 
in the village, suggests: 
DS: ... What would 'fitting into society well, mean for 
you? What would they, need to do or not do, to f it in? (4) 
Mike: I think they'd have to be of a, a more stable 
character. Not so unpredictable as some patients can be. 
(P15) 
b) It touches on the idea that there could be a change in 
status involved in discharge into the community so that 
patient-vil lager statuses could become relatively balanced. 
This was suggested by Anne in discussing the possible siting 
of a group home next door: 
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Anne: Erm (6) Let me think, I can't think. (Arthur 
interjects) Well, providing they az-e in the category where 
they can look after themselves. (Talking over each other) 
It's just like another householder isn't it, just like 
another house (p18) 
c) 'Balance' is related to rationality as in a) but also refers 
back to villagers' balancing devices (see below) which allude 
to further evidence of villagers' rationality in their 
transcript texts. 
d) Finally it also hints at the relationship between 
rationality, realism and relativism which this thesis has also 
addressed. 
Discursive Dependence, Qualified 
In the previous section I argued that it is possible to 
identify a repertoire of 'Relative Balance' which is drawn 
upon in the expression of 'discursive dependence'. 
We also saw above in the extract from the interview with Karen 
that a diminutive 'little' was used with the effect of 
challenging the status or autonomy of discharged longer stay 
patientS33. This word is used occasionally in other interviews 
in relation to patients, as in the following excerpt from the 
interview with Mrs and Mrs Green, Harold and Wendy. This 
retired couple had lived and worked in the village for 
approximately 40 years: 
DS: Did you make friends with patients yourselves? 
Harold: Oh yes= 
Wendy: =Well, only through business really 
33 Van DIjk (1984 p137) also mentions the use of 'paternalistic 
diminutives' by his respondents. 
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H: Not, not, not er personal friends, no. I mean we, 
there's one that is there at the moment, a very 
intelligent um man really. I mean he, been there 40 odd 
years and er, er but um he obviously was the type that 
couldn't, be outside the environment of the hospital. As 
soon as he went out he was sort of in a phobia that held 
got to be back and er. But he was working there, and (1.5) 
rtranslating= 
W: LHe run a newspaper 
H: =He run the newspaper and he translated Russian. He was 
very good at Russian and he used to do this translation 
and er, he had his own little, room and did that and he 
was musical and very good. And he was the patients' 
representative on the, League of Friends. (DS: I see) But 
um then unfortunately he was told that you know he was one 
of better ones and he would probably have to go out, and 
he's gone back er in a very bad state. 
DS: He's still in there is he? 
H: Sti 11 in there, yes IIm sure. Yes cause we were talking 
about him recently. (p2) 
And 
DS: So that wouldn't be very popular, if they were 
rehoused next door? 
Wendy: No, I don't think. I mean, I'm saying if, I mean 
they haven't tried, well they have tried a few but I mean 
not generally speaking in the village. They've taken them 
out= 
DS: =I know there's some down the bottom of the hill 
W: Oh yes, well of course there's their own little 
Harold: Yes they are eh= 
(p7) 
The next extract is from an interview with John and Susan 
Smith, another retired couple who had moved to Shenley over 50 
years previously, and who initially lived within the hospital 
grounds. When I met them they were resident within the village. 
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In this excerpt little, is used in relation to patients in a 
way which conveys poverty, paucity and dereliction: 
Susan: It's like they are in London now. A lot of those 
patients are there with their little boxes, they're 
sleeping in the park. I= 
I 
John: LWel 1 you dont 
know it (laughter) 
Susan: =don It know it but my mind te 11 s me that er that Is 
where they are, a lot of these patients, in their little 
boxes. That's my little section of the pavement. But yeah, 
they've got to go somewhere haven't they? (3) And I think 
its dreadful. (p7) 
The effect of a diminutive may obviously vary according to the 
context but often appears to transform the subject or object 
to which it is attached into something or someone not quite 
complete, or unimportant. In my reading it is patronising. 
occasionally too the connection between patients and children 
is made expliCit34. 
In this next extract from an interview with Jean, a 21 year old 
villager, born and bred, the comparison with children is made 
explicit. I had asked Jean whether any patients would be 
allowed to join the local carpet bowls club. Her reply, which 
began with an 'Um, depends who it was I think', meandered 
through different arguments to finish here: 
34 The connection between mentally disordered people and children 
Is one which has a long history, see e. g. Platt and Diamond (1965). 
In her Interesting book In which she considers the grounds upon 
which madness may be said to 'exculpate', Radden (1985) draws 
parallels between the 'unreason, of children and that of madness 
(ch 10), via a consideration of the work of Plaget. Mad people and 
children, she argues, share a similar lack of reason. This notion 
of madness as '(Exculpating) Unreason' (rather than, for example, 
disease) better allows us to regard madness as ordinary and 
everyday, less obscure, puzzling and less different, she 
maintains, without rendering It Identical to sanity (p53). The 
psychoanalytic tradition also establishes other kinds of links 
between madness and childhood. 
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DS: Um, I mean if somebody turned out to be quite good at 
the bowls, would he be allowed? 
Jean: Probably yeah. Yeah, if he wasn't any problem and 
he was quite good at it. Did as he was told, then yeah 
(j5). It's like with the young ones, there are, I think the 
youngest one there's now is 15. There's a new girl 
started, I think she Is about 10, and they used to be 
younger. Used to be quite younger and it's just the same 
children, init, a lot of the patients. As long as they do 
as they're told and are quite good. Know what they're 
doing (7) (plO) 
And later in the interview. Jean had been talking about how she 
had once worked at the patients' shop within the hospital 
grounds: 
Jean: ... It was quite funny actually, I was scared at first serving the patients. In the end you just do it. You 
don't worry about it, you have a chat with them all as 
well. I found it hard to serve the normal people if you 
call them normal people. Nurses and that. Didn't know how 
to speak to them. Cos you're so used to the way you speak 
to patients you know. Some of them you speak to like 
children. Some of them you have to respect as well cos 
they get angry with you (laugh). You never even used to 
know, sometimes you didn't know which were patients and 
which were nurses. Some of the foreign ones you couldn't 
tell. (p4) 
In the interview with the Greens the same identification can 
be seen: 
Wendy: ... As we always said the patients are no more trouble than, most of the public are quite nice but you 
get them, some of them that you see them coming and 
they're all a damned nuisance. There's no difference 
really is there? We always said their money was as good 
as anybody else's and they needed um kindly treatment and 
er, generally speaking, not all - of 
them but some treated 
as children. Some are highly intelligent and of course 
it's the highly intelligent one that can be very sarcastic 
at times to you. (p4) 
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7: Humanist Concern: Help and Care 
I have shown above how the interpretative repertoire of 
Humanist Concern has been used in conjunction with other 
repertoires in the production of particular discursive effects 
in the context of debate and argument. In this and the 
subsequent section I intend to show how this repertoire may be 
elaborated. 
I indicated earlier (p308) that the repertoire of Humanist 
Concern has a number of different facets and it is to this 
range that I shall now turn. The extracts presented below 
inevitably also display the repertoires Own Interests and 
Relative Balance, for in the large majority of interviews all 
three are drawn upon, in different combinations and with 
various discursive effects. 
These different aspects could, to be sure, be portrayed as 
repertoires in their own right but I have chosen not to do this 
in the interests of economy and textual management. 
This section is concerned principally with a major distinction 
which can be made within the Humanist Concern repertoire, 
between the notion that patients should be looked after,, 
especially in hospital, 'cared for' in their 'proper place,; 
and the suggestion that patients might or should be 'helped'. 
Both parts express Concern but with a different emphasis. A 
reference to villagers' desire to help patients can be found 
in the extract from Parish Council minutes presented on p311, 
as a first part of a prolepsis: 
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Councillor Broadley stressed the fact that in general 
there was a very real desire on the part of the Village 
to help in all practical ways the recovery of those 
patients who would benefit by mixing with the outside 
world, but... 
The focus upon 'help' is often oriented to the notion that 
patients or their conditions may improve, whereas being looked 
after, or cared for, may suggest that no improvement is 
possible. These two parts of the Humanist Concern repertoire 
are not mutually exclusive however. Clearly it is possible to 
talk of patients being I looked after' at the same time as being 
'helped' towards, for example, greater autonomy; or to see 
being 'cared for, as, eo ipso, 'help'. 
In fact direct references to 'helping' patients are few and far 
between in the transcripts, and when used they are often 
accompanied by signs of doubt and dilemma. The following 
extracts were taken from an interview with Lou, aged 17 years 
and still at school. She had lived in the village for 5 years 
and worked from time to time in the local store: 
DS: Supposing then in, in the context of the hospital 
closing down, supposing um, the planning authority came to 
you and said um, well actually Mr and Mrs [Blackwell] and 
family, er we have plans to build a mental health hostel 
right next door here to [your] cottage. What would you 
think about that? (2) 
Lou: Um (2) 1 don't know ** 
DS: Would you have any objection to it? 
L: Um (4) Not really, well (3) In a sense yes and in a 
sense no. 
DS: Do you think you could explain that? In what way would 
you have objections and in what way wouldn't you? 
L: Um (5) I'd mean to help them (9) They'd be new people. 
Um (3) (p8) 
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Later Lou elaborated upon her doubt: 
DS: You were saying yes and no and I'm trying to get at 
what the dilemma might be, about. 
Lou: People who didn't know the area and they came to 
visit us and they realised that you were living near 
patients. Some people would resent it and they wouldn't 
return because they'd think it would be (4) * and they 
wouldn't like it. 
DS: Do you mean friends of yours? 
L: Just general people who aren't used to living near 
psychiatric hospital or anything. They've never met 
anybody like it and they're terribly unsure. They'd still 
be unsure Itil they got to know some of them. They'd soon 
change their mind. (p9) 
The reference to misguided outside 'Others' is ubiquitous and 
will be analysed in detail in the next section. In the present 
extracts the message is explicitly one of uncertainty, with the 
interviewee drawing upon the Humanist Concern (Help) repertoire 
to reference her own position. In another passage, Lou again 
speaks of her desire to help people who are patients, this time 
in the different discursive context of working in the store, 
and in a more positive manner. 
DS: You were saying that you'd miss the patients because 
they're characters? (5) 
Lou: A lot of them have very strong characters. 
DS: Characters, character could be positive or negative 
presumably. It could be nice or nasty? Presumably you see 
them as positive characters? 
L: Yes (2) There are a few that you'd miss. They don't, 
they're very, shy and they don't feel like talking * 
because you're trying to get them to talk and when they 
do talk, they do talk (laugh). Rather a long time. And 
they, I'd miss having the chance of being able to help 
them regain their self confidence * speak to other people. 
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DS: Do you see that as one of your jobs in the store? 
L: No I enjoy it actually. It's not exactly part of the 
Job but it's, because they, if I'm wandering round the 
village they sort of recognise and they actually come up 
and talk to me. In the beginning none of them knew me and 
they just walked past. And at the beginning none of them 
knew me, or, they weren't, they weren't too sure, but now 
they talk to me. You know they meet the family 
occasionally if I was out with my mother * go up and talk 
to them and introduce them to * (pl5) 
And 
DS: How does that feel, that they want to talk to you? 
Lou: Um (3) Well I'm very glad that they want to talk to 
me. At least they want to talk to somebody. They talk to 
quite a lot of people but they have to know them well and 
know they can be trusted and know they, um, have people 
behind them that are going to make them talk and make them 
realise that * 
DS: So it's good for them and presumably 
L: Me as well 
DS: Is it good for you as well? 
L: Yes. It gets me to talk to people which I could do 
anyway, but. You know you feel there's something there 
when you talk, when you manage to get somebody to talk 
who's shy. (p15) 
This notion of discovering 'something there' when talking to 
patients is repeated on occasions by other staff who work in 
the store and provides an interesting commentary on the 
fundamental importance of communication. 
Lou's strong message of explicit help stands alone amongst the 
interviews, however. In another interview with Mike, an 
articulate 16 year old, doubts were again expressed, following 
my lead, 
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DS: A hypothetical question. If you were in charge of the 
store instead of [Brian] would you ever consider employing 
a patient? (4) 
Mike: Mm (2) 
DS: Or would you have doubts about that? (3) 
M: I suppose they'd be understandable doubts to have about 
employing a patient. If there was, you know certain 
patients who by the hospital's recommendation, were more 
ready for outside life, especially if they're being moved 
into you know the homes for the rehabilitation into 
society, then I think there would be a space for employing 
a patient on a small part time basis, to, you know, enter 
them back into society. Um, whether taking someone on, 
because I'm not too quite sure about their you know, the 
intellectual capabilities. There are limits to what you 
can give them anyway. But I think if you had certain peop, 
patients who were trying to be rehabilitated then yes. 
DS: So you'd prefer to have some kind of endorsement from 
the hospital? 
M: If the hospital gave recommendation, yeah. I wouldn't, 
you know, I wouldn't do it without finding out from the 
hospital who, who were the more (4) the better patients 
who were more in society. (p13) 
Mike's talk provides for the possibility that he could, in the 
appropriate circumstances, help patients, although the space, 
to which he refers, small part-time basis', seems quite 
restricted. In terms of the structure of his reply he uses the 
form 'It depends' to refer to particular kinds of patients, 
which I have argued has a dilemmatic quality. In addition Mike 
provides us with a reflexive meta-comment. Following my lead 
he does not simply admit to having doubts but modally suggests 
that in this context, doubts 'would be understandable' . My 
argument is that this reflexive comment, expressing as it does 
a direct comment upon his own understanding or 
understandability, performs a certain and interesting function. 
First of all it challenges any suggestion that doubt may be an 
indication of something not-understandable, that is, as not 
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rational. In this sense Mike is discursively recreating a view 
of himself as a rational and accountable actor. He is raising 
a validity claim about himself, his inner world, and those of 
similar others. But in addition this reflexive meta-comment 
provides a commentary upon how people like him may be expected 
to reply to this kind of question. In particular it can be seen 
as a commentary upon the normative rightness of his assertions 
in the interview context so that he thereby states that doubt 
is not normatively wrong to be expressed here. In a later 
section below (p430 ff) I shall elaborate upon the functions 
of reflexive comments in interview texts. 
In contrast to the display of a desire or willingness to help 
people who are patients, the expression of Concern that 
patients should be. looked after and cared for is regularly 
found in transcripts and more clearly overlaps both. 
conceptually and functionally with the use of Own Interests, 
as I have shown in the previous sections. In other words 
although retaining different foci, both Own Interests and 
Humanist Concern (Care) conceptually incorporate the idea that 
psychiatric patients should be looked after, preferably in 
psychiatric hospital, and the two are often employed together 
with functional effect. In contrast, the emphasis of the 
repertoire Humanist Concern (Help) is more compatible 
conceptually and functionally with the repertoire Relatively 
Balanced, which I have argued allows for the possibility of 
patients being semi-autonomous and 'coping' outside the 
hospital. 
But while sharing as it were the same territory of Humanist 
Concern the two aspects of Humanist Concern (Help and Care) 
described here may in addition each be used to counter the 
other; that is as a resource for an argument against the other, 
as the following extract with Wendy and Harold Green begins to 
show: 
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Harold: Well I think the hospital was there for the, the 
mental pa, was built for the mental patients and as I say 
these have been institutionalised all these years and to 
go out into the outside, world, erm they're going to be 
lost er and I think that there'll still be people needed, 
mental care. More so with the stress of the erm world 
today really. I think that er you know you need a place 
like that and I think a purpose built place like that, 
they'd be far better looked after even if they were only 
there for a year or six months and then go out rather than 
sort of sending them out now into homes where they've got 
to try and go to the market place and people are going to 
be taking advantage of them. I mean because I'm sure 
people would do, really. 
Wendy: I can't see them living in the community, I mean 
I may be wrong, but everybody II ve spoken to said, em 
everybody I've spoken to said, that if they put four in 
the house next door, we wouldn't, em, I mean we'd speak 
to them obviously, but we wouldn't ask them into our 
house, sort of thing. And we wouldn't really expect to go 
in and look after them if they needed to be or if we saw 
their dustbins all filthy and, and they weren't looking 
after themselves. (p7) 
The message here, which actually contains a number of 
fascinating and subtle parts, is that patients cannot cope 
, outside, and should be looked after in hospital; and that 
arguably because of this, neighbours of patients rehoused in 
the village would not expect to help out in certain ways. 
This extract could be said to blend the repertoires of Own 
Interest and Humanist Concern in a manner which functions to 
justify the unwillingness of the speaker, (and via an extreme- 
case formulation, other villagers), to provide support, strike 
up friendships, help out and so on. Here, Humanist Concern 
(Care) is used affirmatively and Humanist Concern (Help) is 
disavowed. And it is in this precise context that the 
intervention by Harold some 5 minutes later in the same 
interview can be understood. 
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Wendy: If they want to go and they can be seen to be 
looking after themselves I suppose it would be a shame to 
stop them but, I dont know * 
Harold: I mean I was speaking to a nurse who was erm on 
the League of Friends, she came from the Brent area, and 
she got put onto accepting the patients from the hospital 
and sort of caring, seeing they were alright when they got 
out into the world. And I met her at a meeting in July and 
said how was she getting on and she said Oh oh very, very 
well. Erm, it was in the Ruislip area and the [peop], the 
patients that had gone there they'd got in a house and the 
neighbours were accepting them in, very well and they were 
looking after, you know keeping an eye on them and things 
like that. And she felt that the group she was looking 
after, they, they, they were progressing alright. But er 
I don't think that'd apply, you know I feel they'd be 
finishing up at er, under the bridge at Waterloo, like, 
and er= 
Wendy: =I suppose, I mean you probably know this the ratio 
of how many going out, how many are living happily, but 
how many are sort of ending up in prison or doss houses 
and such like places, or are, I dont= (p8) 
Harold, perhaps initially surprisingly, provides an account of 
a conversation in which a group home was said to have been 
working well in a different area with the support and help of 
neighbours, but, in an argument which is congruent with the 
position proposed by his wife, tells us in effect that these 
neighbours and the professionals were, or are, misguided; they 
do not essentially know the patients. This can be viewed as a 
variation of the Real ity/Appearance device described by Potter 
(1987) and Potter and Wetherell (1987), originating from Eglin 
(1979, and compare Pollner 1974,1975). The message implicitly 
suggests that the appearance of positivity portrayed by the 
account of the discussion is belied by the essential reality 
of the situation. The appearance must therefore be discounted. 
Regardless of the truth of the recounted discussion the 
(implicit) 'R/AI device can be seen to mediate between the 
repertoires already raised and conjoined by Wendy in the 
previous extract, which for this reader left a sense of 
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unfinished business. Harold's intervention may be read as an 
effort to clear up this business. Its effect is to challenge 
any thought that the couple were themselves being uncharitable 
in some sense, for the couple can see beyond the appearance to 
the reality thereby concealed. 
This extract, then, has considered how the available repertoire 
Humanist Concern (Help) may pose a problem for respondents (via 
its disavowal) and need discursive mediation or management. 
That it may also be an asset can be seen from some of the first 
extracts in this section. 'Helping', certainly in its use here, 
has a positive evaluation, providing an instance of moral 
repute which cannot itself be easily or seriously challenged 
on its own grounds. As in the case of Wendy and Harold, 
challenge may be achieved via the transformation of the area 
of validity claims raised. The Greens were not challenging the 
moral correctness of helping per se; only its factual 
correctness - they can be said to be engaging a technicist or 
instrumental discourse about the correct therapeutic method in 
the circumstances (cf. p341 above), in which the validity claim 
of truth takes precedence. 
The above extracts from the interview with Wendy and Harold are 
also of interest however for the way they illuminate the themes 
of inside/outside, whereby a stressful outside world is 
recreated in which patients will be 'lost' and taken 
, advantage' of. To be sure Harold's later account of helpful 
neighbours somewhat complicates his position, but illustrates 
again a central point of this thesis, the variability of 
discourse in argumentative context. 
A different interview also provides an example of the way 
patients are spoken of as needing to be looked after in the 
hospital in a way that also implicates an interesting 
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distinction between inside and outside. The context is Hostel 
talk. The extract is included here in part because of the 
difficulty involved of working out just exactly what had been 
going on within it. It is taken from the interview with Jean: 
DS: Part of the reason for this study that I'm doing is 
uh, is because a lot of the hospitals are closing across 
the country. It's not just Shenley. It's a nationwide, 
international thing really. Have you had any, did you know 
about that? 
Jean: Yeah, yeah. 
DS: Do you have any thoughts about it? 
J: Well as long ago, as long ago when I was 14 when I 
f irst started there that Is when they f irst started sending 
people out, they were trying to get them to live in the 
community. Giving them houses, living together and that. 
But, a lot of them used to go out and I remember seeing 
them coming back ten times worse, you know. Used to be in 
terrible state when they came back. They always came back 
though. Hardly any of them went out and stayed out. 
DS: So what will happen then when there aren't, these big 
hospitals, when they're all shut? They won't be able to 
go back to Shenley because Shenley won't be there. 
J: I don't know what will happen to them. I don't think 
they'll cope though, a lot of them, especially the older 
ones. 
DS: ' Well I suppose um, the idea is to find other 
accommodation in various places. A lot of people will be 
going back to London. Um, you know they come from Brent 
and Harrow mainly. But supposing, supposing you got a 
letter from the er local Council saying, they wanted to 
build a hostel for patients from Shenley next door to you. 
They're knocking these two houses down and they're going 
to build, or they're going to convert them into a hostel 
for about a dozen people. What would you think about it? 
How would your family and you, respond? 
J: I don't think it would matter if it was a hostel for 
patients or a hostel or shops, they wouldn't want them 
houses knocked down anyway I dont think it would really 
bother them, not really. Cos you'd know they were, pretty 
capable if they were being allowed to stay in a hostel 
anyway wouldn't you. ** 
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DS: Right. So it wouldn't, wouldn't worry you too much? 
J: No. I mean, if there was any trouble then we'd do 
something about it then, but I think we'd try first I'm 
sure [they] would. (p12) 
This extract proved to be eminently analysable in terms of the 
apparent contradictions contained within it, but a full 
analysis would overburden this text. I choose therefore to 
present a small number of points. The first is that the extract 
draws upon the repertoires of (in order) Humanist Concern 
(Care); Relative Balance; and Own Interests. The repertoire 
Relative Balance ('pretty capable') is used affirmatively and 
hence clashes with the earlier repertoire Humanist Concern 
(Care) ('They always came back though; I don't think they'll 
cope though a lot of them... '). This clash can be resolved by 
a speculative interpretation which focuses upon the putative 
functions of different repertoires as used here. 
The conjoining of 'go out', 'coming back' and 'came back' in 
Jean's first paragraph, with Humanist Concern (Care), may be 
read to suggest patients going out and coming back from an 
outside world. This world is not elaborated in the text, but 
the fact that patients always return from it, suggests that it 
may be not as helpful, or enabling as it might be, or that it 
is simply too demanding for patients to be able to cope with. 
This outside world becomes implicitly contrasted with a 
corporate village-hospital, in which the hospital part is not 
entirely competent. Hence it makes sense for Jean to talk of 
patients coming and going as if they are going from or coming 
home to her. Patients need to be looked after by the hospital- 
village. In this context the use of Humanist Concern 
contributes to this division between a corporate 'us' and 
outside Others. 
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On the other hand Jean's later use of the Relative Balance 
repertoire, as in 'you'd know they were, pretty capable if they 
were being allowed to stay in a hostel I, in conjunction with 
, not really bothering' the villagers, functions to promote a 
view of the village as accepting of patients in contrast to a 
potentially heartless outside world; and also presents a view 
of the hospital as competent in contrast to the first part of 
the extract. This village acceptance almost inevitably flows 
from the notion of a corporate hospital-village. And if 
patients are being rehoused within the village then in this 
sense they are not leaving hospital at all. Relative Balance 
is used therefore to generate the inside aspect of the divide. 
The patients' capability enables the 'not being bothered'. 
A number of other interpretations are possible. one suggestion 
made in discussion of this extract was that Jean simply wanted 
to please me, or to appear unprejudiced, by professing village 
tolerance and acceptance, at the cost of coherence. This 
interpretation itself raises a host of issues. Elsewhere Jean 
had not been slow in disagreeing strongly with me about several 
other points. But if she had wished not to appear as a 
prejudiced villager then this is of course still of interest, 
suggesting once more that prejudice is not something to admit 
to (see the section on prolepsis in chapter 12 above). 
In her last paragraph Jean throws I trouble I into the discursive 
ring. I read this as the manifestation yet again of that 
uncertainty which elsewhere has generated a hint of danger or 
violence. Villagers are finally represented as accepting but 
strict, in that they will be tolerant or accepting within clear 
limits, although the precise nature of the half -anticipated 
, trouble' is not made clear, and the limits are not here 
defined. The dilemma lies between 'giving it a try' and 
potential trouble'; between 'tolerance' and 'discipline'; 
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between freedom and order; between the individual patient and 
the society-village; between expressing prejudice and wanting 
to appear or be unprejudiced. 
In the next section I consider in more detail how I others' are 
used with particular discursive effects. 
mArguin_q About Madness 378 
8: Other Times, other Places, Other Persons. 
In the process of arguing a point or position and displaying 
interpretative repertoires in the recorded interviews, 
respondents regularly made reference to an 'other' or 'others', 
with discursive effect. This section is concerned with the 
discursive use of other' in the research dialogue. It 
therefore shares an interest with broader forms of discourse 
analysis such as those of Foucault (1961/1971,1975/1979) or 
Said (1978), the anthropological critiques of anthropological 
others (e. g. Clifford and Marcus 1986) and the analysis of 
media-assisted social processes of labelling and moral panic 
in which various deviant and undesirable others become raised 
to perfection (e. g. Cohen 1973, Hall et al 1978, Moorhouse 
1991, Giulianotti 1991). 
However in contrast to these analyses this chapter considers 
some of the more subtle procedures in which I other Others 134 are 
discursively referenced. These others do not usually display 
the tenor or countenance of threat, terror or barbarism and so 
forth which may sometimes be found for example in the mad 
other, but are more delicately and locally placed within the 
interview texts. As such this analysis has more in common with 
the work of van Dijk (1984) who has used the term 
'displacement' to refer to the strategies by which others are 
portrayed as more prejudiced than the interviewee, as in 'I 
don't mind so much, but the other people in the street, they 
34 For Well (1987) 'other Others' refers to the often unarticulated 
part played In anthropological research by one's relations, 
spouse, friends etc. The 'others, that I am addressing here might 
then be called 'other other Others'. 
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get angry about that' (pl3l), which van Dijk portrays as a move 
for positive self-presentation35. 
The heading of this section refers primarily to the way time, 
place and person can be regarded as basic categories within 
which, or better, in the guise of which, an 'other' is created 
and deployed in the process of building a functionally 
significant contrast structure (D. E. Smith 1978). Although 
presented below as analytically separate, these categories 
often overlap in use, and as examples will show, the attempt 
at separation sometimes becomes strained. In addition the 
heading alludes to those common psychiatric and other medical 
practices whereby the cognitive orientation and functions of 
patients and candidate patients may be tested in time, place 
and person (Tredgold and Wolff 1970/1975 pll-12, Rubenstein and 
Wayne 1976/1980 p13). The category 'Other Persons' is most 
often used in the interviews and will therefore receive the 
greatest attention below. 
The overall aim of this section is therefore to demonstrate how 
lother(s)l is commonly used in conjunction with different 
repertoires and to begin to hypothesise about the different 
kinds of function which lother(s), might serve within the 
stream of argument. In addition however this chapter maintains 
a primary aim of continuing to develop and elaborate the 
interpretative repertoires. 
Other Times 
At a theoretical level, time has been implicated within 
anthropology as a crucial category in the definition of the 
35 And compare Billig et al (1988), for whom 'reasonable prejudice, 
requires an 'unreasonably prejudiced, Other from which to distance and define Itself (p114 ft). 
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anthropological other by predicating 'primitiveness' upon a 
unilinear timescale, or by using temporality as an ontological 
distancing mechanism (Fabian 1983, and see Harris 1991 for a 
recent overview of the use of time as metaphor for otherness 
within anthropology). 
As Polkinghorne (1986 p92 ff) shows, in literary theory or 
narrative analysis, the use of narrative time assumes an 
important position for structuralist analysis (e. g. Genette 
1979), and a central part in Ricoeur's hermeneutics-based 
attempt at understanding the place of narrative in human life 
(e. g. 1979,1981). Similarly inThompson's (1984) sociology or 
critical hermeneutics, time becomes an aspect of ideology 
critique3fi. 
My interest here is fairly specific and it concerns the place 
of temporality as others in interview transcripts. The 
majority of recorded interviews contain references to the 
history of the village and hospital, no doubt in part because 
of my interest in hearing people's historical accounts. Indeed 
both past and future jostle for place, the latter in relation 
to the projected closure of the hospital, and the building of 
a new housing estate, the former in terms of reminiscence. The 
references within the transcripts to 'other Times, are 
therefore extremely frequent. However my focus here is upon the 
discursive or argumentative relationship between Time as Other, 
Hospital/Patients, and Village/Villagers. or put another way, 
my interest is in how time is implicated discursively or 
argumentatively as 'other' in the relationship between village 
and hospital, villagers and patients. 
36 Time has already featured In a different fashion in ch 8 above. 
Bergmann (1992) has recently provided an overview of the literature on the sociology of time. 
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Because a previous analysis (Strange Alliances, p320 ff above) 
has dwelt upon the use of time in this manner, I shall only 
provide one further example here37. 
The following excerpt shows how repertoire use is supported in 
argumentative context with the help of a temporal other. Jean's 
talk about patients being presently mostly lalright, is 
counterposed to the repertoire Own Interests (Major): 
DS: So they wander around the village. Is that alright do 
you think? Do you think, people who are patients ought to 
be allowed to wander, around? 
Jean: Yeah. Cos most of them are voluntary anyway. They 
don't go in there, their own will. Most of lem are 
alright. There's been the odd mishap and they've had to 
call people out to, to get lem, there's people escape that 
shouldn't have done and the alarm used to go off. We used 
to stay in when the alarm used to go off, when we were 
younger. 
DS: There really was a, a 
J: It was like an air-raid siren. 
DS: I didn't know that. 
J: Yeah. It still goes off every now and again but I don't 
think it's 1cos of the patients. Don't know what they use 
it for. We used to, I don't, I don't even know if it was, 
that reason. If one of the dangerous ones used to get out 
this siren used to go off, (laugh) like an air-raid siren. 
That's what we always used to think it was, somebody got 
out. 
DS: That's interesting (2) So it, it may have gone off 
because somebody had got out or it may have gone off 
I for other reasons? 
37 However the focus on time as other raises a potential problem. For 
the very presence of the ordering scheme of time In the extracts 
mark them out as good candidates for the predicate story'. See footnotes 5 (p305) and 11 (p322) above. 
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J: 
LFor 
another reason. IIm sure it was that, IIm sure 
it was. Cos often there used to be a helicopter come over 
afterwards, after the alarm went off. (p8) 
A straightforward and unsophisticated translation of the above 
shows how Jean contrasts a past rendered dangerous because of 
escaping patients (Own Interests, Major), with a less dangerous 
present, a contrast which functions to support her contention 
that it is alright for patients to walk around the village. The 
precise manner in which the present is less dangerous, in which 
time has done its work, is not made clear, and indeed it might 
relate to a change in patients, to a change in escape 
opportunities, or to a change in perception of behaviour which 
used to be, but is no longer, regarded as dangerous. And it is 
possible to work out an interpretation in which not the social 
context but Jean herself has changed, in so far as she is no 
longer a child who imaginatively or wisely, if incorrectly, 
hears the siren as warning. 
But of special interest here is the function of the siren, 
around which debate revolves. That the siren did and still does 
sound, and that it issues from or relates to the hospital, is 
not in doubt in this text. Between us, however, Jean and I have 
problematised the function of the siren which Jean asserts has 
changed over time. The siren used to signal escaping and 
dangerous patients. 
Jean is left however with an argumentative residue or anomaly, 
of a siren functioning in the present for no obvious reason. 
Her argument may be read to the effect that although the siren 
still sounds, the present does not sufficiently provide for the 
hearing of the siren as relating to escaped and dangerous 
patients, in the way that the past did. In this manner the 
stated changed function of the siren consolidates the view of 
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the present as safer, while the extant use of the siren 
challenges this interpretation. 
In this glossed reading, time can be seen to be used 
interactionally in a similar way to place (cf. Eglin 1980), so 
that both particular places and times provide for particular 
readings, while the readings themselves consolidate the 
time/place as the kind of thing which generates that kind of 
reading in the first place (or time). The outcome here however 
is muddied by the residue of the siren sounding in the present, 
which may function to undermine the contrast structure between 
past and present, between dangerous and harmless, and 
implicitly between present acceptance and past exclusion. One 
may speculatively hear this siren as a reverberation of the 
past, a reminder that even though patients are now harmless, 
they were once (and may again be) dangerous. Danger it seems 
is difficult to dispel. 
Other Places. 
To a large extent the discursive use of 'other place(s) I is 
more straightforward than the use of time. In relation to 
place, the 'other' is regularly attributed negative qualities 
in ways which we have already seen above. In particular, other 
places may be coterminous with the unscrupulous outside world, 
in contrast to the tolerant village. 'Other Place' then 
acquires the function of helping to render the village and 
villagers sympathetic, accepting, unexploitative and so forth. 
It may therefore enable the use of the repertoire Humanist 
Concern but an additional repertoire candidate is also 
highlighted here. The following extract comes from the 
interview with Kev. I had been asking him how he would feel 
about a hostel being built next door: 
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DS: People do, people actually do, oppose um developments 
like that. 
Kev: That's right, yes. No I couldn't. But there again if 
I was (2) as I say, if it was just a normal, in say 
another village where it was being built and you hadn't 
had the experience of, of patients, then perhaps it would 
be different. I mean I think if, you know, if, if there 
were places say being built for people in this village, 
you'd get less objections than if you put them in a 
village, not London Colney whatever because they've got 
Napsbury, but you know in another village somewhere else, 
the other side the County and they were if you like 
getting them to live in a village and people hadn't been 
used to them, then they might. You'd get more complaints 
than, than this village * because it's just, I suppose 
people, I don't know, perhaps fear them or whatever, or 
something like that. But whereas here, I say because they, 
it's been here since, you know everyone's been you know 
about that they wouldn't think anything of it, really. 
Because you, right from children, I say you're brought up 
with them so you know, you do get used to them. But it's, 
it's like anything I suppose. Change. People if you like 
don't like change and they wouldn't necessarily like it. 
But er, you would get a few people complain but I don't 
think it would be too bad in, in Shenley just because of 
the fact that we're used to them (3) You'd get more 
complaints, you know, if it was gypsies or something, 
really, than patients. (pl4) 
other places are used here to contrast to the village in a 
conspicuous manner, and are tied to the village by certain 
arguments involving fear, socialisation, and the taken-for- 
grantedness of the hospital in local life. In this way the 
village becomes an place of near sublime understanding and 
enhanced rationality. This discursive reference to a special 
and specific kind of local practice and identity is common in 
the transcripts and often has an almost timeless quality to it, 
witness the following excerpt from the interview with Jean: 
DS: But generally speaking you think it's alright for 
people * to wander round the village without, being 
accompanied? 
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Jean: I think in a small village yeah. Cos most people in 
a small village have always lived there just like Shenley, 
although it's got bigger now, people moving in. (p8) 
References abound in the interviews to villagers being used 
to' patients, growing up with patients, taking them (patients) 
for granted, knowing patients, and to patients and hospital as 
'facts of life'. Time (history, change, diachrony) and 
timelessness (changelessness, synchrony) become interconnected 
themes. In this manner a new repertoire can be identified which 
plays a part in respondents' talk about the hospital and 
patients. I have called this 'Local Identity', which 
incorporates identity in time, place and person38. This 
repertoire has a correlate in other people and places located 
outside the village, or commanded by a different structure of 
rationality. on occasions such places are explicitly linked to 
exploitation as this extract from the interview with the Greens 
shows: 
Harold: Well I think the hospital was there for the mental 
pa, was built for the mental patients and as I say these 
have been institutional ised all these years and to go out 
into the outside world, they're going to be lost and I 
think that there'll still be people needing mental care. 
More so with the stress of the world today really. I think 
that you know you need a place like that and I think a 
purpose built place like that, they'd be far better looked 
after even if they were only there for a year or six 
months and then go out rather than sort of sending them 
out now into homes where they've got to try and go to the 
market place and people are going to be taking advantage 
of them. I mean because I'm sure people would do, really. 
(p7) - 
On other occasions the inhabitants of other places are depicted 
as simply unknowledgeable by virtue of their location, as in 
the extract from the interview with Kev above. 
38 This may have already become apparent in my discussion of a 
village-hospital corporate Identity in 'Humanist Concern', section 
7 above. 
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The hospital and patients as 'fact of life, , absorbed into the 
local social body; the taken- f or-grantedne ss of the affair, 
which I have synthesised into 'Local Identity' may be taken, 
regardless of its truth-value, as discursively functional. The 
discursively created fact of the almost timeless 'fact of 
life,, is, we might say, part of a dominant discourse in which 
, everything, at present, is fine as it is, (cf. Bourdieu 1990 
p52, Thompson 1984,1987 p521)39. 
Other Persons: Inside and Outside 
That the notion of a local villager identity can clearly be a 
useful one in the cut and thrust of local life, has been 
recently touched upon by Strathern (1984) in relation to the 
study of the Essex village of 'Elmdon' where local people draw 
upon different criteria in their definitions of a real 
villager': 
(Thus) the very strength of the idea of a locality is set 
against ambiguous and overlapping categorisations of who 
in social terms can reckon themselves as 'locals'. And 
thus the 'village', so evident with its nucleated houses 
and signposts, cannot match any particular demographic 
configuration. All that people agree upon is that the 
village is divided into 'villagers' and 'non-villagers'. 
(p46-7) 
In this last section I shall focus on the way that other people 
are referred to in the transcripts, in conjunction with various 
39 This may be particularly evident In the debates concerning the 
closure of the hospital. Witness the following statement from the 
Clerk to the Parish Council at the 1987 Public Inquiry: "Shenley 
Hospital has been In existence for over fifty years and during 
that time has been part of the village of Shenley and part of 
village life. Patients of the have been, and still are, treated with 
much respect and understanding and their sickness is understood 
and appreciated ... It was with some dismay therefore, that the Council learned that the hospital was to be run down'... ". 
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interpretative repertoires, and speculate further upon the 
functions such talk performs. It is important to restate that 
there is a considerable overlap between the use of time,, 
'place, and 'person' as 'other', and this will be evident here. 
The range of other persons referred to includes other people 
who live outside the village (place), people who lived at an 
earlier time both inside and outside the village (time and 
place), people who live within the village, i. e. other 
villagers (place), and 'other patients' i. e. patients who do 
not hail from Shenley hospital and who therefore qualify as 
, other Others' (place). 
other Persons: Outside others 
Several younger respondents spoke of how 'the mickey, had been 
taken at secondary schools outside the village by other pupils 
who also lived outside the village, as the following extracts 
from interviews with Lou, Mike and Jean show: 
DS: If the hospital were to shut down next week and all 
the patients were moved off to another, hospital or 
hostels somewhere, would you miss them? (4) 
Lou: - Some of them I would. Some of them with a lot of 
character, humorous. Yes I suppose you would. It's sort 
of, it's the way you think of the village. When you speak 
to people and you say where you live because when I went, 
first went to school, and * said Shenley it suddenly 
clicked [about) the hospital. 
DS: What did people say then? (2) 
L: * They were acting as though I was ashamed to, which 
I wasn't. And you have, you know, people joke about it but 
they don't mean it, you know. It's just something they 
think of on the spur of the moment and you, they apologise 
afterwards saying that they don't, they hadn't been 
thinking... (p13) 
And 
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DS: So you're saying some people, presumably you mean at 
your school, (L: Yes) would feel so strongly that they, 
they would go out of their way to avoid (2) 
Lou: Some of them because they'd be so very, very 
apprehensive. There are a few people who I've invited back 
and they've been, you know, they've sort of questioned 
you. Sort of they'd think about it and you know what they 
are considering and you have to try and tell them there's 
nothing wrong, it Is just, it Is1 ike 1 iving near um, a city 
hospital. (p14) 
I had been asking Mike whether he felt it would make any 
difference in terms of others' responses if he had had a 
psychiatric hospital admission: 
DS: ... Would you imagine then that there would be any difference at all in the way people responded to you? 
Mike: Um, I think it depends on the level of maturity 
really. 
DS: Yours or other people's? 
M: Other people's, because I mean, being young, growing 
up with, growing up living in an area with a mental 
hospital, I take a lot of stick, because I live in the 
same area as a mental hospital. 
DS: Have you? Other people have said this, to me as well. 
M: Youknow, at school wherever and they say 'Where do you 
live? ' And I say 'I live in Shenley', and then, then the 
(2) laughter arising from every corner of the room. 
DS: A few jokes I suppose? 
M: Yes, but, I mean, it gets to you to begin with but then 
you ignore it. It's, it's a case that they're, they're so 
stupid, immature that they don't actually understand what 
a, a mental hospital is like and they don't understand 
what it's like to live with one in the same area as you. 
If they knew then their attitudes would be different (2) 
I suppose that's the same with, with a breakdown. People, 
if they were mature enough would, would treat you in the 
same manner as they did beforehand but people who weren't 
so, so mature may start ridiculing you and treat you in 
a, a strange manner (p16) 
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I had asked Jean what it had been like for her living near a 
mental hospital. She replied that she had not given it a 
thought 'unless people take the mickey out of you': 
DS: So what kind of things did they say? 
Jean: It was, nothing nasty. They just used to take the 
mickey and, 'Shenley nutters', they used to call us all 
, the Shenley nutters', the three of us that went to 
It's quite funny, they still do now. It's like they do 
about Napsbury as well don't they. Take the mickey out of 
people that live round there. 
DS: Did they say any more than that? Would they make any 
other comments about it? 
J: No, not that I've heard, not really. 
DS: So it was a fairly um, something you took for granted 
then? Until, until you went to Borehamwood? 
J: Yeah. 
DS: Did that come as a surprise to you when, when they 
started taking the mickey? 
J: Yeah, it did. I remember it did yeah. Cos I didn't 
think anything of it. It's funny, if I had friends up to 
Shenley as well. We used to go for a walk and they'd say 
'I'm scared' you know, walking down the road. 
DS: They really were scared? (J: Oh Yeah) Or just 
pretending to be? 
J: No, they were scared, you could tell (laugh). Cos 
there's the er public toilets next to the bike shop down 
there and the patients always used to use that when there 
were a lot of them. They used to sit along that little 
bench, yeah. And whenever I had friends up they didn't 
like walking that way, we had- to walk all down the -road way, the other way. Yeah. (DS: Good heavens) Mind you I 
didn't like walking down there either cos you can never 
see. If you're coming from this way, and you're going down 
that alleyway you can't see what they're doing can ya. 
(p2) 
From the perspective of discourse analysis the accounts of Lou 
and Mike above can be said to display some disapproval at the 
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way outside others make jokes at their expense. The message 
here is that it is wrong to do this and in the second interview 
that the perpetrators are stupid, immature and 'don't 
understand'. In contrast to these unthinking others, the 
speakers become more mature, more rational and considerably 
more tolerant. 
In the third extract Jean's friends are initially presented as 
peculiar in that they are said not to have liked to walk along 
a particular alleyway. The outside others, we are told, are 
scared. But immediately after my response of 'Good heavens', 
as much as to say 'how very oddP, Jean goes on to rescue her 
friends by 'admitting' that she too is apprehensive. The 
repertoire in use here is Own Interests (Major) which is at 
first attributed to the others. The subsequent attribution of 
fear or trepidation to herself is supported by reasons, 'you 
can't see what they're doing can yal, and succeeds in recasting 
her friends as, after all, rational and reasonable people. 
'Others' also feature in a similar fashion with older 
respondents. In an unrecorded interview one of the publicans 
for example told me how people who came into the pub from 
outside "like those two", indicating two suited men from 
Borehamwood, have left "when they've seen them" (patients) or 
"when they've (patients) been in here". This was attributed to 
ignorance. 
These extracts all refer to the way other people and place are 
connected. Coming out of frame for a moment, from a 'realist' 
position they suggest that place helps to organise discourse 
and interaction (Eglin 1980). There is a sense here in which 
the symbolism of the hospital extends out geographically in 
terms of others' apprehension. or conversely, that the great 
edifices of the asylums themselves may be seen to act as 
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semantic black holes in the grid of cultural meaning, in which 
meaning is sucked in and held prisoner. This has been expressed 
well by Ignatieff (1983, p169): I 'Total institutions, work 
their effects on society through the mythic and symbolic weight 
of their walls on the world outside, through the ways, in other 
words, in which people fantasize, dream and fear the 
archipelago of confinement. I As Arthur said in my interview 
with him and his wife Anne: 
Arthur: No-one would * away because of them or anything 
like that. It's only if you're out anywhere and they say 
where are you from - Oh, Shenley. Oh, yeah, you know, I 
mean Shenley's well known for mental hospital, like, for 
miles around. You can be 50/60 mile out and they know 
Shenley. Shenley relates to mental hospital, like. (p24) 
In a similar fashion Jill, aged 59 and retired, who had lived 
in the village for 6 years tells us: 
Jill: Knowing one or two people who have been in Hill End, 
I don't think I would think any differently from them 
being in any other sort of hospital. It's just a different 
form of illness isn't it. But what we have noticed, um, 
it's not the people in the village who worry about 
Shenley, it's other people. occasionally when you talk to 
people and loh where do you live? ' and say Shenley. 10h 
that's the nut house isn't it' . You know you get that sort 
of feeling from, it's an association of ideas, that people 
associate Shenley with a mental hospital and perhaps don't 
even realise there is a village with the same name. But 
I think local people I suppose come to accept it. I mean 
there are so many of these hospitals of various sorts 
around here that it's become accepted and certainly 
um---(p1O) 
The use of recounted speech (Tannen 1989) in a number of these 
extracts serves to bring the issue alive here, lending presence 
(Edmondson 1984, Perelman 1982), and serving to make the 
speaker clear about others. In the last extract above, Jill 
reports how 'we have noticed', thereby also supplying the 
legitimacy of intersubjective (objective) agreement. There is 
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some tension however in her location of 'others'. On the one 
hand they are to be found outside the village. On the other 
they are located outside the wider vicinity: 'there are so many 
of these hospitals of various sorts around here, that its 
become accepted'. 
In the next extract from the interview with Anne and Arthur, 
the other person's status as insider is ambiguous, but suggests 
a transition from frightened outsider to tolerant insider: 
DS: So, it didn't put you off? (Anne: No) You didn't think 
to yourself, Oh my God I don't want to go and live in 
(Anne: No) a village thats got a mental hospital? 
Anne: No. One of the girls who er lived in, moved in at 
the same time was terrified, erm of even you know going 
out, but she now works at the hospital. 
DS: She was terrified even of going out, of the house? 
Anne: Yes, yes. Going, not out of the house but up into 
the village where she might meet them. She er didn't like 
the idea. But she now works at the hospital, you know 
she's ... (p3) 
other Persons: Inside Others 
But 'others' are not always from outside the village. Maggie, 
aged 48, had been resident in the village for 7 years, and 
worked in the village store. She had been talking here about 
others who both lived and worked in the village: 
DS: Do you remember what your response was when you found 
out there was a psychiatric hospital just down the road. 
Did you have any thoughts.? 
Maggie: No not really. No it didn't bother me to think 
that there were patients. I think it bothered other 
people, people I worked with, previous to working in the 
shop... (p2) 
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And here I had just asked VaL about the hotline. Val, aged 52, 
had lived in the village for 7 years, and was a member of the 
Parish Council: 
Val: There is a hotline and it is always given in there 
for the residents to call. We've had one or two incidents 
that I have dealt with where an elderly patient's exposed 
himself especially in the summer where you have a lot of 
children around. But on the whole, we don't have too much 
problem with the patients. Some of them walk round and 
talk to you and that's all they want is someone to talk 
to and listen to their problems. Many have sat on my front 
lawn giving me the history of their life. My old man can't 
cope with it though. We're two different people. If they 
become involved with him, he calls me out. (p4) 
Val persists throughout the interview in portraying herself as 
not-bothered and not-frightened in contrast to some local 
others who cannot 'cope' with patients. This lacopial may be 
taken as an instantiation of patients as nuisance, the Own 
Interest repertoire. In addition Val demonstrates discursively 
a willingness to help by listening to patients talk, an aspect 
of the Humanist Concern repertoire. In this extract the two 
repertoires are articulated together with the help of an 
$other'. 
And in spite of his earlier portrayal of the village as being 
'used to' patients, Kev can still allow for a dissident 
minority of village others: 
Kev: Oh (3) As I say if it's somewhere like Shenleybury 
where they can look after themselves and if you like 
aren't violent or whatever, I don't think, I wouldn't 
complain or anything. If it was right next door I suppose, 
and you've got say people from the flats who started to, 
I don't know, get petitions going up or something like 
that, I mean, you might get people doing that sort of 
thing. But I mean I'd never do anything like that. (pl4) 
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In these three excerpts, others are portrayed as fearful, 
bothered, or as being unable to cope with patients. Again the 
difference is created between the speaker who is portrayed as 
competent or tolerant and the others who are faulty or somehow 
even morally inferior. There are few exceptions to this trend. 
However on occasions people will acknowledge that other 
villagers are 'better at dealing with patients' than the 
speaker. Maggie for instance had been recounting a story about 
an episode in the store involving a patient who had been 
, screaming and yelling' and refers to another villager who was 
in the store at the time: 
Maggie: And Brian said 'well, if you want to die, don't 
die here. Go back to the hospital and die I. I think he 
knows better than me how to talk to them, you know. He 
just said that and he shut up, well, he did keep on about 
he wanted to die, just depressed. Very, very nervous. (p3) 
Even here, Brian, acknowledged as more competent, is not 
completely successful and as a result Maggie is not a complete 
failure. 
other Persons?: Village Children 
A particular category or group of village 'others, who attract 
a good deal of comment are local children, especially within 
the context of my question about whether some people in the 
village might be more or less accepting of patients. In this 
sense I more directly help create the 'other', but the 
responses are nevertheless of interest: 
DS: SO (1.5) you don't think it's a problem for other 
villagers. Um, do you think other people in the village 
are accepting, accepting of patients, or tolerant of 
patients or, do you think erm (2) there might be some 
people that don't want to, anything to do with them? 
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Brenda: I haven't come across it no, other than the, the 
young, the children I think they can (2) (cough) 
intimidate the patients, they can shout at them, and er 
(2) 1 think that's the only thing, really. 
DS: Have you seen that yourself? 
B: I don't see it so much now. I mean when I was, the 
children were younger, you'd get it. I mean if a patient 
came down the road the children would shout (2) you know, 
"There's a patient, there's a patient, run", you know, 
that sort of thing. (p1l) 
In this next interaction Irene and Tom dispute my allegation 
that youngsters might 'take the mickey'. They appear to 
disagree on this issue but resolve the problem by 
differentiating between 'our crowd' and others: 
DS: I've heard some stories about sometimes youngsters 
might take the mickey. 
Irene: Oh, yes. I've seen that happen 
Tom: I've not heard, yes 
I: I've seen it happen 
T: I've not seen any baiting going on or anything like 
that you know 
I: But not with our crowd that we had. 
T: I've never seen any lads causing distress to them. (pa) 
Mike however, aged 16, is in no doubt that Younger village 
people are more likely than other villagers to 'discriminate' 
against, patients. At the same time he is not included in this 
set: 
DS: ... Have you ever noticed or ever, d'you remember 
anyone, anyone else doing something or saying something 
about, the patients? 
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Mike: Yes. Actually a couple of days ago there was a, a 
boy who lives further up the village. He was outside the 
shop [windows], and there's one patient who goes through 
the bins and he started cal 1 ing out things to him. Cal 1 ing 
him a dirty old man. 
DS: What, this young, this boy did? 
M: Yes. Insulting him. (DS: Did he? ) Yeah. I mean the, the 
reaction wasn't, the man didn't react to him. But, this 
boy was willing to have a go at him. 
DS: That's interesting because I've not, I've not heard 
or seen that at all. 
M: -There are a lot of cases of the younger generation 
having a go at the patients. The people I used to know 
around here, they used to throw acorns at them and they 
could be very nasty to them but it's, it's something I've 
never really done. I've never had a go or tried to make 
fun of a patient at all. 
DS: How old would that um, that boy have been who you saw, 
you know, a couple of days ago outside the shop? 
M: He was, he must have been about 18. He was older than 
I was. 
DS: I see. (3) And erm, in the past then, the, the er, 
people that were throwing acorns, would they have been, 
in their teens or, younger or= 
M: =Yeah, they'd have been about my age (6) 
DS: What do you think about that yourself? 
M: Er, I don't think much of it at all. I think they do 
it for, a cheap thrill if you like. I mean I respect them 
as individuals really. They are people. They deserve to 
be treated as people. 
DS: I was going to ask,, come on to another question later 
about how you feel that the villagers react to the 
patients but it seems from what you say that there are 
certain elements, or sections in the village that would 
behave differently to others. 
m: I think the teenagers do discriminate against them more 
than the other generations do. (p5) 
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It may be of interest that local children and adolescents are 
offered up as one, and perhaps the prime, example of local 
people 'discriminating' against patients. Regardless of the 
truth of the matter as presented in the texts, the discursive 
identification of village children as 'others' arguably serves 
a number of functions. At the normative level (one's normative 
rightness in so speaking, and the rightness of norms 
themselves) it is clear that a claim is being raised here about 
the moral injustice of such behaviour. This in turn feeds back 
into the sincerity claim, rendering the speaker, at the level 
of impression management, not-prejudiced and rational. But at 
the same time the kind of damage that may be done to the 
village identity by acknowledging prejudiced members, may be 
mitigated by the fact that these members are 'only' children 
and thus not completely communicatively competent (Habermas 
1970) or entirely responsible for their actions, and as such 
are on a kind of par with psychiatric patients themselves (see 
section 6 above, 'Discursive Dependence, Qualified'). 
The following extract explicitly compares patients and children 
in terms of where responsibility should lie for unacceptable 
behaviour: 
DS: Did your parents say anything to you about the 
patients? Did they, or maybe teachers as well. Did they 
give you any arnings, say? 
Penny: No, I don't think so. I think they just used 
to say, like I said to my kids at the school, you know, 
don't torment because you know they can turn4O and don't 
take the mickey, you know. 
DS: So there was an idea that they could turn? 
40 An obscure note: Compare patients 'turning, with de Certeau's 
(1984) link between walking and rhetoric (trope; Gkrtropos, turn 
or style), pp 165 (footnote 8), 183 above. Also consider the link 
between rhetoric and madness proposed In Appendix D. 
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P: Oh yes. I used to say that cos the kids, I used to go 
past the school and the kids would be laughing at one of 
them who used to walk past and calling him names, you 
know. And, what do you do if they're coming out of school 
and a patient turns on them they're going to get blamed 
for it and yet it's the kids that are geeing him up. It's 
the same as anyone. It's not only the patients. If someone 
winds you up, you know. (p2) 
This speaker expresses a kind of sympathy for the people who 
are patients and a desire for justice which is occasionally 
seen in transcripts, shrinking the distance between villagers 
and patients. The suggestion here is that the problem may not 
only lie with some essential unpredictability or violence of 
patients - 'they can turn' - but rather that any violence might 
be directly provoked in a manner which can be readily 
understandable. The irrationality here is located, is placed, 
not just with patients but also with village children. This 
passage then serves to balance up accounts a little between 
patients and villagers but in a manner which implicates not 
exactly villagers but their temporarily-less-than-rational 
offspring. 
on the other hand, in the following extract from the interview 
with Ralph and Nancy, the responsibility is shifted back again 
from both children and patients to hospital in a familiar 
fashion: 
Ralph: Provoked by kids. Unwittingly of course, the kids 
didn't realise it. They thought it was great fun seeing 
somebody with bloody trousers halfway down their legs. I 
think that was the hospital's responsibilities to see they 
was dressed properly if they were allowing them out. (pil) 
Not everyone however acknowledges that children provoke 
patients. In an interesting reversal Anne and Arthur told me 
how children only 'tormented' a non-patient villager. The 
effect of this is unclear however especially considering Anne's 
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comment that children will 'torment anybody that's not=', 
suggesting that whatever 'not' refers to, it is possible that 
it includes patients: 
Arthur: There were only one, he wasn't connected with 
Shenley hospital was he, he used to live round here and 
er, oh dear.. * moving from Radlett into Edwards's old 
house. Geoffrey, he wasn't a patient but the kids used to 
torment him like and he didn't retaliate. He used to run 
away from them. 
Anne: Kids'll torment anybody that's not= 
Ar: =Oh, the little kids and that used to be quite cruel 
to him. Throw sand in his face. 
DS: For any reason? Did he look different? 
Ar: Just a bit, you know. 
An: Yes, he did look different. He did look sort of down 
and out. He was always drinking like. Always half puddled. 
Ar: Yes but I mean for all that he wouldn't harm= 
An: =Well I mean the kids -used to go after this one 
(details omitted). 
Ar: (details omitted) there's a lad there, he's a bit 
backward but, a hell of a nice looking lad, very harmless 
lad he is. The kids used to er torment him, like. He used 
to get upset, he used to get emotionally upset. But he's 
a very friendly sort of lad you know. 
An: But of course, then, he's not a patient. But I haven't 
seen the kids, I have never seen the kids do that with the 
patients. I think they accept them as being what they are. 
(P15) 
n-+har Persons?: Other Patients 
Finally, I want to consider how some of the others referred to 
in interviews are other, non-Shenley, patients. The 
implications here are of interest in so far as these 'others' 
function to render Shenley patients relatively sane and I shall 
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later discuss other forms of interactional I balancing devices I. 
If Shenley Hospital patients become more 'normal I as a result, 
what are the implications of this for the village and 
villagers? Perhaps Shenley village itself becomes a more 
'normal' place. We could say that the village, the villagers 
and the patients all become more rational. Locating the I real I 
problem somewhere else in this sense has a distinct payoff. of 
course in a different discursive situation or argumentative 
context, Shenley patients may be represented in different ways, 
as chapter 9 above has shown. Here, however, we might say that 
prejudice is displayed in the process of countering prejudice. 
Shenley appears whiter but its prejudice has run into the rest 
of the wash. The villagers at once become both reasonable and 
prejudiced (Billig et al 1988) as the following extract 
suggests. The differentiation of types of patients into 
'normal', 'very ill' and 'bad' can also be witnessed again 
here. Consider the following excerpt from the interview with 
Anne and Arthur: 
DS: You say it Is an open hospital. There Is no restrictions 
on people. 
Arthur: Nar, they (2) 
Anne: Only, only the ones that= 
Arthur: =Yes but Shenley's not as bad as the others. Not 
quite as bad as the others. It's only the very ill like, 
they keep them in, keep doors locked but, but the real 
(1.5) the real er bad ones are down the other hospital. 
An: Harperbury 
Ar: Harperbury, they're the, you know, they. I mean the 
ones that's in Shenley are normal p, you know, normal just 
maybe had a breakdown like. I mean one of the regular 
ones, quite a regular one is er Spike Milligan. That's his 
regular that's his second home is that one. Just comes in 
for a few weeks and off he goes again. But you never see 
him wandering round village like. Just comes in. Just sort 
of hides away from everything and, gets the treatment and 
off he goes again. Yeah. In fact I think once, they had 
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him on television and he was still in his, same gear as 
he has, you know, in hospital. Just, you know he was dead 
scruffy looking. Er (1.5) well it weren't his pyjamas, 
something that looked like a pyjama. Sort of top and 
trousers, and slippers on I think. Just as he was and he, 
and he, done the interview and then went back. Stead of 
going back to his home he come back here. (p12) 
The discursive use of Spike Milligan also serves to support the 
argument in its balancing work. This example suggests initially 
that if celebrities and prominent people in our society are 
admitted to Shenley Hospital then the hospital and patients 
cannot be as bad as one might otherwise think. On the other 
hand of course it may be taken to read that these celebrities 
are worse than we ever imagined. 
In a similar vein Jill answered my question about a hostel next 
door: 
DS: I was wondering, erm, what your reaction might be if, 
if somebody said to you - We're knocking the house down 
next door, we're converting it to a hostel for patients 
from Shenley? What would your response be to that (4) 
Jill: (Choking-sigh sound) Difficult to say isn't it 
because er. It's like most things when it's on your own 
doorstep you'll feel differently from what you do when 
it's, further away, but er. It would depend I think on 
what, you know if it Is a sort of er (2) 1 suppose you were 
thinking in terms of a sort of halfway, house. (DS: Yeah) 
Well I think probably sort of I mean if they were patients 
from Shenley, knowing what we do of them, I don't think 
we would be unduly concerned. I think we might be more 
concerned if we didn It know who was going to be there. The 
prospect of it being someone who would be a nuisance and= 
DS: =So what would your main concern be or your main fear 
be? Would it be in terms of nuisance? 
j: Yes I think perhaps somebody being unduly noisy or 
being a nuisance if you were sitting in the garden 
chatting to someone, you know, shouting at you over the 
fence, and um. that kind of thing I think I'd be more 
concerned about. (p9) 
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Here, other hospitals' patients give grounds for apprehension, 
whilst Shenley patients are 'known'. We could therefore talk 
here of a sense of 'Our Patients'. Psychiatric patients from 
this perspective do not constitute a problem In toto but rather 
only those others who are unknown. 
The stuttered and hedged reply from an otherwise articulate 
woman suggests that this question posed a problem for her. Her 
argument that 'It's like most things when it's on your own 
doorstep you'll feel differently from what you do when it's 
further away' cannot sustain close inspection, for the problem 
is not 'most things', but a mental health hostel, and clearly 
it is likely that we would all like some things to be 'on our 
doorstep' . My suspicion here 
is that it has become possible to 
use reference to the NIMBY argument in a rhetorical fashion. 
That is, Jill is not just saying NIMBY but using NIMBY as a 
ready-fashioned discursive resource4l. She then moves on to a 
position of 'It depends' which again implies uncertainty and 
hesitation. Her reference to 'other Patients, serves as a 
rationale for her self-rescue from the problem. She is in 
effect saying, as a resolution to the problem, 'It could be 
worse'. It is difficult to resist the interpretation that Jill 
is reluctant to voice explicit rejection of the siting of a 
mental health hostel next door. In her effort, the repertoire 
Own Interests (Nuisance) becomes attached to Other Patients. 
This notion of 'our patients' has also been recounted in an 
(albeit now dated) newspaper extract. 
Group Secretary, Mr A. J. Paice said: 
41 In other words It Is being used In the fashion; 'We all know now 
that we'd all prefer not to have patients In our back yard. ' 
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I sympathise greatly with villagers having a mental home 
imposed on them. But I don't have much time for outsiders 
who come here knowingly and then complain. I think they 
try and make it out to be worse than it really is ... "It's 
a great deal easier coping with the patients today. 
Because they are not locked up there is far less 
aggression than there used to be. " "The majority of cases 
here are schizophrenics or stress cases, we have no sub 
normal ones - they're the unpredictable ones, liable to 
attack people. (Evening Echo, 29th Oct 1968) 
And yet the discursively flexible and historically ubiquitous 
nature of this form of argument can be seen in a more recent 
letter which appeared in theý Herts Advertiser (10/8/199o). 
Headed by the Advertiser 'A plea from normal people, and signed 
by several people who were patients at a St. Albans 'learning 
disability' hospital, the letter protested about the objections 
from Chiswell Green residents to the siting of a group home in 
that area. As part of their argument concerning their 
normality, the authors contrasted themselves favourably with 
, mental, and 'mentally ill' others. 
Conclusion 
In this section of chapter 14 1 have shown how lother(s), is 
used with discursive effect in a variety of ways and in the 
interaction between researcher and interviewees. Out of this 
analysis I have suggested that the repertoire range be extended 
to include 'Local Identity', which reciprocally implicates 
other persons, times and places, and which contains the notion 
of four Patients'. 
Nevertheless, at other times and on other occasions, as some 
of the previous pages and chapters have testified, Shenley 
patients are complained about in a manner which is difficult 
to reconcile with the notion of 'Our Patients'. And this 
further exemplifies one of the points of the thesis that 
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patients will be talked about in different ways according to 
the argumentative context. In this analysis of I other(s) 1, they 
have become 'Our Patients'. At other times they are 'Not Our 
Patients 142. 
The use of 'others' then functions to recreate identities (e. g. 
of certain villagers as reasonable people). However, these 
descriptions of 'others' also constitute moral work in which 
the boundaries of correct behaviour become redefined. These 
rhetorical moves may be said to point to, or highlight, 
normative issues about the correct ways of acting in certain 
situations in relation to patients. 
42 A further example of this can be found when my respondents 
explain the fact that villagers do not have very much to do with 
the hospital because the patients 'are not ours', Le. do not 
originally come from the village. 
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9: On Telling the Difference 
This section furnishes a fast track account of the way 
villagers go about telling how they can 'tell the difference' 
between villagers and people who are patients at Shenley 
hospital43. 
'Telling the difference' may be taken in tandem with those 
discursive devices which villagers use to minimise or erase 
difference between themselves and people who are patients, and 
which are analysed in some detail in the next chapter. 
This focus upon Telling the Difference began as a study of the 
discursive use of 'knowing' by villagers in interviews. That 
study was wider and more complex than that of the present 
section and some of its themes have since been incorporated 
elsewhere in the thesis. For example 'knowing', in relation to 
'Discursive Dependence' where 'acceptance' may depend upon 'how 
well I know him'; or in relation to 'Others', where reference 
to local knowledge can be seen to be used in the reconstruction 
of -local identity. Thus perhaps some of the more interesting 
aspects of the analysis of the discursive use of telling local 
knowledge have been subsumed and recounted elsewhere. This 
leaves me with a residue of the content of 'Telling How I 
Know', a rather limited list of the ways villagers tell me how 
43 As the heading Implies, 'telling the difference, also concerns 
telling that there is Indeed a difference; that is, that this telling 
is a moment In the processual re-establishment of a categorical 
difference. Of course there exists a wide range of discursive 
methods of 'telling difference,, such as argument, description, 
narrative, syntax and lexicalisation (for example the use of the 
word 'patient' In opposition to that of 'villager') and it Is to this 
range that the project as a whole Is In part addressed. This 
section therefore does not constitute an exhaustive analysis of 
'doing' difference. 
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they tell the difference between patients and villagers. The 
rather clumsy term 'telling how they tell, is occasionally 
replaced here by Itelling2l. 
But one of the problems for adopting a discourse analytic 
approach to this question, i. e. of 'How villagers tell the 
difference', is that in the transcripts a brief answer 
frequently follows straight after a question from an 
interviewer obsessed with this question, and may to some extent 
be disconnected from the surrounding text or argument. In this 
sense its functional use may also be disconnected. This seems 
to me to limit the use of such analysis, except in very general 
terms. 
Kinds of Evidence 
To a large extent the kinds of evidence offered by villagers 
are predictable. They do not include direct reference to ESP 
or divine inspiration, nor do they make use of the notion of 
villagers' drug-induced trances; nor consultations with the 
oracle, Azande-inspired chicken innards or otherwise. 
Villagers' explanations of how they know are highly 
conventional in a contemporary Western sense. Translated onto 
the grid of contemporary epistemologies and social scientific 
methodologies, villagers' explanations might be said to partake 
principally of the empirical /empiricist and the hermeneutic 
/dialogic, with a dash of rationalism (as in thoughtful 
contemplation), intuition, traditionalism and practical 
knowledge linked to routines and tasks at hand. 
In the process of telling2 (see the top of this page) the 
difference, villagers are arguably also displaying their own 
rationality. The stakes here could be high. Villagers have been 
intent upon providing constatives (Habermas 1979) in the form 
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of generalisations supported by examples which describe states 
of affairs involving patients. While these are given in 
generalities such as 'some patients go to the store,, any 
recourse to direct perceptual experience such as 'I saw a 
patient in the store' even more directly implicates the 
observer in the knowledge claiM44. If the villager turns out to 
be unable to provide good reasons to support his or her 
identification of another as a patient, then the identifier's 
credibility is placed at risk. As Kuhn (1991 p44) puts it, an 
inability to answer the question 'How do you know? ' suggests 
that the previous assertion should not have been made45. Or in 
the language of Habermas, communicative action is grounded in 
the reciprocal expectation that reasons will be provided in a 
communicatively competent manner, to support the raising of 
validity claims in arguments, a kind of 'security reserve, 
(Habermas 1982 P269). 
Nevertheless it may in fact be acceptable for villagers not to 
be able to tell the difference between residents and patients 
as long as this incompetence is incorporated as a part of a 
non-prejudiced scheme46. For instance in telling us that he 
cannot easily tell the difference, Kev also makes it clear with 
my help that there is not much difference to him between 
patients and non-patients, and also that it is difficult to 
generalise about patients: 
44 Although as Pomerantz (1984 p609-10) points out, telling "in my 
experience" may be a way of distancing, of suggesting the 
existence of a state of affairs without directly asserting It. 
45 or In other words this Is an especially face-threatening part of 
the Interview. 
46 In case this seems obscure, what I mean here Is that such 
'incompetence' Is acceptable as long as it does not clash with 
other statements. For example it might be less acceptable for a 
villager to say 'I can't stand those patients. By the way, which 
ones are they? ' Compare this with 'The patients are OK. In fact 
it's difficult to tell who they are. ' 
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Kev: ... Um (3) but that can only, you know, that might 
only cover a minority. Some of them you know have got a 
good background, got plenty of money and buy their own 
clothes. But er (1.5) you know, and others with, perhaps 
a bit slower, through, you know with money. But again, but 
again I mean that's not, there's no, I don't think there's 
a general rule. Again some, you know, some are, are better 
at others than that. You know, some, you know, they're 
very different they [don't] know their money but some do, 
but. But that's the same with, with everybody who isn't 
a patient. Some people are slow with money if you like. 
DS: That's true, and dress sense varies as well? 
X: Yes. It's very hard to say really you know who is and 
who isn't. (plo) 
It is therefore arguably the case that the kinds of methods 
which villagers tell within the interview world will render 
them more or less accountable and rational within that setting. 
In, the process of providing reasons the interviewee raises 
claims to truth with referents beyond the interview world. 
However, not only does the interview talk refer to some I thing, 
purported to exist outside the interview, but the evidence 
recounted within the interview which refers to the world 
outside also sets up a further relation in this 'external' 
world between 'the evidence' and some state of affairs being 
evidenced. The evidence in- other words also documents an 
underlying reality (Garfinkel 1962, Heritage 1984). 
How-then do people answer the question 'How do you tell?, I 
shall quickly run through the range of telling2 as evidenced 
in the interview transcripts. 
By asking for evidence I ask for grounds for believing that 
given assertions are true. As Pomerantz puts it , -requesting, 
giving, considering and evaluating evidence are practices which 
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are within the repertoire of social actions that are performed 
by competent people within a culture, (Pomerantz 1984 p607). 
From the point of view of Habermas (1979,1984) my request for 
evidence, grounds or reasons from the interviewee constitutes 
the beginning of a shift from everyday talk to 'discourse, in 
which, in this case, the truth of the matter is thematised, but 
in which normative validity claims are also implicated. 
Direct Experience 
Telling from direct experience is proposed by Pomerantz (1984) 
as a principal way in which people tell that they know 
something in an unproblematic fashion and with certainty, such 
as 'I've just seen a terrible accident on the motorway'. 
However, when the state of affairs is called into question, 
Pomerantz argues that people then routinely consider the 
'source' or 'basis' of believing in a state of affairs. Pace 
Pomerantz, even when this direct perceptual experience is 
challenged, it may still be possible to hold on to direct 
experience as an appropriate warrant. So, for example if I am 
asked if I'm sure that there is a lion in my garden I may say 
, of course, I can see it there, and it's looking mean'. I may 
be asked whether I might not have confused the creature with 
a large dog, and I reply 'Don't be stupid, I've just seen it 
eat the large dog', and so on. 
However, direct perceptual experience provides only a limited 
warrant for distinguishing between people who are patients and 
others, for what can possibly constitute direct experience of 
an essence of 
* 
psychiatric patientness? Interestingly no-one 
replied to the question 'How can you tell the difference? ' in 
the fashion 'You can tell a patient because they're mad', or 
'because they're mentally ill'. Such warrants would indeed be 
beside the point as Katz (1975) has also recognised: 
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Actors cannot directly observe the states of being they 
impute by their use of nouns. Characterologies of all 
types -criminality, sexual orientation, addictions, levels 
of intelligence - none of these essences can be verified 
by direct observation. (p1372) ... In short, when a person 
imputes an essence rather than an act by making his 
identification in terms of the present rather than the 
past, by using nouns instead of verbs, and by referring 
to inherent qualities and not expressed activities, he 
does not directly observe or experience but assumes his 
knowledge of the designated identity. (p1374)47 
To ask someone in the normal course of events how they can tell 
whether an animal is a dog, or a lion, is to invite scorn and 
ridicule (notwithstanding the issue of whether a dog is a dog 
or a bitch). This is not the case with people who are patients 
in a psychiatric hospital. No-one was astonished by the 
question. Many considered it thoughtfully. Some people remarked 
that it was a good question, while others suggested that while 
they could tell the difference most of the time, others 
performed poorly in this respect. This can be seen in the 
extract from my interview with Brian, aged 35, who had lived 
in the village for 5 years, and worked at times in the store: 
DS: How would you say you know that they are patients? 
f 
Brian: That Is another big thing. That Isa very interesting 
question. I mean when I'd been here about 18 months there 
were still people coming in that I wasn't sure if they 
were patients or staff. I, can think of one or two people, 
retired staff. They are lucid and have travelled the world 
but are very eccentric certainly. (p5) 
and in talking about another assistant at the store who lived 
outside the village: 
47 And of course we may say anyway that we never have direct 
experience of the thing in itself' whatever it may be. Rather, 
what Is to count as empirical evidence must be located within our 
systems of discourse and practice. 
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Brian: She certainly thought she was dealing a lot more 
with the patients than she was. They weren't patients at 
all. Probably ex-staff. There are some very eccentric 
people there. I know I keep on about it. And then you get 
people coming in. Certain people have come and gone and 
I never did know. (plO) 
The identification of psychiatric patient-ness or patient 
status may therefore be regarded as problematic in this sense. 
Some of the confusions which can arise have been outlined in 
chapter 9 above. Nevertheless villagers do on occasions refer 
to attributes and behaviours which for them identify others as 
patients, and in this sense direct experience does play a 
significant part in 'telling how I know', by reference for 
example to things seen, heard or smelled. 
What happens is that certain signs are often offered by 
villagers which are considered to be indicative of psychiatric 
patient-ness. By way of explanation, the interview question may 
be said to be cutting violently into the documentary method (or 
the hermeneutic circle ' cf. Giddens 1977 ch 4, Ricoeur 1981). 
The relationship between the surface sign and the underlying 
reality (patient status) is variously configured by the 
interviewee according to the particular extra-interview 
context, e. g. the kind of particular knowledge and gaze which 
one acquires serving in the shop or living in the village. We 
might say that there is no inherent link between the kinds of 
signs offered below and patient-ness and that the sign can only 
be read in this way because of what we already know about 
patients, this place, and so on, in circular fashion (cf. 
Garfinkel 1962, Heritage 1984, ch 4). 
Nevertheless the aim here is less to look at what mechanisms 
are really' at work in villagers' knowing, but rather with how 
they tell2. In the following pages I shall first consider some 
of the ways of telling2, then consider how villagers explain 
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'getting it wrong', and by way of conclusion examine the 
implications of such telling2. 
The Place of Attributes and Behaviour 
DS: Um (3) Right so some might um, might er steal (5) Do 
you know if somebody is a patient from the hospital? 
Anne: Yeah. You can tell. 
DS: Do you know how you can tell? Is it something you can 
UM= 
A: =Er, usually they're, the look on their faces, right? 
I mean, they have a sort of, that look, you know er, not 
quite, not quite with us, you know. Not quite. Also their 
dress. They're dressed in, up first, dressed first you 
know, anything they can, they can get erm (4). Yeah I 
think you can tell. (p5) 
And 
DS: How do you-know whether people are patients, is it 
easy? 
Harold: Oh I think it's very easy 
Wendy: Very rarely that you wouldn't know, very rarely 
indeed. So it's something peculiar. 
DS: What is it d1you. think? 
H: Well, I don't know. I think its, something to do with 
the eyes, the dress 
W: They're well dressed but I always used to if I was in 
doubt look at their collars and things. Somehow there was 
something different yes. (p3) 
And 
DS: I mean apart from kind of knowing them by name over 
the years is there anything about people do you think that 
would help you identify them as somebody who's a patient? 
Jean: Probably their clothes more than anything, the way 
they smell. Yes, I suppose. (p6) 
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In the next extract the sign which is referred to is not so 
much an attribute of the patient-designate, but rather the 
'patient(! ) tone' of the shop assistant. 
Jill: But er it's things like that and sometimes in the 
shop where they're trying to get something for which they 
haven It enough money - and I Oh, I1 11 bring it back to you 
this afternoon' and you know very well by the patient tone 
of the shopkeeper that Is it Is something that happens every 
week and they know very well they're not going to get 
their money so you know they just have to dig their toes 
in. You get the odd sort of incident like that that draws 
your attention to people I suppose. (pl) 
In this extract there is some kind of transformation or 
construction here of the moral order of the village. Clearly 
Jill cannot reliably know this from one incident. But one 
incident is altered to become a common practice and the 
practice is attributed to a moral weakness in the patient. Her 
account of how she knows is, here, rather shaky, we might be 
inclined to say, in that her grounds are not very solid. 
The following extract refers to behaviour and came earlier in 
the same interview. 
DS: I was talking about the people that come from the 
hospital and walk through the village and was wondering 
- whether you see them as patients, how you think of the 
people who come from the hospital? 
Jill: Well I suppose I have sort of mixed feelings in a 
way because some I know through the connections with the 
hospital. Some I recognise and speak to, and others I 
don't. I don't consciously think - oh that's a patient, 
that's not a patient. It's not a thing where I have two 
different groups. But um, I mean sometimes it is clear 
perhaps by behaviour that somebody probably is a patient 
but it's not something that er I especially think about. 
DS: What sort of thing, what sort of behaviour would bring 
someone to your attention or someone's status to your 
attention? 
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J: Um, well I was, thinking of an instance yester erm, on 
Sunday when I came along. Somebody coming out of church 
and the way they were sort of talking not just to 
themselves but sort of shouting as though somebody else 
was there and they were having a sort of argument with 
someone. Well it's not what you normally regard as 
behaviour that somebody would indulge in walking along, 
so I suppose it's something that probably you just 
wouldn't think about in another area perhaps, but here 
inevitably you're going to think - oh that's probably a 
patient going back to the hospital. (pi) 
This extract is of further interest insofar as it links 
together behaviour with place. It is this place, Jill is 
saying, which organises the way people are seen, thought about 
and known. The knowledge is, we might say, place-related. 
obviously Jill's idea is highly congruent with my own in this 
respect, although we may also ask how this reference to place 
functions in the text, i. e. view it from a discourse analytic 
perspective. In this respect Jill's reference to the way place 
organises her perception arguably acts to show that if, in 
spite of her denial, she does 'have two different groups', then 
this is entirely understandable because of the way her 
perception is automatically organised. In other words she 
should not be held accountable as discriminatory, or better, 
her discrimination must be seen as reasonable. This passage 
from Jill could be compared to another which follows 
immediately and in which her earlier position is reversed: 
Jill: ... this is one of the things I think that worries us 
about the possibility of, them being sent back into the 
community. Because this is not a local hospital. Their 
community would be back in Brent or Harrow in areas where 
they're not known, not normally around, and they would 
find it very very difficult that, the way they behave here 
we accept, we're used to them but if they did that in a 
strange area I think their life would be very 
uncomfortable. I don't think people would accept them, I 
think [they'd have] a lot of unpleasant reactions. I think 
it's very [sad]. (p2) 
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Here, in drawing upon the theme of Local Identity, other places 
become heartless worlds in which patients are not only noticed, 
contra her earlier assertion, but rejected, in contrast to the 
village. We might say that the conjunction of the two passages 
serves to present the hospital-village as the patients, 
rightful place. 
Place is further implicated in the next extract, where we are 
told that simply being in a particular place can be used in 
telling patient-ness: 
DS: So for you then it's been very much a kind of taken 
for granted thing? (J: Yeah) Um, do you ever wonder when 
you're walking round the village if you see somebody you 
don't know, would it ever occur to you to, to think to 
yourself 'Is that a new patient or, = 
Jean: =Yeah. All the time, yeah. When you see people 
walking, walking along London Road. Especially if they're 
walking, I don't know why, but especially if they're 
walking on the opposite side to where the houses and shops 
are. Cos all the patients used to walk along that road. 
And sitting on the benches along there. I used to wonder. 
DS: So you might kind of consciously wonder to yourself? 
J: Yeah, yeah. Often. If they're sitting on the benches 
along there as well. Especially if they've got a drink in 
their hand or cigarettes. Or look in the bins (laugh). 
(p6) 
There is a further way in which place becomes intertwined in 
talk with behaviour and attributes, in terms of the practical 
problems at hand (cf. Schutz 1964/1976,2, p235), related to 
a particular place, in this case the village store: 
Brian: Very interesting question that (laugh) A lot of, 
this must be part of the basic illness, but, perhaps the 
way they're trained to go out, but they have a very 
deliberate way of stating things, don't they? They will 
come in and they will say um 'I'll have um four second 
class postage stamps'. Postage stamps. 'I'll have um, two 
boxes of safety matches'. So that they're putting in= 
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DS: =It's an unusual way of speaking then, or, or the 
words that are used are, unusual? 
B: LYes a lot, 
a lot of them have a, a very deliberate way of putting 
things. An eye for detail, which, most people, would 
accept, wouldn't do that, they'd expect to say something 
else. Have you noticed that? (DS: Well, yeah, mm) Can't 
think of, I was talking to somebody at Christmas about it 
actually. They were asking me about it. And er I, I 
couldn't immediately think of more than those two 
examples. But there are other things where, everyday 
things that they're buying, they describe, in a in a very 
meticulous way [as though]. I'm not quite sure why that 
is. There's one, there's one patient who comes in. Again 
he's got very poor, very slow and deliberate speech. An 
Asian. Very (2) Major speech problem. Now he'll always 
come in. He'll always pick up a basket, and sometimes 
he 1 11 just pick up one packet of chewing gum or one packet 
of peppermints. Put it in the basket and bring it to the 
till. 
DS: That's not usually done is it? I ean people don't 
do 
B: -That's not usually 
done. I mean there are baskets there, but 90 percent of 
people coming in the shop they don't want a basket. 
They're, they're just coming into the shop for a paper, 
cigarettes, sweets, one or two items. They're not going 
round the whole store. Erm, but they or he's obviously 
been taught that the basket's there, you pick it up and 
put what you want in there and then go to the counter and 
pay for it. And er it's things like that you notice when 
you (1.5) you know, when you first, first come. (p5) 
The message concerning the relevance of the tasks at hand is 
reiterated by many of the workers in the store who tell me that 
they get to know who patients are because of their work in the 
store. This may be in the form of routine and regular 
interaction as in: 
DS: ... Can you te 11 who er, who are the pa, who are 
patients in hospital and who aren't? (M: Erm) Can you tell 
the difference (1.5) do you think? 
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Mike: I, I think I, you do get to know, I don't know if 
you can te II automatical ly, it Is just- that af ter a whi I e, 
by the pattern of the person's behaviour. Cos patients 
seem to be regular in what they do, and so I mean, some, 
you sort of start seeing at certain times of the day, and 
by their behaviour after a while you start to realise that 
they are, you know, they are from the hospital. (p9) 
or via reference to documents, which include names, addresses 
and so forth, such as pension or benefit books, which are 
passed to and fro over the post office counter. These documents 
provide evidence for staff about the identity of the owners. 
In addition however there is reference to a relationship which 
may be built up over time in places which allow for such 
interaction, in which people including patients get to know 
each other, as the following example testifies. The central 
aspect here is 'telling a relationship', although the form in 
which it takes is one of difference and differentiation: 
DS: Is it easy for you to know who the patients are? 
Irene: Mm. Yeah I walked up the road getting the papers 
yesterday and I thought, that's five I've passed by this 
morning. (laugh). 
DS: You made a mental note did you? 
I: Oh, I often do when I'm walking up. Think, gosh that's 
five to one or six to one. I'm the one. But I know them. 
I know, I mean I, through having worked in the post office 
I got to know their names, a lot of them. And they got to 
know me. I mean some... (pll) 
Thp- Place of Dialogue and Behaviour 
on other occasions respondents have spoken about other ways of 
knowing. Mike, for , example, casts doubt upon the 
generalizability of empirically based criteria such as dress, 
smell etc, and recounts a story which enables him to clarify 
his position: - 
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DS: Other people have suggested dress for instance as 
being an important factor, the way people dress? 
Mike: I don't think that really applies. Some of them may 
wear a jacket, shirt, trousers. I mean I wear a jacket, 
shirt and trousers every day. I mean, I don't think, I 
think some of them do dress in the same way regularly. 
Like Jack always used to wear a green hat. You sort of 
got, his trademark if you like. I mean there are certain 
cases which do dress in a very similar way but I don't 
think it happens all the time. 
DS: So it might be something else then? Something that's 
difficult to define? 
M: I -remember, this is another one when I was a lot 
younger. We were out the front. It was one of the hot days 
and there was me and my brother who were playing out the 
front and he had taken his-sandals off and then we turned 
round and his -sandals had gone missing and there was this 
girl up the road and, you know, I don't think really you 
would know that she was a patient but she had his sandals 
in her hand so we got a little suspicious. She came round 
and said she wanted to see our mum. Auntie (Rosie] talked 
to her and that's when, you know, we real ised that she was 
a patient. 
DS: So she came back with the sandals? 
M: Yes. She came back with them because they didn't fit 
or something. She came back and asked to see our mum. 
That's when we realised that she was a patient. 
DS: When she started talking you realised that? 
M: Um. I don't know whether it was, yes, not so much in 
the way she spoke but in what she said. The conversation 
was very broken, unclear in places which is one thing you 
do get with many of the patients. But otherwise you 
wouldn't really know that she was a patient. (plO) 
In the above example the person finally becomes an identified 
patient out of a rather ambiguous combination of behaviours 
which possibly included aspects of the patient's verbal 
behaviour. In the next extract Tom provides a similar mixture 
of evidence in conversation with his wife Irene. He had just 
been, telling me how he would not normally speak to people 
unless he knew them: 
mArguln_q About Madness 419 
Tom: No. Not unless they addressed me. Then, one has to 
make one's mind up then at the time. 
DS: How would you do that? How would you have done that? 
Irene: (laugh) Easy. 
T: Well you'd soon be able to tell if they spoke to you 
because they'd probably come out with some inane remark 
or on the scrounge for something. 
I: Scrounge more than anything 
T: Yeah that's right. 
I: Scrounge. Cigarettes, money. 
T: For example I was um (at] the pond in the front garden, 
I was doing something there and one Sunday morning all of 
a sudden, a woman plumped herself, sat down beside me. 
(laugh from Irene and DS). And I, the way she spoke, you 
know, initially was that er, you know she'd got a pond 
very similar and she started going on about this pond. 
Well I did have a little bit of difficulty at one stage 
and in the end I did determine that she must be a patient 
and er my wife did confirm that (laugh). It took a little 
bit longer because she was very good at um, she was quite 
knowledgeable. Very knowledgeable, you know. 
DS: How did you know then. You had a suspicion? 
T: The suspicion um was that er (laugh from Irene), I 
don't think, one, a normal person would have taken it in 
, 
their own head to come into anyone else Is garden * and sit 
down beside them, on the ground. That was that was the 
first inkling and-er the way she really did chat on over 
the top in the end. Although she, you know, she didn't let 
up and I thought, well that's not quite, r utting the two 
together 
I: 
[In 
fact she 
to dangle her feet, didn't she, in the end (laugh) (p12) 
The combination of both observation of behaviour and talking 
with the putative patient is drawn upon here to provide grounds 
for telling the difference. At the same time a further 
indicator is offered, which I shall address below, in 'Getting 
it Wrong'. Jean also offers similar grounds: 
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DS: But some, some people are normal then, but you'd still 
be able to tell somehow? 
Jean: Well, most of lem. Some of them look pretty normal 
but there's, you know. There's one that's, he's got a lot 
of money, I think. He must have. He comes in in a suit and 
umbrella and he's, he's violent. You can tell by the way 
he speaks to you, that he's a patient. He can get angry 
with you if you don't get things right. He Is been 
around a long time. 
DS: Wouldn't that happen as well with other people who 
aren't patients? I mean might they not also get angry with 
you if you don't get things right? 
J: Yeah. It doesn't happen in Shenley but it's happened 
in [Marks], just normal people getting annoyed. 
DS: Say people are travelling through the village or 
something. People from Borehamwood popping in the shop. 
Would they ever get annoyed? 
J: only if I short changed lem I think (laugh). Gave lem 
something wrong. (p6) 
The above extracts draw upon particular ways of knowing or 
telling, many of which implicate place in some manner. In 
particular there are the obvious references to patients being 
bodily in the wrong place as in Tom above, or bodily in the 
right place, as in Jean earlier. Jill refers directly to the 
way place organises her perception, while shop staff refer to 
the practices and procedures of the village store as a site of 
interaction. Finally behaviours, both verbal and non-verbal, 
may be considered to be wrong, or 'out of place,. 
The notion of 'anomalies' upon which Dorothy Smith (1978) 
builds can also be expressed 
- 
in these terms. In her analysis 
of the account of K's behaviour the latter was portrayed as 
anomalous in a manner which was congruent with readers' schema 
of mental illness; in other words the contrast structures which 
were authorially created between anomalous and 'correct' 
behaviour allowed the reader to read 'mental illness' into K's 
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behaviour. Behaviour which is predicative of mental illness 
becomes essentially behaviour which is 'Out of place,. My 
suggestion is that the use of place here has advantages over 
the concept of anomaly. As well as anomaly it demonstrates the 
moral-practical and context-relatedness of insanity ascriptions 
or in the present case patient status ascriptions. But in 
addition 'place I may more clearly suggest a hierarchical aspect 
of insanity ascriptions, in terms of the way people ought to 
know' their place in bodily, social and discursive terms, as 
Goffman (1969/1971) has indicated. 
Getting It Wrong 
In the course of telling2, villagers were often pressed by me 
about whether they had ever 'got it wrong', either by believing 
that a patient was not a patient or vice versa. Many villagers 
acknowledged this possibility and agreed that they had on 
occasions got it wrong, while maintaining that most of the time 
they get it right. But in those instances when people recounted 
that they had in fact got it wrong, the method recounted by 
which they had been corrected (i. e. had come to know that they 
had got it wrong) was clear and ubiquitous, if unsurprising and 
unoriginal. Villagers recounted that they had found out because 
someone else had told them the truth of the matter, a 'reliable 
and authoritative source' in Pomerantz' (1984 p 608) terms. 
This more reliable knowledge came, not out of observation 
alone, but out of a form of discourse, as the following 
examples indicate: 
DS: Have you ever mistaken someone as a patient who later 
turned out not to be a patient? 
Penny: Yeah, who was it? I can't remember now what 
happened. There's a couple of people that come in the 
shop. There's a little old man that comes in and buys 
bacon, wanders round for about lo minutes and he went 
outside one day and got on his bike and I said, you know 
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- 'I wonder how long he's been at the hospital, and 
'that's not a patient, he lives in * Road'. Somebody's 
father. But I mean he was acting like, do you know what 
I mean. He whistled away as he walked round and he looks 
a bit shifty, keeps looking up at you, you know. I thought 
he was a patient (laugh) (7 seconds) (plo) 
And 
DS: ... So you can tell, but have you ever mistaken someone for a patient who turned out not to be a patient? u 
Anne: 
[Yes, 
yes, yes, yes. Say cor, I 
thought she was a patient, you know. Yeah, we I ve said that 
a couple of times. Cor I thought it was a patient. 
DS: And how did you find out that she wasn't? 
Anne: Er (4) Probably by asking. Probably by saying er to 
[Tony] or one of the girls, you know I is that a patient? 
'No, no that's Mrs so and so', you know. (p5) 
The notion that someone who is actually a patient at the 
hospital may be incorrectly identified as a non-patient is 
especially problematic. It immediately suggests that the person 
in question does not display any of the signs provided above 
as evidence of patientness. Their behaviour, talk, or person, 
that is, is not out of place, and villagers would have little 
reason to raise the issue at all. In this case clearly then 
villagers would be forced to the correct conclusion only 
following the provision of other kinds of evidence. Anne tells 
us that this happens but does not say exactly how the problem 
is resolved: 
DS: So you might have thought on occasions that somebody 
was a patient when they weren't, have you ever thought-the 
opposite, that somebody wasn't? 
Anne: Yes, we've had, we've had quite a few well to do er 
people who, you know. Gor, you know, you know wouldn't 
believe that they were a patient. Cos they could have been 
just a voluntary, you know, Just staying for, well, what 
was it, somebody used to say um, (4) the newsreader, one 
of the newsreaders used to go to Shenley hospital for a 
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six, for a rest, didn't he, every six months. I've heard 
that Spike Milligan used to go there for a, just... (p5) 
Lou however indicates that the discovery has come out of 
conversation with others: 
Lou: Not so far. No. A lot of people that I hadn't thought 
were patients have been but not the other way round. 
DS: So you haven't thought they were patients because 
their dress has been OX presumably to start with. How 
would you then have found out that they were patients? 
L: I don't know (laughter). Through the grapevine. 
Somebody would say - Oh that's a patient and you'd stop 
and think - oh, really (laughter), are you sure? People 
in the village seem to know, to be able to tell the 
difference. I don't know * (laughter) * the majority of 
them * (p4) , 
The shift by villagers from knowledge which is related, albeit 
complexly, to sensory experience, to a clarification of the 
situation based upon social interaction and language can be 
seen to mimic in lifeworld microcosm some of the philosophical 
issues addressed earlier in the thesis. In the face of doubt 
there is recourse to discourse. The linguistic turn in 
philosophy and social science might be said to find its 
lifeworld correlate here. Thoughtful observation, it appears, 
is insufficient on its. own as an adequate criterion of truth. 
Conclusion 
It may be clear from the above examples that many of the 
grounds which are offered within the Interview world for 
telling patients from non-patients involve more than just truth 
claims. The 'empirical' grounds ('Telling from Experience, ), 
at least, also implicate normative claims concerning the 
correct or right way to be or to behave. 
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To say-for example that one can tell who patients are because 
they wear short trousers is, in this context in which 
rationality is involved, necessarily to make an evaluative 
judgement about their behaviour, dress etc, just as 
'psychiatric patient' itself is a category with essentially 
moral significance (Goffman 1961/1968). As MacIntyre (1971 
p258) has put it: I ... to characterise actions and 
institutionalized practices as rational or irrational is to 
evaluate them. Nor is it the case that this evaluation is an 
element superadded to an original merely descriptive element. I 
And for Habermas, of course, understanding in general is tied 
inherently, if not uncontroversially, to rationality and 
evaluation, in the sense that to understand is to understand 
reasons, and to understand reasons is to take, at least 
implicitly, a position on them (Habermas 1984,1985 p204 and 
cf. McCarthy 1985). 
The normative component of insanity ascriptions is an old theme 
(e. g. Coulter 1979, Ingelby 1982, Laing 1971, Scheff 1966 and 
see Busfield 1986, p84-5 for an historical review) and one 
which I have amalgamated into a scheme drawing upon the work 
of Habermas (see Southgate 1992c). I share with Coulter the 
idea that 'Psychiatric determinations, just as lay insanity 
descriptions, are thoroughly normative, even where the 
diagnostician or ascriber does not openly articulate or even 
recognise his participation in the normative order of action- 
description and appraisal' (1979, p145). 
However, it may -be that the conf lation of arguments about 
rationality are dubiously placed in this chapter about the 
identification of patients. At any rate several of the above 
examples make it, clear that the signs involved are those which 
are disapprovable of. This was commented upon explicitly by 
Ralph and Nancy in their criticism of the hospital: 
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Nancy: We were told that there really wouldn't be any 
violent ones but you did get the odd one, liable to hit 
you if= 
Ralph: =The point is they sometimes, well not so badly now 
but they used to dress those patients and make them look 
stupid. They'd come with a jacket with the sleeves down 
here and the trousers half way down their legs. Well it's 
human nature for kids to poke fun at something like that. 
And that depends on how the patient felt and some of the 
trouble was caused by that wasn't it. 
N: Yes m, yes- 
DS: They were provoked you mean? 
, 
R: Provoked by kids. Unwittingly of course, the kids 
didn't realise it. They thought it was great fun seeing 
somebody with bloody trousers halfway down their legs. I 
think that was the hospital's responsibilities to see they 
was dressed properly if they were allowing them out. 
N: Allowed out, Really what we didn't quite like. 
R: That's right, yes. (pil) 
The sequence involves the use of reference to particular 
attributes, short sleeves and short trousers, in a now familiar 
attack upon the hospital. The speakers may have had good 
grounds here. It is clear that in this context not only are 
these attributes disapproved of but they are portrayed as 
directly leading to trouble. 
What might save patients in this respect is the Possession of 
aný institutional ised framework at their back as it were, which 
normalises particular kinds of dress or behaviours. Labourers 
for example may wear their clothes in an inimical style without 
passing muster, indeed as a kind of uniform. But the only 
institution the patient has at his or her back is the 
institution of insanity which is by definition 'Out of place. I 
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ITelling2 the difference' therefore displays, I argue, not 
simply an orientation to impression management, in which the 
villager can impress as rational for the practical purposes of 
the interview, but also acts to re-establish the normative 
correctness of everyday village life, by contrast with the 
'out-of-placeness, of psychiatric patients. 
In addition however there is one further point. Validity claims 
to normative rightness can be thematised in another way. We may 
ask for instance whether it is normatively right for people 
(ourselves) to generalise about patients as we do, for example 
by giving as grounds that one can distinguish a patient 
'because of the look on their face' and so on, or to invoke 
such answers in interviews. 
To be sure this may be a difficult question and one resolution 
hinges upon making a distinction between the telling, and the 
reality. If, in other words, patients really do sport a 
particular I look' or wear short trousers, then it may be right 
to say so. And if I as a researcher have grounds to believe 
that villagers do make such distinctions, then it seems 
reasonable to explore their methods. 
However from the point of view of discourse analysis the 
question might be shifted to; 'What are the hypothesised 
discursive functions of particular embedded generalizations?, 
Clearly one answer is that the identity of the group 
generalised about becomes set apart from that of the speaker. 
In reply to my question the answer, 'it's impossible to 
generalize' was rare (but see section 10 below) perhaps because 
arguments had already been predicated upon being able to 
differentiate between patients and non-patients. At the same 
time the focus upon telling the difference was engineered by 
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the researcher and it may have been difficult for respondents 
to resist this invitation. 
In the next section I shall consider the means by which this 
differentiation, this difference, is countered by villagers; 
the discursive methods used by villagers which function to 
shrink the distance between themselves and those others who are 
patients. 
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10: Balancing Devices 
The, title of this section came out of my interest in certain 
recurring themes within 'interview transcripts, not necessarily 
viewable as repertoires, coupled with the notion drawn from 
work on discourse analysis that interpretative repertoires may 
be managed or mediated by specific linguistic devices. For 
example Potter (1987) has documented the use of what he has 
called, following Eglin (1979), the Reality/Appearance (R/A) 
device, and which is used to separate a warranted from an 
unwarranted version of events or readings, by undermining one 
version in the process of producing another. And Gilbert and 
Mulkay (1984) have given us the TWOD48 which is used in the 
mediation of competing and textually propinquitous 
interpretative repertoires. 
These themes or devices are not so much made up, like 
repertoires, of sets of lexical items, maxims or tropes, but 
rather constitute short pithy phrases, commonplaces, or 
individual maxims, or otherwise consist of discrete rhetorical 
schemes or tropes49. ' 
My suggestion is that the following devices perform various 
functions. They serve, to balance the relative status of 
villagers and patients, to-shrink the social distance between 
them, a distance which may otherwise have been conveyed in that 
48 The 'Truth Will Out Device', one member of an anticipated I ... family of 'reconciliation devices' arising from scientists, movement 
between Interpretative perspectives' (1984 p92). 
49 Nash (1989 p112) distinguishes between two kinds of rhetorical 
figure: the 'scheme' which refers to syntax, to word-order and 
syntactic patterning; the 'trope' which refers to semantics, to 
figures which play on the sense of words. Examples of the latter 
are metaphor and Irony. 'Proplepsis, is probably best 
categorisable as a scheme. 
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part of the interview, or in the interview as a whole. They 
constitute what- appear- to be discursive endeavours to 
ameliorate, to soften and to mitigate, and limit anticipated 
interpersonal and identity damage. They can often be seen to 
express a puzzling over normative issues and to partake of an 
hypothesised dilemma facing villagers within the interview 
world: of a desire on the one hand to maintain difference 
between themselves'and patients, while on the other a desire 
not to be seen as prejudiced and to signal the morally doubtful 
nature of discrimination. Many of these methods may therefore 
be seen as deeply ambiguous. 
The devices identified here are no doubt common in all talk, 
and in theory and practice may be utilized in a wide range of 
contexts. As in the previous chapter 'Discursive Dependence and 
Relative Balance', the use of 'Balance' in the title here is 
meant to implicate rationality, as in villagers' becoming more 
balanced and hence more rational, and reasonable as a result of 
using these methods. 
There-are of course many ways in which villagers can achieve 
this balance effect, not least, as I have shown, by the 
judicious use of, differentý repertoires. In this respect the 
central figure ofýspeech has been the proleptic manoeuvre by 
which ostensibly competing repertoires can be juggled with an 
apparently moderating ef f ect upon the message. This rhetorical 
figure constitutes the major balancing device. In this section 
however I wish to extend the notion of prolepsis - work which 
was begun earlier in 'Discursive Dependence', where the use of 
'It depends' was documented and compared briefly to prolepsis 
and the 'Two Hands' manoeuvre identified by Billig et al 
(1988). 
My argument here is that the anticipation of objection and 
criticism may appear in a number of guises, and is not confined 
to the not ... but' form, although it is perhaps most explicit 
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in this forM50. In the following pages I begin by tracing two 
further types of proleptic manoeuvre. Although they do not 
always,, as it were, define themselves as proleptic, as in 'I 
don't want you to think I'm prejudiced, but... I, they are 
nonetheless identifiable in terms of the kind of work I shall 
argue they perform within the transcripts. 
I 
The balancing devices proposed below consist of two principal 
types. The first ('Reflexivity,, 'Not Only, But Also') may be 
identified as proleptic, two-handed and potentially ambiguous. 
The second type ('As Sane As', 'Direct Credits') may be less 
clearly regarded (at least in terms of the local text) as 
proleptic, and consists of those more straightforward means of 
challenging difference. Another way of putting this is to say 
that for the latter group, content takes precedence over f orm5l. 
In addition, however, I have identified a further device, 'The 
Thin Line', which receives extensive examination. A path can 
be found into the extended world of prolepsis via reflexivity 
and it is to this that I now turn. 
Reflexivity'andthe Research Interview 
Within the human sciences, the concept of reflexivity has a long 
history and aý number of meanings (ct - baucock 1980, Lawson 
1985, Platt 1989 and Steier 1991). In modern times reflexivity 
may be located in a variety of traditions: for example, in 
(1962) essential condition for the development of mind; 
so All language In action Is anticipatory In some manner: the 
completion of a sentence Is anticipated In Its opening; talk (and 
writing) throws us Into an anticipated future of mutual 
comprehension (or Intended 
, 
Incomprehension). Where we wish to be understood we may actively engage In a continuous effort to forestall misunderstanding. This is not quite the same as the 
anticipation and Interception of criticism. 
51 1 have come to regard this latter group, primarily 'Direct Credits', 
as a mixed-bag of Particulars and generalities which do not 
necessarily fit In elsewhere (into repertoires), but which seem 
nonetheless to perform Interesting functions. 
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Garfinkel's practical reasoning (a social setting should be 
seen as 'self-organising with respect to the intelligible 
character of its own appearances, 1967 p33); philosophical 
reflection which finds its postmodern pinnacle (or nadir) in 
the reflexive deconstructions of Derrida or Adorno (see Dews 
1987 for a, comparison); in the critical theory of Habermas - 
the reconstruction of the historical and normative conditions 
of critical theory which have culminated in The Theory of 
Communicative Action, and in which his emancipatory critique 
is arguably capable of reflexively locating itself; and it 
finds a central place in the sociology of scientific knowledge 
(e. g. Wool 
, 
gar 1982,1988b), as well as cybernetics and systems 
theory (e. g. Bateson 1973), and not forgetting Foucault's 
critique of reflexivity as 'the tyrannical twin of the liberal 
ideal, of, individualityl, as Connolly (1987 p108) puts it. 
From a. structuralist perspective (e. g. of de Saussure), 
language is reflexive in the sense that meaning derives from 
differences between signs within the linguistic system as a 
who 1e (Cu 
' 
ller 1976/1986). And talk may be said to have a 
reflexive moment in that it presupposes an involvement with its 
co-text in the production of meaning. Or, from the view which 
asserts the centrality of an active and ordering subject, 
language in action is often continually and reflexively 
monitored for comprehensibility and effect. 
Within the context of this section the emphasis is not so much 
upon the way respondents may in general be said to reflexively 
monitor their talk, but rather upon their statements which 
explicitly display the fact that they are reflecting upon their 
answers, in confronting difficulties in the research interview 
and in, dealing with the topic at hand: people-who-are-patients. 
Such comments about being reflexive often proleptically achieve 
the effect of waylaying possible criticism. 
The form this kind of talk can take is varied. For example in 
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my interview with Brenda I had raised the issue of the-siting 
of a mental health hostel next door: 
Brenda: I don't really know. Until you're sort of 
confronted with that sort of thing you Fdon't know, yeah. 
DS: 
[It's 
difficultto 
know how to respond. I know, that's true, yeah, um 
B: I think generally people aren't too pleased about that 
sort of thing. It's a good idea but in the middle of a, 
an estate or something, I've mixed feelings about that 
one. (p15) 
The initial comment about the difficulty answering that kind 
of question is quite valid but then functions to distance 
Brenda from her subsequent articulation of disapproval. 
on other occasions people reflect upon and emphasise the 
truthfulness of their statements in a way which suggests that 
they are orienting to the truth in spite of appearances to the 
contrary or doubts about whether they really ought to be so 
doing (and see chapter 12 above).. For example I had just asked 
Anne and Arthur about the reception patients might receive at 
the local Women's Institute: 
Arthur: Xnowing, I'll be honest, knowing the people that 
go to the do's, the women's thing, I honestly don't think 
they'd, they wouldn't say no but they wouldn't give 
anybody any encouragement (p17) 
The issue of how subjects ought to reply to my questions is 
sometimes directly and explicitly addressed by respondents 
themselves in a manner which appears to give voice to the 
dilemmatic quality of their very thought processes, expressed 
here in terms of competing 'levels' (and cf. the R/A device). 
My question concerned the siting of a hostel next door: 
Mike: I've lived next to a nutcase for several years. He 
was a bit strange. He wasn't a Psychiatric patient but he had a worse sort of infliction being petty minded and jealous. Yes I suppose the ideal thing to say would be yes 
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but, and I wouldn't mind at all if they built one, but 
(3) to think deeply (pl4) 
And 
Andy: On the face it should concern me but deep down I 
should think, well blow me down,, these people have got to 
live somewhere. You know, you've got to think that (3) 
It's no good isolating yourself from the world. (p14) 
However one respondent in particular provided an interesting 
variant on reflexive talk and I want to look more closely at 
the interaction. The extract concerns explicit meta-talk 
(Schiffrin 1980), the respondent's explicit reflexive comments 
upon her own, and our joint, talk, as they relate to the topic 
of people-who-are-patients. It may perhaps be worth recalling 
that many proleptic manoeuvres involve such meta-talk as in 
'This may sound silly, but... 1, while meta-comments may be used 
(are perhaps essentially used) proleptically. Karen and I had 
been discussing the idea of patients attending the village 
society meetings: 
Karen: Yes I mean how would one, would they be able to 
cope with the complexities of planning applications and 
things which is basically our main business and would they 
want to get involved in that kind of thing *I suppose in 
theory there Is nothing against it. But um, the other thing 
about coming along to jumble sales and things like that, 
I've never really noticed one do that and there again I 
suppose if they weren't going round taking things and 
disrupting then *. Very difficult isn't it? You don't know 
what's a right answer. 
DS: There's no right answer. 
K: Well. 
DS: Do you think there is a right answer, that you ought 
to be saying X, Y and-Z? 
K: I don't know (laugh). Er, not exactly I mean sometimes 
when you actually put these, things into words it sounds 
terribly er (2) er (1) 1 don't know what the word is. You 
know however much you say oh they're perfectly alright, 
you're going to say no they're loony, go away (laugh) 
you're not really being fair to them. 
DS: it's difficult to put into words isn't it? 
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K: Whatever you say -it sounds as though they're second 
class citizens which shouldn't be *. Haven't really 
thought about them really. It's very difficult to put it 
into words. 
DS: So you hadn't thought that way but somehow when you 
come to talk about it it comes out= 
X: =It comes out like that. Um 
DS: That's interesting. 
K: It sounds terrible, you know. You don't really want to 
say that but 
, 
er you can't help feeling that's the way it 
sounds (7) (p12) ' 
At the meta-leývel Karen is thematising the implicit claim about 
correct ways of talking. 'Whatever you say it sounds as though 
they're second class citizens which shouldn't be *I provides 
a comment upon patients, herself, the interview process and the 
normative, rightness of kinds of talk. What are the effects 
here? 
To begin with there is an effort to make a correction 
concerning the way patients have been talked about within the 
interview. Karen is saying in effect that 1) this is not what 
she really means and/or 2) she is inexorably driven to talk 
like this by 
' 
virtue of some hidden structure or logic of 
discourse itself (R/A, structure/appearance). In the process 
of telling that talk does not sound right, she is distancing 
herself from her talk. A kind of hedging, it serves here to 
mitigate her position, to render her, we might say, less 
prejudiced. 
At the same time the status of patients may also be affected. 
To meta-comment upon the who' 
" 
le process of this or any such talk 
as talk which does not allow for a Positive interpretation, 
Karen is saying that patients are getting a bad deal here, in 
this kind of interview, and that perhaps they are not as bad 
as they seem to be. 
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on the other hand, however, Karen manages in this discussion 
to use the word 'loony' which she had not used in the rest of 
the interview. In other words her meta-talk about the 
unfairness of it all manages at the same time to compound the 
problem. We now have I loonies' as well as 'patients,. As Bill ig 
et al (1988 p5) have pointed out, the Enlightenment's prejudice 
against prejudice may itself serve to enable the expression of 
prejudice. , 
The above examples show how reflexivity can be used as a 
resource in discourse in a manner which may be both 
illuminating and mystifying. As Eagleton (1991 p6l) puts it in 
discussing liberal humanism: 
I- ... a true liberal must be liberal enough to suspect his 
own liberalism. Ideology, in short, is not always the 
utterly, self-blinded, self-deluded straw target its 
theorists occasionally make it out to be - not least in 
the cynical, infinitely regressive self-ironicizing of a 
postmodernist age. On the contrary, it can rise from time 
to time to 'metal inguistic I status and name itself, at 
least partially, without abandoning its position. And such 
partial self-ref lectiveness may tighten rather than loosen 
its grip. ' 
In so far as the above comments also apply to my own text, 
there is a whirl of recursive logic here which threatens to 
draw us into a reflexive madness. It may then be prudent to 
break off this particular analysis at this point. 
To conclude, explicit meta-talk in the above example may be 
said to render the speaker more rational. At the same time it 
also challenges the status of patients as provided for by the 
kind 
, 
of tal 
,k 
which is depicted as allowing no positive 
interpretation. In this sense it poses a dilemma of normative 
rightness, of the right way to talk about thi's kind of issue. 
In the end however the discursive Position of patients is not 
greatly improved in relation to villagers. 
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Not Only, But Also 
In my search for items and ways in which villagers minimise 
difference between themselves and patients, the phrase 'It's 
not only patients' or 'Its not Just patients' almost leaped out 
as it were from the transcripts. The phrases are used, it 
appears, in a straightforward fashion which has the effect of 
an attempt at limiting damage to both the speaker's and 
patients' status-and identity, and in a manner which suggests 
that discrimination is wrong. In the following excerpt which 
takes a narrative 'form, -Penny has been drawing upon the 
interpretative repertoire of Own Interests (Nuisance), mediated 
by some concern-for patients' welfare: 
Penny: ... But it was a shame because after a while they had to get rid of him because he started getting too 
friendly with people and he was tending to get on their 
nerves. People started complaining. He was waiting for 
them to finish their drink and he was up there taking the 
glass straight away, you know. He used to come up to me. 
'Hello you work up in the shop' and held chat. They're 
alright as I say for ten minutes but then when they, they 
stay. It's like any, it's not only patients, ordinary 
people if they sort of dump themselves on you they can get 
on your nerves, can't they. (p20) 
Penny had, been telling me about a man, a patient at the 
hospital, who used to work in a village pub collecting glasses. 
Her talk had not been flattering to patients and exhibits a 
facet of the Own Interests repertoire, in that 'they' in 
general and this, man in particular, can be a nuisance. 
Her use of '... it's not only patients' serves on the one hand 
to render patients perhaps not quite so separate a group of 
people, not quite so different after all; while on the other 
hand it impresses upon the hearer the notion that the speaker 
is in fact not prejudiced against patients in spite of the 
negative portrayal. It is a device which retrospectively, and 
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in a discourse analytic sense, might be said to discursively 
'cool the mark out', to use Goffman's (1952) phrase. The target 
or mark having been 'hit', is cooled down. The real time 
correlate here is between the speaker and hearer: 'Just in case 
you're beginning to get steamed up with the notion that I'm 
prejudiced, just listen to this'. The 'mark', in this case the 
potential stigma, is ameliorated. The social status of people 
who are patients is brought into line with ordinary people, 
albeit as an apparent afterthought. 
In terms of the implicit anticipation of criticism, this device 
can also be said, like the instance of meta-talk above, to 
constitute a prolepsis. In the following excerpt Kev talks in 
a similar fashion about staff at the village store: 
Kev: ... Yeah, I mean I know. I mean some of the staff, you know they wo, they won't walk through the alley. But I 
suppose that's not just the patients, that's through, 
through er, you know er, it could be anybody if there was 
going to be an attacker... (p2l). 
I 
But 'Not Only' is not, just confined to the repetition of a 
f ormul 
, 
aic 'Not only, or 'Not Juste . It also takes other forms, 
such as the following extract where discussion had centred upon 
'problems with patients, over the years and in particular the 
issue of danger: 
Wendy: I don't think p, people were frightened of the 
patients. I think You'll get an odd few say they were or 
the children were, but erm. I mean I wouldn't have left 
my child, children with a group of patients. No, I would 
n't do that. I, you don't know. But um, no they weren't 
frightened in the village and most of the patients, the 
trouble was, that, there again it was, children were part 
of the family and they loved the children and really it 
was more that they'd try and pick up your baby or try and 
make a fuss of it so you wouldn't like that to happen so 
you keep= 
DS: =You wouldn't like it to happen, because (1.5) why? 
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Wendy: Well, Imean you-wouldn't mind them sort, talking 
to your baby. I mean certainly you wouldn't mind, you 
wouldn't stop them. You wouldn't like them talking to your 
children, you wouldn't mind them talking to the children, 
but I wouldn't leave my baby in a pram out there for them 
to be (1.5) 
DS: Because something could happen? 
Harold: Something may happen but er= 
W. - , =Yes, that's right. 
DS: A sense of not being sure? 
W: But then I wouldn't leave my baby outside a shop in the 
town f or, f or any other person to grab at would you so IIm 
not thinking that they're necessarily any erm, you know, 
I think they're more loving really. (p9) 
This excerpt, demonstrates again the way that identities are 
discursively created according to the argumentative context. 
Patients are initially not to be feared. Doubt about this 
creeps in, but ý-the argument is saved when patients are 
categorised with I any other person and f inal ly emerge in f act 
as 'more loving'. Patient status is rescued and perhaps 
elevated. The message 'It's not Just patients, balances 
patients up or brings, them into line with any other person', 
thereby countering the implicit message that patients 
constitute a danger or threat. The Own Interests (major) 
repertoire is challenged in the process. 
And in the following talk with Xev: 
Kev: ... Um (3) but that can only, you know, that might 
only cover a minority. Some of them you know have got a 
good background, got plenty of money and buy their own 
clothes. But er (1.5) you know, and others with, perhaps 
a bit slower, through, you know with money. But again, but 
again I mean that's not, there's no, I don't think there's 
a general rule. Again some, you know, some are, are better 
at others than that. You know, some, you know, they're 
very different they - 
[don't] know their money but some do, 
but. But that's the same with, with everybody who isn't 
a patient. Some people are slow with money if you like. 
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DS: That's true, and dress sense varies as well? 
K: Yes. It's very hard to say really you know who is and 
who isn't. (p1O) 
On other occasions patients become balanced with others in 
terms of their sanity as the following section suggests. 
As Sane As 
Although not employed proleptically, this next device does 
perform a balancing function. We have come across it in a 
previous section, when Ralph recounted how the 'psychiatric 
people' are as 'mad as the patients' and 'some of the patients 
are a damn site saner than (the staff)' (p321). There is a 
clear attempt here to bring patients and staff together in 
terms of their (ir) rationality, and indeed to elevate some 
patients in the process. - This was used overall to impugn the 
reason of the hospital authorities in the argumentative 
production of trouble. Other respondents have also used this 
method: 
Irene: ... And some of the doctors that would come in were 
as, well you would-say were as barmy. You really would. 
I mean there was a doctor who used to come in to that post 
office, between you and I, and he would send telegrams to 
the queen you see (p28). 
Again the, talk is amusing and at the same time points to some 
contiguity between patients and their carers, the kind of thing 
which has been noted in chapter 9 above. 
Direct Credits 
In this subsection I want to consider 
-the more 
direct and less 
ambiguous ways in which villagers may on occasions propose that 
there is no difference between patients and villagers. The 
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methods are straightforward and perform a particular function. 
Thus Lou tells us that patients are 'Just ordinary people': 
DS: ... Say you were walking down the street and you saw 
somebody you hadn't seen before, would you ever think "I 
wonder if, I wonder if that's a pa, a new patient? " 
Lou: No. (Laugh) No. I'd just think it was someone * to 
the village. 
DS: Right, right. So the patients in hospital don't, don't 
maintain a very high prof i le in your, rin your perceptions 
or in your view? [No. 
They'' L: re just, 
just ordinary people ... (p5) 
I 
And in talking about, an hypothesised psychiatric hostel next 
door: 
DS: Would it affect your family life in any way? 
Lou: Um (3) Not really (1.5) They'd just be other people 
who'd be living nearby (3) 
DS: You were saying yes and no * and IIm trying to get at 
(2) what the um, dilemma might be (1.5) about it (3) 
L: Well people who didn't know the area, and they came to 
visit us, and they realised that you were living near 
patients. Some people would resent it and they wouldn't 
return because they'd think it would be (4) um and 
they (1.5) they wouldn't like it. (pa) 
Here, Lou at once demonstrates herself as accepting and 
portrays unspecified 'others' as Potentially intolerant (cf. 
section 8 above). 
In a similar fashion in Kev's use of 'not Just', he also states 
clearly that in terms of generalising about patients in certain 
respects 'I don't think there's a general rule': 
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Kev: ... Um (3) but that can only, you know, that might 
only cover a minority. Some of them you know have got a 
good background, got plenty of money and buy their own 
clothes. But er (1-5) you know, and others with, perhaps 
a bit slower, through, you know with money. But again, but 
again I mean that's not, there's no, I don't think there's 
a general rule. Again some, you know, some are, are better 
at others than that... (PIO) 
And in my discussion about her work in the village store with 
Carol, aged 35, who had lived in the village for 10 years: 
DS: You obviously have contact with the patients here in 
the shop. What's that like, dealing with the patients from 
the hospital? 
Carol: I like it because they are very honest. They know 
exactly usually what they want. I feel a lot of compassion 
for them because feel that it can happen to anyone. The 
situations they're in. Yes, they're alright. They're a bit 
amusing some of them. I don't know if they mean to be but 
they are, yes, it's nice. (p4) 
On one occasion however the attempt to provide a direct credit 
to patients' identities became complicated, as the following 
example shows. Wendy Green was talking about an incident when 
some patients had become upset at something a villager had 
said: 
Wendy: ... You know it was not a kind thing They did 
hurt some of them, yes [I feel], I think really. Just the 
same as human beings really. Oh they are human beings but 
they're the same really. There's some nasty and some nice, 
and some mean, and some dishonest. (p5)52 
In the process of attempting to directly state the similarity 
between people who are patients and others, the words become 
tied up in a 
ýemporary knot. The outcome ends up as at best an 
52 And compare the following extract: Val: 'On a Tuesday afternoon 
is carpet bowls but they are people not patients. ' (Val p8). 
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ambiguous message, and at worst as a message which could give 
us cause to speculate about the speaker's 'real motives'. The 
same speaker also provided a further ostensible direct credit 
which turned out to have questionable undertones: 
Wendy: As we always said the patients are no more trouble 
than, most of the public are quite nice but you get them, 
some of them that you see them coming and they're all a 
damned nuisance. There's no difference really is there? 
We always said their money was as good as anybody else's 
and they needed kindly treatment and er, generally 
speaking. Not all of them but some treated as children. 
Some are highly intelligent and of course it's the highly 
intelligent ones that can be very sarcastic at times to 
you. (P5) 
From the commentary position of critical social theory there 
is a clear link here between the maxim 'their money (is) as 
good as anybody elsels' and the critique of political economy. 
Money is the ideal expression of the exchange abstraction. 
According to the idealised world of circulation, of exchange, 
of the market, the exchange abstraction provides an expression 
of equivalence and equality. All are equally free here to buy 
and to sell, according to their inclination. And yet as Marx 
showed there is a whole realm which is displaced and repressed, 
the realm of production, of sensuous human activity, in which 
a structured inequality and lack of freedom is concealed. And 
so by analogy it can be found here in this maxim. Hidden here 
is difference. Their money may be as good as anyone elsels, but 
the question is, are they? 
Direct Credits continued: Intelligent, Cute, and More or Less 
Friends 
The above excerpt also illustrates another feature of interview 
transcripts, the attribution of intelligence to people who are 
patients in what appears to be a direct credit, which I want 
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to suggest has the effect of balancing up the relative status 
of patients and villagers. At the same time it may function to 
lend to the speaker the kind of hypothesised and thoughtful 
identity which a person who acknowledges these differences has. 
In the above extract the reference to intelligence follows 
directly upon the heels of 'Not all of them but some treated 
as children', and also in the following abstract from the 
interview with Wendy and Harold: 
DS: There's a sense I've had that patients are seen as 
children or should be treated almost as children? 
Wendy: Well some do but I mean that wouldn't be the truth 
wouldn't be right with all of them no it wouldn't really 
I don't think, do you?. 
Harold: No I don't, no, no. I mean you ** There's one, 
I 
Wendy: They're more intelligent than us by far really. 
(p5) 
Harold goes on immediately here to provide an example in 
narrative form of how a particular patient provided him with 
an almost profound insight into his human lot, thereby 
demonstrating the person's wisdom, although as a direct credit 
the example may be ambiguous: 
Harold: There's one that walks through the village now, 
he's not a very, he's, I'd say he's 40,50 something like 
that. He's not an old patient, [not] seen him recently but 
I was walking along with my grandson this year and er he 
came along and he said 'Hello' and I spoke to him and he 
said I What a lucky man you are I and I said I Am I? I and he 
said 'Yes, you've got a little boy, a little grandson to 
go, and um I've spoken to him since because it was, I 
realised what a lucky man I was. He wasn't the lucky man 
you know, in his case, you know, that he hadn't got a, and 
that was what he was trying to infer. And I've spoken to 
him many times now because we've sort of made that, he 
speaks and er, um, I think they respond to Fkindness and 
er (p5) 
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Within the interviews villagers often gave examples of patients 
they had known who were intelligent or talented. John and Susan 
Smith had both lived for a time within the hospital grounds and 
John had worked at the hospital. His account, which trades on 
our shared comprehension that the couple had a special 
understanding by virtue of their close and prolonged contact 
with patients, serves to rescue both patients and other 
villagers. Patients become 'more or less friends,: 
DS: ... I've talked to various people and it seems from 
what I can gather that um very often people have said the 
villagers don't particularly want very much to do with the 
hospital and don't go very often to hospital functions for 
instance. 
John: Very likely not, yes. No, no, no, I can quite 
understand that because they don't understand. This is 
another thing. You've got to get used to mental patients. 
Matter of fact you find some very, very good people among, 
I mean to say he painted that, this one painted this one 
behind here. You had some very brilliant people as 
patients. Oh yes people, you've got to understand them. 
I used to talk to a lot of them and made more or less 
friends with them. They used to love to come down the 
garden, do jobs and things like that. But you've got to 
get used to them. You've got to, you know, talk to them. 
Susan: You've got to humour them (p4) 
In the following excerpt I had just asked Wendy and Harold 
whether they had made any friends with patients over the years, 
and they began talking about a "very intelligent man": 
Harold: =He run the newspaper and he translated Russian. 
He was very good at Russian and he used to do this 
translation and er, he had his own little, room and did 
that and he was musical and very good. He was the 
patient's representative on the, League of Friends. (DS: 
I see) But um then unfortunately, he was told that you 
know he was one of better ones and he would probably have 
to go out, and he's gone back er in a very bad state. 
DS: He's still in there is he? 
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H: Still in there, yes I'm sure. Yes cause we were talking 
about him recently. 
Wendy: He could have come out, he has been here and er he 
would talk to= 
H: =He has been in here, we've been in, to us, he's been 
in, come in, like er, but he was very friendly and very 
polite and I would have had no qualm of any, problems with 
him like (p2) 
This passage provides an oblique commentary upon the 
appropriateness of discharging (even intelligent) patients, and 
is therefore consonant with the couple's expressed position on 
this matter. Other villagers provide similar accounts 
concerning intelligence. I had just asked Kev if he had any 
thoughts about why people were admitted to Shenley hospital: 
Kev: Um, well, on why they're there? 
DS: Yeah, why they're there. 
X: Well (1.5) Nervous breakdown, I would say, you know? 
[Let's have a think] It's, if you, I don't know, if you 
find out little bits of information from, perhaps staff 
or something about their background, I think some of it 
is quite interesting. I don't know if that's a nice thing 
to say, 53. [You feel] er (2) You, you do, you know, and some 
of them, you know what I mean, they obviously had fairly 
good Jobs * Couple of professors or 
DS: Is there? Right. 
y,: Yeah, I think, you know. Then I know there's a couple 
of er, there's a couple who used to be boxers, you know. 
so you get to know a bit of their back, ground, but I just 
I just yeah envisage people sort of really, I, I think 
really yeah, nervous breakdowns. (p6) 
This whole hedged excerpt can be read in terms of the function 
of minimisation of social difference between people who are 
patients and others, linked to a reflexive proleptic meta 
53 This Is another example of meta-talk with a proleptic form. 
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-comment. That is, the elevation of status, as in professor or 
boxer, functions as evidence that patients are not disbarred 
from having reached such occupational heights by virtue of 
their present patient status. The status of patients is being 
balanced we might say with that of villagers. Difference gives 
way to similarity. Kev repeats his position later in the 
interview in his argument that a psychiatric breakdown 'can 
happen to anybody': 
DS: So you could imagine, hypothetically at least, it 
could happen to you as well as other people? 
Kev: Yes, oh yes, oh yeah. As I say there are professors 
and things, I mean, well it can happen to anybody. And 
even, I don't know, I mean, I'm not under a lot of 
pressure at work but I can, I can see it happening to lot 
of people say on the stockmarket, or something like that. 
You know, where there is an awful lot of pressure on. 
(p20). 
On the other hand it is perhaps the case that the definition 
of some patients as intelligent serves to reduce the status of 
the rest of the hospital patients in comparison with their 
intelligent associates. 
For example, when Kev tells us 'I don't know if that's a nice 
thing to say' (p445 above), he is reflexively referring to his 
statement that some of the information he had found out about 
patients 'can be quite interesting'. There is an explicit 
reference here to a possible interpersonal discursive offense. 
The meaning I infer here is that Kev is concerned that he might 
be 'damning with faint praise'. 
of course the suggestion that some patients are intelligent may 
simply imply that patients might exhibit the same range of 
intelligence quotients as that exhibited by the rest of the 
population. Nevertheless there is also the sense that patients 
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may be viewed as less than averagely intelligent, for example 
when in the extract already presented above, Wendy, Harold and 
I mark out what appears to a division between patients as 
children and patients as intelligent54: 
DS: There's a sense I've had that patients are seen as 
children or should be treated almost as children? 
Wendy: Well some do but I mean that wouldn't be the truth 
wouldn't be right with all of them no it wouldn't really 
I don't think, do you?. 
Harold: No I don't, no, no. I mean you ** There's one, 
Wendy: They're more intelligent than us by far really. 
(Wendy and Harold. 5) 
However, even when their precise level of intelligence is less 
than clear, patients are often portrayed as demonstrating an 
almost 'native' cunning, so that they may still be depicted as 
coming out on top in their negotiations with villagerS55. For 
Irene and Tom below, 'cute' means crafty and devious: 
Irene: They're cute. 
Tom: Oh they're very, some of them are very cute. 
DS: How do you mean, cute? 
Irene: You've got one, that will, uh, every time you see 
him (in unison Tom) 'Got 10p for a cup of tea? ' 
Irene: 'No sorry'. 
(Gap) 
Compare 'Discursive dependence, qualified', p361 ff above. Of 
course we may also call children 'intelligent'. Being seen as 
children, or as childlike, or in need of care etc, does not therefore logically preclude patients from also being regarded as Intelligent. 
55 These negotiations are often depicted In story form within the 
Interview world; see below, and especially the short stories of 
Anne (p204 above) and Ralph (p322 above), and Southgate (1991). 
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I: ... there was one patient, I suppose he's in his thirties now I don't know, um, but he would watch, to see 
if **Is car was there and he came around for a roll, of 
a cigarette-tobacco. 
T: He made the mistake of giving him one, one day (joint 
laughter). From then onwards he was considered a soft 
touch (laugh). 
I: And he used to watch f or him. Is he there today? II No, 
no. III thought that was his car . So you see he knew the 
car, didn't he. They're very cute some of them. Very cute. 
(p6) 
And in the next excerpt Wendy and Harold had been talking of 
how patients should not be discharged into the community: 
Wendy: They'll always need care though. I mean even, 
there's ones being born [every] day and I'm sure they'll 
need care. I don't think it's. Quite honest I feel very 
strongly about it. I don't think they should be put out 
into the community, just. Some of them, those that want 
to go probably. I don't think a lot of them will ever be 
able to care for themselves. They know their money usually 
though. They're quite careful most of them. Not careful 
but they know 
DS: So they know what's going on? 
W: They won't let you do them, certainly, I don't think 
they'd let you do them. They'd do you if they could, some 
of them would you know. 
DS: They would would they? (W: Oh yes) They'd take 
advantage of you? 
W: Well they will, they'111 give you fourpence instead of 
sixpence especially if they think you, 11 say, oh it's not 
worth it, let it go, sort of thing. (p5) 
It is perhaps- quite remarkable that 2p can be the criterion of 
advantage or disadvantage in the 1990's, and it may be that it 
is precisely the poverty of the interactions between villagers 
and patients which is being expressed here. From the discourse 
analytic perspective of this chapter I also find here a 
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movement towards a discursive levelling, if not of status then 
of power, but in a terribly minor and pathetic fashion. 
What then of Direct Credits? My suggestion here has been that 
on the one hand these portrayals function to lend power to, and 
improve the status of, people who are patients, within the 
interview world. At the same time they arguably render the 
speaker more reasonable, rational and accepting of patients. 
one the other hand however the attribution of a quasi 
animalistic cunning is a double-edged affair which renders 
patients both 'winners' but also 'losers'. Indeed the implied 
notion that 'patients may be mad, but they're not stupid, 
contains also an implication of a kernel of rationality which 
may be extremely useful for villagers on occasions to ascribe. 
Such a kernel allows for some attribution of responsibility and 
accountability to patients, providing a resource and rationale 
by which villagers may more easily hold patients responsible 
for their actions should this become necessary. In other words 
it may become a useful 'reasonable prejudice, device. 
on The Border 
The final analysis of a balancing device is perhaps the most 
important in terms of the thesis as a whole, for its 
implications extend beyond the extracts presented here to the 
organisation of the experimental Appendix D. This section 
focuses in particular upon one of a number of spatial metaphors 
which have been used by villagers in their depiction of 
difference between themselves and people who are patients, and 
between madness and sanity: the thin line. 
Like many other metaphors to do with madness such as lover the 
edge,, round the bend', 'very far gone,, lover the top' etc, 
the thin line' expresses a spatial relationship. Spatial 
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metaphors are quite common in everyday life as Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) have shown, and indeed the metaphor of the thin 
line is also found in everyday use. For example the 'thin line' 
can be used in many a context of potential dispute, such as, 
, there's a thin line between euthanasia and murder,, in which 
the message is proposed that the opposing sides could easily 
be reversed, and one could be taken or read as the other; the 
tenuous membrane of the line might easily be breached56. 
A variant of the thin line can also be found in a transcript 
offered by Wetherell and Potter (1989) in their study of 
accounts of violent police behaviour' during the South African 
Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand in 1981: 
'... they had to decide between, the fine line between do 
we stop or do we go in. (Yes. ) (8) And, er, that would 
have been a decision which I wouldn't have liked to have 
taken. ' (p211). 
Here the fine line refers to a decision which the police have 
to make about how to respond, a decision which is portrayed as 
extremely difficult. 
It may be possible to draw an equation between the thin line 
and the metaphors of 'drawing the line between', 'stepping over 
the 1 ine being I out of 1 ine I or bringing someone I into 1 ine 
In all of these examples there is posited a boundary and an 
issue which is more moral or normative than factual. Where the 
, thin line' points to uncertainty and indecision, 'drawing the 
1 ine I and the other examples, perhaps represent ef f orts to draw 
boundaries more firmly. Indeed in his account of the position 
56 Compare also the notion of the 'thin blue line' to describe the 
police presence and role (see the Errol Morris 1988 documentary/film 'The Thin Blue Line'), or the 'thin black line' to refer to the marginalisation of black people (see R. Fortnum, 
'Widening the thin black line' Guardian 20/2/91). 
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of Habermas, Pusey (1987 p57-8) provides some notion of the 
stakes here in relation to the world of philosophy: 
There is no external reference point which guarantees 
objectivity or provides a basis for 'presuppositionless 
description'. Nor is there any ready methodologically 
guaranteed line between observer and observed, author and 
text, knowledge and interpretation, fact and value, 
explanation and understanding. We must face a fundamental 
ambiguity of the human condition in which 'the other is 
there both as an object for me and as another subject with 
me'. 
In this sense the lack of a philosophical 'dividing line' may 
be used to point to the thin line between madness and sanity 
in so far as the absence of philosophical certainty propels us 
towards the possibility of a kind of madness (cf. Bernstein 
1983 p16-20,1986 p1O, Lawson 1985 p124) 
Within psychiatry itself, Scott (1973a) has also drawn upon the 
metaphor of a 'well-ill line' in a powerful depiction of 
psychiatric and interpersonal 'closure', and the treatment 
, barrier'. 
In the interview transcripts the thin line and its variants are 
used on several occasions. I shall document some instances of 
their use here and then go on to suggest ways that their use 
may be interpreted. It is important to note that this is only 
one of the metaphors used to talk about this subject, but one 
which has I believe a special place as a balancing device. 
Spatial metaphors concerning an explicit difference between 
madness and sanity occur in 12 recorded interviews with 
villagers and the 'thin line' or variants, in which both a 
barrier and fragility are conjoined, occurs in 5. The balancing 
work which they do can also be achieved by other means as 
indicated above. Other spatial metaphors which villagers have 
used to suggest such a separation include for example 'edge,, 
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'border', and 'length', as the following sequences illustrate. 
Brenda had been talking about a time when she too had been 
feeling distressed: 
Brenda: ... I mean, I mean I can talk to my husband but he 
said "Go and see the doctor and see what he can do", you 
know, but. 
DS: Did you think you were close to a breakdown then? 
B: No. I don't think I was close to a breakdown, I was 
just feeling very, very low, tearful and you can't (4) 
You're not in control of anything, you can't do anything. 
You (2) 1 mean you feel, you know up there that you need 
some sort of help. You don't know what sort of help. I 
just thought going up the doctors, he might be a bit ss, 
sympathetic, he might be able to do something for me, 
because you don't like feeling, like it, you know, that's 
um, and that's the only response I got from the doctor (2) 
DS: Do you think anyone can have a breakdown? 
B: Yes 
DS: Do you? 
B: Yes (laugh) 
DS: Do you think you, you could. I know you weren't having 
one then, but, do you imagine there could be a 
circumstance when you could? 
B: I think most people can. I think it's something that 
just (1.5) that's just like that isn't it, Just happens, 
yeah. Doesn't necessarily have to come on over weeks, 
months, years. I think it can Just, something just snaps. 
DS: Right, it doesn't have to build up necessarily? 
B: No. Well that's the impression I get anyway. Anything 
could trigger it off. 
DS: Yes I see (little chat with the dog here). That makes 
it sound a bit precarious almost. Like you don't know 
when, I mean it could happen to anyone just like that 
(laugh). 
B: Well, life is like that. It's like living on a knife 
edge really isn't it. (Laugh). (pig) 
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Brenda's use of 'snaps', 'knife edge' and 'trigger it off, 
promotes a vision of suddenness, possible pain and violence, 
but also a sudden movement from one 'place' to another57. 
In another interview I had asked Anne and Arthur whether they 
would hypothetically mind others knowing if they had been 
patients in a psychiatric hospital: 
Anne: ... I mean even on health things they ask you, don't they, have even been, you know. Have you ever had a 
nervous breakdown, you know. Well anybody can have a 
nervous breakdown, can't they. 
Arthur: Oh, yes. 
Anne: But er, you know, once they've got that on your, on 
yer form, they go - oh, you know. 
DS: So they might think that you're a nutcase58or 
something. 
Anne: -It could happen again, yes, 
yeah. You can go over the edge like, you know. You can, 
you're on the border. 
DS: You're on the border,, it could happen again? Right. 
Anne: Do you want another coffee? (pig) 
Anne repeats here the notion of a border or edge which a person 
might be expected to recross and this is given as a reason for 
not discl 
. 
osing a former-patient identity. Finally, Susan and 
John suggested: 
57 The 'knife edge' can Itself be regarded as possessing a property 
of the 'thin line' In so far as the edge of the blade Is 'thin'. 
58 Anne had just used this word In a previous passage: I ... you'd want to keep it quiet I think, In case they thought, oh, we've got 
a nutcase here., 
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Susan: Well anybody can er, in our lives er, it's the 
simplest thing. When you think of the brain. It's only 
just a little er, length, and anybody can be mental, 
can be like that. 
John: 
ýh 
yes. I think er, yes it's one of those things. 
I don't think so much today but in olden days I think it 
was -I oh, a mental patient' you see. But some of them was 
remarkable people. (P4) 
The Thin Line 
An explicit reference to a line or divide of relative width 
can, as I have suggested, be found in five interviews with 
villagers. In the first example the metaphor came out of my 
direct question in a way which links the patients who frequent 
the village and Brian's own intra and inter-personal problems: 
DS: I, I don't know if, if you have any ideas about what 
the difference is between um, being sane and er insane, 
if you like? 
Brian: (laugh) Well 1 (4) Well I suppose all I know is 
that it's a very, narrow dividing line (2) And er (2) You 
can, you can see in yourself, um obsessions if you like 
that could easily get out of control but er * You know 
when I was working all those hours, and the affect on the 
marriage you can see, you can see that *I always think 
, for the grace of God' (2) 1 think it's a very (2) very 
narrow division indeed. People (1.5) go (1.5) you know, 
the, the other side of it and come back, temporarily or 
longer term. That's (1.5) about all I can say about. Some 
go over and never come back, [depending on the 
circumstances]. (p1O) 
Brian replied by referring to problems he had experienced. In 
the process, sane-insane refers to a line which people might 
cross. In the next excerpt 
,I 
had been asking Kev why he thought 
people might be admitted to a psychiatric hospital in the first 
place. When he suggested 'people sort of really, I think really 
yes, nervous breakdowns', I then attempted to find out what 
, nervous breakdown' might mean to him: 
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Kev: (laughter) Er I, I don't, I suppose there's a, they 
say a very f ine divide between, you know, between it 
happening and er (2) 1 don't know, how it would happen but 
er (1.5) 1 suppose, with a lot of people it's the perhaps 
pressures at work or something like that and if it did all 
get too much to you and you did have a nervous breakdown, 
i suppose you'd have to say that, I mean they're all 
voluntary patients aren't they. But perhaps you would go 
in and try and sort yourself out perhaps (1.5) 1 suppose 
it's pressure really (1.5) either at work or at home or 
something like that. Just severe pressure and it just I 
mean, I suppose it, it's a slow build up but it can you 
know, but eventually it's just a, perhaps in a couple of 
days [whatever], you find it's all too much. 
DS: Over a couple of days you'd sort of break down, over. 
Build up over a long period? 
K: Yeah build up over a long period I suppose of being erm 
unhappy and all the pressure getting to you, but then I 
don't know the actual stage of it actually happening. i 
can, I can you know see it quite clearly how it does 
happen and the slow build up to it perhaps and * but after 
that the actual erm, if you like, when it does happen, I 
don't know, I can't really picture that at all to be 
honest. (PO 
Kev provides a causal model here in which the crossing of the 
line is related to 'pressure,, in a manner similar to Brian's 
account above". 
From Sanity to Insanity 
The metaphor of the thin line is used several times in one 
particular interview, with Maggie, and it is interesting to 
trace the way its use develops. 
DS: Let's come back to the patients. Do you have any 
thoughts about, about erm why they might be admitted to, 
to Shenley in the first place? 
59 Also, Kev's account Is heavily hedged, and his reference to a 
'very fine divide' Is preceded by 'they say'. These hedges serve 
to discursively distance Kev from the views he expresses. 
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Maggie: Why? 
DS: Yeah (2) 1 mean would you see them as being ill? Would 
you see them as suffering from an illness or, would you 
see them differently? 
M: Well mental illness, yes. Well, well I think, haven't 
they all been, had something to do with mental illnesses, 
breakdowns? 
DS: Well, well that's right, except that people talk about 
it in different ways. Some people might talk about mental 
illness. Other people might talk about breakdown, 
some people might talk about stress. 
M: 
[There's 
a very fine line between (DS: There's a fine 
line), yes there is between being normal, and not being 
normal (2) because I knew that when, when I had my 
breakdown. I, I could have easily have gone over the line. 
I just had to be strong. It depends on the people who are 
helping you to get better anyway. 
DS: So you say that there's a thin line between 
M: Normal and abnormal (laugh) if you like. (Maggie. 7) 
In this example Maggie draws upon her own experience in 
outlining the nature of the difference between being normal and 
not being normal/ being abnormal. Maggie went an to talk about 
how she had remained out of a psychiatric hospital and overcome 
her problem with the help and support of friends. We are told 
that a breach of the line could have been easy. Maggie tells 
us here that she is close in some respects to people who are 
patients at Shenley Hospital, in that she has been close to the 
line, and could have 'gone over' to the other side. In this 
way Maggie suggests that she and patients are not so very 
different after all. 
But at the same time a difference lingers in so far as Maggie 
did not actually cross the line, while patients implicitly have 
or do. And this difference is reinforced by her explanation of 
events in terms of her own personal stz'ength. An alternative 
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for Maggie might have been to use the word 'lucky'. This 
explanation and the presentation of the self as 'strong' more 
effectively separates Maggie from 'abnormal, patients who are 
by definition 'weak'. 
However, Maggie adds an afterthought: It depends on others 
trying to help anyway'. This tends to mitigate the otherwise 
inevitable conclusion that not only are patients weak but also 
perhaps to be held responsible and to blame i. e. for their 
weakness (Kirmayer 1988 p8O). 
The salient feature here is not the fact of breakdown per se, 
but strength. Strength and normality are related. one has to 
be strong to remain normal. There is another implication: if 
defences or barriers are lowered, the line may be crossed. The 
metaphor moves here to personal invasion, battle, resistance. 
To take this further it is as if the realm of the abnormal 
lurks ever ready to take advantage of lowered defences. 
Later in the interview Maggie again ref ers to this If ine 1 ine I: 
DS: Does it ever concern you or is it ever an issue for 
you that, about whether you can identify somebody or 
whether, um wanting to know whether someone is, or, or 
someone isn't a patient? 
Maggie: 
[Do 
you mean does it concern me that I can't 
tell the difference d'you mean? Or can I tell the 
difference? Em (2) 
DS: Well yes, if you like, does that (1.5) 
M: Does it bother me? (DS: Yeah) (2) Probably that's what 
I mean about a very fine line, you know. You know what I 
mean don't you. Very, very fine between patient, and, 
patients and myself really * 
DS: You've had a clo, closer experience of this haven't 
you, with your family, with yourself and your mother. 
(pll) 
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And later again Maggie was talking about a villager who 
frequents the store: 
Maggie: ... He's he's a nervous wreck 
if you like. You 
know, he * and shakes. And he's. Oh, oh it's terrible. He 
makes me feel a bit like that when I'm, I'm er in his 
presence, you know. He's so strange - He, comes in and gets 
a paper, holding his money out. He wants your attention 
straight away * but he isn't a patient. You see what, you 
see what I mean about a thin line don't you? 
DS: I see what you're getting at, (M: Mm) yeah. 
M: Yeah, the, the, the older they get I think. Not 
everybody but a lot of people do get impatient. They get 
nasty, you know. Can't wait a minute. I know a lot of 
young people are like that as well, it's because they have 
to, they have to go to work. They haven't got much time, 
it's rush rush. But the older ones that are retired 
rhaven't got that. (p19) 
But the issue of the thin or fine line and (ab)normality is 
also drawn into the debate concerning Maggie's mother who had 
actually been admitted to a psychiatric hospital. Following 
immediately after the first extract: 
Maggie: I sort of got myself better with the help of, 
well, my mother funnily enough. Um, even though you know 
a lot of it was to do with her she did help in a way. 
Because sometimes she was quite, quite nice, quite normal. 
She was a very loving mother and it [sort] of feels like 
a mum, you know. 
DS: You were 16 weren't you? 
M: Yes about 16,17. 
DS: And how old would your mother have been then? 
M: Mm, oh dear, let's see, she was about 56,57 maybe. 
DS: So it was about three years after that that she was 
admitted, after you were married presumably? 
M: Yes, they had to do that, she had to be admitted to get 
treatment because she was wouldn't go into hospital. She 
hated hospitals. I don't think, when I used to visit her, 
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it was such, so strange. It seems, all seems strange to 
me now to see her in that environment. Because she seemed 
to be the only sane one amongst, all the others. As if she 
shouldn't have been there. She wasn't insane, she wasn't 
insane at all. It was just the sort of illness that made 
her, go off the rails a [little] bit. 
DS: What would you see the difference, between, between 
er you know, being insane and er, if you like being 
mentally ill? Would you see a difference between the two? 
Um (2) 
M: The way I see it. Is there a difference between, um (2) 
um what, a mental illness and, insanity? (DS: Yeah, yeah) 
I don't really know, I don't know whether. How do you 
know, I don't know anyone that's insane, not insane. 
DS: What about the patients at the hospital? 
M: Do you consider them as being insane? 
DS: (laugh) I don't know, um (2) 
M: I thought anybody that was insane wasn't let out of the 
hospital. I don't think that they have the freedom that 
patients here have. 
DS: Right, so they'd have less freedom (2) OK. 
M: But I think if my mother had lived, I think she would 
have come home eventually. She hadn't been in there very 
long before she came home one, one day and died. I mean 
it, well I hope she wouldn't have been in there. It's very 
dif f icult *I mean with her dying we 1 11 never know whether 
she was, she was insane or not. I don't think she was. 
DS: No I don't want to suggest that she was. I'm just 
trying to get at some of the ideas you might have about 
it. You said that she, it was the menopause really that 
um, triggered things off for her and that she was a bit, 
she got up in the middle of the night. She used to come 
and, come out in her nightdress, come to see you. (p7) 
I want to suggest that we have been witnessing here a 
negotiation concerning the identities of Maggie and her mother 
in relation to people who are psychiatric patients, and in a 
way which implicates the metaphor of the fine line which Maggie 
has had recourse to. She had already Positioned herself this 
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side of the fine line, as finally strong and normal. Her mother 
is described as having been initially sometimes 'quite normal' 
but then being admitted to hospital, where we are told she is 
the only person who is not insane. The other patients were 
insane, and 'insane' is something Maggie does not know, is 
beyond her knowing. Her mother by contrast in this passage was 
, ill'. 
The term 'illness, functions here to separate mother from 
, insane' others and relieve mother of the responsibility of 
becoming 'not-normal'. However it conflicts perhaps with the 
earlier implication that normality is tied to personal strength 
which may also imply moral strength and responsibility. This 
confusion perhaps highlights the ambiguity or contradictions 
of illness': If one is 'ill' then one is not responsible. on 
the other hand one's lack of moral strength may result in 
illness and hence one remains, in a certain sense, responsible. 
It appears to be the case that in the negotiation over 
identities 'insane' becomes another and 'further, step beyond 
the metaphorical fine line separating normal from abnormal. 
'Insane' finally comes to mean 'those who are not let out of 
hospital'. In this sense the patients from Shenley Hospital who 
frequent the village are not insane. 
What is happening here is that Maggie (with my assistance) sets 
up three contrast structures. The first is between 'normal- 
strong and normal -? strong-breakdown I. The second is between 
'normal-? strong-breakdown and abnormal-weak,, separated by a 
fine line. The third is between 'abnormal-weak and insane'. 
Insanity is discursively produced with the effect of rendering 
Maggie and especially her mother as both sane, or at least not 
insane . 
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The thin line has led us on a Journey in which insanity becomes 
the most distant, unknown and unknowable territory. But it is 
there only for unknown others and not the self or one's loved 
ones. Schematically the metaphorically spatial relationship can 
be configured as follows: 
(Normal/strong 
V. 
[Normal/? strong/breakdown/Maggie 
-The Thin Line 
Not Normal/weak/breakdown/illness/Shenley patients/ 
Mother]) 
V. 
Insanity/not normal/not known 
The final line of Insanity is left unlinked by brackets to 
other categories in order to emphasise its (utter) 
disconnectedness. 
My argument here is that the metaphor of the thin line 
functions by virtue of the very thinness of the line to provoke 
a sympathy or empathy with others who have crossed that line, 
such as people who are patients at Shenley Hospital. In this 
sense the thin line constitutes a balancing device. 
However at the same time it may be no accident that the thin 
line and other spatial metaphors are most often (but not 
entirely) used in the context Of villagers, recounting of 
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personal experiences of emotional problems, psychiatric 
breakdown, near-breakdown, or hypothesised breakdown, as the 
examples above show. Perhaps to confine the discursive 
demonstration of understanding and empathy to one's own 
situation or problem in this way bespeaks a reciprocal lack of 
acceptance or empathy for people who are patients. In the 
earlier examples above, respondents used spatial metaphors in 
a way that kept them the 'right side' of the border and thus 
preserved their sanity. In the case of Haggle the borderline 
was shifted across, or pushed back, so that Maggie, who agreed 
she had had a breakdown, still remained the right side of the 
border, and her mother who had been admitted to hospital 
remained-the right side of insanity. The crossing of the line, 
and a fartiori the further lands of insanity, are not for us 
but should be left for others, while ironically in Maggie's 
case Shenley patients were also caught in the net and dragged 
back from the border with insanity. This discursive analysis 
of a boundary negotiation might well be compared to results 
from other empirical studies (e. g. Townsend 1979 for a review, 
Schwartz 1957, X. Smith et al 1963, Yarrow et al 1955a, b) which 
suggest that families may resist the definition of a member as 
mentally ill until the 'last straw'. As Townsend (1979 p211) 
puts it, the public's recognition threshold for family members 
is high 'partly because they do think of mental illness in 
stereotyped terms', i. e. as something nasty to be avoided6O. 
60 Compare the 'general public' respondents of Askenasy (1974), over threequarters of whom distinguished between 'nervous 
breakdown' and 'mental Illness', the latter considered to be 
generally Incurable and requiring long hospitalization (ch 19). 
And In their Interesting study, of 'first-contact' psychiatric pre- 
patients, some of whom were diverted from hospital and others later admitted after assessment, Townsend and Rakfeldt (1985) 
showed how their subjects managed self-identity by using 
contrast structures, such as 'normal' patients v. 'really crazy' 
patients. 
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The extract above shows how this boundary can be shifted in 
discussion. 
At the same time as promoting similarity, the metaphor of the 
thin line as barrier therefore also promotes a distance or 
difference, a separation by virtue of the line itself. Clearly 
such separation can be achieved to some extent by a villager, 
merely by providing a sympathetic comparison from the safety 
of his or her own fireside in contrast to the location of an 
interview on a psychiatric hospital ward. From this view, 
separation is achieved simply by being resident somewhere other 
than a psychiatric hospital (I am excluding staff here). 
However my point is rather that the metaphor itself provides 
the double-edged meaning by its conjunction of both quasi- 
identity (thinness) and difference (the line). 
No doubt any border or boundary metaphor can be said to 
implicate both identity and difference as some of the above 
examples suggest, but it is the qualification of 'thinness, in 
the use of the maxim-metaphor 'thin line' which provides for 
the possibility of a particular reading in which closeness and 
similarity become stressed or dominant within the intervieWS61. 
Conclusion to section 10 
In this section I have shown how villagers set about 
discursively shrinking the social distance between themselves 
and people who are patients, via a number of devices which have 
included reflexivity'; 'not only patients'; 'as sane as'; 
, direct credits, (including 'intelligent, cute and more or less 
61 Although this priority could be reversed in a different 
argumentative context. For example 'It may be thin, but it's still 
a dividing line'. 
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friends'); and certain metaphors which configure the 
relationship between the two parties. Several of these devices 
however also turn out to be double-edged. I have suggested 
that 'reflexivity', 'not only patients' (and from an earlier 
chapter, 'It depends') are particularly strong candidates for 
the predicate prolepsis. 
These methods may be used flexibly in conjunction with the 
interpretative repertoires which I have earlier identified, and 
they may be compared to the analysis of methods in the previous 
chapter 'Telling the Difference' . The 'thin line' is also drawn 
upon in Appendix D. 
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11: Discussion 
In this chapter I have identified a small number of 
interpretative repertoires. I have also shown above how these 
repertoires may be used flexibly with a variety of effects or 
functions. For example, I have suggested that they are often 
conjoined in discursive manoeuvres which serve to criticize and 
attack, while simultaneously presenting the speaker or the 
village as a whole as tolerant, helpful and accepting of 
patients. These repertoires therefore function in defence and 
attack, in the cut and thrust and the exigencies of everyday 
life and the interview world, in the raising of truth claims, 
in impression management and in the expression of moral- 
practical issues. 
All the repertoires may be used in arguing that patients should 
be, and should remain, in the hospital. The repertoires of 
Humanist Concern (Help) and Relative Balance have an 
orientation which looks out and away from the hospital but at 
the same time are often used in a subordinate fashion to Own 
Interests, so that they may readily act as the bit-players in 
a proleptic manoeuvre which serves to increase the discursive 
power of the other (Own Interests) repertoire. 
It is possible to imagine a reversal of this scenario in which 
villagers and others draw upon all repertoires but in arguing 
for the hospital to be closed. Villagers could say for example, 
'The patients may be a nuisance for us sometimes but many of 
them can cope well on their own with support and we should 
encourage them to settle in the community' and so on. Thus the 
functions of the interpretative repertoires vary according to 
the way they are qualified and according to their sequence and 
positions within the argumentative structure. 
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The rhetorical figure 'prolepsis' has occupied a central place 
here in the management of criticism and prejudice. In this way, 
as Billig et al (1988 ch 7) note, the denial of prejudice may 
be used to express prejudice. We may then follow Billig et al 
(ibid pl. 14) in speaking of 'reasonable prejudice,, and I have 
shown how respondents will often compare themselves to less 
enlightened, less reasonable and less tolerant 'others'. At one 
time I came to regard the dilemmatic and two-handed responses 
of villagers as constituting, and perhaps representing for 
patients, a kind of social 'double-bind', in which one hand 
beckons while the other is held up in refusal, like a policeman 
stopping the traffic and urging it on at the same time. 
However there are several ways of understanding these 'two- 
handed' responses. For example, we may consider them as 
displaying a universal aspect of thought processes; that is, 
as illuminating the argumentative and rhetorical nature of 
thought (Billig 1987). Second, to the extent that one hand is 
asymmetrically weighted to the detriment of patients, we can 
read this as a display of knowledge concerning the (putatively) 
socially acceptable way of expressing 'reasonable' prejudice. 
Third, we can understand this two-handedness as an expression 
of a very real dilemma for villagers concerning the correct way 
to act towards people who are or have been patientS62. 
At the same time I have recast this dilemmatic form in terms 
of problematic validity claims, as critical windows through 
which further opportunities for dialogue and discourse can 
focus. By representing discourse in this way I have tried to 
62 And so 'dilemma, may itself be read as referring to (a) the dilemma 
about how to be critical of patients In a socially acceptable 
manner, or (b) a more profound dilemma concerning the correct 
way to act towards patients themselves. 
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show that the analysis of villagers, talk within the interview 
world may be linked theoretically and analytically to Habermas 
critical theory. 
However, in relation to 'practice', to prescriptions about how 
villagers should react or should have reacted to patients, my 
own claims in this respect are quite limited. I am not 
proposing here an ideal and utopian state of affairs, nor that 
villagers are always prejudiced in their criticisms of hospital 
and patients, although from time to time there is reason to 
believe this to be the case. 
Critique is an ability of the social scientific layperson, as 
Habermas makes clear, and in this respect it is possible to 
regard the identification of problematic validity claims within 
the interview world as something which the villagers are also 
themselves doing, albeit not necessarily consciously. Their 
reflexive comments which anticipate criticism may at times 
obfuscate and function to impress, but they also reflexively 
point back to themselves to suggest moral dilemma, and in a 
manner which can invite criticism of their own position63. 
Villagers assert their own interests but in a way which also 
acknowledges some of the interests of patients. Together 
perhaps, within the interview world, we have been deepening and 
enlarging possibilities, for discourse. 
For Habermas, as I have shown, the very criticizability which, 
so to speak, is built into these ' 
formal pragmatic validity 
claims, links them up directly to the anticipation of an ideal 
speech situation, and to a critique of structures of distorted 
63 Habermas (1984 P105) suggests: 'The Interpreter can ... uncoverthe systematically distorted character of processes of understanding 
by showing how participants express themselves In a subjectively 
truthful manner and yet objectively say something other than 
what they [also] mean [unbeknownst to themselves]. ' 
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communication. However, a full appreciation of the degree to 
which discourse may be distorted by institutionalized and 
imbalanced relations of power needs to be grasped by way of a 
socio-historical analysis oriented to the model of the 
suppression of generalizable interests64 (and cf. Thompson 
1984). For we must also ask how the dynamics of contemporary 
capitalist societies themselves help to define and structure 
the matrix of interests and responses of villagers, patients 
and hospital, and in this way the understanding of the dilemmas 
of villagers may be broadened. From a Habermasian perspective 
the dilemmas facing villagers may be configured in terms of an 
analysis of the relation between the lifeworld structures and 
system imperatives of the village-hospital. Reasons offered in 
debate about the legitimacy or otherwise of public reactions 
may then be evaluated in the context of such wider analysis and 
in the light of a counterfactual reconstruction65. 
64 'Such a counterfactually projected reconstruction ... can be guided by the question (justified, in my opinion, by considerations from 
formal pragmatics): how would the, members of a social system, at 
a given stage In the development of productive forces, have 
collectively and bindingly Interpreted their needs (and which 
norms they would have accepted as justified) If they could and 
would have decided on organization of social Intercourse through 
discursive will-formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting 
conditions and functional Imperatives of their society? I (Habermas 
1ý76 p113). This constitutes a proposal- for a way of criticizing 
Interests which unjustly present themselves as general interests, 
while not claiming that a general Interest Is always at stake In 
real life (Habermas 1986b p175-6). 
65 For example, Habermas (e. g. 1987a) encourages us to understand 
the reification of the lifeworld in terms of the metaphor of a battle 
-front, 'a line of conflict' (Ibld p392) continually raging between 
lifeworld and system. But this conflict, we may say, Is dilemmatic 
to the extent that in a complex society the lifeworld Is dependent 
upon an efficient system, while at the same time coming under 
threat from the rationality of that system. The further metaphor 
which Habermas offers here, the 'colonization' of the lifeworld, 
may lend itself by analogy to an understanding of the experiences 
of villagers as they relate to hospital and patients, as system 
correlates which disrupt, challenge and Invade the privatism of 
lifeworld domains. But at the same time the hospital has provided 
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The recurring references within interviews to danger, fear and 
threat are also susceptible to differing explanations. On the 
one hand for example we may be witnessing the expression of an 
implicit understanding about the way madness as 
unintelligibility can disrupt the structure of social action 
itself (cf. ch 2 above and Southgate 1992c). On the other hand 
the overall dominance of the repertoire Own Interests, at least 
as it refers to the defence of property, may be said to reflect 
the enduring status of civil, vocational and familial privatism 
as major motivating factors in our society (Habermas 1976). 
I have therefore painted a picture in this chapter of 
ambivalence, uncertainty, doubt, dilemma, and sometimes guarded 
prejudice, and have indicated the difficulty which villagers 
sometimes have in seeing patients as 'people' at all. And yet 
on other occasions local residents have spoken of establishing 
a rapport, of becoming 'almost friends', with some patients. 
Within the interview world, patients have also been defended 
by villagers and the discursive distance between villagers and 
patients has been reduced. To this extent perhaps, the picture 
is less than completely bleak. 
As Barham and Haywood (1991 p150) recently put it, the 
challenge is to consider how these people may be brought back 
into the (life)world, how 'personhood' can become perhaps once 
again the organising principle of our understanding. Yet I do 
not expect responses to change simply from 'education' or 
closer 'contact' with patients or former patients. Rather, the 
work for local people and once offered an emancipation of sorts 
from traditional forms of dependency upon employment on the 
large estates of the time. And In this discourse on Interests, 
norms and needs, we may propose viewing patients as abstracted 
from the communicative rationality of neighbourhood, home, family 
and friends, having been pushed (another Habermas metaphor) or 
pulled out Into the state psychiatric system, the psychiatric 
space, as Scott (1979) described It. These Issues have been 
explored further In Southgate (1992b). 
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degree to which we accept, encourage, and help others 
inevitably refers back to the kind of society which we are. 
Habermas proposes that reactions against the colonization of 
the life-world by system rationality may take a number of 
different forms, and he distinguishes between old and new 
conflicts (Habermas 1981a, 1987a). The former concern for 
example the 'old middle class, protests against the threat to 
neighbourhoods and property, a concern primarily with 
'security' (1987a p392). The latter involve conflicts around, 
for example, quality of life, equal rights, individual self- 
realization, participation and human rights, often organised 
around a critique of economic growth. From this perspective we 
might say that the'kinds of response which patients receive in 
the future will not simply be a function of 'distribution', but 
concern at the same time 'the grammar of forms of life' 
(Habermas 1981a p33). 
471 
2 C:: PC7-ua-- 
Perhaps expressing an ambivalence of my own about finishing 
(off) this project, my attempts at constructing a final 
Conclusion have repeatedly foundered. This Epilogue constitutes 
the last of a long line of previously unsuccessful attempts. 
As I pointed out earlier (plo), it has not been the immediate 
concern of this research project to highlight the unmet needs 
of people who are psychiatric patients, nor to proffer 
suggestions for the reform of Psychiatric services. The primary 
focus of this project has been upon villagers rather than 
patients and the aim has been to investigate the topic of 
'public reactions'. Were the Secretary of State for Health to 
request a copy of this thesis in the expectation that its 
findings would have clear and detailed social policy 
implications which could be immediately implemented, I fear she 
might be disappointed. 
And having understood social research as a Jointly-created and 
reflexive venture, suggestions directed to the summary 
specification of significant 'findings' have, anyway, not been 
entirely welcome'. Neither have I felt a desperate need to make 
The provision of 'findings, strongly suggests that reality may be 
discernible In an unmediated sense, tends to diminish the 
research process and the methodological debates, and deflects 
attention from the creative moment In social research. It may also 
contribute to a process of relfication by which social research becomes understood in a limited instrumental fashion. 
Nevertheless, on pages 465-470 above, I have Incorporated a 
summary of the discourse analysis chapter which may be read as 
research 'results'. 
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recommendations for future research, over and above those 
already contained within this thesis. And so to some extent 
this Epilogue constitutes a detour of sorts from conventional 
paths and places. 
On the other hand, and notwithstanding my understanding that 
social research can take various forms and be conceptualized 
indifferent ways (e. g. as social critique, as dialogue, as the 
achievement of instrumental knowledge, as art, as self- 
exploration or therapy, as direct intervention and social 
action), it may nevertheless be disingenuous to attempt to 
entirely detach the project from a social policy perspective, 
not least because it initially emerged from issues of 
psychiatric practice and because it contains otherwise implicit 
prescriptions for such practice and policy. But before 
addressing (in a minimal fashion) these implications, some 
comments upon earlier chapters are in order. 
It may be the case that in the light of the long last chapter, 
Arguing About Madness, chapters 8 and 19 recede in s igni f icance. 
I hope that these earlier chapters still retain some power of 
their own, but they also provide a backdrop which I believe 
facilitates the reading of Arguing About Madness. It was partly 
the problems I encountered in giving epistemic priority to one 
version of events over another in ethnography (see chapter 5 
above), that led me to adopt the discourse analysis approach. 
I have made it clear however that I have not been entirely 
happy with this approach either. Notwithstanding the centrality 
of language and linguistic forms of representation for social 
research, there is a danger that an analysis which declines to 
go 'beyond the text' (see p261 above) might distance the study 
from the real lives, fears and hopes of real people. I hope 
that chapters 8 and 9, together with my incorporation of the 
work of Habermas into the discourse analysis perspective, have 
to some extent forestalled this possibility. 
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This thesis has emphasized the often subtle, equivocal and 
dilemmatic nature of public reactions to insanity while showing 
that at other times, especially where 'violence' is raised as 
an issue, responses may be unambiguously negative. However, I 
have also suggested that 'violence' may itself be used as a 
method or resource around which less clearly articulated 
troubles, fears, disapproval or enmity may be crystallized. But 
subtle responses should not be taken to mean that they are 
necessarily more benign than frankly negative reactions; on the 
contrary, the very 'reasonableness, of some judgements may lend 
them power. 
The model of crisis intervention in Psychiatry, from which this 
research received Impetus, is based upon the premise that in 
a crisis a person's ordinary means of dealing with problems are 
no longer adequate to a changed situation. This is a time for 
some people of confrontation with madness, mental breakdown, 
etc, but also a time in which possibilities become opened up 
for further emotional growth. And it is at this time of 
emotional disequilibrium and turmoil, personal doubt and 
lowered defences, that the labels which may be attached to the 
person's behaviour, perceived as problematic in some way, can 
assume special significance for those involved. In this thesis 
I have argued that psychiatric labels and stigma retain their 
importance, albeit in often subtle forms. At the same time, the 
ability of villagers to transcend stereotypical notions, to 
respond at times positively (if not always unambiguously) to 
people who are patients, suggests that there are no simple or 
necessary public reactions to insanity. Given the willingness 
to enter into a thoughtful debate about another's (or one's 
own) plight, stereotypical notions can be challenged. 
Psychiatric crisis intervention can (and does) make use of this 
possibility by attempting to mobilize resources which include 
such positive and hopeful views of self and others. 
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It is clear from this research that the building of Shenley 
hospital has, in various ways, had a profound effect upon the 
village. I have suggested that the influence of the hospital 
has extended out beyond the village and that the very 
massiveness of its space-time presence has acted to reproduce 
and reinforce negative images of madness. Nothing I have 
learned from this project has led me to abandon my belief that 
the old mental hospitals should go. Some people may at times 
need asylum but the form this takes can be vastly improved. 
I wish to turn now to a few words of advice for others engaged 
in social research, advice which could have saved me many 
frustrating hours. Tape-recorded material is most efficiently 
transcribed directly onto a computer using a word-processing 
program, rather than a type-writer. This allows for much easier 
correction and recorrection of transcriptions. But make sure 
you keep back-up copies of files. 
Health Authority Ethics Committees may require substantial 
reassurance that a project is, as far as it is possible to 
tell, benign. A personal appearance at a Committee meeting may 
perhaps be one way of providing this. 
I had been warned about bibliographies. But even though I had 
kept notes along the way of titles and dates of articles and 
books, these were not in the end sufficiently comprehensive to 
enable an easy and stress-free compilation. As a result, the 
bibliography put up a good fight which lasted several weeks. 
it finally succumbed with the help of a Polytechnic (now 
University) librarian. On the problem of which books and 
articles not to read, when so many appear on the surface to be 
relevant-and full of underlying promise, I have not yet found 
the answer. 
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But to return once more to Shenley. Although divided in many 
respects, there is, I believe, one thing upon which the 
majority of both villagers and patients would have agreed, and 
perhaps vehemently, if they had sat down together to discuss 
issues of mutual concern. In this counterfactual and 
hypothesised rapprochement, both parties would have been (and 
would be) grateful for action by Hertfordshire County Council 
to impose more substantial speed restrictions on traffic 
passing through the village and past the hospital. A 
pathetically small request, one might think, but one so far 
resisted by the Local Authority in spite of demonstrations and 
publicity by villagerS2. One or two patients asked me to make 
this point in my final 'report', and this Epilogue has provided 
the opportunity. 
I hope that the methods adopted in this project have enabled 
me to convey something of the flavour of life in a particular 
place. one older village resident asked me not to be 'too hard, 
on Shenley village. I hope I have provided a fair account. And 
as I write (August 1992), building work on the new housing 
development at the hospital site has already begun. No doubt 
Shenley will never be the quite the same again. 
2 Although quite recently a mini-roundabout has been constructed 
at the junction of Green St and London Rd. 
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Transcription Conventions 
I have adopted the following transcription conventions in 
relation to extracts from recorded interviews: 
A number in brackets indicates a noticeable pause timed 
to the nearest second e. g. (3), and normally longer than 
one second. 
2A number in brackets preceded by a lpl e. g. (p3) indicates 
the page of the transcription from which the extract came. 
The sign 1=1 at the end of one speaker's utterance and the 
beginning of the next speaker's utterance indicates no 
discernable gap between speakers. 
4 The following sign I[ I signals overlaPping talk. 
Where words 
, 
are contained within square brackets e. g. 
[muddy the analytic waters] then this signifies doubt 
about the words' accuracy. The use of square brackets 
which do not enclose text e. g. 1[ 11 indicates that some 
material has been deliberately omitted. 
1 6 Round brackets perform a variety of functions. They 
contain clarificatory remarks e. g. Harold (a villager), 
laughter e. g. (laughter), and brief interjections e. g. 
(DS: Mm) . 
7 The use of asterisks e. g. 1*1 indicates that I had been 
unable to understand what had been said and unwilling to 
make a guess. 
The demarcation of completed sentences in the text 
involving the use of full stops and capital letters is 
used in a conventional manner in order to render the 
transcripts more reader friendly. Their application is 
creative and intuitive. Commas are used to indicate 
hesitations or short pauses normally less than one second 
in duration. 
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Reproduction of Herts Advertiser article 4/9/19871 
Headline: Patient sit-in stirs fear 
Report by IAN BROWN 
FEARS were revived this week 
over the safety of 
"wandering" hospital patients 
in Shenley. 
The concern comes from the 
village vet Raymond Gee and 
his wife Sheila, after a 
young hospital patient walked 
towards their house and sat 
in the car of some friends 
who were just about to leave. 
The man asked for the keys so 
that he could go to London 
and it proved difficult to 
get him out of the vehicle. 
A call to the hospital for 
help proved fruitless. The 
man was physically ill and, 
when he smoked a cigarette 
he had asked for, he 
swallowed a still smouldering 
butt. 
Mrs Gee, who said that police 
eventually came to help after 
they dialled 999, said the 
incident lasted about 45 
minutes and it was only the 
couple's experience in 
dealing with medical 
emergencies that stopped it 
becoming more serious and the 
pstient being put more at 
risk. 
"If he had sat in a less 
patient person's car or if he 
had confronted someone 
violent, this could have been 
a very serious problem 
indeed", said Mrs Gee. 
Mr Gee wrote to Shenley 
Parish Council claiming the 
hospital was neglecting its 
responsibilities. 
His criticism was heightened 
when he told of another 
incident in the winter when 
he had found an elderly 
patient who had suffered cuts 
to his face after falling in 
the road. On that aoccasion, 
he took the patient back to 
the hospital himself. 
"This latest event was 
potentially a nasty 
situation. It is something 
that could happen in the 
village but we felt that if 
someone had lost their temper 
they could have hurt the 
patient", added Mrs Gee. 
This week parish councillors 
agreed some patients could be 
a nuisance but said many 
residents were not dialling 
the hospital's special hot 
line number to gain 
assistance. 
That comment was echoed by 
hospital administrator Mrs 
Ann Wilson. She said: "We 
I have reproduced here the original double-column format and 
also the spelling mistakes and punctuation. 
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have- over 800 patients here 
and we have to operate under 
the limitations of the Mental 
Health Act. We can only 
detain people who are a 
danger to themselves or to 
others. We accept there can 
sometimes be what the public 
would regard as unacceptable 
behaviour but incidents occur 
from time to time 
"if there are compiaints give 
us the times and dates and we 
will look into it. It can be 
distrassing and we will do 
our best to help. 
"I am concerned there seemed 
to be no-one to deal with 
this matter but I would 
refute any suggestion that 
pending our closure we are 
slacking our service. There 
are less incidents in the 
village now than ever. " The 
hot line to call for help 
with patients is Radlett 
7588. 
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SHENLEY PARISH COUNCIL 1 1-20 
Report on open meeting between Shenley Parish Council, and others, and 
the Chief Nursing Officer Mr. Manners, of Shenley Hospital , held in the 
Village Hall Shenley on Tuesday April 9th 1974. 
CHAIRMAN 
The Chairman of the Council, Cllr. E. C. Turner, said that, as he was em- 
ployed at the Hospital, it might be thought that he was notun biased, 
and under the circumstances he would step down and ask the Vice Chairman 
Cil, S. A. Heath o take the Chair for the open meeting. Cllr. S. A. Heath in 
the Chair.. 
Clir H ath welcomed those present, and in particular the representatives 
from Aldenham Parish Council, who had similar problems with Hospital 
Patients. He asked Cllr E. J. Broadley to open the discussion by putting 
the case for the Villagers. 
Cllr Briadlet said that for some time past there had been concern in the 
Village over the obvious deterioration of the standards which allowed 
patients from the Hospital to leave the confines of the Hospital. Patients 
were in the Village improperly dressed, and seemingly under the influence 
of drugs, and in some cases their behaviour left much to be desired. The 
Villagers were worried that the 'Hot Line' was not working as in the 
past and appeals for help with difficult patients were not being dealt 
with as quickly as in the past. He instanced a case at the King William 
IV public House, and cases of intimidation by patients to house wives, 
and cases of indecent behaviour n the Village and its surrounds. He 
thought that not enough attention was being given to the very real concern 
of the Villagers when faced with these problems. Cllr Broadley stressed t 
the fact that in general there was a very real desire on the part of the 
Village to help in all practical ways the recovery of those patients who 
would benifit by mixing with the outside world, but it did seem that many 
who were allowed out were in no fit state to be at large, and they did 
Because the original report was somewhat faded and did not 
photocopy well, I have reproduced It here complete with spelling 
mistakes, original punctuation and line breaks, and with the same 
print style (Prestige) and pitch (12 c. p. l. ). However the original 
occupied 2 larger pages, whereas this reproduction spans 4 pages. 
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nothing in helping relations between the Village and the Hospital. Shenley 
had had the Hospital in its midst for so long that it was accepted as part 
of Village Life, but there were limits and if they were exceede there 
could well be a serious deterioration in thos relations which would not be 
for the good of the Hospital or the Village. If requests for help were 
dealt with promptly it would go a long wy to restore confidence, but 
when such requests were not answered for long periods confidence was 
broken. 
The Landlord of the King William said that on one Sunday he had had two 
patients, dressed in pyjamas and dressing gowns only enter the bar, and 
ask for cigarettes, they had no money, and were asked to leave the bar, 
he went to phone the unlisted number of the Hospital for help, and the 
call took some time as there seemed no one at the Hospital who would, or 
could take action, on returning to the bar the two patients were back, and 
begging money from the customers to but cigarettes, at the same time there 
were two other patients in the Bar, one of whom asked for drink, thinking 
that the patient looked to be under medication the Landlord asked if it 
were proper for him to drink alcohol and was assured it w ould be right 
the drink was served, and after the patient had drunk some of the 
liqour he vomited across the table he was sitting at, and ser ously 
upset other customers in the Bar. Help came from the Hospital after a 
lapse of forty minutes, The Landlord said that in his case when he asked 
for help it was wanted immediately, such delays made his job impossible. 
He also asked as to the practictability of patients being provided with 
drink at the Hospital, where supervision could be kept on them, and those 
who should not drink be controiled. 
A representative of the Aldenham Parish Council asked if were true that 
there were patients from Broadmorr in the Hospital who were allowed out 
there had been similar cases in Radlett with Patients, and while it was 
agreed that all assistance possible must be given it was also thought 
that there should be a stricter screening of patients who were allowed 
out that those who were likely to cause annoyance, or who were a danger 
to themselves and the Public were under control. 
Cllr Murray said that he had attended meetings between the Parish Council, 
and the old Hospital 
Management Committeeand it seemed to him that the 
points raised were the same as at those meetings, there did appear to be 
a distinct break between the Doctors and Nursing Staff at the Hospital 
and the Village, perhaps if this could be overcome relations between the 
two would improve as each got to know each others problems. 
Cllr. Woolf said that there was no doubt in his mind that all the trouble 
hinged on the fact that there appeared to be no screening as the suitability 
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(2) 
open Meeting 9.4.1974 continued 
of patients who were allowed outside the hospital grounds, he had been told 
that this was impossible, but it was the only reasonable solution, and ways 
and means should be found to make it practicable. 
Mr. Jeferies said he was concerned regarding the possibilty of children 
being frightened or interfered with on their way to and from school 
and enquired as to the preqautions taken by the hospital on this point. 
Mr. Manners in reply to the points raised said that, the responsibility 
for allowing patients freedom lay with the Medical, and Nursing Staff 
of the Hospital, and they fully appreciated this responsibility, they 
made decisions on the facts as they knew them, and their own appraisal 
of the persons concerned, there was always the possibilty of a mistake 
being made, and all were very concious of this, however the decisi ns 
reached were honest, and the best that could be arrived at. 
Regarding the emergency line, he said that there had been difficulties, 
which he hoped were in the main removed, it should be understood that 
the Nursing Staff were fully occupied and there might be times when it 
was not possible for anyone to get away immediately, he could give no 
assurance as to how long it would be before a request for assistance was 
met, but every effort would be made to keep it as short as possible. A 
car was now always at the disposal of any Charge Nurse called to the 
Village, and this would help to make the delay shbrter. The Hospital 
and ts Staff wished to keep the realations between the Hospital and the 
surrounding Villages on a friendly basis, as this would help in the 
work of the Hospital in re-establishing patients. That there were 
diffulties he agreed, there were long saty patients in the Hospital who 
had not been in the outsid world for many years, and in was to be 
expected that these when first let out would be difficult, and starnge, 
it should be apprec iated that things were as strange to the patients 
He made no excuses, but assured those present that every consideration 
was given to most of the points raised at the meeting. There was now 
in operation at the Hospital a system of internal communication which 
made it quicker to contact Staff Nurses. Regarding the supplying of 
alcohol to patients this could not be done owing to the cost. As regards 
the school children, the patrol was always in the Village at the times 
when Children were entering or leaving school. 
Arising from Mr Manner's statment, the following points were made, 
Patients were said to be on licenced premises for up to nine hours per ady, 
spending up to Z5.00 per day. 
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The Hospital was asked to look at the possibility of screening patients at 
the gates as they left the Hospital that those improperly dressed could 
be turned back. 
That every effort should be made to ensure that prompt and effective 
help be sent immediately to any request made on the 'Hot Line,. 
The me ting closed with a Vote of thanks to Mr Manners for his attendance 
and his answers t 8.30p. m. 
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Introduction to 'Appendix: Patients Talking From an Often 
Unenviable Position, 
The main body of the research has detailed, Inter alla, the way 
that people who are patients deviate on occasions from their 
particular pathways through the village to appear in 'back 
regions' of the village such as kitchens, bedrooms and so 
forth. It also highlights the way that villagers respond, and 
in particular how they talk about patients. of special 
relevance here is villagers, use of the metaphor a thin line' 
to describe the relation between themselves and people who are 
patients. This metaphor is drawn upon in this Appendix. 
The key to the methodological and textual conventions which 
have been adopted here may be f ound in an Annexure to the 
Appendix, which also explains the broader rationale for this 
Appendix itself. 
Transcription conventions may-be found in Appendix A. 
This was presented as a paper to the Discourse Analysis and Reflexivity Group (DARG) Workshop at Brunel University In April 
1992. However I have abbreviated the Introduction here, and 
slightly modified other parts. 
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This book is neither fict nor faction. It is both friction 
and fraction. It is shorter because I had longer. It is 
worse because I am better. (drif field 1991 preface) 
Meaning on the schizophrenic's level is precisely that 
state to which all Post-Structuralists aspire. (Harland 
1987 p174) 
of course you'll have trouble making sense of what they 
say but then that's why they're here. (Shenley Hospital 
Charge Nurse) 
But in fact these extracts make perfect sense (Southgate 
1992a) 
This Appendix attempts to open a small space from which 
patients' voices, excluded from the main body of the thesis, 
may be briefly heard. 
From a review of interviews with patients it seems that many 
of the concerns of villagers are shared by patients. At the 
same time, just as villagers' accounts may be variable at one 
level, so people who are patients may express variable views 
in the same interview. That these transcripts also yield 
ambivalence and dilemma can be seen in the way that goodwill 
towards the village is often coupled with complaint about 
villagers, behaviour. And on occasions these hospital residents 
offer acute interpretations of the issues involved. 
sAppendix D 485 
In the following pages I have reduced my own analytic 
commentary to a bare minimum, preferring here to let the people 
tell their own story'. 
Miles: When I dress up you can't tell I'm a patient. Put 
my collar and tie on or my er, my sports shirt and that. 
But they get to know, they know me. They know me in the 
King Harry now. 
DS: What did you say to them? 
M: Told him to fuck off. 
DS: Did you? I see. 
M: He wouldn't serve me. He doesn't, once they find you're 
from the, put it this way, you know, once they've got an 
idea you're from Shenley they try to ignore you. I was 
standing there and he served about four people without 
serving me (inaudible). 
DS: What did he say then? 
M: He said you're banned. 
DS: You're banned? 
M: Just an excuse (pe) 
(gap of several pages here) 
DS: So it seems the King Harry is the, has been a bit of 
a problem. 
M: Yeah. 
DS: Why do you think it was that they didn't like um (2) 
patients in there? 
M: Er that's, that's er, that's their way. Perhaps they 
think if they have patients coming in there they will lose 
customers, do you understand? 
Villager: But of course they're not really speaking for themselves 
are they? I mean you are orchestrating the extracts, controlling 
even my voice. 
DS: That's true of course, but we'll come back to that later. Can 
we return to the patients, accounts? 
mAppendix D 486 
DS: They'll lose customers? 
M: Yeah. 
DS: For any particular reason though. Why would they lose 
customers? 
M: Well people might feel a bit er (2) downtrodden or feel 
a bit er (inaudible) to drink with patients, from the 
hospital. 
DS: It's as if sometimes people from the, patients from 
the hospital should be avoided? 
M: That's right, yeah. Something like that, yeah. 
DS: Do you have any theories about why that might be the 
case? 
M: No. They're just people. You can't change lem. (p14) 
For Miles it seems to be the case that this is simply how the 
villagers are. His statements have a conciliatory ring about 
them: 
Miles: You see people have got their set way of living, 
you can't change them. You just take them as they are. I 
never try changing anyone, you just accept them as they 
are. 
DS: You mean the villagers or= 
M: =Yeah the villagers. They've got their set ways of 
living. Every night they go down and have a couple of 
pints. No more, no less. (inaudible) a pint of beer. His 
mates buy him back a pint of beer. Next night the same thing. (p13) 
Miles shares with villagers the way of talking about patients 
as if they constitute a separate group of 'people' . But his 
anger is 'tempered by a present willingness to take the 
perspective of the other. This 'understanding, is by no means 
unusual. Many patients I interviewed made similar comments. 
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DS: What was the reason he had for asking you to leave? 
Richard: Cos I was in hospital that's why. Perhaps one or 
two people upset him when they went in before me but I 
don't know what time it was I went in there but I mean, 
in the evening= 
DS: =Do you mean one or two patients? 
R: Could have been one or two patients annoyed him in 
there the way they drank, you know. 
DS: I see. But why should he ask you to leave? 
R: Well I was in hospital with them. I was in hospital as 
ell. Lots of people in. 
I failed to pursue the issue of the time that Richard went to 
the pub, which may have been relevant, but instead gave Richard 
some space in which to complain about his treatment. But he 
refused to be directly critical of the villager who had been 
serving behind the bar and who had asked him to leave. 
DS: Well, do you think it, it was reasonable of Clive to 
ask you to, to ask you to leave? 
Richard: 
[It 
was alright, it was in a way. 
DS: Even if you hadn't done anything? 
R: Yeah, I didn't do anything. 
DS: That was still reasonable of him was it? 
R: Yeah that's right. 
DS: You didn't feel annoyed about it? 
R; No, no. 
This reluctance to criticise directly was common in interviews. 
To some extent it may be said to parallel the disclaimed and 
hedged accounts and arguments of villagers; the dilemmatic 
nature of villagers, talk about patients. Indeed Just as 
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villagers would deny being prejudiced while locating prejudice 
elsewhere, many of the patients I interviewed spoke of 'other' 
patients at the hospital being the cause of the problems: 
Graham: There is a certain etiquette involved. I went into 
the King Harry with another patient. He ordered drinks but 
didn't have the money to pay for them. They barred us. 
DS: How did they say it? 
G: They were quite abrupt. "You're barred". "Please leave 
now, don't come back". I walked back two years later with 
a fiver to the King Harry and they said okay. 
DS: Was their action reasonable? 
G: I think they had a point. You can't protest. The 
publican has the right. Discriminating, you know. You 
can't go to a tribunal about it. I think it's right. 
DS: Have you been discriminated against? 
G: Not really but I've suffered. 
Local Identities 
The issue for villagers about who might or might not be a 
patient is also grasped by people who are and who have been 
patients. Stewart provided an ironic commentary by way of a 
story ' 
DS: Have any of the villagers ever commented to you about 
um. (2) whether they know that you've been a patient. Have 
they ever commented, made any comments about that at all? 
Stewart: No, it was funny, I was standing waiting on the 
bus to go to Radlett and there was a woman from Shenley 
hospital standing beside me at the bus stop and this guy 
stopped his car, and said "Do you want a lift to Radlett? " 
and he was asking me. And, this woman came up behind me 
asking if she could have a lift. And he said no way. Just 
no way. And he was talking to me in the car and he was 
saying "She's a psychiatric patient". You know, "I don't 
want to be had up by the police for driving her away" or 
something like that you know. So apart from that, I don't 
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have any comments like that at all. As I say I keep my behaviour, socially, or in public, as normal as possible. 
(p14) 
others were more blunt about it. I had asked Clare whether any 
villagers had ever commented about her being a patient at the 
hospital: , 
Clare: No. No-one talks to me. No-one knows I'm a patient. 
DS: Would you mind if they knew? 
C: I don't want them to know. 
DS: Why not? 
C: They might stop me using the post office. 
DS: Why? 
C: They might think I'm infectiously ill. (p3) 
And others were even blunter still. In the following interview 
I had been asking Derek whether any villagers had ever made a 
comment about the fact that he happened to be a patient at the 
hospital: 
DS: No-one's ever said anything to you about it? 
Derek: I don't know, not much to go on. I'm not, I'm not 
a patient. 
DS: You're not a patient? 
D: I'm not a patient (3) You're a patient. 
DS: Right, okay 
D: You're the, you're the patient, I'm not. 
DS: okay. (pB) 
A related anxiety can be traced in my interview with Laura: 
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Laura: When I first went to the village they didn't know 
I was a patient. Other patients talk to villagers but I've 
never been one of those. They're friendly and nice, a lot 
of it is how you treat them it seems to me. When I see the 
shopkeeper talking to a villager about gossip then I'm 
treated in a different manner, it's upsetting to me. 
There're areas where I just don't belong. I don't belong. 
I'm not able to share with them, I haven't got the 
history. (p2) 
And then in talking about one of the local shop assistants: 
Laura: Held be very polite. He used to ask me - How are 
you? He's stopped asking me how I am. 
DS: Why? 
L: I've asked myself that. Perhaps he's found out that I 
come from here. Or perhaps other patients have been giving 
me a bad name, talking about me. (p3) 
From this passage it seems that being known in the village as 
a patient from the hospital may be an issue for some of the 
patients themselves. Ambivalence about Psychiatric patient 
identities can also be witnessed in the following passage from 
my interview with Stewart: 
Stewart: I had a personal stereo on in the King Harry. She 
told me to turn it down. Now it wasn't particularly loud 
and people were talking louder than my stereo and the 
music in the bar was just as loud as mine and and I 
thought that was petty. I don't know, I find this area and Radlett very sort of snobbish and er they tend to frown 
upon you quite a bit. 
DS: Is that for any particular reason do you think that that happened? 
s: In the pubs? 
DS: Yeah in pubs on those two, occasions. 
s: I don't think, no, they didn't know I was a psy, I mean 
a couple of guys sitting on the bar said "Are you a 
nurse? " They actually said that to me. 
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DS: They asked if you were a nurse? 
S: Yeah (inaudible) And I don't think= 
DS: =What did you say, to that? 
S: I said, No no (laugh). You wouldn't catch me nursing 
(laugh). But, no I don't think it was because I was a 
psychiatric patient because I don't, sort of, er this 
sounds terrible, but I don't look like one, you know what 
I mean. I don't dress badly or anything like that, and I 
carry myself alright. You can tell when somebody is a 
psychiatric patient by their behaviour, and er I act quite 
normally. So I don't think it was anything to do with me 
being a psychiatric patient, I think it was just sheer er 
snootiness and nastiness. (p6) 
Here Stewart has used a manoeuvre which has become very 
familiar, a textbook disclaimer ler this sounds terrible, 
but. - I which acts to problematise the sequence as dilemmatic 
or as one which is raising a problematic validity claim. The 
occasioned putative offence here is one of discrimination 
against people who are psychiatric patients. 
In another interview, Terry made the interesting suggestion, 
which could be directly interpreted in the terms of the 
labelling perspective, that the sign Outside the hospital 
should be taken down: 
Terry: Once they've got that Shenley hospital sign up 
outside they don't want to know this place too much then. 
That's where you get the antisocial business too. (p2l) 
Danger and Violence 
Just as danger and potential violence proved to be ubiquitous 
themes in interviews with villagers, so they also proved in 
interviews with patients. of interest here is that although 
none of the patients interviewed admitted to having been 
violent themselves, the theme often strongly emerged in their 
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explanations of villagers' reactions. Thus Stewart and I had 
been discussing employment and stigma, topics which he had 
raised: 
Stewart: Well I think that some mental illness you can't 
see it, like a physical disability you can, I think that 
makes you prone to be a bit unpredictable and er. They 
can't see what. the problem is, so you're unpredictable. 
And I think that= 
DS: =Do you think you're unpredictable? Or is it other 
people who think that you might be unpredictable? 
S: I'm not unpredictable myself. 
DS: You don't think, you don't think you're unpredictable? 
S: No, I don't think so. I'm a bit moody but I think 
everybody is, you know. But I think other people'll tend 
to, although it I s'going down as I say, the stigma, I think 
that probably people tend to em frown upon it to a certain 
extent. But I think everybody has some sort of neurosis 
or whatever in them. Everybody has problems whether 
they're psychiatric or whatever and I think that, I like 
to think that my behaviour is no different from Fred 
Bloggs in the street. When you see these animals at 
football matches I think, well I would never do that, so 
it depends on how you define normal. (p4) 
And in the following story and sequence in my interview with 
Nigel: 
Nigel: I'll tell you a funny story like that. There was 
a guy came out of Shenleybury cottages. He said 'do you 
want a1 if t up the hi 11 1. I was standing at the bottom and 
I said, 'yeah that would be great' . 'How much is your busfarel he says. I said 'usually 50pl It was before I had 
a pass. And he said 'right, I'll take you for 50p then'. 
, Ive got to make a 'living somehow' he says. I thought, 
what a shark, you know. (Laugh) 
DS: That's a bit of a cheek, isn't it? 
N: Yeah it was a bit. But I mean that's a true story, I 
mean. He was on his way to Borehamwood. 
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DS: So did you give him 50p? 
N: Yeah, thought I might as well. I wasn't losing out. 
DS: That was just to go up the hill? 
N: Yeah, I mean that's what it would have cost me on the 
bus. I think this is a, this is a problem. I think a lot 
of (2) not that he knew I was a psychiatric patient but 
I think a lot of psychiatric patients in the worl, in the 
outside world are taken advantage of. They talk about 
people, being aggressive who have a psychiatric problem 
but Wendy's friend, Wendy was reading eh, or a friend of 
hers was saying that people that have got mental problem 
aren't necessarily aggressive. They're not as aggressive 
as people normal, as quite normal people like. 
DS: I think that's probably true, yeah. 
N: They're very sort of meek and mild I think. They 
wouldn't say boo to a goose and subsequently they get 
trampled on, in life nowadays. (pl5) 
In- the process of telling his tale Nigel establishes a 
discursive distance from a patient identity by referring to 
patients as 'they' and 'them'. 
In my interview with Laura she had been talking about the 
stigma of psychiatric hospitalisation and I asked her why she 
thought it happened: 
Laura: Ignorance, lack of knowledge. Stigma is their 
problem. I get paranoid. I ask myself first - is it me? 
If it's not me but them then it's their problem not mine. 
There's a terrible contrast between the world outside and 
the world here. There are nice people outside. Most 
patients are not nice. I suppose I've turned against my 
own kind. I don't tolerate them so much now. I read this 
brochure assuring the community that they need not be 
frightened of patients being outside. They haven't 
reassured patients that they don't have to be afraid of 
the public. There are obvious fears, for example being 
mugged, a changing society outside, letting people in the 
door if they haven't got identification. (p3) 
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Laura performs a very difficult juggling act here, for like 
Stewart and Nigel above she attempts to steer a course between 
defending and criticising other patients, and between defending 
and criticising -the 'world outside' . Her dilemmatic form of 
expression, of talk, and of thought, may be ordinary and 
everyday, but the content is arguably vital for her and her 
future life. There is, perhaps, a 'terrible' dilemma here about 
the place to speak from. Danger plays a part in her argument 
and dilemma, and in a skilful fashion she reverses the danger 
claims of non-patient others' and villagers, with consequences 
for her own identity. Yet she is caught in a kind of limbo, a 
liminal in-betweenness, neither convincingly one place nor 
another, neither patient nor non-patient. 
In another interview, Terry had been explaining that villagers 
had not been 'too friendly' with Shenley hospital, because it 
was a mental as opposed to a general hospital. I pursued this 
point with him: 
DS: I'm interested in that question. I mean I wonder what 
should it, what could it be about a mental hospital then 
that might make the villagers unfriendly? 
Terry: They might be afraid someone might attack em I 
should think. See what I mean. You always get that. 
Particularly with a schizophrenia sort of patient or like 
that. A schizophrenic patient might, he might turn nasty, 
(mad] . He might suddenly attack someone. You've got them, 
some of them schizophrenia patients got the attack 
tendency. So a patient like that, they might be afraid of 
a patient like that. I've got that feeling about it 
anyway. (pl6) 
Di. scussiOn 
A reading of the above excerpts from interviews with patients 
suggests that at least in their form, and sometimes in their 
content, they are virtually indistinguishable from extracts of 
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interviews with villagers. These extracts share in the 
reasonableness of those others previously analysed, although 
to be sure the perspective is often different; that is, it is 
often clear that these people are speaking from another, a 
different, place'. 
However it may be objected that even though these extracts 
appear to lend support to vi 1 lagers I own views, or because they 
are coherent and sensible, they do not properly represent 
patients I voices. On the other hand the same may be said of 
villagers' accounts by virtue of my abstraction of those 
passages which make most sense2. 
Villager., I think we should come back to my earlier point. I mean 
that Dr Cooper tried to persuade us that the patients are like us, 
that they're the same as us. I said to him: "You can't tell me 
they're the same as us, they're ill and we're not". He wanted to 
give them more freedom. But I used to argue that patients had 
been sent there by their relatives to be looked after properly. 
Now you've portrayed patients as being as sane as the villagers. 
Your text is simply not mad enough here. I mean, what about the 
crazy parts of these patients' interviews, or the Inter-views with 
those patients who are quite 111? You've left this out. If you 
included it you'd see that you simply can't trust what they say. 
They're portraying the village in a poor light. Your text Is much 
too sane to make sense. 
Patient: But I don't think he's saying that there's no difference. 
At the very least we are speakfng from a hospital ward. 
Villager., You startled me! What are 7ou doing here? You're not 
supposed to be here. I'm going to 'phone the hospital. 
DS: Okay. Wait a minute. Let's discuss this out In the open shall 
we. 
2 VIUa_qer. * Are you sayinq now that vflla_qers don't make sense? 
DS: I'm saying that It has been difficult sometimes to understand 
what villagers mean. And this Is perhaps often made more difficult by virtue of the distancing Involved in transcribing (and cf. Ochs 1979), scanning, etc. These transcriptions have often appeared as 
almost alien texts to be Interpreted. The same of course can be 
said about my own fieldwork notes, what Gadamer (1986 p391) has 
called the 'vanishing point' of the text. 
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Drawing upon Foucault's Histoire de la Polie, Felman succinctly 
states the problem addressed here: How is it possible to give 
voice to madness?: 
... how to say madness 
itself, both as Other and as 
Subject; how to speak from the place of the Other, while 
avoiding the philosophical trap of dialectic Aufhebun-q, 
which shrewdly reduces the Other into a symmetrical same; 
while rejecting all discourses about madness, how to 
pronounce the discourse of madness. Is such a discourse 
possible? (Felman 1985 p42) 
To re-articulate this problem we might say that by re- 
presenting patients' voices as 'as sane as' those of villagers, 
I thereby include and hence confine and detract from them. On 
the other hand if I draw upon the madder parts of transcripts, 
they may be simply discounted and excluded, as evidence of 
mental illness, originating almost from a totally alien place. 
or conversely the latter may become susceptible to a symbolic 
transformation by the reader and hence an incorporation into 
the sane world. Encouraging the voice of madness qua madness 
then becomes problematic. 
In her fascinating book, Felman traces the way that madness and 
rhetoric are connected; how madness may be 'said, in the way 
that a text's statement may be estranged from its performance 
villager: But the point here is 'difference'. These people are 
different from villagers and In ways which set them apart from 
the rest of us. Look, they even acknowledge this themselves, in 
some of the extracts above, when Stewart for Instance tries to set 
himself apart from other patients. 
stewart: 7ust a minute. You can't use that argument without 
contradicting yourself. 
Vfllager., You're becoming a nuisance. 
DS: Alright. I do agree that there are some Important Issues here 
which concern precisely how we encourage or allow patients a 
voice. Can we pursue this theoretically in the sane light of day? 
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in the movement of non-totalisable, ungovernable linguistic 
play 'through which meaning misfires' (p252). 
Clearly there is an important issue here concerning people who 
are patients and social research. Following the arguments of 
Felman and Foucaultýwe can suggest that the two are connected 
(but see Derrida 1963/1978, Boyne 1990 passim, Gutting 1989 
pp262-266 for critiques of Foucault's early structuralist view 
of madness as expressing a fundamental infra-rational truth of 
human reality. See also the critiques of the empirical content 
of Madness and Civilization by Midelfort 1980, Porter 1987/90 
ch 1, Sedgwick 1982a ch 5). 
I had intended at one point to use the allusion to 
methodological problems in the social sciences to build a kind 
of sympathy with-madness. To be sure the parallels between 
social research and madness have occasionally been drawn 
(Schwartz and Jacobs 1979, Moerman 1988 p120, Clarke 1975, 
Lurie 1967/1987, Sanders 1980), as they have between 
philosophical thought and madness at least since Descartes 
(e. g. Bernstein 1983,1986 p1l, Boyne 1990, Lawson 1985 p125). 
My rather vague plan involved using the reflexive play of the 
relativist problematic to turn the text into a veritable 
lunatic asylum of doubt and discord and in the process to 
interrogate the distance and dichotomy between author and text 
(Woolgar 1988a), sanity and madness. I have dropped this idea 
although I still believe it may have merit (cf. Ashmore 1989, 
Woolgar 1988b). Nonetheless this text still provides for a 
reflexivity of sorts, if not as full-blown or psychotic as I 
had originally imagined. 
But the issue of how to re-present the voice of the Other is 
not confined to patients. The same problem arises in relation 
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to the voices of villagers'. For if, even in an Appendix, I 
have excluded a central part of patients, talk, I have also 
organised the talk of villagers into a coherent whole, in the 
main body of the text; a totality which coopts, incorporates 
and also inevitably excludes those parts which do not make 
sense, which do not 'fit' well with the rest or which have 
simply been overlooked. Villagers' voices then become harnessed 
for the interests, of the 'writer' (cf. e. g. Clifford and Marcus 
1986, and Mascia-Lees et al 1989 for an excellent critique of 
Opostmodern, anthropology from a feminist perspective). 
It is true that discourse analysis is precisely grounded in 
these methodological problems in so far as it seeks to 
illuminate variation, difference and dissonance at a particular 
level. Nevertheless it is yet unclear whether it overcomes 
these difficulties. 
And the problem may be Pushed even further, and perhaps may be 
temporarily allowed to rest, on the border between madness and 
sanity. At this interface, on this 'line, which separates 
villagers from patients, a reversal may occur during which time 
both differences and similarities become unclear, confused and 
uncertain. Here on the border those voices of both villagers 
and patients which have hitherto been denied expression might 
find a place from which to speak, a place which is hardly a 
place at a112. 
I have a notion that if the talk of both patients and villagers 
can be brought together, - can be re-presented together, then 
some extra meaning may be found. In the back places of the 
I am grateful to Peter Cronin for this point. 
Tutor: Don't you think you're being a little too allusivelpoetic here? 
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text, just as in the back regions (Goffman 1959) of the 
village, patients and villagers may come face to face. And here 
in the back wards of the text, Habermas I version of rationality 
and communicative competence may become repressive (cf. Hesse 
1980, Warnke 1987 p128). From Miller's (1987) perspective, for 
example, Habermas' attempt to provide a non-foundational 
grounding for a critical theory, in communicative action, does 
not itself escape the philosophy of consciousness but 
presupposes a pre-existing autonomous, intentional and rational 
subject. In this respect we might say that those people who are 
communicatively incompetent become less than human in Habermas' 
scheme of things. 
Communicative competence is the capacity to handle language 
adequately as a certain tool in the necessary attempt to reach 
shared understanding (Brand 1990 p124, Habermas 1970a). For 
Habermas this competence is an ability of the human species as 
such, the capacity for communicative rationality oriented to 
understanding and agreement, coordination and cooperation. Yet 
this privileging of accord and cooperation certainly plays down 
the negative side, the dissimulation, the discord, disharmony 
and misunderstanding (Roderick 1986 p159). And in this sense 
we might say that in the theoretical approach to insanity 
ascriptions offered elsewhere (Southgate 1992c), which draws 
upon the effort of- Habermas to extend the concept of 
rationality, madness and the art of radical dissimulation (cf. 
j. C. scott 1990 p2) is well and truly chained and subordinated'. 
Patient and Mager: Okay, (yawn), yeah. But let's come back to the Issue of representing, excluded voices. We can't really See how 
you can do this, although we thought You might have attempted it by engineering a fictional dialogue between us patients and 
villagers in which we at once interrogate each other and you the 
author. 
DS: I'd prefer not to do that, because I suspect It makes It at 
once too easy and too difficult. And what would such a dialogue look like anyway? My Idea is different although I'm not 
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pretending that It solves the problem. The sane and the Insane 
meet In several places; In the village, In the hospital, here In this 
thesis, and here 'in' the computer. In fact the computer can be 
seen as the place of arch-rationality. Its ordering of the binary 
numerical opposition breaks through as a very particular quality; 
on or off, yes or no, either/or, an algorithm, pure syntax. 
And yet In the process of tape-recording Interviews, 
transcription, scanning, and incorporation 'into' the computer, 
something peculiar happened. on one or two occasions, without 
computerised note or explanation, the predictable and ultra-sane 
became unpredictable, chaotic, anarchic. One or two transcripts 
of Interviews with villagers suffered a kind of breakdown, If still 
perhaps comprehensible with effort. They came out of the scanner 
looking' 
Brian: If It Is a narrow dividinq line between beinq sane 
and Insane as I think It Is if you have a sort of mental 
breakdown vou. I would hoDe. that you need verY 
Individual attention verY raDIdlv to aet vou out and qet You 
a com-lete cure Too often In the 'ast mental hosnitals 
haven't been usid' In that way. If You've qot a Droblem with 
somebodY let's nut them In a mental hosýital and It takes 
manv. m-ny months sometimes 
- 
It's Duttina them awaY 
rather than workina with them- If vou were fiqhtinq to be 
heard for a lonq time_ I cýn see what You're saYinq that 
In many cases De*'Dle do qo In and theY're sorted out verv 
auicklv but If that breakthrouah didn't occur verv quicklY 
then vou can aet stuck In the sYstem- 
Harry. * I'm the conservative, marxist MP for Hertsmere. This 
covers Shenley. I go to all the pubs In the village given a 
chance, I own them. I prefer the Black Swan. People are 
kind, they employ me in work. I meet top people in the 
village in the bar. It's my office. We talk. Shenley hospital 
is a luxury hotel, 10 star. The food is lovely. it's owned by 
me. Lovely staff, I want to stay here. Villagers are my 
friends and lovers, also my constituents. I love it here. I 
want to live here for the rest of my life. 
DS: Does anyone ever Invite you back? 
Harry., They'd like me to go there but they're too shy to 
ask me. You publish that, you'll make millions. 
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ANNEXURE TO 'APPENDIX: PATIENTS TALKING FROM AN OFTEN 
UNENVIABLE POSITION' 
Conventions and Explanations 
In the Appendix, excerpts above the footnote line are taken 
from 'genuine' interviews with people who were at the time, or 
who had previously been, patients at the hospital. Most of 
these extracts were taken from tape-recorded and transcribed 
interviews but a proportion result from detailed hand-written 
notes taken during the interview. 
These excerpts are Juxtaposed to a footnoted discussion between 
a patient, a villager, and myself, which is 'fictive' but which 
on occasions draws from and reconstructs extracts from 
interviews with both villagers and patients. 
The Appendix was intended as a reflexive meta-commentary upon 
the rest of the thesis; as one way of addressing some of the 
problems which have been 'left over' from an earlier 
theoretical discussion of the philosophy of social science, and 
which have become amplified during part two of the thesis. 
While the discussion in the main body of the thesis is 
reflexive in a theoretical sense, the Appendix attempts by 
contrast to build a reflexivity which is constitutive of its 
subject/object. It is not meant to resolve anything, but rather 
to #muddy the analytic waters$ (Woolgar 1991 p42) a little. 
However as well as highlighting some of the aporias of theory 
and method of the thesis, I had hoped that this Appendix might 
add to the thesis in terms of further conveying a sense of 
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local life, of the relationship between villagers and patients; 
and in its textual place (at the end of the thesis) and form, 
provide a further perspective on questions of social closure. 
I had hoped that form and content might merge here. 
The thesis may therefore be seen to move between different 
modes of representation. The participant observation study is 
written in a realist mode (with suitable relativist caveats); 
the discourse analytic study is presented as more reflexive in 
aim and method but nevertheless arguably still displaying 
realist residues; the Appendix attempts a more radical 
representation which could be said to challenge the previous 
two. 
In this process a central aim has been to attempt to expose the 
power relations, embedded in any ethnography and discourse 
analysis (cf. Clifford and Marcus 1986, Mascia-Lees 1989 p1O). 
I had an idea that it might also serve to promote both 
ambiguity and its tolerance; the idea of systemic slack', 
which serves as a counterpoint to disciplinary control 
(Connolly 1983 p339), a slack which is itself rooted in the 
resistance to disciplinary strategies. As William Connolly puts 
it: 'Since the self is not "designed" to fit perfectly into any 
way of life, we must anticipate that every good way of life 
will both realize something in the self and encounter elements 
in the self resistant to its form; and we should thereby 
endorse the idea of slack as part of our conception of the good 
life. " (ibid p339). 
In particular I have attempted here to bring together method 
and madness, so that the rational and the irrational might be 
said to meet along the 'thin line, which is said by villagers 
to normally separate the two. Something of the developmental 
logic of the Appendix may be characterised in the following 
manner: 
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Patients are presented in the main body of the Appendix as 
rational. From a Position below the footnote line and 
apparently separate to the main text, villagers object that 
this method is improper because, really, patients are mad. I 
attempt to show how madness may creep into even the most 
rational of speech by way of the very instruments researchers 
use to represent it. This culminates in villagers, talk 
undergoing a kind of 'breakdown' itself, which I set next to 
some of the more colourful talk of someone who is a patient. 
In the main body of the text the patients have then become 
sane, in so far as their excerpts are intelligible, while 
villagers have been finally pushed 'over (below) the line' by 
the researcher, into virtual incomprehensibility. 
Finally, I suspect that the Introduction, Appendix and Annexure 
presented here could be better configured in relation to each 
other and 
- 
the transcription conventions in a way which is 
further illustrative of issues of reflexivity'. 
I You're the patient, I'm not. 
Well, it could be said that this Annexure comprises the anchor, the key by which everything else is 
explained, by which everything else is put in its 
place. It says 'this is what the position really is' . As such it merely reproduces the realist mode which the Appendix attempts to undermine and thereby 
undermines the Appendix itself. On reflection perhaps this was a crazy idea. 
You Ire the patient, I'm not. 
Right, okay. 
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